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Current moral theology is witnessing a significant renewal and retrieval of virtue 
ethics. It is not however without challenges; including the critique that it is too self-
centred. The question this objection raises is whether the ethical framework proposed 
by virtue ethics has personal and communal concerns? The task of this thesis is to 
defend that position that virtue ethics unifies both the good of the agent and the good 
of others. To this end, the thesis employs a number of complimentary methods: 
diachronic, synchronic and comparative. Such methods are not self-contained but 
mutually enforce each other building towards a more comprehensive account.  
Chapter One may be described as a “status quaestionis” or review of “the state 
of investigation.” It utilises a diachronic method, identifying the recent context, 
challenges and the historical traditions. It begins by situating the turn to virtue ethics 
in moral theology as a significant part of the renewal called by Vatican II. It outlines 
some reasons for the eclipse and retrieval of virtue ethics in recent decades. In 
particular it draws on the analysis of Alasdair MacIntyre and Joseph J. Kotva. The 
current reappraisal of virtue ethics is a recovery of a tradition of ethical reflection. 
The opening chapter therefore proceeds to outline some of the main developments 
and figures within that tradition. This overview is intended to provide an intellectual 
context for the types of reflection currently taking place in virtue ethics within the 
field of moral theology. It is primarily a history of ideas, focusing on the classical and 
Christian tradition, with particular attention to the pivotal role of Thomas Aquinas.   
The synchronic method of following three chapters presents a close reading of 
three moral theologians: each representative of three noteworthy exemplars of the 
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centering of virtue ethics within moral theology, namely Romanus Cessario, James F. 
Keenan, and Joseph J. Kotva.  
Chapter Two details the theological-anthropological approach of Romanus 
Cessario on the virtues. He characterizes his method as ressourcement-Thomist and a 
realist Thomist. Such an approach returns to “authoritative sources” of Christian faith 
in order to rediscover their meaning and establish a continuity with past. It considers 
particular themes like virtue ethics and human nature, development of virtues, virtue 
ethics with a personal an communal dimensions.  
Chapter Three presents the approach of James Keenan. His method may be 
described as a revisionist-Thomist. Such an approach develops a progressive moral 
theology by weaving together personalist currents of contemporary philosophy with 
pastoral concerns and focusing on key place of the person within virtue ethics. 
Keenan explores other virtues and various contexts in which the relational value 
virtue ethics fits appropriately. He interlaces the virtues of justices, fidelity, and self-
care with contexts like discipleship, and sexual ethics in order to create the relational 
model. 
Chapter Four turns to virtue ethics within the Reformed tradition and in 
particular the work of Joseph Kotva. His approach is …  In particular, it focuses on 
Joseph Kotva, a neo-Aristotelian with a Thomist nuance, who, as a result, is marked 
by an ecumenical tone. The perspective of his schematization is very theological as he 
explains the dynamic interplay between, Christology, grace and the virtues. The 
chapter will progress to show the biblical connections with virtue ethics in order to 
elucidate that virtue ethics has both a personal and communal orientation.  
Chapter Five draws together these different explorations of virtue. The 
comparative methodology employed in this chapter provides a means to categorise 
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divergences and convergences among the authors, and therefore commonalities and 
lacunae within the contemporary renewal of virtue ethics in moral theology. The 
themes addressed are: tradition, the nature of virtue, the development of virtue, and 
the use of scripture, the human person, and relationality. 
It further suggests a foundational reason for the differences in approach, style 
and, indeed, the norms defended by each of the authors. Virtue ethics proposes that 
ethical reflection cannot be independent of a treatment of the human person. 
Therefore, drawing on Millard J. Erickson’s typology of models of the human person 
– substantive, relational and functional – it proposes that the each author aligns with 
one of the categories.   
Central to each of the accounts of virtue ethics is the role of relationality and 
the consequent rebuttal of the charge of selfishness that opened the thesis. However, 
the authors restrict relationality to human-to-human interaction. Accordingly, an all-
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Over the centuries, moral theology and moral philosophy have been characterized by 
three major approaches, deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics. 1 
Unfortunately, history reveals that virtue ethics was in the shadows while other 
theories flourished. The past decades have witnessed a surge of both philosophers and 
theologians towards its retrieval. The pioneering works of Elizabeth Anscombe, 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Servais Pinckaers are pivotal. Today, the three approaches are 
often played off each other in moral theology: While the deontologists and 
consequentialists reduce morality to rules and obligations and sadly neglect the 
human person, virtue ethicists insist on the relevance of the human person and 
importance of character.  
According to Christine McKinnon in Character, Virtue Theories, and the 
Vices, non-virtue theories “undermine the moral value of acts that are intended to 
benefit the agent himself . . . Virtue ethics is alone . . . in recognizing that the agent 
herself may be a legitimate object of benefaction.2 Through virtue ethics the human 
person is placed in dialogue with God, with oneself, with other humans and with the 
environment by de-emphasizing quandary ethics. In this sense, through virtue ethics 
people continue to shape themselves as individuals and the narrative of virtuous 
persons that make the community molds their communal self-understanding. 




1 Richard M. Gula, Reason Informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1989), 301. See also Charles E. Curran, “Virtue: The 
Catholic Moral Tradition,” in Readings in Moral Theology 16: Virtue, ed. Charles E. 
2  Christine McKinnon, Character, Virtue Theories, and the Vices (Toronto: 
Broadview Press, 1999), 54. 
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A. Some Objections To Virtue Ethics 
The return to the approach of virtue ethics has stimulated oppositions and challenges 
from rival theories and theorists. This section shall acknowledge a few major 
objections. However, the leitmotif of this thesis is to answer only one of them. David 
Solomon classifies the objections as external and internal.3 External objection comes 
from outside ethics itself, which raises epistemological and metaphysical challenges. 
According to this objection: “An EV [Ethics of Virtue] cannot be sustained because a 
necessary condition for the success of such a theory is a certain metaphysical or 
theological underpinning which, given the rise of distinctively modern science and the 
decline of classical theology, is implausible.”4 
 The internal objections come within virtue ethics itself. We shall briefly 
highlight three of these internal objections. Firstly, it is generally argued that virtue 
ethics fails to provide appropriate guides in particular moral situations. While 
deontology and consequentialism provide necessary frameworks towards actions, 
virtue ethics rather references virtuous persons, who may not be in touch with specific 
situation. Therefore, virtue ethics is beset by indeterminacy.5 
 Secondly, since different cultures express different virtues, virtue ethics 
embodies cultural relativity. This objection challenges the objectivity of some virtues. 
For example Roland Hursthouse in On Virtue Ethics explains the disagreement among 
philosophers on some virtues like compassion, modesty and humility. He writes that 
																																																								
3 David Solomon, “Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics,” In Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy Vol. XIII Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, ed. by Peter A. French, 
Theodore E. Uehling and Howard K. Wettstein  (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1998), 430. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Mark Timmons, Moral Theory: An Introduction (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2002), 235.  
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while other philosophers defend these virtues, Aristotle, Hume, and Nietzsche will 
reject them.6 In this context, virtue ethics becomes relative. The argument continues 
that if virtues are based on cultural setting, then virtue ethics promotes sectarianism.7 
 The last objection which is very pertinent is that virtue ethics is a self-centered 
ethic. The objection goes that if the validity of acquiring a virtue is grounded in the 
agent’s needs and desires, then the needs and desires of other people become 
insignificant. Writers like Thomas W. Ogletree, Bernard Williams, Wolfgang 
Schrage, Edward Lohse and Sarah Conly make such assumptions.8 For example 
Thomas W. Ogletree in The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics writes: 
The attention to individual persons as privileged centers of meaning 
and value inclines such theories as virtue ethics to take insufficient not 
of the role relationships play in human selfhood. The social good 
becomes secondary to individual attainment . . . The aristocratic 
leanings of perfectionist thought may themselves be problematic, 
obscuring the degree to which our destinies as human beings are 
interlocked. When some fare well and attain much, it is almost always 
at the expense of others.9 
Another variant of the above charge is voiced by Bernard Williams in Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy: “Thinking about your possible states in terms of virtues is not 
so much to think about your actions, is rather to think about the way in which others 
																																																								
6 Roland Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 32. 
7 See Kotva, “Christian Ethics and the ‘Sectarian Temptation’,”; Scott Holland, “The 
Problems and Prospects of a ‘sectarian Ethic’: A Critique of the Hauerwas Reading of 
the Jesus Story,” The Conrad Grebel Review 10 (Spring 1992): 162-67. 
8 Thomas W. Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1983); Edward Lohse, Theological Ethics of the New Testament, trans. 
M. Eugene Boring (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991); Sarah Conly, “Flourishing 
and the Failure of the Ethics of Virtue,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. XIII 
Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, ed. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling and 
Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 92-93. 
9 Ogletree, The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics, 33. 
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might describe or comment on the way in which you think about your actions.”10 At a 
general level his charge is that virtue ethics is self-centered.  
 The thesis shall show that virtue ethic is not narcissistic by expounding the 
relational or communal value within the field and particularly within the works of 
Romanus Cessario, James F. Keenan, and Joseph J. Kotva. We shall argue that while 
a prima facie concern of virtue ethics is the development of one’s character, it is 
fundamentally concerned at the same time with the well-being of others, as earlier 
mentioned Solomon argues: “Classical virtues like justice, Christian virtues like love 
or charity, and Alasdair MacIntyre’s favorite modern virtue, Jane Austen’s amiability, 
all have a predominantly other-regarding character”.11  
B. The Concept of Relationality 
James R. Beck and Bruce Demarest present two theories to human relationality.12 
First is the theory of external relations, which is also called the classical ontological 
view. The theory states that relationships are merely external to the human person, 
and so do not have a substantial effect on the person. Relationships are only but 
accidents.13 It means that relationships are not intrinsic in the substance of the 
person.14  
Second is the theory of internal relations also called reductive relationalism. 
The theory states that the identity and nature of a person depends completely upon the 
																																																								
10 Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), 11. See 
also Jonathan Webber, “Cultivating Virtue,” in Phenomenology and Naturalism, ed. 
Havi Carel and Darian Meacham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
11 Solomon, “Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics,” 434. 
12  James R. Beck and Bruce Demarest, The Human Person in Theology and 
Psychology: A Biblical Anthropology for the Twenty-First Century (Grand Rapids: 
Kregel Publications, 2005), 305-347. 
13 Ibid., 306. 
14 Ibid. 
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relations the person sustains to other persons and things.15 In this case the relation is 
intrinsic and indispensable not accidental.  
Along with Beck and Demarest, this thesis proposes that a genuine theological 
approach on the human person must adequately incorporate these two theories of 
human relationality. Therefore, this thesis will respond to the charge of narcissism, 
mentioned above, by exploring anew the relational value of virtue ethics. We here call 
it all-inclusive relationality which is both horizontal and vertical. Horizontal because 
it expresses the relationships between the person as an individual, persons to persons 
and persons to the environment. Vertical because of our dependency on God. 
To explore anew the relational value of virtue ethics, the thesis makes a 
comparative reading of three scholars, namely Romanus Cessario, James F. Keenan, 
and Joseph J. Kotva. Our choice of moral theologians who specialize in virtue ethics 
is based on fact that they share similarities yet differ quite considerably. Cessario and 
Keenan are Catholic theologians, who utilize different methods and arrive at different 
conclusions, while Kotva is a Mennonite from the Reformed tradition. This thesis 
shall delineate how their various traditions influence their theologizing from a 
complementary perspective. They all belong to the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition to a 
large extent. However, we shall show the extent to which they share in that tradition.  
This reading shall be based on the arguments in favour of the reasonableness of 
commensurability. Therefore, even though my theological predisposition of their 
choice is based on their general approach to virtue ethics, it is specifically grounded 
upon their articulation of the relational nature of virtue ethics. In this context, I shall 
draw upon their particular and general works with reference to virtue ethics with a 
view to creating lines for commensurability. 
																																																								
15 Beck and Demarest, The Human Person in Theology and Psychology, 309. 
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C. Methodology 
 Broadly speaking this thesis uses the qualitative research method, articulating 
the approaches of our dialoguing partners. 16 This method also enables a researcher to 
explore through multiple procedures that are both flexible and evolving.17  The 
multiple procedures used in this thesis are diachronic, synchronic and comparative 
study. These methods are not self-sufficient but mutually inclusive for a project as 
this. 
 The diachronic approach appropriately fits into the qualitative research 
methodology because it helps in assessing the historical contexts that form the 
development of ideas and concepts on the virtues over the centuries. It also puts to 
perspective the contemporary debates on virtue ethics. While the synchronic approach 
assists in providing the necessary guide for a close reading of the theologians. This 
approach gives opportunity of the examination and interpretations of concepts and 
processes. Finally, the comparative study enables us to pull together the convergences 
and divergences in ideas, traditions, and method of theologizing by our interlocutors. 
On the whole, the comparison in the qualitative tradition involves configurations and 
appropriate interpretations.  
 
D. Thesis Design 
In general, the thesis is divided into five main chapters with sections and sub-
sections. Chapter one gives the historical overview of virtue ethics. The chapter is 
divided into two sections: section A can be considered as “status quaestionis” or 
																																																								
16 Egon G. Guba and Yvonna S. Lincoln, “Competing Paradigms in Qualitative 
Research,” in Handbook of Qualitative Research, ed. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna 
S. Lincoln (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994), 114. This method is appropriate for a 
research such as this because it provides the four indicators necessary for a reliable 
research: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. 
17 Ranjit Kumar, Research Methodology, 3rd ed. (Los Angeles: Sage, 2011), 184. 
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review of “the state of investigation.” It considers the renewal of moral theology and 
the eclipse of the theology of virtues. The section re-evaluates the arguments 
presented by Alasdair MacIntyre and Joseph J. Kotva as to the how and why of the 
eclipse of virtue ethics and its consequent retrieval in the past decades. It also 
highlights the relevance of the call of Vatican II to renewal of which virtue ethics is 
today considered as an integral part. Section B outlines the historical development of 
virtues; from its beginnings in classical tradition to contemporary era. The sub-
sections within will show the development and movement of ideas. It will show the 
link between the content of virtue ethics and its contexts.18 This will enable us to 
place into perspective our dialoguing partners in succeeding chapters. 
Chapters two, three and four employ the synchronic method by providing a 
reading on each of the scholars under study. In chapter two we shall show how 
Cessario approaches the virtues from a theological-anthropological standpoint. The 
relevance of Aristotelian-Thomist influence on theology today is emphasized. As 
such, this thesis shall demonstrate how this tradition influenced Cessario’s theology 
on the virtues. Specifically, we shall situate Cessario as a ressourcement-Thomist and 
a realist-Thomist. Thereafter, the chapter shall consider particular features of virtue 
ethics that highlight the relational value we are seeking to accentuate. To this end the 
chapter ends with the Cessario’s presentation of communio. 
The third chapter discusses Keenan’s personalist-pastoral approach. The 
chapter situates him as a personalist and a revisionist-Thomist. This enables him to 
weave together his personalist currents with his revisionist tendencies because virtue 
ethics is argued to be person centered. He explores other virtues and various contexts 
in which the relational value virtue ethics fits appropriately. He interlaces the virtues 
																																																								
18 See Abraham Edel, Method in Ethical Theory (New Brunswick: 1994), 27. 
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of justices, fidelity, and self-care with contexts like discipleship, and sexual ethics in 
order to create the relational model. The chapter concludes with the context of the 
Eucharist as the paradigmatic example that shows the relational nature of the human 
person. Keenan’s approach in this chapter is very “progressive” and anthropological. 
Since our previous two theologians are Catholics, chapter four turns to the 
approach of the Reformed theologian Joseph J. Kotva. This chapter proceeds by 
showing the ecumenical tone of Kotva. He brings something new in his approach as 
he seeks areas of convergences rather than divergences between theologians from 
varying traditions. He does this through the use of correlational style. The perspective 
of his schematization is very theological as he explains the dynamic interplay 
between, Christology, grace and the virtues. The chapter will progress to show the 
biblical connections with virtue ethics in order to elucidate the personal and 
communal nature of virtue ethics. This is in line with the call of Vatican II for the 
renewal of moral theology through Scripture. Kotva proposes a reconstruction of 
virtue ethics to include the virtues of forgiveness. The chapter offers an account of 
virtues that is spiritualized. 
The final chapter is divided into three sections. All three sections pull together 
the different explorations of virtue by Cessario, Keenan, and Kotva and place them 
within particular and general themes in order to create a comparative reading. The 
chapter proceeds by justifying comparative reading based on tradition. Whilst 
chapters two, three, and four situate the scholars respectively according to their 
traditions, this chapter proceeds to show their convergences and divergences. It 
intends to show how similar they may be but not exactly the same and how different 
they may be but not mutually exclusive. Themes like, the nature of virtue, the 
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development of virtue, their use of scripture and how they conceive the human person 
within Erickson’s three views will be comparatively examined.  
The thesis shall then return to the focal point of the relationality of virtue 
ethics. We shall argue that the concept and theology of the relational value of virtue 
ethics by our dialoguing partners is restrictive to only human relationality. There is 
caveat in such a concept because it does not include the environment. The thesis 
finishes by outlining some “points for further study”. Thus, we propose an all-
inclusive relationality that encompasses humanity with environment. To this effect the 
thesis shall propose what we may call a triad of ecological virtues namely; 
“ecological-justice”, “ecological-love”, and “ecological-prudence”. The thesis shall 
end with a general conclusion. 
In summary, this thesis exhibits an unambiguous structure: First, an overview 
of the current state of virtue ethics, followed by a historical development of ideas over 
the centuries. Second, the presentation of specific features of virtue ethics by the 
authors understudy that relate to the theme of our study; third, a comparative reading 
based on particular themes culminating with an all-inclusive relationality approach. 
Charles Curran puts perspective to this in the following words: “This model sees the 
moral life in the light of the individual’s multiple relationships to God, neighbour, 
world, and self, and the need to act responsibly within these relationships.”19 
 
																																																								
19 Charles Curran, “ Virtue: The Catholic Moral Tradition,” in Virtue: Readings in 
Moral Theology no. 16, ed. Charles E. Curran and Lisa A. Fullam (New York: Paulist 
Press, 2011), 55.  
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PART I: HISTORY 
CHAPTER ONE 
 A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF VIRTUE ETHICS 
1.0 Introduction 
David O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon in Catholic Social Thought: The 
Documentary Heritage write: “The human race has passed from a rather static 
concept of reality to a more dynamic, evolutionary one.”1 This statement both 
implicitly and explicitly has implications to the history of moral theology.2 The works 
of John Mahoney, John Gallagher, and Renzo Gerardi disclose this dynamism within 
the retelling of the history of moral theology.3 Their histories show that the nature of 
moral theology is constantly shifting its method. For example, ethicists have often 
focused on laws, rules, principles and procedures for resolving moral issues, 
concealing the role of the virtues.4 William C. Spohn in an article “Return of Virtue 
Ethics,” articulates this point more succinctly: 
Since the enlightenment, moral philosophers concentrated on 
specific acts which are justified by rules or consequences, 
while deliberately ignoring questions of virtue, character, and 
the nature of human happiness. The Manualists departed from 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas in treating the theological and 
																																																								
1  David J. O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, Catholic Social Thought: The 
2 Thomas A. Shannon, “Methods in Ethics: A Scotistic Contribution,” in The Context 
of Casuistry, ed. James F. Keenan and Thomas A. Shannon (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 1995), 3.   
3  John Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology: A Study of Roman Catholic 
Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); John A. Gallagher, Time Past, Time 
Future: A Historical Study of Catholic Moral Theology (New York: Paulist, 1990); 
Renzo Gerardi, Storia della morale: Interpretazioni teologiche del’esperienza 
Cristiana (Bologna: Edizioni Dehoniane, 2003). Each of these approaches the history 
differently; Mahoney begins with referencing the patristic era on the penitentials, 
Gallaher gives a more comprehensive antecedents of the manuals, while Gerardi takes 
on a magisterial history with Scripture as a starting point. See James F. Keenan, A 
History of Catholic Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century: From Confessing Sins 
to Liberating Consciences (New York: Continuum, 2010), 6. 
4  Joseph J. Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 1996), 5. 
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moral virtues as sources of obligations rather than as the 
dynamics of moral living.5 
 
Unfortunately, both Mahoney and Gallagher say very little on the virtues. They were 
not unaware of the relevance of the retrieval of virtue in morality theology.6 Yet, 
writing in the 1980s and 1990s they did not yet take the project of the retrieval of the 
virtues seriously enough. Therefore, their history needs to be reconstructed to reflect 
more on the virtues.7  
The aim of this chapter is to place virtue ethics more properly within the entire 
history of moral theology. It aims to look at the history of ideas regarding virtue – 
where it has come from, where it is now, and where it may be going. This is important 
because history helps renew sources of significant sources of theology. As highlighted 
by Servais Pinckaers: “The genesis of concepts and systems, traced by historical 
study, gives a new dimension to their content, bringing them relief and new clarity.”8  
The chapter shall be divided into two sections: The first section explores the 
call of Vatican II to renewal, and the reasons for the current retrieval of virtue ethics. 
This may be termed a “status quaestionis” or a review of “the state of investigation,” 
in which it will be argued that virtue ethics is a vital aspect of the renewal. The 
second section shall articulate different historical epochs, conceptions, development, 
and growth of virtue ethics. This is with a view to showing the dynamic historical 
																																																								
5 William C. Spohn, “Return of Virtue Ethics,” Theological Studies 53 (1992): 60. 
See also, Gallagher, Time Past, Time Future, 56-62. 
6  See Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology: A Study of Roman Catholic 
Tradition, 249; Gallagher, Time Past, Time Present: A Historical Study of Catholic 
Moral Theology, 56-58. 
7 David A. Horner, “Is Aquinas an Act-Ethicist or an Agent-Ethicist?” The Thomist 
70, 2 (April 2006): 237-65. 
8 Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. from the third edition by 
Mary Thomas Noble (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 192. 
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antecedents of virtue ethics both as a philosophical and theological concept with its 
accrued riches and contemporary significance in the way it is applied.  
SECTION 1: THE RETRIEVAL OF VIRTUE ETHICS WITHIN THE 
RENEWAL OF MORAL THEOLOGY 
1.1 Vatican II and the Renewal of Moral Theology 
The Second Vatican Council document on the formation of priests Optatam Totius, 
adopted and promulgated on 28th October, 1965, called for the aggiornamento of 
moral theology:   
Special care is to be taken for the improvement of moral theology. 
Its scientific presentation, drawing more fully on the teaching of 
Holy Scripture, should highlight the lofty vocation of the Christian 
faithful and their obligation to bring forth fruit in charity for the life 
of the world.9 
 
Vatican II is especially known for its ecclesiology, that is, the identity of the church 
and the relationship between the church and the world. However, the renewal of 
moral theology by way of scripture is only briefly mentioned in the decree for the 
formation of priests. Yet, even such a small reference implies that at the time in which 
the decree was promulgated, there is already a struggle with the earlier manualist 
tradition. The reasons will be outlined later.  
Specifically, Optatam Totius explicitly requested that moral theology be 
renewed through Scripture. According to Charles Curran, the particular purpose of the 
renewal was to articulate the God-man relationship because the Christian is conceived 
as a person who responses to God’s call.10 Accordingly, Rudolf Schnackenburg in 
																																																								
9  Vatican II Optatam Totius, 16. Degree on Priestly Training 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decree_19651028_optatam-totius_en.html (accessed March 23, 2015).  
10 See Charles Curran, “The Role and Function of Scripture in Moral Theology,” in 
Readings in Moral Theology: The Use of Scripture in Moral Theology no. 4. Ed. 
Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), 180.  
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The Moral Teaching of the New Testament could argue that the renewal of moral 
theology was intended to foster ecumenical dialogue with Protestants by emphasizing 
the primacy of God’s intervention in human history.11 But the renewal also disclosed 
some fault lines. Enda McDonagh in Moral Theology Renewed identifies the 
following tension:  
The renewal issues form the tension generated between two forces in 
the mind of the church or the theologian, the never-ending quest for 
a fuller understanding of the Christian message and the need to 
expound that message in the light of the prevailing ideas, needs and 
problems of the men of a particular time and place. The task of 
theology then is to provide the intellectual and scientific basis for a 
fruitful dialogue between the Word of God and his world.12 
 
But moral theology was in a poor state to negotiate this tension. Reflecting on Moral 
Theology according to Vatican II, Joseph Fuchs noted that the above instruction 
reflected that poor place moral theology vis-a-vis other theological disciples. 13 
Similarly, Paulinus Ikechukwu Odozor in Moral Theology in an Age of Renewal: A 
Study of the Catholic Tradition since Vatican II further comments: 
The Council was rather reacting to the long-standing discontent 
which many people in the Church in general as well as in the moral 
theological community had been expressing over the state of the 
discipline. Although this displeasure had become especially 
noticeable in the years leading up to the Council, its roots were 
indeed very deep. For example, in 1899, Fr. Thomas J. Bouquillon, 
the first professor of moral theology at Catholic University of 
America, wrote that moral theology had become obsolete, a pathetic 
poor cousin of other theological specialties as a result of its inability 
to keep up with the times.14  
																																																								
11 Rudolph Schnackenburg, The Moral Teaching of the New Testament (New York: 
Herder & Herder, 1965), 13-53. 
12 Enda McDonagh, Moral Theology Renewed (Dublin: The Furrow Trust, 1965), 13. 
13 Joseph Fuchs, “Moral Theology According to Vatican II,” in Human Values and 
Christian Morality (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1979), 1. This article first appeared 
as ‘Theologia moralis perficienda; votum Concilii Vaticani II’, Periodica de re 
morali, canonica, liturgia, Rome, 55 (1966): 499-548.  
14 Paulinus Ikechukwu Odozor, Moral Theology in an Age of Renewal: A Study of the 




Elsewhere, Odozor, draws together MacDonagh’s and Fuch’s observations:   
Long before the Second Vatican Council many people in the church 
believed that moral theology could no longer adequately confront the 
problems of modern society. The two world wars, the great scientific 
and technological developments in the modern era, the rise of new 
nations, and the emergent pluralism among these nations and in the 
world at large were only some of the factors which posed new 
questions for Christian living. Moral theology between the two 
Vatican Councils was aware of many of these problems and tried to 
resolve some of them, for example, those pertaining to sexuality and 
the use of medical technology. However, the tools that were 
employed proved to be inadequate . . . By the time of the Second 
Vatican Council, the dissatisfaction with this theology had become 
quite palpable and led to the Council’s call for the renewal of moral 
theology. 15 
 
Since the tradition of the manualists was inadequate to respond to relevant questions, 
the difficulty remained regarding what structure would be appropriate as a model for 
moral theology to engage adequately with the world today? McDonagh suggests three. 
Firstly, moral theology must be God-centered.16 What the history of moral theology 
reveals is that faceless institution of law has always taken center stage instead of 
God.17 This has always endangered genuine search for perfection, because people turn 
to the law as the guiding principle to achieve perfection.  
Secondly, moral theology must be Christocentric. McDonagh emphasizes the 
Christocentric link specified by Vatican II, and maintained by theologians such as 
Fuchs.18 Lumen Gentium, the Dogmatic Constitution On The Church, promulgated on 
November 21, 1964 echoes: 
 
																																																								
15 Paulinus Ikechukwu Odozor, Richard A. McCormick and the Renewal of Moral 
Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), xiii-xiv. See also 
Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology, 303. 
16 McDonagh, Moral Theology Renewed, 18. See also Josef Fuchs, “Moral Theology 
According to Vatican II,” in Human Values and Christian Morality (Dublin: Gill and 




The Head of His Body is Christ. He is the image of the invisible God 
and in Him all things came into being. He is before all creatures and 
in Him all things hold together. He is the head of the Body which is 
the Church. He is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead, that in 
all things He might have the first place. All the members ought to be 
moulded in the likeness of Him, until Christ be formed in them. For 
this reason we, who have been made to conform with Him, who have 
died with Him and risen with Him, are taken up into the mysteries of 
His life, until we will reign together with Him.19 
Fuchs re-echoes Vatican II’s assertions in the following words:  
The council requires that moral theology shall be taught not only and 
not primarily as a code of moral principles and precepts. It must be 
presented as an unfolding, a revelation and explanation, of the joyful 
message, the good news, of Christ’s call to us, of the vocation of 
believers in Christ. This means that Christ and our being-in-Christ 
are to be its center and focus.20 
 
Christ thus is the true human end, since moral theology has to be centered on Christ 
and the Christian life has to be lived in imitation of him. Ann Marie Mealey in The 
Identity of Christian Morality is more pro-active when she argues that when moral 
theology is appropriately Christocentric it enhances dialogue with biblical studies 
about the person of Christ revealed in Scripture.21 She cautions that if Vatican II’s 
directions are not followed:  
Moral theology will turn to the human sciences as a dialogue partner, 
rather than to sacred sciences of biblical studies, spirituality or 
dogmatic theology . . . The lack of cooperation with the sacred 
sciences means that moral theology runs the risk of conducting itself 
in way that scarcely refers to the person of Jesus or to the call to 
holiness and transcendence.22 
 
Among the many theologians that set in motion the direction of the Second 
Vatican Council, two moral theologians are particularly significant: Fritz Tillmann and 
Bernard Häring. Fritz Tillmann in 1934 published Der Meister Ruft (The Master 
																																																								
19 Lumen Gentium no. 60-63. 
20 Fuchs, “Moral Theology According to Vatican II,” 3. 




Calls) where he graphically shows the fundamental idea of what it means to follow 
Christ.23  His influence concerned the personal effect that Jesus’ self-understanding 
had on the community of disciples.24 Moral theology for Tillmann, “was the scientific 
presentation of following Jesus in the life of the individual and community: Catholic 
moral theology finds the source of its search for moral truth in the person of Jesus as 
the original image and the eventual goal for all of us”.25 Also, Bernard Häring in the 
foreword of his book The Law of Christ writes: “The principle, the norm, the center, 
and the goal of Christian Moral Theology is Christ. The law of the Christian is Christ 
himself in Person.”26 Other post-conciliar theologians like German Grisez elaborated: 
“The renewal of moral theology, the council says, requires ‘livelier contact with the 
mystery of Christ and the history of salvation’- in other words, moral theology should 
be Christocentric.” 27  John Paul II cemented the Christocentric approach in the 
introduction to the 1993 Encyclical Veritatis Splendor.28  
 Thirdly, a renewed moral theology has to be presented in a way that is person-
centered and not action-centered, as was the case with the manualists. McDonagh 
argues:  
In the structure of moral theology, man, may never be treated as an 
object or as an impersonal source of material actions, the morality of 
																																																								
23 Fritz Tillmann, The Master Calls: A Handbook of Morals for the Layman, trans. by 
Gregory J. Roettger (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1960), 1-68.  
24 See Daniel Harrington and James F. Keenan, Jesus and Virtue: Building Bridges 
Between New Testament Studies and Moral Theology (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 54. 
25 Ibid. 
26Tillmann, The Master Calls; Bernard Häring, The Law of Christ vol. one (Cork: 
Mercier Press, 1963), vii. 
27 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ: A Summary of Christian 
Moral Principles (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1991), 5. See also Livio 
Melina, Sharing in Christ’s Virtues: For a Renewal of Moral Theology in the Light of 
Veritatis Splendor, trans. William E. May (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University 
of America Press, 2001). 
28 John Paul II, Encyclical letter Veritatis Splendor (London: Catholic Truth Society, 
1993), 3. 
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which are judged independently of the person performing them. The 
human response which these actions express is as personal as the 
divine invitation which prompts them. In the moral theology which 
studies and judges them, this personal character should emerge very 
clearly.29 
 
In particular, this opens the way to virtue ethics since it is a character-based ethics and 
therefore person-centered. This aspect of the personal nature in which moral theology 
should take will be discussed later in chapter five.  
 According to Odozor, the renewal of moral theology can be summarized as a 
challenge to construct a moral theology that is: 
Historically conscious, as opposed to one which is founded on 
externalism; a moral theology which has confidence in the human 
race, as opposed to that which is pessimistic about the prospects of 
the human race; a moral theology which is built on confidence in 
grace, as opposed to one which is founded on the terror of sin; a 
moral theology which stresses the theme of the covenant rather than 
legalism; a moral theology which assigns values to earthly realities 
rather than one which stresses only private piety and sins.30 
 
Yet, despite virtue ethics being consistent with such priorities, it took another 
generation of moral theologians began to draw upon its possibilities. Roughly twenty 
years after the Council, Romanus Cessario noted: “It is a safe generalization to say 
that virtue theory occupies small place in the current renewal of moral theology, at 
least in Roman Catholic circles.”31 Today, however, virtue ethics has taken center 
stage in the Roman Catholic theology. To place Cessario’s assertion in context, virtue 
ethics was still at the margins of philosophical as well as theological discourses.  
This thesis considers virtue ethics as an intrinsic aspect of the renewal that 
opposes the externalism, legalism and pessimism highlighted above by Odozor. 
																																																								
29 McDonagh, Moral Theology Renewed, 23. 
30 Odozor, Moral Theology in an Age of Renewal, 42-3. 
31 Romanus Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 12. 
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Considering norms and principles in current Catholic theology without virtue ethics 
will stagnate the entire call to renewal.   
 
1.2 Understanding the Eclipse of Virtue Ethics 
As already noted, John Gallagher in Time Past, Time Future, and John Mahoney in 
The Making of Moral Theology provide a comprehensive historical overview of 
developments within moral theology, without fully accounting for eclipse and 
retrieval of virtue ethics. However, James F. Keenan in a co-authored book Jesus and 
Virtue Ethics gives a particular reading of the history of moral theology that accounts 
for the reclaiming of the framework. Accordingly, Keenan proposes seven distinct 
periods in the history of moral theology: Patristic, penitentials, scholastics, 
confessional manuals, casuistry, moral manuals and contemporary moral theology.32 
Each era, he contends was either marked by avoiding sin, or on becoming a disciple 
of Christ.33 For example, the penitential era: 
During this period, moral theology was shaped predominantly by a 
concern about the sins ones should avoid, and not about the good to 
be pursued. Similarly, with emphasis on one’s own moral state, the 
Christian’s communal self-understanding was less important, and a 
long period of moral narcissism began, in which Christians became 
anxious not about the kingdom or the needs of the church, but rather 
about individual souls.34 
 
																																																								
32 Daniel Harrington and James F. Keenan, Jesus and Virtue: Building Bridges 
Between New Testament Studies and Moral Theology (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 2. 
33 Ibid., 1. 
34  Ibid., 3. See also Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 14. See also 
Pinckaers, “Rediscovering Virtue”, 361.  
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Ethicists concentrated on controversial issues: pre-marital sex, abortion, euthanasia, 
suicide and a host of others. The basic question asked was “is this right or wrong?”35 
Ethics from this backdrop, many currently argue, was depersonalized.36 
Contrary to the above, Aristotle, Plato and Aquinas conceived morality in 
terms of the dispositions or traits of character rather than rules. Mahoney affirms that 
Augustine along with Ambrose and Gregory viewed the whole moral life in the 
categories of the four cardinal virtues in unison with charity. 37  These writers 
emphasized the interiority of the Christian and also the outward expression of that 
interiority.38 Consequently, the penitentials lost this tradition of the Fathers who 
depended on Scripture and the virtues.39 
The moral theology that evolved during the scholastic era naturally depended 
on the virtues to outline a suitable moral identity.40 Before Aquinas, Aristotle in the 
Nichomachean Ethics offered eleven virtues for the citizens in the polis, honesty, 
magnanimity etc.41 Aquinas in Summa Theologiae adopted the cardinal virtues of 
Plato, Cicero, Ambrose, Gregory, and Augustine namely, prudence, justice, fortitude 
and temperance.42 Aquinas’ genius is seen in his addition and underlying synthesis of 
the three theological virtues of faith, hope and charity.43  
																																																								
35 James F. Keenan, “Virtue Ethics,” in Christian Ethics: An Introduction, ed. Bernard 
Hoose (London: Cassell, 1998), 84. 
36 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 3rd ed. with new 
prologue (London: Duckworth, 2007), 6-12. 
37 Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology, 43. See also James F. Keenan, Moral 
Wisdom: Lessons and Texts from the Catholic Tradition (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 147. 
38 Harrington and Keenan, Jesus and Virtue, 2. 
39 Ibid., 2. 
40 Ibid., 4. 
41 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics (hereafter NE).  
42  St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Complete English Edition in Five 
Volumes, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province vol. 2 Ia-IIae QQ. 1.114 
(Indiana: Christian Classics, 1948), q. 61, aa.1-5 (hereafter ST); Some other works of 
a Aquinas are Summa Contra Gentiles, and the Compendium Theologiae and finally, 
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This thesis earlier highlighted the shift in the way moral theology was 
undertaken during the penitential era. This movement reached a highpoint in the early 
modern era with casuistry and the moral manuals. The manuals were not concerned 
with Christian edification or the holistic growth of the human person. To take a 
particular symptomatic example, namely the 1908 manual of Thomas Slater, A 
Manual of Moral Theology for English-Speaking Countries:  
We must ask the reader to bear in mind that manuals of moral 
theology are technical works intended to help the confessor and the 
parish priest in the discharge of their duties. They are as technical as 
the text-books of the lawyer and the doctor. They are not intended 
for edification, nor do they hold up a high ideal of Christian 
perfection for the imitation of the faithful. They deal with what is 
obligation under pain of sin; they are books of moral pathology.44   
 
Slater further emphasizes: “Moral theology proposes to itself the much humbler but 
still necessary task of defining what is right and what is wrong in all the practical 
relations of the Christian life . . . The first step on the right road of conduct is to avoid 
evil”. 45  Unsurprisingly, the virtues went into a natural eclipse with the above 
conclusion of the role of moral theology. However, it would be overly critical to 
argue that the eclipse of virtue ethics was a deliberate attempt by the theologians of 
that era. We have to bear in mind that the era was simply responding to the challenges 
of its time, namely promoting moral order.  
With regard to philosophy, Philippa Foot in Virtues and Vices offers another 
reason for the eclipse of virtue ethics. She explains: “The tacitly accepted opinion was 
that a study of the topic would form no part of the fundamental work of ethics; and 
																																																																																																																																																														
Commentaries on Aristotle.  Daniel Harrington J. and James F. Keenan, Paul and 
Virtue Ethics: Building Bridges Between New Testament Studies and Moral Theology 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 3. 
43 ST I-II, q. 62. aa. 1-4. 
44 Thomas Slater, A Manual of Moral Theology for English-Speaking Countries vol. 
1, 3rd ed. (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1908), 6. 
45 Ibid., 5-6. 
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since this opinion was apparently shared by philosophers such as Hume, Kant, Mill, 
G. E Moore, W. D. Ross and H.A. Prichard . . . Perhaps the neglect was no so 
surprising.”46 As a result, virtue ethics became irrelevant and was driven to the 
precincts of both philosophical and theological discourses. 47 
As in theology, Foot advocates the need for retrieval. According to Foot, the 
works of remarkable philosophers like Georg Henrik von Wright and Peter Geach 
initiated a comeback.48 However, a large number of philosophers and theologians 
consider Elizabeth Anscombe to have begun the original return in her landmark 
article, “Modern Moral Philosophy.”49 It gained significant momentum with the more 
recent influential work of Alasdair MacIntyre, entitled After Virtue, to which we shall 
return in the last sub-section of this chapter.50  
																																																								
46 Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1978), 1. 
47 Conversely, Foot’s assertion above has been contradicted to some extent by recent 
virtue ethicists who are looking back even to Hume for inventiveness on the virtues. 
For example Terence Irwin in The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical 
Study ascribes his inspiration on the virtues to Hume. See also Terence Irwin, The 
Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study, Vol. II: from Suárez to 
Rousseau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 641-674. 
48 Georg Henrik von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness (London: Rouledge and 
Keegan, 1963), 136. See especially chapter vii. Even though he alludes to the earlier 
work of Nicolai Hartmann as the only full-scale modern treatment of virtues that he 
knows; Peter Geach, The Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
There are others who attribute the resurgence of virtue ethics to Elizabeth Anscombe, 
in her essay “Modern Moral Philosophy,” like James Van Slyke, Theology and the 
Science of Morality: Virtue Ethics, Exemplarity, and Cognitive Neuroscience, ed. 
G.R. Peterson, K.S. Reimer, W.S. Brown and M.L. Spezio (New York: Routledge, 
2012). 
49 Elizabeth Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33 (1958): 1-19; 
James Van Slyke, Theology and the Science of Morality: Virtue Ethics, Exemplarity, 
and Cognitive Neuroscience, ed. G.R. Peterson, K.S. Reimer, W.S. Brown and M.L. 
Spezio (New York: Routledge, 2012). This thesis shall stick to the account that goes 
back to Anscombe. 
50 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed. 
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On the theological side, Vatican II ushered a more incisive call to renewal 
within church circles as earlier indicated.51 We shall return to this in our later 
discussion on the contemporary era. 
 
1.3 Reasons For The Retrieval of Virtue Ethics 
As already noted, the current retrieval of virtue ethics offers great advantages in 
addressing deficiencies in moral theology. Servais Pinckaers summarizes the benefits 
of such resurgence in the following words:  
The introduction of the concept of virtue offers many opportunities for 
the shaping of a morality that takes the human person into account. 
Virtue is a dynamic human quality acquired through education and 
personal effort. It forms character and assures continuity in action. 
Teaching on virtue would seem to be a good corrective for excessive 
individualism.52 
In sum, virtue ethics provides a better and comprehensive framework of moral 
experience.53 This is because in moral reflection virtue ethics “moves from specific 
acts to the background issues such as character traits, personal commitments, 
community traditions”. 54  The current interest in virtue ethics is therefore more 
pertinent to contemporary society. Following the observations of Joseph J. Kotva and 
Alasdair MacIntyre the factors that have led to a renewed interest in virtue ethics, may 
be summarized as follows: the perception and experience that society is in moral 
crisis, the rise of historical consciousness, and failed contemporary ethical theories.55  
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1.3.1 Anthropological and Moral Crisis in Society: A Moral Sense Argument 
Morality both as a concept and praxis has always been a significant element in human 
history.56 We cannot talk about society comprehensively without morality. Likewise, 
we cannot talk about morality within human society without referencing “right and 
wrong”, “good and bad”, “duty and obligation”, “praise and blame”.57 Such terms, 
according to Vincent MacNamara, summarizing the Catholic moral tradition, should 
be understood from the perspective of “what is good or fulfilling or growth-making 
for people.”58  
When contemporary society is examined along these lines, Kotva argues that 
one can identify moral malaise. According to him, the moral bankruptcy evident in 
modern society is an important factor responsible for the renewed interest on the 
virtues.59 Kotva may have overstated this as one can identify moral dissatisfaction in 
all epochs. Charles Taylor in The Ethics of Authenticity corroborates when he writes: 
“Moral laxity there is, and our age is not alone in this. What we need to explain is 
what is peculiar to our time.”60  
The cultural moral legacy of the past is today being challenged by a counter-
culture. For example the counter-culture phenomenon is very prevalent in American 
society. According to Timothy Miller in Hippies and American Values, counter-
culture is a romantic social movement among the teenagers that had its beginnings in 
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late 1960s and early 1970s.61  These teenagers, through their lifestyles in the areas of 
sex, drugs and Rock, expressed their dissatisfaction to mainstream culture.62 And 
according to Art John in his article “A Theory of Hippies; Part One: ‘What have you 
Got?’” the above dissatisfaction is a revolt against status quo.63 This revolt as further 
explained by Jack G. Gurgess in an article “Notice to the Dead and Dying: You are 
Standing on a Generation” has a dimension of a generation gap where the young feel 
the old are moribund.64	Today, people ask the question, “what is happening to the 
young teenagers?” Conversely, the younger ones are “astonished” at what has gone 
wrong with the older people. 	
Kotva agrees that modern society is in crisis. To sustain this argument, Kotva 
cites Newsweek Poll, which found that 76% of adult Americans think, “The United 
States is in a moral and spiritual decline.”65  The decline is multifaceted: it is 
economic, financial, and above all anthropological. For example, Robert Keen writes: 
“An unprecedented storm hangs over the stability of international currencies and the 
world economic system has become not only progressively volatile but in danger of 
collapse.”66 Again, the growth of multinational co-operations that entails controlling 
business from a distance has ripple effects. This implies that decisions are made 
regardless of local situations, which “are increasingly made on the basis of the balance 
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sheet alone, without any reference to the human or social cost”.67 There are other 
ethical issues created by developments in economics. For example the use of 
customers’ confidential information for personal benefits, and potential abuses of 
products like alcohol, cigarettes and other substances.68 Such a malaise is narrated in 
the film Wall Street captured by the maxim that ‘Greed is good.’69  
Furthermore, Kotva argues that current debates on the breakdown of 
“traditional” family setting and violence in television points to the decline in moral 
standards.70 With regard to the family, he writes: “Children are less likely to become 
healthy, well-balanced moral agents if they lack loving parental guidance and 
appropriate role models.”71 Finding proper role models today becomes a challenge; for 
it is not the saint who becomes a model today but the “rock star”. 
 Derek L. Philips in his article “Authenticity or Morality?” argues that modern 
society has made being “authentic” and “in touch with one’s feelings” the ideal.72 In 
effect, this approach abrogates the place of absolute norms in society, with serious 
consequences requiring a virtue ethic to reshape. He concludes:  
We cannot accept or sustain a society in which many people 
are authentic and thus free to give themselves over to 
undisciplined urges and felt needs. If we are to secure a decent 
society, we need a population that internalizes moral principles 
and develops on various virtues. In other words, a good society 
depends on a virtuous citizenry. Lacking such a citizenry, life 
will become more and more like a jungle and the barbarians in 
our midst will devour the rest of us.73 
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These are some of the moral questions contemporary society faces. Present 
society has to be cautious of a so-called neo-barbarism. It is continually asserted that 
that moral advancement is not commensurate with modern scientific advancement. In 
response advancement must be holistic in order to be truly human.74 The answer 
therefore may be found in the return to virtues.75  
 1.3.2 The Rise, Challenge and Dynamism of Historical Consciousness 
John Lukacs in Historical Consciousness: The Remembered Past argues that one of 
the significant developments in western civilization is the emergence of historical 
consciousness.76 Kotva uses the ideas of James Gustafson and John Mahoney to 
explain how the rise of historical consciousness has become one of the major factors 
leading to a renewed interest in virtue ethics.77 According to Charles Curran our 
recognition of historical consciousness can shape our understanding of virtue ethics 
today.78 
The human being is by nature a historical being, situated in a specific historical 
and cultural context with identifiable beliefs systems and moral codes. By extension, 
“all knowledge including moral knowledge is historically grounded and at same level 
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informed by the setting from within which is known.”79 Historical consciousness is the 
awareness of the narrative of the past that is on-going.  
 Historical consciousness has given birth to two shifts: it limits the role and 
status of rules and increases the attention given to one’s context.80 Starting with the 
former, it is evident that in contemporary society, history is used to challenge the 
status of moral rules.81 Certain rules, it is proposed, are made which are acceptable 
because they suit a particular historical context. But when same rules are placed within 
a different historical context they might be unacceptable. A classic example is the 
long-standing Christian prohibition against money lending, which has now changed to 
the point where even some churches give loans or take loans with high interest rates.82 
As society is dynamic so also are certain rules.  
It is imperative to acknowledge that ethics cannot continue to be based on rules 
and norms without discussing the value of the historical moment in which such rules 
are applicable.83 Such an approach would ensure a balanced ethical framework that is 
workable and coherent with both norms and historical situations of any epoch. This is 
vital in doing theology today because the awareness created by historical 
consciousness is overwhelmingly inexhaustive: 
The more aware we become of the fluid and changing nature of society, 
the more our moral judgments must attend to the details of the concrete 
situation. If nature and society are basically unchanging, then the 
general principles are fine and we simply do whatever those before us 
did. But if nature and society change and develop, then we must attend 
to contextual variety and situational specificity. The continuities of 
human life are no doubt important, but historical consciousness pushes 
																																																								






ethical theory to acknowledge the potential uniqueness of each 
moment.84 
 
The above statement echoes the variety of current approaches of Christian ethics in 
particular movements such as “Liberation theology”, “Black theology”, “Situation 
ethics”, “Feminism”. Each of these approaches insists on contextual specificity.  
In the same way, virtue ethicists can take account of the specific context. 
Thus, there is the movement from norms and rules to character formation and 
contexts. But equally virtue ethics is universal, that is, it is relevant to different 
historical contexts and situations. Furthermore, it proposes the development of certain 
virtues (especially prudence) to be able to deal with real practical situations.85   
1.3.3 Failed Ethical Theories 
One of the basic claims made by MacIntyre in After Virtue is that the Enlightenment 
project of justifying morality failed.86 Although the Enlightenment scholars like 
Kierkegaard, Kant, Hume, Smith and others agreed on the character and context of 
the precepts that constitute morality, something was missing. MacIntyre writes: 
For Diderot and Hume the relevant features of human nature are 
characteristics of the passions; for Kant the relevant feature of 
human nature is the universal and categorical character of certain 
rules of reason. (Kant of course denies that morality is ‘based on 
human nature’, but what he means by ‘human nature’ is merely the 
physiological non-rational side of man.) Kierkegaard no longer 
attempts to justify morality at all; but his account has precisely the 
same structure as that which is shared by the accounts of Kant, 
Hume, Diderot, except that where they appeal to characteristics of 
the passions or of reason, he invokes what he takes to be 
characteristics of fundamental decision-making.87  
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Although these philosophers approach morality from varied frameworks, their 
conclusions can be reduced to the authority moral rules and obligations have on 
morality. Hence, MacIntyre argues that the project of this nature had to fail because of 
the apparent inconsistency between their shared conception of moral rules on the one 
hand and divergences in their conception of human nature on the other hand.88 From a 
philosophical point of view, these schools of thought are dislocated from their 
historical connections to both classical and theistic roots.  
The Enlightenment project as represented by Kant, Hume, Diderot and 
Kierkegaard was centered on reason alone. In comparison to a theistic framework, 
reason “can supply . . . no genuine comprehension of man’s true end,” and so 
“insufficient to deal with the passions.”89  The feature of the moral scheme that is 
teleological in nature was classically expounded by Aristotle in his Nicomachean 
Ethics. According to this scheme there is a significant difference between “man-as-he-
happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-realized-his-essential-nature. Ethics is the 
science which is to enable men to understand how they make the transition from the 
former state to the latter.”90  Keenan and Kotva draw directly from this language, as 
shall be outlined in chapters three and four.   
A project centered only on reason was bound to fail, because it failed to show 
the connections between foundational principles with other normative principles like 
virtues and the vices that instruct people on how to move from potentiality to act. It 
makes for incompleteness. Kotva argues that the missing element of the different 
modern ethical theories was an explication of human moral experience. 91 
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Consequently, they neglected the question of character, which constitutes a huge 
aspect of that moral experience.92  
The current revival of virtue ethics is a response to the inadequacies of moral 
theories as indicated above. In sum, our effort so far has been to establish why there is 
a renewed interest in virtue ethics today. The succeeding section shall seek to 
understand the meaning and nature of virtue ethics. 
 
1.4 Towards a Working Definition of Virtue 
There are various definitions on virtue from both the philosophical and theological 
traditions.93 For example from the philosophical tradition, Julia Annas in an article 
“Virtue Ethics,” writes: 
A virtue is a state or disposition of a person . . . A virtue, though, is 
not a habit in the sense in which habits can be mindless, sources of 
action in the agent that bypass her practical reasoning. A virtue is a 
disposition to act, not an entity built up within me and productive of 
behaviour; it is my disposition to act in certain ways and not others. 
A virtue . . . is a disposition to act for reason, and so a disposition 
that is exercised through the agent’s practical reasoning.94 
 
Annas’s definition has no reference to God. But our focus in this section is to 
articulate definitions of virtue in line with Christian tradition. To this end, virtue has 
been defined by Stanley Harakas in Toward Transfigured Life as: “The habitual and 
firm orientation of the will and of the whole character to act in specific and concrete 
ways which are appropriate to those who are in the process of growth in the image of 
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God.”95  Similarly, Annas admits that even among the ancient pagans there is a 
tradition, originating from passages in Plato, taking virtue to be ‘becoming like 
God’.96 Yet she does not reflect it in her definition.  
As St. Augustine in De Trinitate stresses, this image of God becomes the 
beginning and ultimate goal of human destiny.97 For the Christian moral tradition the 
ultimate goal is and remains personal union with God.98 Gregory of Nyssa argues: 
“The goal of a virtuous life is to be like God.”99 Virtue therefore, leads to the love of 
this ultimate goal or the highest good. This remains a central theme in Christian 
tradition. We shall return to it in almost all succeeding chapters.  
Jean Porter in Recovery of Virtues: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian 
Ethics outlines Aquinas’s grounding of his theory of virtues in this general principle of 
goodness and the human good.100 Morally good actions are conceptually linked to the 
relevant virtue in that certain determinate kinds of actions are characteristic of 
particular virtues and tend to promote them in the individual. Following Aquinas, 
Porter identifies elements in promoting a particular virtue, one of which is for some 
criteria for distinguishing true from false exemplifications of the virtue in question 
with guidelines derived from a higher principle.101 In this context, Christ becomes the 
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higher principle. Therefore, for the Christian the one and true value and motivation is 
the incarnated Christ. Häring further articulates:  
 
Christ taught us what virtue is; above all in His own all embracing 
love. What virtue appears in the very excess of His loving sacrifice 
by which he offered himself for the glory of God and the salvation of 
mankind. In Christ there is the most tremendous union of opposites 
without force or constraints. In Him is the most perfect and 
harmonious balance of virtue with all the haunting beauty of 
consummate goodness.102 
 
St. Augustine also identifies all virtues with the person of Christ: “Now we require 
many virtues, and through these virtues we advance to virtue itself. What virtue, you 
inquire? I reply: Christ, the very virtue and wisdom of God. He gives diverse virtues 
here below, and he will also supply the one virtue, namely himself.”103 This brings out 
the Christological nature of virtue ethics, a theme highlighted in renewal of moral 
theology and which shall be further developed in forthcoming chapters.  
Since virtue is seen as a habitus, some theologians identify salient qualities 
which belong to a life lived according to Christian virtue. The following are the three 
features of actions qualified by habitus: First, promptness or readiness to do 
something; second, ease or facility in performing the action, and third, joy or 
satisfaction while doing it.104 Aquinas himself argues: “A habit is called a virtue 
because it confers aptness in doing; secondly . . . it confers the right use of it.”105 Thus, 
a virtue becomes a habitus only when performed out of one’s volition or freedom.  
Brian Davies in Thought of Thomas Aquinas sees within humanity ability or 
capacity in potency: “Virtues are abilities, tendencies, or capacities which make it easy 
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for us to do certain things or behave in certain ways.”106 They are then dispositions by 
which a person acts well.107 Aquinas accepts St. Augustine’s definition of virtue as “a 
good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously of which no one can make bad 
use, which God brings about in us, without us.”108 This definition shall be unpacked 
later.  
Crucial in understanding the virtues is Porter’s reference to the fact that the 
virtues “are enduring traits of character which incline the agent to act in one 
characteristic way rather than another . . . A virtue is always a good quality.”109 This 
good quality is explained by Aquinas to be the perfection of a power:  
 
Now, it is necessary that the end of which any power is capable is 
good, because every evil implies a defect . . . For this reason, it is 
necessary that the virtue of anything be said to be ordained to good. 
Hence, human virtue, which is an operative habit is a good habit, and 
is productive of the good.110 
 
Virtue considered as a habitus therefore is not the approval given to an action 
after it has been performed, but the source of action, a modification inclining it 
towards its full realization in action. T. C. O’Brien sums it all: 
 
Virtue is a good habit. Because man directs his activities towards 
objectives to be realized, and these objectives are in conformity or 
opposition with the authentic finality of his nature, his actions can be 
good or bad. But just as his objectives measure the moral values of 
his activities, so his actions. If these habits give a bend toward truly 
human goals, then they are good, and are called virtues; otherwise 
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From the above citation, habits towards truly human goals provide the context and 
measurability of determining whether actions are virtuous or vicious. Virtue can be 
said to be an operative habit that is morally good while vice is an operative habit that 
is morally bad. In a Thomistic framework, virtues make us “good” although they in 
themselves cannot make us good. Rather they are capable of doing so when through a 
combination with operational actions they are able to produce the good, because virtue 
is ordered towards activity.112 This perfection of a power for its operation Aquinas 
calls “operative habit”.113 
In the final analysis, we can say that virtue disposes the Christian towards 
actions that pertain to right conduct. That does not eschew the fact that in the operative 
process of virtue, difficulties might be encountered. But when these conflicts arise, the 
higher good helps in the perfection of the virtues through faith and Christian 
exercises.114 Therefore the ability of something to function well in accord with its 
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SECTION 2: A HISTORY OF THE THEOLOGY OF VIRTUE  
1.5 Historical Overview 
Having given a preliminary understanding of virtue, this section will seek to explore 
the historical contexts of virtue ethics. The aim is to show both a consistency and 
dynamism to the concept of virtue and to identify links between the different historical 
periods. It shall only choose two significant people from each era, while 
acknowledging the contributions of other writers.  
1.5.1 Virtue in Classical Tradition 
Jean Porter observes two foundational sources for Christian thought on the virtues: 
“Namely the ideals and theories of virtue that emerged in Greek antiquity and were 
further elaborated in the Hellenistic Roman empire, and the ideals of virtue set forth or 
implied in Scripture.”115 In the Classical Greek tradition virtue was a commonly used 
concept. But there was a shift in its usage. For example: “In Athenian society, the 
heroic virtues that are appropriate to the warlike society of archaic Greece became 
increasingly problematic in the more settled, urban conditions of that society. These 
social changes, in turn, gave rise to systematic philosophical reflection on the 
virtues.”116 In these changed conditions, the prized virtues changed because in the new 
Greek worldview, the good person became identified with being a rational being. 
Perhaps this raises questions whether the less rational a person was, the less virtuous 
he/her was? Two of the most important figures of this period among others are Plato 
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1.5.1.1 Plato and The Virtues 
Plato (427-348 BCE) in The Republic, using Socrates as mouthpiece, proposes the 
virtues of wisdom (sophia), courage (andreia), self-restraint (sophrosune) and justice 
(dikaisune) as the four core virtues of the ideal city.117 These virtues according to Plato 
are acquired based on classification within the city. For example, wisdom is identified 
within the ruling class, called the Guardians: “The city is wise only through the good 
counsel and knowledge of its Guardians.”118 Only the philosophers as the wise can be 
the Guardians and so the ruling class. Courage was a virtue for the military class 
whose duty was to defend the city.119 Self-restraint unlike wisdom and courage is not 
common to one class but more like a kind of “concord or harmony”.120 Furthermore, 
“self-restraint . . . requires not only that the better should control the worse, but also 
that they should agree that the better should be in control.”121  
Plato’s aim was to create a social order. But he does not bring out the 
distinctive features that explicate whether each class within the social order is content 
with its tasks, especially the economic class. Such a model undermines the rights and 
freedom of the economic class, for it is brutal to limit a person’s task to only one. 
Justice as a principle for the formation of the ideal city becomes shaped by the 
importance of social order. In Platonic terms it is the principle of sticking to ones own 
job which is best suited to him/her.122  
There are lots of objections that can be raised on Plato’s account of virtues in 
the city. For example his account of justice as only a political concept does not reflect 
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the understanding of justice as a moral concept substantiated in relationships between 
people. On the whole, Plato is making us believe that people can foster right relations 
with others within his stratified structure of the ideal city through the virtues.  
1.5.5.2 Aristotle and the Virtues 
Contrary to Plato’s stratified concept, Aristotle (384-322 BCE) developed a more 
integrated understanding of virtue. It is commonly asserted that virtue ethics 
considered as a systematic science has its foundations from Aristotle. D. S. 
Hutchinson in The Virtues of Aristotle writes: “Aristotle’s philosophy of virtue is 
intimately and inextricably connected with other aspects of his moral philosophy . . . 
Aristotle’s moral philosophy is nothing more than a discussion of the virtues (both 
ethical and intellectual).”123 This systematic element is shown by his arguments 
regarding theories of human conduct. For him the subject matter of ethics is not 
principles but virtues. In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle argues that the virtues reside 
not in the passions but in states of character and to some extent faculties.124 For 
Aristotle, one cannot have practical wisdom without first acquiring the virtues.125 
Consequently, for Aristotle the most significant thing in ethics is acquiring the virtues, 
and not acquiring theories and principles of conduct. Summarizing his entire moral 
philosophy of virtues, Aristotle understands virtues to be a special character trait that 
results from training.  It involves acquiring the ability to act spontaneously. It is a 
hexis.126 
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A distinctive feature of Aristotle in the development of the theory of virtues is 
his doctrine of the mean.127 For Aristotle the mean in which virtue lies makes the 
virtues stable dispositions that avoids extremes in particular actions. According to 
Porter, Aristotle’s mean is sometimes equated with moderation, reflected in today’s 
understanding of the virtue of prudence as caution. However, Aristotle’s notion of the 
mean is challenged today because the application of the mean varies from one 
circumstance to another.128  
Aristotle added to the four Platonic virtues, generosity, wit, friendliness, 
truthfulness, magnificence and greatness of soul. For Aristotle, happiness or 
eudaimonia was the ultimate good of the virtues. Aquinas will develop more on this 
later and will go further than Aristotle to state union with God as the ultimate good of 
the virtues.  
In sum, both Plato and Aristotle claim that the virtues are essentially 
expressions of one’s quality. The entire classical tradition understood virtue as a 
process likened to acquiring a practical skill. The analogy of skill acquisition is 
pertinent because in learning to acquire a particular skill, the apprentice learns from a 
person who knows better than him/her. In this sense virtue requires that an individual 
learns from another person but with the view of thinking and comprehending for 
oneself.  Similarly, Annas states:  
Ethical reflection begins from what you learn in your society; but it 
requires you to progress from that. Virtue begins from following 
rules or models in your social and cultural context but it requires that 
you develop a disposition to decide and act that involves the kind of 
understanding that only you can achieve in your own case.129 
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Such a progress is dynamic and it delineates the social and communal dimension of 
virtue ethics. Annas further writes: “Classical virtue theories are marked both by 
realistic recognition of the socially embedded nature of our ethical life.”130  
1.5.2 Virtue in Sacred Scripture 
Sacred scripture, of course, does not provide a systematic reflection on the virtues. 
Rather scripture can provide a source of insight by articulating distinct characteristic 
traits, and placing exemplary individuals as models of right conduct. In what follows, 
the next two sub-sections will look at virtues in the Old Testament and New 
Testament.  
1.5.2.1 Virtue in Old Testament Literature 
According to John Barton in an article “Virtue in the Bible” the Bible does not 
explicitly deal with virtue as a model but it does so implicitly.131 To be precise, the 
Old Testament does not use the word virtue per se but speaks of human and divine 
qualities of goodness.132 Sacred Scripture uses the Hebrew word Sedeq in place of 
virtue. This word when used is in reference to right conduct (cf. Gen. 15:6; Deut. 6: 
25; 24:13; Ps 106:13). This implies that the entire language of virtue seems very quiet 
until later Hellenistic influence: “The place one might immediately look for the first 
of our themes, that of fixed and stable moral dispositions, is the wisdom literature, 
especially proverbs and the Wisdom of Jesus Ben Sira.”133 In Wisdom literature 
Virtus is used to refer to virtue as a general term (cf. Wis. 4:1; 5:13), and applied to 
some specific virtues like the moral virtues: “And if anyone loves righteousness, her 
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labours are virtues; for she teaches self-control and prudence, justice and courage; 
nothing in life is more profitable for mortals than these (Wis. 8:7).”134 Note that in the 
Old Testament prudence was used to denote wisdom.  
According to the commentary of Barton, in wisdom literature people are 
generally classified into two categories: the wise (otherwise called virtuous person) on 
the one hand and the fool (vicious person) on the other. This categorization is 
premised upon the knowledge that a person’s action reflects his/her character. Wisdom 
literature also emphasizes that for good actions to be performed, the individual must 
heed good counsel of wise people: “The . . . purpose of the book of Proverbs . . . taken 
as a whole was some kind of moral training: by reading about the wise and the fool 
one gradually learned to imitate one and avoid turning into the other.”135 This dynamic 
based on the analogy of apprenticeship is similar to the classical tradition as 
underscored earlier. The difference between the two traditions lies upon the impact of 
the acquisition on the learner. In the classical tradition, the trainer undergoes series of 
training over time. But the impression given by the wisdom literature especially 
Proverbs on the dichotomy between the wise and fool, is of the wise or foolish as fixed 
and unchanged.136 From this context therefore, the fool remains a fool and the wise 
gets wiser (Prov. 9:9). One begins to wonder whether the fool has any hope of 
becoming virtuous? Responding to this dilemma Barton thinks that the Bible is 
interested in conversion not moral progress.137  
This thesis finds Barton’s position unsatisfactory. James M. Gustafson in “The 
Changing use of the Bible in Christian Ethics,” argues that the Bible is a “revealed 
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reality rather than a revealed morality”.138 Christian ethics is not completely about 
morality reduced to propositions but about God, his revelation and invitation to 
humanity and how humanity responses.139 When Biblical morality is reduced to 
revealed morality conversion becomes its focal point but when considered as a 
revealed reality then the progressive aspect of human morality becomes a continuous 
response to the invitation of God, without ruling out the place of conversion. This idea 
is captured in various narratives of the Old Testament. For example God’s relationship 
with the people of Israel depicted in the marriage of Hosea to an unfaithful wife 
(Hosea 2:1-23).  
Therefore, this thesis considers the Christian interpretation of the Old 
Testament ethics to be both in terms of conversion and progression. This conception 
re-enforces the dialogical nature of Christian faith and the relationship with the 
divine.140  Gustafson writes: “The Christian moral life, then, is not a response to moral 
imperatives, but to a Person, the living God.”141 In this sense, Paul Lehmann argues in 
an article “The Christian Foundation and Pattern of Christian Behaviour” that the most 
important question is not what God commands but what God does. It is more about 
“The Divine Indicative than it is about Divine Imperative”.142 In this context therefore 
the biblical ethics of the Old Testament cannot be completely an ethics of conversion 
but also an ethics of progression. These two concepts can be suitably applied to virtue 
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ethics, as one eschews vice which is conversion and through repeated actions becomes 
virtuous which is progressive. 
The central theme about virtue in the Old Testament can be reduced to moral 
goodness. To be good by Old Testament standards was to keep the Law. In this sense 
the law was used as a formative process to being aright with God. At the explicit level 
therefore, the language of virtue is seemingly understated but at the implicit level it 
resonates within the entire ethics of goodness which God calls believers. Furthermore, 
the language of virtue can be derived from Old Testament stories depicting immoral 
practices. For example the story of Abraham sleeping with his maid in Gen. 16, or the 
story of Joshua killing an entire population as an act of obedience to God’s command 
in Joshua 6.143 Even though the morality of such actions is challenged today, we can 
implicitly learn via negative of what it means to be bad. Barton argues in favour of 
such a supposition that the biblical authors perhaps wrote these narratives with the 
view of exemplifications to see what can be learned from them about the difficulties 
and merits of living a virtuous moral life and the ills of failing to do so.144  
1.5.2.2 Virtue in New Testament Literature 
The theology of virtue is more vivid in the New Testament than the Old Testament. 
Nevertheless, it is not a dominant idea in the New Testament. The New Testament 
offers accounts of character traits that can be either coherent or incoherent to the 
Christian moral life.145   
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A cursory look at the Old Testament reduces its ethics to explicit rules 
neglecting inner dispositions. But the New Testament approach displays an explicit 
ethic based on inner intentions, desires, and dispositions.146 According to Servais 
Pinckaers in Morality the Catholic View an approach such as this offers an account of 
the ways of wisdom that lead to holiness of life and perfection through the virtues.147 
This is evident in the successions of antithesis in the Sermon on the Mount in Matt. 
5:12-48, and Luke 6:27-39.148 Still, the New Testament cannot be said to explicitly 
treat virtues. 
Going through the New Testament one can see the orientation towards the 
virtues of wisdom and justice. For example it speaks of wisdom which is given even to 
little ones in the Messianic age (cf. I Pet. 4:7). A central theme of both the Old and 
New Testament is the true nature of justice: “Sacred Scriptures constantly exhort and 
guide us to respect the rights of others and to do so with practical wisdom or prudence 
that exceeds mere legalism (cf. Col. 4:1).”149 The virtue of justice in the New 
Testament is placed at the level of the human heart considered as the root of human 
action. The parable of the ten maidens may be an eschatological parable but we can 
infer that Jesus illustrates the virtue of prudence as well: Five prudent or wise and the 
other five imprudent (Matt. 25: 1-13; Luke 14: 28-30; Matt. 6:19-20). He typifies 
temperance in Matt. 4: 1-11 by not succumbing to the devil’s temptations and in Matt. 
9: 10-17 by taking the little fish and few loves and feeding thousands and the leftovers 
																																																								
146 Millar Burrows, “Old Testament Ethics and The Ethics of Jesus,” in Essays in Old 
Testament Ethics, ed. James L. Crenshaw and John T. Willis (New York: Ktav 
Publishing House, 1974), 233.  
147 Servais Pinckaers, Morality the Catholic View, prefaced by Alasdair MacIntyre 
and trans. Michael Sherwin (Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2001), 8. 
148 Burrows, “Old Testament Ethics and The Ethics of Jesus,” 233. 
149 Cessario, The Virtues, or the Examined life, 12. 
	 35 
are gathered. Jesus exemplifies the virtue of fortitude when he remained resolute to 
undergo the cross in Matt. 26: 36-39.  
In the Pauline writings the excellence of character is exhorted: “Whatever is 
true, whatever is honourable, whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is pleasing, 
whatever is commendable, if there is any excellence and if there is anything worthy of 
praise, think about these things” (Phil. 4:8). St Paul stresses that Christ is the source 
and center of Christian virtue. He considers the virtues as found in the Greek culture 
and proposes them to the believers. For example according to Abraham J. Malherbe in 
Paul and the Popular Philosophers the virtue and vice lists in Col. 3:18-4:1 is a so-
called household code appropriated from the Stoics.150  But Paul emphasises their 
transformative quality through faith in Christ, which makes them quite distinct from 
those in Greek culture. N. T. Wright in Paul and the Faithfulness of God argues in 
favour of this when he writes:  
The center of Paul’s ethics is ‘to be a kind of Christian transformation 
of the ancient traditions of virtue, of character development. This, 
indeed, is the point at which his ethical teaching is at the same time 
closest to, and most interestingly distinguished from, that of the world 
around. As with the tradition from Plato and Aristotle onwards, Paul 
has a goal in view, but his goal is not Aristotle’s ‘happiness’ 
eudaimonia.  Nor is the attaining of that goal a matter, as it is in 
Aristotle, of the ‘self-made man’ producing the cardinal virtues of 
courage, justice, temperance and prudence that were required for a 
soldier or statesman in ancient Greece. Paul’s goal . . . is the mature 
humanity which reflects the divine image and which will be reaffirmed 
in the resurrection. The attaining of that goal is as much a matter of 
self-denial as of self-fulfilment. And the virtues which are to be 
produced include four which not ancient pagan would have recognized 
as positive character-traits: patience, humility, chastity and above all 
agapē, ‘love’.151 
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Another point of departure of Paul from the Greek philosophers is that his concept of 
character development in virtue is eschatological, while for the Greeks it would have 
been only temporal.152 
 This gives a new vision and modification to the virtues. Thus, Pinckaers 
commenting on St Paul says:  
It is clear that for him the organism of charisms and virtues 
possessed an entirely Christian head, formed by three virtues of 
which the philosophers were ignorant. Faith, hope and charity 
guaranteed a direct bond with the source of Christian life, Christ and 
his spirit. These virtues were unique in their dependence on the 
initiative of divine grace. They governed all of Christian action and 
gave to the other virtues, working in harmony with them, an 
incomparable value, measure, dynamism and finality.153 
 
The virtues are thus seen to effect personal transformation with an eschatological 
dimension. 
As highlighted earlier, the New Testament offers an account of character traits 
to sustain the Christian life. St. Paul in Gal. 5: 22-23 gives a lists of the fruits of the 
spirit which are consistent to the Christian character: “By contrast, the fruit of the 
Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness, gentleness, and 
self-control. There is no law against such things.” These may be considered as 
personal character traits but Paul would have expected that they be practiced within 
the Christian community. A deeper Christian formula is articulated by St. Paul when 
he expresses in I Cor. 13:13:  “And now faith, hope, and love abide, these three; and 
the greatest of these is love.” Paul does not name them conceptually as theological 
virtues which was a systematization undertaken by Aquinas as we shall later see.  
The entire theology of the virtues in the scripture particularly the theology of 
Paul shows an emergence of a new approach to virtues different from the Greco-
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Roman tradition. Paul’s addition of the Christian virtues of love, patience, humility, 
and chastity not known within the pagan world gives distinctive feature to the growth 
of the idea of virtue.154 This shift will impact on the succeeding eras, as we shall see 
below. 
 1.5.3 The Patristic Accounts of Virtue in the Latin Church 
The classical tradition has shown us how the virtues especially the cardinal virtues 
were generally accepted in Greek culture. It is no surprise that in the first century Philo 
of Alexandria incorporated the scheme in his biblical interpretations. 155  In the 
succeeding two centuries Philo’s work influenced the works of Clement of Alexandria 
and Origen. Platonic and Stoic backgrounds which influenced St. Paul in the preceding 
sub-section also predisposed Clement and Origen.156 Later on Latin Fathers like 
Ambrose, Lactacius, Jerome and Augustine came on the scene. These Church Fathers 
drew a lot from Platonic and Stoic schools of thought through the process of 
assimilation. Pinckaers shows this relationship in the following words:  
They draw on pagan thought and culture in order to place it in the 
service of the Gospel. It is from this collaboration between faith and 
reason that theology is born. The Fathers especially take advantage 
of pagan moral teaching concerning the virtues, vices and 
contemplation. They adopt the four classical cardinal virtues: 
prudence, justice, courage, and temperance, which are surrounded by 
numerous annexed virtues, and are already mentioned in Wisdom 
(8:9). This process of assimilation is made easier by the fact that the 
Fathers, like the philosophers, considered the moral life as a quest 
for happiness, and see in the practice of the virtues the best response 
to the primordial question of happiness posed by every human 
heart.157 
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With these came the process of the Christianization of the cardinal virtues of the 
Classical tradition.  
Despite the influence of classical philosophy, the accounts of virtues offered by 
the Fathers of the church primarily flowed from Scripture. Correspondingly, Pinckaers 
holds that there are two central sources of the Fathers’ teaching: Scripture being their 
primary source and secondary source of Greco-Roman culture and philosophy.158 
Their general moral teachings were centered on Christ as presented in the Gospels, 
through the celebration of the Divine Liturgy, reading and meditating on scriptural 
text(s) and applying the text in daily living.  
 Even though they drew upon Platonic and Stoic thought the Patristic Fathers 
differed on the goal of the virtues. For Plato and Aristotle the highest good of virtue is 
happiness, although Aristotle goes further than Plato by stating that humans cannot be 
like God because God is too transcendent. Hence he eschews the concept of God in his 
understanding of virtues.159 But the Fathers show a connection between virtue and the 
highest good that is God. For example Ambrose argues: “Virtue is thus defined by the 
wise. The first good of things is to know God, and which a pious mind to reverence 
him as true and divine, and to delight in that lovable and desirable beauty of the 
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eternal truth with the whole affection of the mind.”160 Ambrose set the platform for a 
deeper theological understanding of the virtues, particularly the cardinal virtues.161 
1.5.3.1 St. Ambrose and the Virtues 
According to Bejczy, Ambrose (330-397 AD), bishop of Milan, is regarded as the first 
person to use to the word virtutes cardinales (cardinal virtues) and virtutes 
principales. 162 Peter Lombard in The Sentences supports this claim: “Primus autem 
qui eas cardinals vocat est Ambrosious (the first therefore who called them [the four 
principal virtues] was Ambrose.”163 Bejczy argues that Ambrose although did not 
consistently used the terms or phrases cardinal virtues or principal virtues, but referred 
to them in some of his works as the gifts of the Holy Spirit.164   
Because of the influence of Platonic categories, Ambrose employed the 
allegorical style in trying to explain the virtues.165 He converts the Platonic virtues into 
Christian virtues. For example, in De Paradiso Ambrose interprets the four rivers of 
paradise as the cardinal virtues which came forth from the source of wisdom.166 He 
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further uses the allegorical style in his oration of his dead brother Satyrus (ca. 378). 
Here, he praises his brother for living the Platonic virtues. Ambrose commandeered 
the virtues in a way that transcended philosophy. His aim was to Christianize the 
cardinal virtues as seen in his work De Officiis Ministrorum.167 For he believed that 
the cardinal virtues do not only help people live good lives but also at the hour of 
death they help people prepare for the final journey. In this sense Ambrose 
unswervingly connects the virtues to God, who is the summum bonum.168 By so doing 
he shares with Paul’s eschatological dimension of the transformative power of virtue. 
His further use of allegory can be seen in the way he associated the cardinal virtues 
throughout his works with biblical quartets. For instance, the four creatures in the 
book of Ezekiel  (Ez. 1:1-28; the man stands for prudence, the lion for fortitude, the ox 
for temperance, and the eagle for justice), and also the four men who carried the lame 
man to Jesus in Mark 2:3-4. 
 Ambrose further incorporated the cardinal virtues into the teachings of Jesus in 
the New Testament. For example, he believed that the cardinal virtues were analogous 
to the Lucan account of the Beatitudes (Luke 6: 20-22 & 24-26).169 He demonstrates 
this in his Commentary on Luke, for him “those who are poor in spirit”, are blessed 
with the virtue of temperance, for those who are temperate overcome the seduction of 
materialism. And “blessed are those who are hungry, they shall be satisfied”, 
references justice, for those who are just are compassionate to the needs of others. And 
“blessed are you who weep, you will laugh”, is referencing Christian prudence (notice 
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he qualifies prudence to be Christian) which is the sort of practical reasoning that 
seeks eternal happiness. Ambrose connects the last cardinal virtue to the beatitude 
“blessed are you when people hate you . . . rejoice and be glad for your reward will be 
great in heaven”. For him the crown of suffering is the “consummation of courage” for 
the Christian believer.170  To complete his list, Ambrose added the Pauline virtues of 
faith, hope and love to the classical virtues of justice, wisdom, fortitude and 
temperance. Augustine will later adopt the same list, ordered towards love, as 
established by Paul.171 
Ambrose’s synthesis of the virtues with Scripture became very foundational to 
later Fathers like Saints Augustine and Gregory.172 Lastly, Bejczy remarks that one of 
the important contributions Ambrose made was that he taught his audience, “the 
cardinal virtues if interpreted in accordance with the faith, were not just useful for 
believers and pleasing to God, but secured the salvation of the soul – a message 
unheard in the Latin Church until then”.173 One can say that Ambrose’s approach was 
soteriological in nature. 
1.5.3.2 St. Augustine and the Virtues 
Augustine of Hippo (354-430 AD) is another significant figure.174 Like previous 
classical authors, Augustine’s theological considerations on the virtues were 
influenced by what was characteristic of the society. His conception of virtue was tied 
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to the concept of the good that makes a person happy. He argues that the perfect good 
must be beyond humanity: the ultimate good is God.175 His Christian understanding of 
love on the one hand and the Stoic concept of reason on the other hand hugely 
influenced his approach, in which faith and charity come to the aid of reason, which 
leads a person to true happiness. Augustine follows Plato and the Stoics in maintaining 
that the virtues are expressions of a quality.176  But he deviates from them by 
identifying the quality to be Christian love. He employs Neo-Platonic categories of 
dispositions by which the soul liberates itself from the bonds of earthly existence in 
order to embrace God.177 John M. Rist in Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized argues 
along this line:  
For while according to the Stoics all forms of virtue are modes of 
right reason, for Augustine they have become modes of love. As a 
result of their love for God, says Augustine, men are able to react 
morally to whatever situation may arise in the course of their 
lives.178  
 
Central to Augustine’s conception of virtue is the idea of Christian love: “This 
love bestows the ability to place all human affections in their right order, loving God 
above all, and loving creatures as expressions of Good’s goodness, within the 
parameters set by God’s decrees.”179 The love of God for Augustine is the only proper 
motivation of virtue.180 Such a conception led Augustine to argue that the cardinal 
virtues were simply forms of charity. The passage below shows how he subordinates 
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the cardinal virtues to the theological virtues. Such a systematic style makes his 
approach different from other patristic Fathers who were more homiletical:  
Virtue is nothing other than the perfect love of God. Now, when it is 
said that virtue has a fourfold division, as I understand it, this is said 
according to the various movements of love. Thus, these four virtues 
. . . I do not hesitate to define them as follows: Temperance is love 
giving itself entirely to the beloved; courage is love readily baring all 
things for the sake of the beloved; justice is lover serving only the 
beloved and therefore ruling rightly; prudence is love distinguishing 
wisely between what hinders it and what helps it. But, as we have 
said, the object of this love is nothing other than God, the sovereign 
good, the highest wisdom an the perfect harmony. We may therefore 
define these virtues as follows: temperance is love preserving itself 
entire and incorrupt for God; courage is love readily bearing all 
things for the sake of God; justice is live serving only God, and 
therefore ruling well everything else that is subject to the human 
person; prudence is love discerning well between what helps it 
toward God and what hinders it.181 
This citation, explains two things: Firstly, Augustine agrees with Ambrose on the lists 
of the virtues and also with St. Paul who gave primacy to the virtue of love or charity. 
Secondly, it shows how Augustine connects the classical cardinal virtues with the 
Christian virtues that will be later called theological virtues. According to Pinckaers 
this connection will be foundational to the entire structure of moral theology in later 
years.182  
There is an aspect, which Augustine adds to his theology of the virtues that is 
less emphasized by Ambrose, namely grace. He maintained that love must underline 
the virtues but emphasized that all virtues are imperfect if not supported by Grace.183 
																																																								
181 St. Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae (On the Morals of the Catholic 
Church) 15.25 [PL 32:1322]. 
182 Pinckaers, Morality the Catholic View, 21-2.  
183  Rist observes that Augustine seemed to have consistently sustained this 
understanding in most of his writings. However, in a later work De Trin. 13.20.25 due 
to pressure from the Pelagian argument he was prone to emphasize faith rather than 
love as the gift that promotes genuine virtue. But Rist would have us believe that this 
would rather be a development not a change of doctrine. See Rist, Augustine: Ancient 
Thought Baptized, note 50. See also Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized, 170. 
	 44 
Augustine’s position is based on the fact that as fallen humans no one can act justly 
without the aid of grace.184 Therefore, the ideal moral end, which the virtues are 
targeted towards, cannot be achieved without grace. This Augustinian concept of grace 
will influence the understanding of Kotva as we shall later see. 
It should be noted that both Ambrose and Augustine did not intend to advance 
a comprehensible account of virtue theory. It was only around the twelfth century that 
this project found a definitive systemization. The two Fathers of the church above 
offer us an understanding of virtue that is built upon Pauline theology and existential 
realities as offered by early philosophers. Their use of the cardinal virtues differs with 
Augustine, unlike Ambrose, infrequently utilizing the four cardinal virtues as an 
exegetical motif. The works of these Fathers offer the theoretical developmental 
framework of Christian virtue ethics, with the love of God as the summation. This era 
remained of significant importance to the entire history of moral theology as 
concluded by Pinckaers: 
The Fathers, it is true, do not systematize moral theology in the way 
that later generations will. Yet their moral teaching, because of its 
close proximity to Scriptures and to the personal and ecclesial 
experience of Christians, as well as its close relationship to dogmatic 
theology and the liturgy, contains a fullness that makes it an 
inexhaustible heritage and a model to follow.185 
To place this aspect of history into context within the whole history of moral 
theology, this legacy of the Fathers was lost with the inception of the early medieval 
era.  This period moved away from theorizing the virtues to practical living giving rise 
to the “penitentials” or instructional manuals intended for confessors, containing lists 
of sins and penance to be enforced on the penitent. This tradition continued till the late 
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medieval era that ushered in the Scholastic era and a flurry systematic approaches. Of 
particular prominence are Peter Lombard, and St. Thomas Aquinas. 
1.5.4 Scholasticism: A Systematic Approach to Virtue 186 
This period stretches from the eleventh century to the fourteenth century.  
This period of theology coincides with the formation of independent 
townships and the birth of an urban mercantile class, as well as with 
the creation of universities and the construction of the gothic 
cathedrals. It also coincides with the spiritual movements initiated by 
St. Francis and St. Dominic and expressed in religious orders of a new 
type, different from the monks.187 
 
With regard to the history of ideas, this era delineated the relationship between the 
cardinal and theological virtues.188 Previously termed “three graces,” by Augustine, it 
was at this time the term theological virtues came into prominence.189  
Another significant element is the retrieval of Aristotle’s works and the 
introduction of scholastic method.190 Scholastic method grew out of disputations in 
schools during the Middle Ages. It had two complementary features: “1.The 
acceptance of ‘authorities, or major works of antiquity, as sources of knowledge and 
bases of teaching. 2. The use of dialectic as reason’s chief tool in the working out of 
science.”191  Its basic instruments were definition, distinction, and argumentation. Its 
ideal goal was certain truth, although frequently it could reach only probable 
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conclusions.192 This is done with the practice of rational dialectic.193 By the thirteenth 
century the scholastic method employed analytico-synthetic method.194 This is a 
method which offered solutions to both theological and philosophical problems, and 
was influenced by Aristotle.195 But the Aristotelian procedure was centered on logic 
devoid of divine revelation. Thus, Christian writers of this generation had to 
embellish Aristotle’s logic with their Christian beliefs. 
 The next section of the thesis attends to the works of Peter Lombard and 
Aquinas on the virtues because they offer a more complete theological synthesis of 
the virtues than any of the other scholastics. According to Pinckaers:  
The works of the fathers show Christian thought and experience to be in 
continuity with apostolic tradition, while confronting it with the 
philosophical wisdom whose sources they endeavour to utilize while 
safeguarding the supremacy of revelation. In the transmission of 
patristic teaching the Sentences of Peter Lombard play a determining 
role as the required manual for theological teaching.196  
 
Lombard and Aquinas through a dialectical style will develop their knowledge of the 
Fathers more profoundly and as well as the varying schools of philosophy like stoics, 
Platonists and Aristotelians.197 
1.5.4.1 Peter Lombard: Virtues in The Sentences 
Peter Lombard (c. 110-1160) as a schoolman was a student of Peter Abelard (1074-
c.1142). But these two had opposing methodologies with regard to virtues.198 We 
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shall briefly contrast them to reiterate the fact that the scholastic period is a synthesis 
of two traditions namely, the Aristotelian and the Augustinian traditions. Abelard 
conceives virtue in completely Aristotelian categories, namely, as a firm or constant 
disposition that enables one to be moral. Conversely, Lombard offers a stringent 
theological account of the virtues that is based on patristic authorities.199  
In the four Books of The Sentences, Lombard ties the notion of the virtues to 
qualities conferred by grace.200 For example in Book Three he treats the virtues and 
aligns them with Christ by arguing that Christ had the virtues of faith, hope and love. 
Lombard’s treatment of the virtues is tied to his teaching on salvation.201 He defines 
virtue in Augustinian terms: “a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly, 
that nobody uses badly, and that God alone works in man”.202 Following the above 
definition, Lombard’s concept of virtue is linked to grace. This is one of the 
specialties of the Scholastic Period. In fact, later theological articulations about the 
virtues after this period will have very minimal and in some cases complete neglect of 
the role of grace within the Catholic tradition. This is more emphasized within the 
Reformed tradition, as we shall see in later chapters.203 However, the danger of 
sticking to Lombard’s definition is that one can undermine human effort on the one 
hand or over reliance on the grace of God on the other hand. Effectively, in order to 
avoid this, Lombard moves away from the classical tradition that totally viewed virtue 
only as a human quality. 
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 Lombard adopts the principal virtues of the classical tradition of Wisdom 8:7 
(justice, prudence, fortitude and temperance), and of the Fathers like Augustine. For 
example he follows Augustine who in the De Trinitate wrote: “Justice consists in 
helping the wretched, prudence in guarding against treacheries, fortitude in bearing 
troubles, temperance in controlling evil pleasures.”204 Mattison notes that Lombard 
does not propose an unequivocal explanation for any classification of the virtues.205 
He simply groups the virtues but “nowhere does he define a category (such as 
‘theological virtue’)”.206 According to Mattison, Lombard in The Sentences explains 
faith, hope and charity on the one hand and prudence, justice, fortitude and 
temperance on the other hand. But he argues elsewhere, like Augustine that charity is 
the mother and the form of the virtues.207 Lombard’s ideas on the virtues are highly 
Augustinian. The link between the theological and cardinal virtues for Lombard was 
to help order our lives on earth but at the same time they open up heaven for us. 
“Thereupon, . . . the four virtues are fully present in Christ; in fact, it is from him that 
we derive our virtues.”208 In this sense, one can hold that Lombard’s ethics is 
generally Christocentric. 
 However, some writers have criticized Lombard’s position in the way he links 
the virtues to Christ. For example, Marcia Colish in Peter Lombard observes that 
Lombard’s treatment of the virtues does not offer a precise link between the 
theological and cardinal virtues.209 Also Philipp Rosemann citing Balzer Handbuch 
says that Handbuch criticizes Lombard’s annexation of the virtues in his 
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Christology.210  Rosemann thinks that both Colish and Handbuch’s criticisms are 
based on structure rather than content.211 In this sense, he sees nothing wrong with the 
Lombardian inclusion of the virtues in Christ. Hence he concludes:  
The Lombardian conception of virtue is different from our own, in 
so far as he prefers to show us virtues in its perfect state, that is to 
say, in Christ. One could say that Peter Lombard approaches virtue 
“from above”, from a quasi-divine angle, and not from the point of 
view of its instantiation in ordinary human nature.212 
 
Implicitly, the criticism attempts to say that Lombard does not provide a formal 
categorization of virtue.213 But Mattison argues differently:  
However, though Lombard devotes no explicit attention to 
explaining the bases for categorizations of virtues, his treatment of 
the cardinal virtues does offer an implicit rationale for what the 
four cardinal virtues have in common . . . It demonstrates that, . . . 
the cardinal virtues certainly pertains to humanity’s destiny in 
eternity . . . and because their presence in the next life requires 
further discussion, it seems that their activities are primarily 
associated with temporal life. This is a foreshadowing of how 
certain thirteenth-century thinkers, including Thomas, will 
distinguish the cardinal virtues as a category.214 
 
 Considering Colish’s critique and Mattison’s observations this thesis holds 
that Lombard’s synthesis of the virtues does not explain how the different 
categorization relate to one another. Rather it is Aquinas who in his synthesis of the 
virtues explicates the relationship that Lombard failed to do. 215  The common 
understanding is to consider the two sets of virtues as opposing to each other. But 
Aquinas will show that they are intertwined by using arguments from both the 
scripture, patristic Fathers as well as various schools of philosophy. 
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1.5.4.2 Thomas Aquinas: A Philosophical and Theological Synthesis 
of the Virtues in the Summa Theologiae (c. 1225-1274).216 
The practical theology which was prevalent alongside the Manualists tradition at this 
period was deficient. There was a doctrinal gap which Aquinas sought to fill: 
All Dominican writers . . . previous to Thomas had valiantly covered 
various aspects of learning for their confreres in pastoral care- 
Raymund and his fellows for confessional practice, . . . Aag Denmark 
for missionaries, . . . James of Varazze for lives of saints and preaching, 
Simon of Hinton for the practical theological needs of his English 
brethren.217  
 
Unlike those cited above, Aquinas saw the need to provide a Summa of general 
theology that encompassed God, trinity, Creation, Incarnation and human nature.218 
 Aquinas is aware of the departure of the virtues from the manuals hence he 
introduces them in the Summa. In the Summa Theologiae Aquinas presents an 
extraordinary structure of the virtues.219 He defines virtue in Augustinian terms as 
well.220 Each virtue is explained with its opposing vice and correlating gift of the Holy 
Spirit.221	
Aquinas treats the virtues by using the dialectical method. He also articulates 
the teachings of the Fathers and makes citations from the Bible and of course 
Aristotle. He shows a great interest in returning to sources. The twentieth century 
movement Ressourcement emphasises such a return to sources. In chapter two of this 
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thesis this theological approach shall be further explained, showing a link with the 
history of virtues presented in this chapter. 
  In the Summa, Aquinas discusses the virtues as the basis for Christian faith 
made possible through grace. Hence he first treats the theological virtues then follows 
up with the cardinal virtues. The question remains on what basis does Aquinas 
categorize the virtues? He follows the tradition that preceded him by categorizing 
them on the bases of object, end, and efficient cause. However, he differed from 
others because he shows through his categorization the relationship between the 
virtues, an area that was overlooked by his predecessors. Later scholastics after 
Lombard like William of Auxerre (1150-1231) and Philip the Chancellor (1160-1236) 
initiated a deeper categorization of the virtues.222  Yet a fully integrated treatment of 
the synthesis of the categorization needed to be developed which will explicate the 




1.5.4.2.1 Categorization and The Relationship of the 
Theological and Cardinal Virtues  
To show the relationship between the theological and cardinal virtues Aquinas argues 
that the virtues can be categorized based on cause, object and end. Firstly, virtues can 
be acquired generally through either habituation or grace:  
Virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the 
specific nature, in so far as in man’s reason are to be found instilled 
by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and 
action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues, and 
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in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in 
accordance with reason.223 
 
According to Aquinas, both the cardinal and theological virtues are caused by nature. 
However, Aquinas introduces a distinction between the cardinal and theological 
virtues by reason of perfection: “It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by 
nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to perfection, except 
the theological virtues, which are entirely from without.”224 Aquinas argues in the 
second article that human virtue directed to the good, which is defined according to 
the rule of human reason, can be caused by human acts or acquired human virtues.225 
He draws out a distinction between the moral virtues and the theological virtues by 
stating: “Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our 
actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological virtues. Therefore it was 
necessary for us to receive, from God immediately others that are proportionate to 
these virtues.”226 
 Secondly, Aquinas categorizes the virtues based on object. Here he 
differentiates between the theological and cardinal virtues. Aquinas argues:  
The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now the Divine 
Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope and charity: for it 
is written (Ecclus. Ii.8, seqq): Ye that fear the Lord believe Him, and 
again, hope in Him, and again, love him. Therefore faith, hope and 
charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they are theological 
virtues.227 
 
Aquinas introduces the concept of happiness to show the distinction between the 
theological and cardinal virtues explaining that man is perfected by virtue for it is by 
those actions he is guided to true happiness. Happiness is twofold according to 
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Aquinas: happiness achieved through man’s natural principles and happiness beyond 
man’s nature obtained through God alone. Therefore, the theological virtues directly 
concern God as their sole object, while the cardinal virtues indirectly concerns God as 
their object:  
The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as he is 
the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But the 
reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently 
directed to Him in so far as He is the object of supernatural 
happiness.228 
 
Thirdly, it is a categorization based on the end of virtue. Aquinas holds that the 
cardinal virtues perfect the intellect and appetites in proportion to nature, but 
theological virtues do so supernaturally.229 Aquinas brings together both the object and 
end of virtue: “Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the 
last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason.”230 Aquinas as captured 
above further expresses the link between the virtues:  
The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, 
inchoatively: i.e., to God Himself immediately. But the soul needs 
further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, 
yet in relation to God. The power of those naturally instilled 
principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. 
Consequently man needs in addition to be perfected by other 
principles in relation to his supernatural end.231 
 
 One of the defining differences between Aquinas and other earlier scholastics 
is that Aquinas explains that the cardinal virtues can be both infused and acquired but 
with a difference in formal object.232 For example, he distinguishes between infused 
and acquired temperance: a person with acquired temperance may fast from food 
based on human reason but the person with infused temperance may fast from food 
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based on Divine rule. In this context, both may share the same material object but 
differ in their formal object.233 Also Aquinas is “able to account for the difference 
between the cardinal and theological virtues by attending to more than the ultimate end 
of virtue”.234  
The above synthesis and categorization of virtues by Aquinas had a far ranging 
influence on later writers within the Thomistic tradition and even outside it. Looking 
at the huge amount of written materials on Aquinas (Neo- Thomists) one can say that 
his teachings have been given varying of interpretations that have even expanded his 
original thought.235  
1.5.4.2.2 The Theological Virtues 
Drawing upon the Patristic tradition and Scripture, Aquinas identifies the divine or 
theological virtues as faith, hope and charity.236 These theological virtues for Aquinas 
cannot be accounted for naturalistically.237 Aquinas explains why they are called 
theological virtues: “First, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us 
aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because 
these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy 
Writ.”238 He reiterates that the theological virtues are needed and not the cardinal 
virtues alone. Although the inclusion of the cardinal virtues is drawn from the 
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distinctly Aristotelian source, Brian Davies in Aquinas brings out the difference 
between Aquinas and Aristotle:  
Aristotle has no belief in God as a Trinity. And he has no notion of 
God becoming human so that people may come to share in the 
divine life. Aquinas, however, does. He also thinks that there can 
be no sharing in the life of Trinity unless God brings about in us 
more than what Aristotle would have taken people to be able to 
bring about simply considered as human beings. Aquinas 
introduces the notion of theological virtues since he believes that 
God is prepared to give us more than we are, or are capable of 
achieving, simply by being human. And he does so because of the 
way he reads the Bible, especially the New Testament . . . that God 
offers people something they cannot achieve on their own.239 
 
We can say that Aquinas places importance on the theological virtues because of his 
conception of the distorted nature of humanity by sin. Humanity cannot save itself and 
so must rely on the grace of God. God alone is the beatitudo that humanity seeks. 
Hence, the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. In the next sub-sections we 
shall explain each of the theological virtues in the light of Aquinas. 
 
 
1.5.4.2.2.1 The Virtue of Faith 
Aquinas begins the Secunda Secundae by treating the virtue of faith; this is because 
faith is about God the First Truth.240 He initially treats faith as an act in general in 
questions one to three, and then proceeds in questions four to sixteen to discuss faith 
as a virtue. For Aquinas, faith is an assent of the intellect and will on the basis of the 
formal object of Truth which is God.241 It is also certainty about things unseen.242 
Aquinas captures the physical and spiritual dimension of the person within his 
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understanding of faith both as an act and as a virtue by acknowledging the fact that it 
is an intellectual assent that comes about through its object and choice.243  
Faith for Aquinas has an end, namely heaven. Therefore, to attain to the perfect 
vision of heaven faith becomes a prerequisite. This is one of the distinguishing 
elements between the Thomistic and Aristotelian conceptions of virtue. 244 
Furthermore, Aquinas distinguishes active faith from passive faith otherwise called 
living faith or lifeless faith. Faith based on divine truth is the living faith while faith 
based only on human reason is the lifeless faith of the philosopher.245  
In contrast to the Pelagians who argued that faith was a product of man’s free 
will, Aquinas argues that God infuses faith. He writes:  
Man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his nature, this 
must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle moving 
him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the assent 
which is the chief act of faith is from God moving man inwardly by 
grace . . . To believe does indeed depend on the will of the believer: 
but man’s will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in order that 
he may be raised to thing which are above his nature.246 
 
The implication is that faith though a gift of God must be accepted and lived by the 
believer. From this context therefore, the “inner act of faith” must be complemented 
by the “outer act of faith”.247 Aquinas here establishes the link between a person’s 
interior motivations and his exterior actions. For this to be possible the gifts of 
understanding and knowledge must correspond and respond to the virtue of faith.248 
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Thus, the effects of faith are to engender appropriate fear of the Lord and purity of 
heart.249 
 Aquinas also considers the vices opposed to faith in question ten: “In due 
sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief, which is contrary to 
faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance 
and dullness of mind, which are contrary to knowledge and understanding.”250  
1.5.4.2.2.2 The Virtue of Hope 
Aquinas devotes only five questions to the treatment of hope. This means that it 
receives the shortest treatment among the theological virtues.251 Perhaps this is so 
because so much was taken for granted then with issues of believe in God. But Josef 
Pieper in Hope argues that there is anthropological presuppositions that supports 
Aquinas’s treatise on hope:  
Hope like love is one of the primordial dispositions of the living person. 
In hope, man reaches ‘with restless heart,’ with confidence and patient 
expectation toward . . . the arduous ‘not yet’ of fulfilment, whether 
natural or supernatural. As a characteristically human endeavour, then 
hoping incarnates a reaching out for anything that is perceived as good, 
and for anticipated fulfilment that the possession of something 
brings.252   
 
Based on the above one should expect that Aquinas to give it a thorough treatment but 
he does not.  
Unlike the virtue of faith, Aquinas delves directly into treating hope as a virtue 
in question seventeen. Hope is a virtue because its object is a future good by means of 
divine assistance: “Our hope attains God Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is 
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therefore evident that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to 
attain its due rule.”253 According to Aquinas there are four distinct characteristics of 
hope:  
First, that it is something good . . . hope regards only the good; in this 
respect hope differs from fear, which regards evil. Secondly, that it is 
future; for hope does not regard that which is present and already 
possessed: in this respect, hope does differ from joy which regards a 
present good. Thirdly, that it must be something arduous and difficult to 
obtain, for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles . . . in this 
respect, hope differs from desire . . . wherefore it belongs to the 
concupiscible, while hope belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourthly, that 
this difficult thing is something possible to obtain: for one does not 
hope for that which one cannot get at all . . . hope differs from 
despair.254 
 
 In this sense hope can be treated partly as an intellectual virtue but more 
concretely as a theological virtue.  
Pointedly, the object of hope is eternal happiness as argued by Aquinas:  
The hope of which we speak now, attains God by leaning on His 
help in order to obtain the hoped for good. Now an effect must be 
proportionate to its cause. Wherefore the good which we ought to 
hope for from God properly and chiefly, is the infinite good, which 
is proportionate to the power of our divine helper, since it belongs to 
an infinite power to lead anyone to an infinite good . . . Therefore the 
proper and principal object of hope is eternal happiness.255 
   
Even though the object of hope is eternal happiness with God, Aquinas also assumes 
that it has secondary objects by referencing “other things” for which we pray to God 
for. From this context, Aquinas integrates again both the mundane and spiritual 
spheres of humanity. But he cautions that God has to be the final end, and He should 
not be used as a means to other goods.256  
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 Aquinas here shows the relationship between the virtues faith and hope. He 
first argues that faith precedes hope.257 But he goes on to show the link in the 
following words:  
Hope is called the entrance to faith, i.e., of the thing believed, 
because by hope we enter in to see what we believe . . . thereby man 
begins to be established and perfected by faith. The thing to be 
hoped for is included in the definition of faith, because the proper 
object of faith, is something not apparent in itself.258 
 
In sum therefore, hope is a virtue that offers the believer a confident drive towards the 
future by overcoming all inhibitions. 
The opposing vices to the virtue of hope are despair, hatred of God, unbelief 
and presumption.259  
   1.5.4.2.2.3 The Virtue of Charity 
The importance Aquinas gives to this virtue is manifested in the number of questions 
devoted to the topic, namely, twenty three to forty-six, which is almost the same 
number of questions devoted to the first two virtues (faith and hope) put together. He 
places a premium to it because he treats it both as a doctrinal and theological piece.  
 Quoting Augustine Aquinas defines: “Charity is a virtue which, when our 
affections are perfectly ordered, unites us to God, for by it we love him.”260 This 
definition delineates the friendship that exists between God and humans of which the 
whole Summa Theologiae is framed. By implication, the virtue of charity enables 
people to achieve the end for which they strive through friendship with God. It is not 
surprising then that Aquinas considers it as the form of all the virtues:  
Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as being their 
exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of efficient cause, 
in so far as it sets the form on all . . . charity is compared to the 
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foundation or root in so far as all other virtues draw their sustenance 
and nourishment therefrom, and not in the sense that the foundation 
and root have the character of a material cause. Charity is said to be 
the end of other virtues, because it directs all other virtues to its own 
end. And since mother is one who conceives within herself and by 
another, charity is called the mother of the other virtues, because, by 
commanding them, it conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the 
desire of the last end.261  
 
By loving God the principal end one loves what God loves. Charity thus esteems both 
the supernatural and natural order as aligned to God. In the supernatural order, man 
shares in the Godhead through the love of neighbour and also through the love of 
one’s body, love of sinners and enemies.262 In the natural order there is the proclivity 
to love friends, our nearest and dearest, namely family members and friends. This is an 
affective relationship, or interpersonal relationship, that occurs in nature. Aquinas thus 
gives both a theological and anthropological explanation to charity. The effects of both 
the supernatural and natural order which is esteemed by charity are joy, peace and 
divine mercy.263 More so, Aquinas conceives these as acts of charity.264 By and large, 
we can claim that charity plays an integrating role among the theological virtues and in 
the life of every Christian.  
At the basis of Aquinas’ theology on charity is the concept of friendship. 
Charity is the virtue that enables the friendship between God and humankind to be 
sustained. Edward Schockenhoff in an article “The Theological Virtue of Charity (IIa-
IIae, qq. 23-46,” claims that Aquinas was the first medieval theologian to insert the 
Aristotelian category of friendship into the virtue of charity as God’s activity of 
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infusion upon humanity.265 Charity becomes the grace-filled friendship of the human 
person for God. Elsewhere, Aquinas uses charity and friendship interchangeably.266 
However, Aquinas does not use the words charity and love interchangeably in 
the Summa. Aquinas in the Summa he uses only charity. It is very likely that he 
avoided using love because of the multiple meanings of the word love as used 
differently by catholic and protestant theologians.267 Some authors in their theological 
reflections on the theological virtues use the term love rather than charity, such as 
Josef Pieper in Faith, Hope, Love.268 But Aquinas consistently uses charity, only using 
love as a principal act of charity.269 Perhaps, Aquinas considers love as a personal 
choice as one can choose to love or not to love that comes from within, while God 
from without directly infuses charity.270 Aquinas considers the following as vices 
against charity: hatred, sloth, envy, discord and schism, and scandal.271 
1.5.4.2.3 The Cardinal Virtues  
The distinguishing factor in the theological virtues is that their objects concern God 
directly. In contrast, the cardinal virtues concerns what modern theologians call 
“innerworldly” activities.272 These include activities like making decisions, engaging 
in relationships filial and erotic, dispensing of goods, confronting difficult situations 
etc. These innerworldly activities are often considered as moral virtues given that the 
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term is used with a broader connotation.273 At the same time the moral virtues are 
called cardinal virtues. Mattison explains that although Aquinas uses the term “moral 
virtues” to refer to the above-mentioned activities but in some instances he uses 
“cardinal virtues” to avoid confusion.274 Here, we choose to use the term “cardinal 
virtues”. 
The cardinal virtues are central to Aquinas’ moral theory because of his 
predisposition towards Aristotelian tradition. He names four of these virtues following 
this tradition: Prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude. They are called acquired 
virtues because their acquisition comes about through repetitive human activity. These 
four virtues order all our appetitive and intellectual powers that make it possible for us 
to perform human acts: prudence orders our practical reasoning, justice orders the will 
while temperance and fortitude order the passions which are divided into 
concupiscible and irascible. Thus, they sufficiently order all the components within us 
that are involved in any moral action.275  
Aquinas further reiterates that for people to act well, it is requisite that not only 
their reason be well disposed through a habitus of intellectual virtue, but also their 
appetite be well disposed through a habitus of cardinal virtues.276 Davies explains the 
above claim by commenting that knowledge is not enough to make a person good, 
because one might have the knowledge of the good but yet be unable to act in the light 
of what he/she knows to be good. 277  Ipso facto, an individual must be engaged both at 
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the level of intellect and will; for a man may have doctorates from the most prestigious 
university and yet not be good.278  
1.5.4.2.3.1 The Virtue of Prudence 
Kerr in After Aquinas: Versions of Thomisms asserts that the word prudence in modern 
language suggests caution: “Sometimes a virtue, often more like a vice, it means a 
habit of being circumspect and discreet, careful above all to avoid undesired 
consequences of a decision.”279 John Connery criticizes the above conception in an 
article “Prudence and Morality” when he says for the modern mind: 
The prudent man is the man who takes no risks. He is a conservative 
who will neither raise head above the crowd nor stand out for it. If 
such prudence is associated with morality at all, it is with a kind of 
moral mediocrity. The prudent man never does anything very bad; 
neither does he do anything very good . . . The less a person did or 
said, the fewer mistakes he would make, and hence the more prudent 
he would be considered.280 
 
What Connery is saying is that prudence of this kind rather stifles and hinders the 
authentic life of perfection and can lead to indifference and permissiveness in moral 
living. Jean-Pierre Torrell agrees in Saint Thomas Aquinas that such a conception of 
prudence suggests a timorous and even negative attitude of action that is 
unacceptable.281  
 For Aquinas prudence is “right reason about things to be done” (recta ratio 
agibilium).282 Torrell expands this Thomistic definition by saying: “Prudence is the 
virtue of decision, of personal responsibility, of risk consciously taken. It closes the 
deliberative processes by daring to prescribe action in a specific situation, singular 
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each time that will never repeat itself as such”.283 From this context Torrell calls 
prudence a virtue of risk. But Torrell misinterprets Aquinas. To understand this we 
must capture the background that informed and shaped Aquinas’s usage of the term. 
Prudence is a derivative of the word “providens”, “prudentia”. Aristotle calls it 
“Phronesis.”284 Kerr explains that Aquinas identifies prudence with the biblical 
doctrine of divine Providence that is, “prudential and providential”.285 Aquinas’ usage 
of providence stems from the fact that the created world was created ‘good’: “In 
created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards 
their order towards an end and especially their last end, which . . . is the divine 
goodness.”286 Thus, God does have a plan for all created things. This plan is what 
Aquinas calls providence. In this sense therefore, prudence cannot be considered as a 
virtue of risk. 
 Prudence is the habitus of choosing (electus) that is making choices.287  For a 
choice to be good, two things are required: First, the intention is directed to a due end 
and this is the work of a moral virtue which includes the appetitive faculty to the good 
that is in accord with reason. Second, the person must rightly utilize the means that 
are required to attain the end. This is only possible by means of reason that knows 
how to counsel, judge and command, which is the function of prudence and the 
virtues annexed to it.288 
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Prudence understood as both an intellectual and moral virtue has a phenomenal 
worth.289 This worth of prudence does not consist in mere thought but in its thorough 
application to human actions. 290  Keenan summarizes Aquinas’ understanding of 
prudence that counters Torrell’s conception of risk:  
Prudence, of course is not the tepid little virtue that warns us against 
taking bold steps. On the contrary, prudence is the virtue that looks 
forward to the overall end of life and sets all subsequent agendas for 
attaining that end and all intermediate ends. Prudence discerns and 
sets the standards for the pursuit of the end and therein helps us to 
articulate the norms of moral action. Moreover, prudence enjoys 
nearly the same function and authority over the moral virtues that 
charity does with the infused virtues . . . prudence unites and 
connects the moral virtues.291 
 
Aquinas stresses the unequivocal place of prudence when he says: “Nobody can be 
virtuous without possessing prudence . . . The other virtues can never be virtues 
unless their seeking is prudently conducted.”292 In this way Aquinas emphasises the 
primacy of prudence over the other cardinal virtues. He demonstrates this primacy 
and excellence in many ways. For instance, he claims that prudence directs the 
cardinal virtues in the choice of means and, specifically because it appoints the mean 
that all virtues are to attain. It is the most excellent of the acquired virtues.293 
Furthermore, prudence is superior because it puts order into acts of reason.294 It plays 
both a directive and perfecting function to all the other cardinal virtues.295  
 The virtue of prudence in its integrative, perfective and directive roles 
fundamentally perfects both the action and the individual who performs it through the 
instrumentality of reason. Vice on the contrary generates actions that are partly or 
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totally not in consonance with right reason. This is either through excess or defective 
use of reason that produces a definite or subtle form of evil. Aquinas identifies those 
vices, which are directly opposed to prudence, and those with a false resemblance to 
prudence which are often due to abuse of the things required of prudence.296 In sum, 
the main vices opposed to prudence are: imprudence and counterfeit prudence, but 
there are others aligned to these.297 
     1.5.4.2.3.2 The Virtue of Justice 
 The virtue of justice is the longest in Aquinas’ treatment of the virtues in the Summa 
Theologiae (qq. 58-122). Possibly, the significance of this is because of the social and 
theological nature of justice for Aquinas.298 A close look at the traditions that Aquinas 
references makes this point clearer: he references classical writers especially 
Aristotle, then the patristic Fathers specially St. Augustine as primary sources. 
Aquinas considers the plurality or diversity of views on justice and claims that it can 
be understood as a virtue in general and in particular.299 Aquinas therefore gives a 
systematic account to these conceptions of justice and integrates it as an essential 
aspect of Christian moral life.  
 Justice in general concerns the common good of the community as its object and 
is guided by what the philosopher calls legal justice.300 For Aquinas general justice is 
identifiable with Aristotle’s legal justice. The distinctive Christian feature Aquinas 
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gives to justice is what makes him different from Aristotle as we shall see later. 
However, elsewhere Aquinas designates general justice as legal justice.301  
 Particular justice concerns matters relating to specific goods that may differ 
from person to person.302 In either way, justice is a most needed virtue in relation to 
both oneself and other human beings. We can say therefore, there are three basic 
relations of justice as proposed by Aquinas: Firstly, the relations of the individuals to 
one another. Secondly, the relations of social whole to individuals, and thirdly, the 
relations of individuals to the social whole.303  
According to Aquinas the other virtues are about the passions but justice is 
about operations from the will.304 Justice both general and particular is expressed 
fittingly in external actions. Although they are prompted by the inner disposition of the 
person they are not directed by the passions. Justice in this way is not a tendency but a 
settled disposition to act in particular ways.305 This is what makes justice distinct from 
fortitude and temperance.306 But Aquinas ignores the fact that the passions when not 
properly ordered can negatively influence the administration of justice in particular 
instances.  
The importance of this virtue is appreciated when one understands that the 
other virtues concern the perfection of a person in relation to himself. But justice 
connects one with other persons: 
It is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct 
man in his relations with others: because it denotes a kind of 
equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to say that 
things are adjusted when they are made equal, for equality is in 
reference of one thing to some other. On the other hand the other 
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virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit him in relation 
to himself, . . . whereas the right in a work of justice, besides its 
relation to the agent, is set up by its relation to others . . . Justice has 
its own proper object over and above the other virtues, and this 
object is called the just, which is the same as right. Hence it is 
evident that right is the object of justice.307 
 
This explains why Aquinas describes justice as the “habitus whereby a person with a 
lasting and constant will renders to each his due with constant and perpetual will”.308 
Aquinas further explains that the inclusion of the words will and perpetual in this 
definition stresses that justice must be done by a voluntary act of will and must be 
firm. But the question remains who and what determines what is due to a person?309 
Traditionally, this has been answered by emphasizing that the goal of justice is “ius” 
often translated as “right”. Ius describes a well-ordered society. But this is not always 
the case. Nonetheless, the just person seeks what is right in relation to others, and 
others in relation to himself/herself.310  
In Aristotle’s view who determines what is due to the other would be the 
philosopher. Within the philosophical tradition there are diversities of opinion on this 
point. For example the categorical imperative of Kant differs from Jeremy Bentham’s 
principle of utility. While Kant says: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you 
can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”311 In this instance one 
acts justly only based on duty or obligation. But there are situations beyond the 
consideration of formal obligations. The principle of utility on the other hand claims: 
“Act always so as to maximize total net balance of pleasures and pains.”312 This means 
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an innocent person can be punished for a greater majority. This concept is both 
reductionist and hedonistic. These principles may to some extent determine what or 
who is due what, but Christian tradition offers a more general perspective. For 
example in Matt. 7:12, Jesus says: “Do unto other as you would have done unto you”. 
This is today called the Golden Rule.  
Aquinas considers two kinds of justice, “distributive” and “commutative” 
justice.313 Even though Aquinas examines these two forms of justice together, he 
shows how different they are: distributive justice distributes common goods equitably, 
while commutative justice is concerned with the reciprocal dealings between two or 
more people.314  Both forms of justice fit into John Rawls assertion of justice in A 
Theory of Justice: Justice “is the first virtue of social institutions”.315 Note that Rawls’ 
use of a plural in the word institutions delineates the overarching importance of the 
virtue of justice in all spheres of life. Aquinas in both forms of justice attempts to 
portray the relational nature of justice. Both distributive and commutative justice form 
an organic whole in Aquinas’ treatment of justice. These two concepts are given a 
more in-depth meaning when Aquinas later introduces the concept of restitution and 
respect for person.316 This implies that justice as a virtue is natural to humanity.317  
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The chief vice of justice is injustice with its annexed vices of reviling, tale 
bearing, cursing, cheating and lying, usury, etc. Aquinas explains these from questions 
sixty-four to seventy-eight in the Summa.  
    1.5.4.2.3.3 The Virtues of Fortitude and Temperance 
Aquinas names fortitude and temperance among cardinal virtues or what he calls 
“human virtues”.318 While the first two cardinal virtues as we have seen perfect the 
will and intellect, these two last cardinal virtues concerned human passions. Hence we 
consider them together. Such virtues help control both the irascible and concupiscible 
powers of a person.319 However, Aquinas accepts fortitude to be one of the gifts of the 
Holy Spirit and corresponds to the fourth beatitude.320  
Fortitude otherwise called courage had a very limited conception prior to and 
during the time of Plato and Aristotle. These considered fortitude in military terms. 
But Aquinas broadened out the idea by way of the Ambrosian concept of courage: 
“Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense, as denoting firmness of mind in face of 
assaults of all kinds . . . For he that can stand firm in things that are most difficult to 
bear, is prepared, in consequence, to resist those which are less difficult.”321 In this 
context there are two aspects to fortitude: Firstly, it is a general virtue denoting 
firmness of mind with respect to all virtues. Secondly, it denotes steadfastness in 
facing practical difficulties or dangers.322 Aquinas notes that although fortitude is a 
passion it must conform its possessor to reason.323 Yet fortitude may also enhance 
reason. The will according to Aquinas can be disinclined to follow that which is in 
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accordance with reason on account of some obstacles, requiring the virtue of 
fortitude.324  
 In Thomistic categories, virtues are considered in relations to the end. In this 
sense fortitude is a virtue of the end. Hence Aquinas introduces the concepts of fear, 
death, and endurance.325 Fear is one of the obstacles that disavow the will from 
following reason. From this perspective, fortitude is the virtue that restrains fear and 
moderates daring.326 Death is the greatest of bodily evils. For Aquinas fortitude is 
what we need in the end for all will have to die either through sickness, battle or 
martyrdom.327 
Pieper suggests that the word fortitude presupposes vulnerability.328 It means 
that people are subject to desires like sex, food, drink and the fear of death. But the 
specific character of fortitude is in suffering injuries in battle for the realization of the 
good. One of the distinctive features in Aquinas’ treatment of fortitude is the 
introduction of the concept of ultimate good. Even though Aristotle argues in his 
Ethics that to be brave fortitude is a good in itself, Aquinas argues differently: “In 
overcoming danger, fortitude seeks not danger itself, but the realization of rational 
good.”329 Here he distinguishes proximate good and ultimate good. The proximate 
good agrees with Aristotle’s identification of fortitude being the good itself but the 
ultimate good Aquinas links to God: “Accordingly, we must conclude that the brave 
man intends as his proximate end to reproduce in action a likeness of his habit, for he 
intends to act in accordance with his habit: but his remote end is happiness or God.”330  
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 According to Aquinas fortitude cannot stand alone. He explains how it is 
linked to other virtues: It has to rely on superior virtues like prudence and justice. In 
this effort of Aquinas, we can see that he begins to fashion out the hierarchy existing 
between the virtues.331 Therefore, the praise of fortitude depends on prudence and 
justice. Pieper sums it up in these words:  
Under the direction of prudence, the good of man becomes 
compellingly evident. Justice primarily brings about the actual 
realization of this good. Fortitude by itself is not the primary 
realization of the good. But fortitude protects this realization or 
clears the road to it.332 
 
However, we must note too that the exercise of other virtues will always need the 
virtue of fortitude. For example, for a judge to pass sentence to someone who is 
considered an influential person in the society, he needs courage.333 Aquinas names 
some of the vices of fortitude, ambition, vainglory, pusillanimity or fear.334 
Lastly, human desires must be governed by a habitus inclining them to suitable 
moderation, namely temperance. Temperance has a wide range of usage in both Greek 
and Latin. Primarily, the Greek usage implies “directing reason” in the widest sense. 
But in Aquinas’ usage as noted by Pieper, the primary and essential meaning of 
temperance is “to dispose various parts into one unified and ordered whole.”335 
Aquinas calls temperance the serenity of the spirit (quies animi).336 Therefore, it 
signifies the realization of the inner order in oneself, differentiating it from other moral 
virtues.  
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It is commonly believed that temperance is a virtue completely against human 
inclinations or pleasures, because it is conceived as curtailment and repression of the 
passions. But Aquinas argues differently: 
Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to it. Where man 
naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to him. Since, however, 
man as such is a rational being, it follows that those pleasures are 
becoming to man which are in accordance with reason. From such 
pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but from those which 
are contrary to reason. Wherefore it is clear that temperance is not 
contrary to the inclination of human nature, but is in accord with it. It 
is, however, contrary to the inclination of the animal nature that is 
not subject to reason.337  
 
The sensitive appetites of the body are good in themselves. But the reason and method 
by which they are pursued determines their rightness or wrongness. Hence, Aquinas 
calls temperance a virtue of moderation:  
Temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly 
concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible goods, viz. 
desire and pleasure . . . Temperance directly moderates the passions 
of the concupiscible which tends towards good, as a consequence, it 
moderates all the other passions . . . Desire denotes an impulse of the 
appetite towards the object of pleasure, and this impulse needs 
control, which belongs to temperance.338 
 
Temperance implies self-preservation not negation. This virtue according to Aquinas 
guards the person against perversion from within, and also protects one from the 
perversion from without.  This virtue concerns the control of the bodily desires like 
sex, food and drinks etc. The modes for the achievement of temperance are chastity, 
continence, humility, gentleness and mildness, while the vices against this virtue are, 
unchastity, incontinence, pride, gluttony and so on. 
By way of concluding this section, this thesis has shown the development of 
virtue ethics over the centuries reaching its apex with the systematic articulation by the 
scholastics of the late medieval era and especially Aquinas. We have seen that these 
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developments have shown a movement in the conception of virtue from purely 
political and philosophical contexts to a valued theological context.  The developments 
of virtue in the medieval era were more conceptual.339 However, the theme of virtue as 
noted by Porter was still part of many literary works and was extensively being used to 
offer pastoral counselling.340 Foundational to the above application of virtue was the 
understanding that whatever way virtue is considered either from a philosophical or 
theological perspective it is always connected to the good of the human person.  
Unfortunately, the next historical period – the modern period – departed from 
the rich tradition of the schoolmen. After the systematisation of the earlier period, 
came a period of delineation and codification with the development of the confessional 
manuals centred on the seven deadly sins. These manuals truncated the highly 
systematic work of the scholastics. The Protestant Reformers like Martin Luther and 
John Calvin criticized the manuals and returned to the moral codes of the scriptures. 
The virtues then were less emphasised in the theological tradition and went into a 
period of decline. What preoccupied the minds of pastors and theologians was sin and 
as a result the commandments were more emphasized.341 Pieper gives another reason: 
“It is true that the classic origins of the doctrine of virtue later made Christian critics 
suspicious of it. They warily regarded it as too philosophical and not Biblical enough. 
Thus, they preferred to talk about commandments and duties than about virtues.”342 
Concurrent with an over-emphasis on the law was a new preoccupation with sin 
particularly understood as a noncompliance to law.  
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1.5.5 Virtue Ethics in the Modern Period (from Fifteenth to Nineteenth 
Century)343 
According to Porter the theological advancements of virtue was in decline with the 
advent of the modern period in the fifteenth century.344 Due to the Reformation, the 
place of the virtues was undermined by two sources. Firstly, there were the objections 
of the Reformers themselves. Secondly the response of the counter-reformation as 
exemplified by Francisco Suárez (1548 –1617) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) who 
emphasised a more principled and so legal approach to the natural law.345 Because of 
the shift in debate the virtues were relegated to the background in theological 
discourses. 346  Catholic Moral theology became primarily preoccupied with 
conversations on natural law and sin. 
This period began with a criticism of scholasticism. For example, Grotius 
criticized the Aristotelian concept of the mean in passion and action. He argues that 
while the mean in action can be found, the mean in the passions seem implausible.347 
But elsewhere Grotius admits that some virtues keep the passions relatively under 
control hence we can talk of moderation. However, he argues that this is not the 
inherent activity of virtue but right reason. Although, Grotius admitted that “no 
antecedent stable set of rules or laws can substitute for the moral knowledge the 
virtuous agent possesses,”348 later developments prioritised the law over character. 
Virtue then became subordinated to duty. This is well captured by John Locke in An 
																																																								
343 Porter, “Virtue Ethics,” 95. According to Porter, the modern period as used here 
stretches from the fifteenth century to the nineteenth century 
344 Ibid. 
345 See Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study, 
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Essay Concerning Human Understanding: “By whatever standard soever we frame in 
our minds the ideas of virtues or vices . . . their rectitude, or obliquity, consists in the 
agreement with those patterns prescribed by some law.”349 A later eighteenth century 
work corroborates Locke’s claims: “A virtuous man is one who has the habit of acting 
conformably to his duties.”350   
  According to Porter, this situation demanded for a new approach to virtues.351 
This gave birth to the moral-sense theory led by David Hume (1711-76). According to 
Hume moral judgment is based not on reason but on sentiments of approval and 
disapproval, feelings or dispositions.352 Hume connects motives with virtues and 
differentiates between natural and artificial virtues based on the general claims that 
“we value virtuous actions only insofar as they express a virtuous character”.353 
Consequently, human action according to Hume is guided by feelings not reason. This 
is clearly stated in Treatise On Human Nature: “Reason is, and ought only to be the 
slave of the passions.”354 According to Porter:  
This represents a break with the dominant classical and medieval 
understanding of the virtues, according to which they are always at 
least informed by rational judgments even if they do not consists in 
knowledge or reasonableness alone. However, Hume does grant that 
one important class of virtue depends on reason indirectly, namely 
artificial virtues such as justice, which presuppose rational social 
conventions for their origin and exercise.355  
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The moral-sense theory seems to have also appealed to Jonathan Edwards 
(1703-1758), a puritan theologian.356 Edwards in The Nature of True Virtue follows 
Hume to hold that moral judgments are based on sentiments not reason.357 Like 
Hume, he also breaks away from the classical medieval conceptions of virtues 
informed by reason. Edwards understands virtue as “the beauty of those qualities and 
acts of the mind that are of moral nature, i.e. such as are attended with desert or 
worthiness of praise and blame.”358 According to Edwards: “The nature of true virtue 
consists in a disposition to benevolence towards being in general; though such a 
disposition may arise exercises of love to particular beings, as objects are presented 
and occasions arise.”359 In this context the being in general can be identified with God 
and particular beings by implication are other humans. For an individual to love God 
makes it possible to love another person. Therefore, true virtue does not arise from 
self-love but rather the love of God, a presupposition that counters the charge that 
virtue ethics is narcissistic.  
 It is to be noted that while the modern period writers like Hume and Edwards 
broke away from the classical tradition, they in some way continued with the tradition 
of Aquinas by giving the virtues a divine reality. However, the moral-sense approach 
by Hume and Edwards was inadequate in providing a comprehensive approach. As a 
result, from the beginning of the ninetieth century to the early part of the twentieth 
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century virtue was not a theme that was prominent among philosophers and 
theologians. 
1.5.6 Contemporary Era: A Challenge for a New Approach (from twentieth 
century to present) 
In the previous sections this thesis outlined the fact that the eclipse of the theme of 
virtues can be traced back to the overly legalistic emphasis on natural law of the 
Manualists and Casuists. In contrast, the late twentieth century can be regarded as an 
era of retrieval, and perhaps some modification of virtue ethics. Charles Curran in the 
foreword to a collection of readings on Virtue states:  
Virtue is a most important subject in moral theology, but until a few 
decades ago it lived mostly in the shadows of the discipline. In recent 
decades, writing on virtue has re-emerged spectacularly in both 
philosophical and theological ethics. In the realm of Roman Catholic 
theological ethics . . . this return to the language of virtue finds its 
roots in the mid-twentieth-century turn to the subject.360 
 
Recalling earlier sections of this chapter, there were two phases in this renewal. 
The first phase of the retrieval was dominated by the philosophical tradition, which we 
introduced in the first section of this thesis.361 Within this tradition, the pioneering 
works of Elizabeth Anscombe, Georg Henrik von Wright, Peter Geach, and Alasdair 
MacIntyre are remarkable.362  
Special attention is deserved by the works of Anscombe and MacIntyre, 
reaffirmed by B. Talbot in Retrieval of Ethics: “The two texts that are most widely 
cited as the starting points and the inspiration for the [virtue ethics] movement are 
Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” and Alasdair MacIntyre’s “After 
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Virtue.””363 Correspondingly, D. Statman in “What is Virtue Ethics All About?” 
writes: “The Debate which inaugurated much of the renewed interest in the virtues 
began with Anscombe’s article, “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958).”364  
Anscombe in her article “Modern Moral Philosophy,” attacked the legalistic 
tradition called deontology and dangers of consequentialism by proposing neo-
Aristotelian approach to virtue as the comprehensible substitute.365 She argues: 
Anyone who has read Aristotle’s Ethics and has also read modern 
moral philosophy must have been struck by the great contrasts 
between them. The concepts which are prominent among them 
moderns seem to be lacking or at any rate buried or far in the 
background, in Aristotle . . . It might be possible to advance to 
considering the concept “virtue” with which, I suppose, we should 
be beginning some sort of a study of Ethics.366 
 
MacIntyre like Anscombe based his work primarily on Aristotle.367 Unlike most moral 
philosophers, MacIntyre through most of his works beginning from After Virtue to his 
recent work Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues 
argues that virtue theory provides a wider context of human teleology and 
dispositional history than action based ethics.368 One of the distinguishing factors 
about MacIntyre’s approach is captured by Patterson: “His decision to formulate a 
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grounding of the virtues in terms broader than on the basis of an analysis of human 
nature.”369  
The second phase of the retrieval of virtues is theological. As named in section 
I, some twentieth century catholic theologians such as Fritz Tillmann and Bernard 
Häring recognised the necessity of such a renewal shortly before Vatican II.370 These 
theologians first turned to Scripture as a central source and later to the theme of 
virtues. For example, Tillmann departed from the principle based approach to 
Scripture. In his book first published as Der Meister Ruft (The Master Calls) in 1934, 
he argues that the central theme in Christian moral life is discipleship, that is the 
imitation of Christ through the virtues.371 We shall elaborate on this in chapter three of 
this thesis. Häring in Law of Christ written in 1963 argues that the Christian moral life 
cannot be reduced to only the observation of moral norms, but that the foundation of 
the Christian moral life is found in the virtues, precisely the theological virtues.372 He 
explains that through the theological virtues we are placed in dialogue with God 
through Christ:  
The theological virtues give to us an interior relationship to Christ, 
our Teacher, Redeemer, and Friend. They are the inner capacity, the 
divine invitation and obligation to imitate Christ, because Christ is 
for us the sole cause of this God-like life flowing from these virtues 
is nothing other than actual imitation of Christ, harkening to Christ, 
hoping in Christ, obediently loving Christ.373 
Surprisingly, even after Vatican II the neglect of virtue ethics continued for 
quite a period. Some scholars like David Cloutier and William C. Mattison III have 
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recently observed the neglect in major theological works of the post-conciliar period 
of 1968-1993.374 Major textbooks that were being used in seminary formation were 
devoid of the theme of virtues. For example, the fifteen volumes of Readings in 
Moral Theology edited by Charles Curran and Richard McCormick overlooked virtue 
ethics, until the sixteenth volume edited by Curran and Lisa Fullam titled Virtue. 
Other resource books exemplified the same lacuna such as Richard Gula’s Reason 
Informed by Faith (1989) and Timothy O’Connell’s  Principles for a Catholic 
Morality (1990).375  
A significant new direction was marked out by Servais Pinckaers in his The 
Sources of Christian Ethics (1995). The same year Gula utilises character and virtue 
ethics in Ethics for Pastoral Ministry – of which a second edition, Just Ministry was 
published in 2010.376 O’Connell also shifts towards virtue ethics in a later work 
entitled Making Disciples. 377 Cloutier and Mattison III further accuses Germain 
Grisez in his The Way of the Lord Jesus vol. 1 of the same neglect.378 However, 
Grisez in a later volume briefly integrates virtue. Very recently the theological 
landscape has been filled with works on the virtues. Some works draw together older 
pieces under the new organising principle of virtue. For example, Benedict XVI’s  
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The Virtues (2010), edited by Jacquelyn Lindsey, collects some of Benedict’s 
speeches where he references virtues.379  
Most recently, Michael W. Austin in Virtues in Action: New Essays in Applied 
Virtue Ethics (2013) puts together well written articles on virtue ethics encompassing 
areas like professional virtue, social virtue, environmental virtue.380 The implication 
of the above is that the contemporary approaches on virtue ethics is reflected not only 
in theological fields but also in the philosophical, economic and social spheres of 
life.381  
The theologians under study in this thesis – Romanus Cessario, James Keenan 
and Joseph Kotva – are contemporary theologians who have shown great interest in 
the field by elucidating different aspects of virtue ethics to fit coherently into different 
aspects of moral theology. For example, Cessario argues that the moral life is based on 
the traditional virtues of Christian literature and wisdom from the Thomistic tradition. 
He therefore offers an interpretation that seeks meaning by returning to original 
sources, often termed Ressourcement.382  Keenan privileges virtue ethics as a method 
																																																								
379 Pope Benedict XVI, The Virtues, collected and ed. Jacquelyn Lindsey (Indiana: 
Our Sunday Visitor, 2010).  
380 Michael W. Austin, Virtues in Action: New Essays in Applied Virtue Ethics (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
381 MacIntyre, After Virtue 2nd ed., ix. See also Maria Carl, “Law, Virtue and 
Happiness in Aquinas’ Moral Theory,” The Thomist 61, 1 (January 1997): 425; 
Robert B. Kruschwitz and Robert C. Roberts eds. The virtues: Contemporary Essays 
on Moral character (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1987), 237-63; James F. Kenaan, “Virtue 
Ethics and Sexual Ethics,” Louvain Studies 30, 3 (2005): 182. This is the basic idea 
that Kotva reflects in his book, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 5. On the 
economic and social life see Robert Keen, “Virtue is a Necessity,” Tablet (8 
November 2008): 4-5. Interestingly, the renewed interest on virtue is again reflected 
in best-sellers: Andrew M. Greeley, “The Cardinal Virtues” (New York: Warner 
Books, 1990). Kotva cites another best-seller, William J. Benett, “The Book of 
Virtues: A Treasury of Great Moral Stories” (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993). 
382 This shall be further explained in chapter two. 
	 83 
of building bridges between Scripture and moral theology.383 More importantly, he 
develops a concept of virtue that is relational in nature because he considers the human 
person as the center of normative ethics. And Joseph J. Kotva appeals to the Gospel of 
Matthew and Paul’s letters to express the concerns of virtue towards personal and 
communal growth.384  
In sum, contemporary approach to virtue ethics is distinct from other eras for a 
number a reasons. Firstly, the theological position taken by contemporary theologians 
are intended to counter action-based ethics. Secondly, Anscombe, MacIntyre, Haring, 
Tillmann and others argue that virtue ethics provides a wider field for human 
flourishing than principled-based ethics. Finally, another distinctive feature of this era 
is the extension of virtue ethics to other fields of study like medical ethics, legal and 
media ethics.  
1.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter began by way of reading backwards: from where we are. It justified the 
renewal called by Vatican II and argued that virtue ethics is an integral part of the 
renewal. It also thematically explicated the eclipse and retrieval of the theology of 
virtues. This enabled us to place into proper perspective virtue ethics within the 
general historical settings. The history of virtue ethics has been drawn from both 
classical moral tradition and theological traditions: the cardinal virtues drawn upon 
from Plato and Aristotle while the theological virtues from the Augustinian, 
Ambrosian and Thomistic traditions. This means that the history of virtue ethics 
encompasses diverse approaches. According to Porter: “It would be a mistake to 
assume that there is one definitive form of virtue ethics, or even that all virtue 
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ethicists would agree about the meaning and implications of the concept of virtue.”385 
The implication of this statement is substantiated by the different approaches to virtue 
ethics in contemporary theology. This is because there is an extension of virtue ethics 
into sexual ethics, medical ethics, pastoral life, legal and media ethics, business ethics 
etc. Therefore, virtue ethics provides a wider framework for the application of the 
will, dispositions of character, prudential judgment and even the passion in various 
fields of human study.386  
 One of the great strengths of the history of virtue ethics is that unlike its rivals 
deontology and consequentialism, it has a long history of interaction with moral 
theology by its engagement with Wisdom literature in the Old Testament, the ethical 
teaching of Paul in the New Testament and the systematization of Aquinas.387 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ROMANUS CESSARIO: A THEOLOGICAL-ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
APPROACH  
2.0 Introduction 
Born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1944, Romanus Cessario is an American theologian, 
presently serving as a professor of systematic theology in St. John’s seminary, 
Brighton, Massachusetts, and at the Theological Institute of Fribourg, Switzerland, 
specializing in sacramental and moral theology.  
 Of particular interest to Cessario is the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. He 
serves as an Associate Editor, The Thomist (1980 to date) and a member of the 
Advisory Board, Center for Thomistic Studies, University of St. Thomas (1999 to 
date). He is also General Editor of Catholic Moral Thought Series, The Catholic 
University of America Press (1995 to date). As a moral theologian, he is a visiting 
Professor at Pontifical John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family 
American campus, Washington, D.C, Australian campus, East Melbourne, and 
Victoria. He is a member of and has held offices within many academic organizations 
including the Academy of Catholic Theology (2007 to date), the Ramsey Colloquium, 
Religion and Public Life Institute (1998 to date) and the Society of Christian Ethics 
(1994 to date). 
 In the course of this chapter, I will first situate Cessario as a theologian and 
then examine his over-all theological structure on the virtues. Thereafter, I will outline 
themes that will help articulate the community or relational value of virtue ethics in the 
current moral landscape. 
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2.1 Situating Romanus Cessario  
As outlined in chapter one, contemporary scholarly study has identified lapses in the 
way moral theology was practiced over the recent centuries.1 One of those lacunae was 
in the area of virtue ethics. Cessario ascertains: “The history of the treatment of 
Catholic moral theology of moral virtues, . . . exhibit uneven patterns of interest.”2 He 
goes further to state:  
During the four centuries that preceded the opening of the Second 
Vatican Council in 1962, happiness and virtue and the developed or 
infused ‘connaturality’ that unites them in the human person were not 
the themes that dominated Catholic Moral teaching. Moral teachers of 
course spoke about eternal happiness, but not as an end or object that 
shapes concrete human conduct and that can be experienced, at least in 
some measure, here and now by those who live a virtuous life. They 
rather spoke about eternal happiness as a future reward for right 
conduct. Moral teachers did write about the virtues, but not as the 
preferred way to describe the requirements of the everyday moral life. 
Nor is there much evidence that the Christian people received 
instruction on how to appreciate virtue’s ‘connaturality’ . . . The 
Christian virtues were displaced from moral theology . . . The 
displacement of the virtues from moral theology changed the way 
Christians thought about the moral life.3  
 
Cessario argues more succinctly:  
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From the Council of Trent until the Second Vatican Council, the casuist 
systems, which we may provisionally define as a morality based on the 
formation of conscience, and the obligation to obey duly established 
norms, largely eclipsed the virtue tradition of moral theology that 
guided Roman Catholic moral theology since its beginning in the 
patristic era.4 
 
This context helps to explain the depth and urgency of the pastoral direction, which 
Vatican II initiated, in the renewal of moral theology as a whole and the retrieval of 
virtue ethics in particular.5  
Therefore, Cessario sets out to respond to the on-going renewed interest in 
virtue ethics, one that has been sustained by developments in several disciplines 
particularly the psychological sciences, philosophy and theology itself. 6  Cessario 
delineates his primary aims as follows: First, to illustrate that the moral life is based on 
traditional virtues in Christian literature and instructions. 7  He proceeds on the 
supposition that the virtuous life is revealed through eternal law, natural law and 
gospel law of grace.8 Secondly, Cessario seeks to explore in all his works the value of 
theological instruction about the virtues in appreciating, protecting and promoting 
human life among different religious faiths and other people of good will.9 Thirdly, to 
provide valuable tools about the virtues to students at all levels and to provide 
meaningful dynamics for the moral life of Christians in general.10  
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Cessario’s general framework on the virtues is drawn from the theological 
system of St. Thomas Aquinas. He writes: “Although the theology of the virtues 
presented . . . draws upon many resources, the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas remains 
the central influence. In the thirteenth century, Aquinas distinguished himself by 
developing a moral theology of the virtues.”11 Of Aquinas, Charles Curran observes 
that: “there is a persistent tension between philosophy and theology in the writings and 
legacy of Thomas Aquinas.”12 This trend is depicted in the various interpretations and 
approaches of Thomistic ethics on the virtues.13 For example, “Jean Porter in her 1990 
book The Recovery of Virtue deals only with the philosophical aspect of Aquinas and 
brackets the theological.”14 In comparison, Cessario in his 1991 book Moral Virtues 
and Theological Ethics emphasizes the theological aspect of Thomistic notion of 
virtues. 15  However, Aquinas’s theological ethics can be harmonized with his 
philosophical ethics. 
In my effort to situate Cessario, I consider him as a primary interpreter of 
Aquinas. Porter in a recent article criticizes Cessario for being too faithful to Aquinas: 
“While I find this book The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, to be illuminating 
in many ways, however, he does seem to me to assume too quickly that Aquinas’s 
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moral theory is closed to any further development.”16 Yet as Aidan Nichols argues in 
“Thomism and the Nouvelle Theologie,”: “The job of Thomas’s interpreters was not 
merely to retrieve his spirit but to integrate issues of contemporary import into his 
universal verity.”17 This is the exactly what Cessario does as he interprets Aquinas. 
Cessario may be described as a “Ressourcement Thomist.” Ressourcement is a 
twentieth Catholic movement that has had a powerful impact on contemporary 
Catholic theology.18 Ressourcement is a French neologism with no corresponding 
English word. According to Gabriel Flynn in an article “The Twentieth-Century 
Renaissance in Catholic Theology” the word was first coined by French poet and social 
critic Charles Péguy (1873-1914).19 It is a movement marked by “a return to sources, 
or renewal through return to sources”. It is a movement according to Deem that began 
with some Catholic scholars in the early part of the twentieth century to return to the 
first interpreters of Christian revelation, the Church Fathers and consequently Aquinas 
who heavily relied on them.20 Therefore, the renewal of theology entails a return to 
																																																								
16 Jean Porter, “The Fundamental Option, Grace, and the Virtue of Charity,” in 
Readings in Moral Theology No. 16: Virtue, ed., Charles E. Curran and Lisa A. Fullam 
(New York: Paulist Press, 2011), 186 note 17. 
17 Aidan Nichols, “Thomism and the Nouvelle Theologie,” The Thomist, 64 (2000): 13-
14. 
18 Michael Deem, “Culture and Theology: The Ressourcement Movement (Part 1)” 
vox-nova.com/2008/03/30/culture-and-theology-ressourcement-movement-part-1 
(accessed August 15, 2013).  
19 Gabriel Flynn, “The Twentieth-Century Renaissance in Catholic Theology,” in 
Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology ed. 
Gabriel Flynn and Paul D. Murray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4. 
20 Deem, “Culture and Theology.” There are progenitors to this movement but those 
who gave the movement a definitive shape are; Francisco Suarez, Domingo Bañez, and 
John of St. Thomas. See Jose Pereira, Suarez: Between Scholasticism and Modernity 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007). Later on the works of Maurice 
Blondel, Action (1893): Essay on a Critique of life and Science of Practice, trans. 
Oliva Blanchette (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); Pierre 
Rousselot, The Intellectualism of Saint Thomas, trans. James E. O’Mahoney (New 
York: Sheed and Ward, 1935) and Joseph Maréchal, A Maréchal Reader, trans. Ed. 
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roots in theology in the writings of the early Church Fathers, in order to understand 
their basic ideas and interpret them into contemporary theology and world.21  
One of the great figures of the ressourcement movement was Henri de Lubac, 
and in particular his work entitled Catholicism. What makes de Lubac stand out among 
others is: “The conviction that the treasury of Patristic theology does not wear thin 
along the historical terrain traversed by Christianity and that Christianity cannot meet 
the exigencies of modern times without rediscovering its essence through return to its 
sources in the church Fathers.”22 In fact Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger wrote in the 
forward of the aforementioned book: “De Lubac makes visible to us in a new way the 
fundamental intuition of Christian faith so that from this inner core all the particular 
elements appear in a new light . . . whoever reads de Lubac’s book will see how much 
more relevant theology is the more it returns to its center and draws from its deepest 
sources.”23  
Cessario returns to two invaluable sources in Christian history, namely, the 
early Church Fathers and Thomas Aquinas. Stephen M. Fields, citing Marcellino 
D’Ambrosio, in an article “Ressourcement and the Retrieval of Thomism for the 
Contemporary World,” identified in Thomas a similar quality to the Church Fathers: 
“Like the Fathers of the church whom the movement pledged to revive, Thomas ‘held 
theology, spirituality, and pastoral practice in a dynamic and vital unity’, even as he 
																																																																																																																																																																
Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970). For a comprehensive historical 
development of the movement see Flynn and Murray eds., Ressourcement: A 
Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology, 1-289. 
21 Ibid. 
22  Michael Deem, Part II: The Ressourcement Movement: Henri de Lubac 
percaritatem.com/2006/10/25/part-ii-ressourcement-movement-henri-de-lubac/ 
(accessed August 15, 2013). 
23 Henri de Lubac, Catholicism, trans. Lancelot C. Sheppard and Elizabeth Englund 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988).  
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maintained a dialogue with the currents of his time.”24 A close reading of the works of 
Cessario reveals the extent of this retrieval.  
The categorization of Cessario as a Ressourcement Thomist is also made in a 
recent book titled Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments and the 
Moral Life. Reinhard Hütter and Matthew Levering in the introduction of this book 
capture: “The present volume honours Romanus Cessario by witnessing to the renewal 
of Thomistic theology.”25 The editors indicate the role Cessario has played in the 
endeavour to retrieve the thoughts of Aquinas: “Realizing much sooner, than many 
others that ressourcement does not dispense with, but in fact requires, Thomism, he 
figures as one of the truly influential theologians of our time.”26 Cessario himself 
declares: “One can practice a sound moral theology by employing fully and honestly 
the classical sources that from the beginning have nourished the discipline, and at the 
same time honour the magisterium as a guide on contemporary problems and issues.”27 
Cessario again indicates that sources from the New Testament, early Church Fathers 
notably St. Augustine and Medieval Scholastics especially Aquinas are credible in this 
endeavour.28 
With regard to virtue ethics therefore, this method will lead Cessario to utilise 
the works of early church Fathers.29 For example in his book The Moral Virtues and 
																																																								
24  Stephen M. Fields, “Ressourcement and the Retrieval of Thomism for the 
Contemporary World,” in Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-
Century Catholic Theology, ed. Gabriel Flynn and Paul D. Murray (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 355.  
25 Reinhard Hütter and Matthew Levering eds., Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred 
Doctrine, the Sacraments and the Moral Life, Essays in Honour of Romanus Cessario 
(Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 1. 
26 Ibid., 3 




Theological Ethics, Cessario argues that the subject of virtue ethics in the Christian 
moral life is given its first sustained treatment by the fourth century apologist 
Lactantius in his work entitled Divine Institutiones. 30  In book six, chapter five, 
Lactantius argues that virtue is an interior reality, which shapes human capacities to 
perform good actions. It is a property of each individual: virtue is altogether our own, 
for it depends upon the will of doing that good.31 He makes a distinction between 
virtue and knowledge: “Knowledge cannot be virtue, because it is not within us, but it 
comes from without.”32 Therefore, the knowledge of good and evil in itself is not 
virtue. Virtue is in the very performance of good acts and the avoidance of evil acts: 
“Yet knowledge is so united with virtue, that knowledge precedes virtue, and virtue 
follows knowledge because knowledge is of no avail unless it is followed by action.”33  
Another early Church Father that Cessario cites in the development of his virtue 
ethics is St. Augustine.  One of Augustine’s most cited texts is On The Free Choice of 
the Will, in which Augustine introduces the topic of virtue ethics and discusses the 
virtues in relation to the eternal law, reason and wisdom. 34  In his attempt to explain 
how the human person comprehends and applies both eternal and temporal laws, he 
																																																								
30 Ibid. See also Lucius Caelius Firmianus Lactantius, De Opificio Dei, Chapter 12; 
Lactantius, Complete Works, trans. William Fletcher, in The Ante-Nicene Christian 
Library, vol. 21-22 (Edinburgh, 1871), republished as The Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 7 
(Buffalo: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1899-1900); Divine Institutes, trans. 
With introduction and notes by Anthony Bowen and Peter Garnsey (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2003). 
31 Lactantius, Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 7, tran. William Fletcher and ed. Alexander 
Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe (Buffalo: Christian Literature 
Publishing Co., 1886), chap. 5. See also Cessario, Moral Virtues and Theological 
Ethics, 1-2.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid. 
34 St. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, Bk. 1. 
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claims that both laws provide pattern and guidance to the will in making choices.35 But 
he adds that this dialectic is not automatic, for there exist possibilities of going astray. 
In his opinion this is the point where the cardinal virtues come into play. Augustine 
maintains that it is the will that turns out to be decisive in determining whether reason 
the higher portion of the human being or the desires or the appetites or passions that 
prevail.36 This is the point where Cessario departs from Augustine: “Virtue implies 
more than the will to commit a virtuous action. Authentic virtue exists only when the 
human person possesses a certain interior conformity of both the cognitive and the 
appetitive powers to the purpose or goals of a virtuous life.”37  
Augustine again brings in another possible perfection of the human person 
namely wisdom. While Augustine treats wisdom to be wider than prudence, Cessario 
systematically harmonizes them but qualifies wisdom as Christian wisdom.38 He holds 
that while practical reason intervenes at particular moments of moral choice, their 
normative character derives from sources which remain a priori, and therefore 
independent of cumulative human experience and inclinations.39 But on the other hand: 
Christian wisdom develops in an individual, at least in part, as 
a result of both inclination and experience. Thus, Aquinas 
insists that the moral virtues and prudence operate according to 
a kind of synergy, that is they exercise a causal influence on 
each other. As a result of this synergy of prudence and the 
virtues, Christian wisdom, in accord with lex aeterna, really 
enters into and shapes the appetitive life of the individual.40 
 
In other instances Cessario treats wisdom and prudence independently: 
“Prudence, even though a virtue of the mind, operates differently than the virtues of 
																																																								
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 78. 




the speculative intellect, wisdom, science and understanding.”41 Prudence therefore 
operates as a virtue in connection with the inclinations of the human person to achieve 
a goal.  
The reading of Thomas in alignment with the Church Fathers identifies 
Cessario as a Ressourcement Thomist. But the emphasis on Thomas himself also 
marks Cessario as a realist moral theologian. According to David Brink in “Moral 
Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness,” moral 
realism is the metaphysical claim that there are objective moral facts that imply true 
moral propositions.42 For Cessario such metaphysical and moral realism is epitomised 
in the tradition of St. Aquinas.43 
Cessario is more specific than Brink when he argues that moral realism begins 
with the assumption that we can know reality.44 Aquinas in Summa Theologica writes: 
“The first act of human intellect is to know being, namely a reality as the first and 
proper object of the understanding, just as sound is the first and proper object of 
hearing, the sight is the first and proper object of our eyes.”45  
																																																								
41 Ibid., 87. 
42 David Brink, “Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and 
Queerness,” in Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. Louis P. 
Pojman (California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1989), 421. Ibid., 1. See also Franklin I. 
Gamwell, “Moral Realism and Religion,” Journal of Religion 73 (1993): 479-495. 
43 Cessario, Introduction to Moral theology, 17-22. See S.W. Blackburn, “Moral 
Realism,” in Morality and Moral Reasoning: Five Essays in Ethics, ed. John Casey 
(London: Methuen, 1971), 101-124. 
44 Jim Wishloff, “The Land of Realism and the Shipwreck of Idea-ism: Thomas 
Aquinas and Milton Friedman on the Social Responsibilities of Business,” Journal of 
Business Ethics 85 (2009): 3. 
45 ST q. 5, a.2 
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Philosophical and moral ethicists may have a more limited view about moral 
realism, paving a way to confusion.46 But Thomistic moral realism according to 
Cessario: “Provides the most promising way to overcome the confusions and some of 
the characteristic of much of Christian ethics.”47 Cessario himself claims that in order 
to understand the moral life in line with the church’s teachings one has to have 
recourse to the moral realism of Aquinas.48 Cessario thus offers us four features of 
realist moral theology within the Thomist tradition.49 
 Firstly, a realist theology according to the Thomistic tradition has and is 
derived from one source namely sacra doctrina, which refers to the nature of divine 
teaching itself. According to Aquinas sacra doctrina both treats divine realities and 
regulates human ways of acting.50 Secondly, moral theology is a science of faith. 
God’s truthfulness alone, as mediated through the witness of Scripture and Tradition 
and safeguarded by the Magisterium ensures the authenticity of the revealed teaching 
about morals. Thirdly, realist moral theology is concerned with explaining the good 
ends of human flourishing and not to expound whatever ecclesiastical pronouncements 
say about them. Fourthly, all forms of moral realism must reflect the central place of 
the Holy Spirit in the moral life of the believer.51 Thus, the whole theological 
framework of Cessario is built upon these features of a realist theology. Cessario 
concludes:  
Moral theology must first recognize ‘the principles of the moral order 
which spring from human nature itself’ as to many reflections of God’s 
																																																								
46 Cessario, Introduction to Moral theology, 1, footnote 1. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 17-22. 
50 ST Ia, q. 1, a. 4.  
51 Cessario, Introduction to Moral theology, 17-22. 
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purposes and designs for the world- what Aquinas calls the Eternal 
Law. Likewise, although moral realism accords to human persons the 
highest dignity in the created order, it reserves to God the highest 
dignity simply speaking. Therefore, realist moral theology makes divine 
wisdom, not human reason, the ultimate measure of created morality, so 
that while right reason plays an important role in the development of a 
virtue-centered life, rationalizations about human conduct do not.52 
 
From the foregoing, we can see how Aquinas remains a central influence to 
Cessario. As seen in chapter one, Aquinas provided a profound and new synthesis in 
theological reflection especially on the virtues 53  According to Cessario, such a 
synthesis supported the immense interest in Aquinas on the virtues in medieval era and 
today.54 
Hütter and Levering also observe the influence Cessario has had in promoting 
the Thomistic tradition.55 He has been involved in a number of other publications in 
order to further disseminate the work of Aquinas.56 Cessario in his work A Short 
History of Thomism reiterates the relevance of the Thomistic tradition in the present 
enquiry on virtue ethics.57 And in general: “Thomism remains an active intellectual 
tradition in both secular and religious circles.”58 
 Another key feature of Cessario’s work is how it is placed at the service of 
faith. Hence, Cessario examines and applies the virtues in the light of Christian faith 
recognizing the impact the church has had over society and its members: 
																																																								
52 Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics 2nd ed., 6-7. 
53  See Thomas Franklin O’Meara, Thomas Aquinas: Theologian (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 20.  
54 Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics 2nd ed., 6. 
55 Hütter and Levering eds., Ressourcement Thomism, 16. 
56 Ibid., 17. See Cessario, “Theology at Fribourg,” The Thomist 51 (1987): 329.  
57 Romanus Cessario, A Short History of Thomism (Washington, D. C: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2003). First published in French and later in Italian with 
the title: IL Tomismo E I Tomisti. 
58 Ibid., 12 
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For the Catholic Church is by the will of Christ the teacher of truth. It is 
her duty to proclaim and teach with authority the truth which is Christ 
and, at the same time, to declare and confirm by her authority the 
principles of the moral order which spring from human nature itself.59 
 
An example of such an influence in his work is in the difference between the 
two editions of Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics in which the second includes the 
authoritative texts of church documents like Veritatis Splendor and Deus Caritas Est. It 
also supports his grounding of moral theology in sacra doctrina. Therefore, Cessario 
connects his explication of the virtues with papal documents and especially documents 
that address fundamental questions of moral theology such as Veritatis Splendor. Such 
an approach responds to the criticism that virtue ethics ignores the authority of Biblical 
and Church teaching. Cessario does engage virtue ethics with scripture especially the 
New Testament. However, he has been criticised for providing a poor engagement.60 
But most importantly, Cessario shows the interconnection between the personal, 
communal, and ecclesial life.61 
Alongside the conceptions of Cessario as Ressourcement Thomist and a realist 
moral theologian Cessario seeks to disclose a virtuous life that is theologically founded 
upon Christ. It is a claim Cessario himself makes: “To seek a warrant for this claim 
leads one to the central message that Christ came to reveal to the world. It is the 
incarnate Son who announces that the Blessed Trinity exists as both the final cause of 
all human activity and the true perfection of the human person.”62  
																																																								
59 Vatican II, Dignitatis Humanae, no. 14. 
60 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 64. 
61 Cessario, The Virtues and the Examined Life, especially chapters three and five. 
62 Cessario, Introduction to Moral theology, 212. 
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In the next section, I shall examine how Cessario understands human nature, 
and shall seek to unpack his theological reflections on the virtues. Cessario brings a real 
depth in his interpretation of Aquinas in an era of renewed interest in the virtues. 
Drawing upon the published works cited earlier, this thesis will give an expository 
background towards understanding Cessario’s theology of the virtues. 
2.2 Over-all Theological Structure  
According to Cessario, the current debates about the principles of moral theology; the 
place of Magisterial teachings, the rights of individuals to make choices have 
challenged and somewhat changed the way a Christian may examine his or her 
conscience.63  The presuppositions of Revisionism and casuistry remain rule-centered 
no matter how they are presented today.64 Conversely, a new approach is urgent in 
current moral reflection. This motivated Cessario’s publication of 1991 edition of The 
Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics. Here, he illustrates a moral life based on the 
traditional virtues in Christian literature and instructions. Furthermore, Cessario argues 
for the theological aspects of the Thomistic idea that the Christian moral virtues are 
infused and not acquired.65 He argues again that since virtue is called by Aristotle and 
Aquinas a “habitus of acting according to reason”, when something is “against reason” 
it is in its most fundamental sense against virtue too.66  
																																																								
63 Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 2-3. 
64 Ibid., 3. Cessario gives an elaborate explanation to the revisionist and casuist 
outlook. See his works, “Casuistry and Revisionism: Structural Similarities in Method 
and Content,” in Humanae Vitae: 20 anno dopo, Atti dell II Congresso Internazionale 
di Teologia Morale (Milano: Edizioni Ares, 1989), 385-409; Introduction to Moral 
Theology, 229-242. 
65 Ibid. 
66 See ST I-II q. 64.a.1. 
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The claims Cessario makes are from a fundamental morality that explains why a 
life of both faith and reason leads invariably to a virtuous life and consequently perfect 
happiness. His chief concern in this book is the moral virtues. In chapter seven of the 
second edition he examines some official church documents that bear on both the 
cardinal and theological virtues.67 Cessario affirms: “Drawing on these documents that 
interest religious and all people of good will, the new concluding chapter aims to 
illustrate the perennial value of theological instruction about the moral virtues for 
safeguarding human life and society.”68 The difference between the two editions 
typifies the dynamism of thought and faithfulness to the church teaching. However 
there are similarities. In both editions, Cessario discusses important topics like 
personality, habitus and its development, character and growth in the Christian life, 
communio and the moral life and many other topics. Cessario discusses the theoretical 
framework of virtue ethics in these books by introducing the reader to the original 
synthesis of theological ethics.69 
 It is in another work, entitled The Virtues or the Examined Life, that Cessario 
treats the seven virtues individually. What runs through them all is that Cessario 
examines the basic features of the Christian moral life within the Person of Christ who 
is the norm for judging the Christian moral action. He argues that the vocation of the 
Christian is in transforming the seculum by a virtuous life, a point stressed by Pope 
John Paul II in the encyclical Christifideles laici.70 Cessario unequivocally argues that 
																																																								
67 Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics 2nd ed., ix.  
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., 6. 
70 See Cessario, The Virtues and the Examined Life, vi. 
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every human action streams from the person’s union with Christ who is virtue 
personified.71  
Consequently, this study identifies Cessario’s general structure to be anchored 
upon a theology of participation. The theology of participation was originally 
developed from Platonic tradition, signifying the derivation of temporal diversity from 
eternal unity and the structural dependence of the many on the one.72  But as used in 
Christian tradition especially by the church Fathers and Scholastics, the concept means 
the dependence of creatures on the creator in the order of efficient, exemplary and final 
causality. 73  However, there developed a Thomistic notion to the concept of 
participation from the concept of Esse as the Actus essendi that is participation by 
similitude and composition.74 To connect this principle to the virtues Aquinas asserts 
that human intuitive knowledge of the first principles resembles Angelic “Intellection” 
while man’s more characteristic knowledge is reasoning whereby he reaches out to 
reality through the moral virtues.75 Therefore, the excellent participation is seen in 
Christ’s sharing of human nature: “God not only renewed the human race but gave 
humanity the power to become partakers of divinity through the grace of Christ.”76 
Similarly, Cessario examines virtues from the theological-anthropological standpoint 
that begins and is sustained in Christ.  
In another article entitled “The Meaning of Virtue in the Christian Moral Life: 
Its significance for Human life Issues”, Cessario unpacks the implications of a virtue-
																																																								
71 Ibid., vii. 
72 New Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. “Participation.” 
73 Ibid.  
74 See ST I, q.4.ad.3. 
75 ST II-II, q. 47.a 5. 
76 New Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. “Participation.” 
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centered life on morality for difficult issues in bioethics.77 He examines several themes 
in contemporary moral theology, discussing proportionate reason and the ethics of 
personal responsibility. He articulates the fact that the church has a role in leading 
people to the fullest knowledge of God.78 This explains his inclusion of a new chapter 
on Veritatis Splendor and Moral Virtues in his second edition of The Moral Virtues and 
Theological Ethics as highlighted earlier. 
The naming of Cessario’s overall theological structure makes it possible to see 
his movement in locating virtue in the whole of human experience. I shall proceed to 
examine how virtue envelops the human reality in nature according to Cessario. 
2.3 Understanding Virtue in Human Nature: Natural and Gospel Laws 
According to Aquinas: 
Virtue is natural to us in respect to specific nature insofar as certain 
naturally known principles in regard to both thought (intellectus) 
and action (synderesis) are in our reason naturally which are like the 
seeds of intellectual and moral virtue, and insofar as there is in the 
will a certain appetite for good in conformity with reason.79 
 
For Cessario, Aquinas acknowledges the reality of a more common but general instinct 
for virtue as part of the human experience.80 But he goes further to comment that such a 
human nature requires moral development in order to form these motivations for 
																																																								
77 More needs to be developed between virtue and bioethics. 
78  Romanus Cessario, “The Meaning of Virtue in the Christian Moral Life: Its 
significance for Human life Issues,” The Thomist 53, 1 (January 1989): 173-196. 
79  ST I-II, q. 63, a. 2. See Jonathan Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 
(Princeton 1984) Physics II. Ch1; Angela M. McKay, The Infused And Acquired 
Virtues In Aquinas’ Moral Philosophy: A Dissertation. Graduate Program in 
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0452004-125337/unrestricted/McKayAMO52004.pdf (accessed May 16, 2013). 
80 Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 98.  
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virtue.81 This moral development is evident among Christian apologists who were 
tenacious in their theology of the need for Christians to develop a distinctive moral 
culture irrespective of the prevalent antagonism to gospel values.82   
 A genuine understanding of human nature is not achievable without reference to 
original sin. However, Cessario argues that biblical understanding of original sin has 
led to a misinterpretation of correct understanding of human nature.83 Considering this, 
Cessario argues that anthropological factors deny built-in virtues in human nature.84 
However, realist theologians like Aquinas and Cessario himself accept the 
understanding that original sin touches every person. Aquinas expounds: “As a result of 
(the loss of original justice) all the powers of the soul are in a sense lacking an order 
proper to them, their natural order to virtue.”85 Yet he does not completely deny the 
built-in virtues in nature even though he acknowledges their lack in the original scheme 
of things. Even with the fallen, an instinct for virtue remains.86 This is corroborated by 
Istva Bejczy in The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages: A Study in Moral Thought 
from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century where he underlines the essential medieval 
idea of virtue and morality in the notion of the fallen human nature.87 For the medieval 
authors virtue is not just the realization of the potential goodness innate to the human 
soul but a victory over the defects, which attach to human nature since the fall.88 
																																																								
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid., 96. See also Avery Dulles, A History of Apologetics (London: Hutchinson, 
1971); Karl Barth, Doctrine of the Word of God: Church Dogmatics, vol.1, Part 1 
English trans. G.T Thomson  (Edinburgh: T & T, 1939), 30-33. 
83 Ibid.  
84 Ibid., 97. 
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86 Gaudium et Spes, no.10. 
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 Conversely, the rationalists and other romantic views are polemical to this 
understanding of human nature. Baron D’Holbach for example, argues in The System of 
Nature or Laws of the Moral and Physical World, that nature alone through known 
experiences can bring about the search of happiness and so rejects the built-in virtues.89 
But Cessario wittingly avoids the extremes of D’Holbach and other rationalists by 
arguing:  
When it comes to evaluating basic human nature, Christian realism 
seeks to maintain a balanced position. It can never suggest that human 
nature, even in its fallen state, amounts to a miserable wreck left only 
to await divine intervention in order to realize any moral goodness 
whatsoever . . . On the other hand, moral realists surely reject the 
Pelagian view that, given the fact of Christ’s resurrection, human 
nature’s inclination to virtue itself suffices to lead a morally good 
life.90 
 
Since the instinct of virtue is not obliterated with original sin, Cessario 
following Aquinas, uses the term “natural virtue”, a distinguishable tendency within 
human nature to achieve perfection based on specific nature and individuated nature 
aligned to right reason.91. Jacques Maritain in Person and the Common Good makes 
use of such a metaphysical distinction.92 The argumentation is furthered by Cessario 
who like Aquinas accepts the fact that natural virtue may exist in an individual only in 
the sense that bodily dispositions are disposed better or worse to particular virtues.93 
Cessario in line with Aquinas’s conception concludes that there exists a universal 
																																																								
89 Baron D’Holbach, The System of Nature or Laws of the Moral and Physical World 
vol. II, tran. H.D. Robinson, 3 ebrary.com/lib/nuim/docDetail.action?docID=5001753 
(accessed 26 August, 2013). 
90 Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 97.  
91 Ibid., 98; See also ST I-II, q. 63, a. 2. 
92 Jacques Maritain, Person and the Common Good, trans. John J. Fitzgerald (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972). 
93 Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 98. See also ST I-II, q. 63, a. 1. 
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drive for virtue that is a constitutive part for all humanity independent of original sin.94 
Therefore, virtues exist in nature and knowledge of the good can proceed from nature. 
 Catholic moral teaching holds that within the realm of human knowledge and 
conduct, the Christian can sufficiently arrive at moral truth from two sources: Through 
natural law and gospel law. The Gaudium et Spes, Pastoral Constitution on the Church 
in the Modern world recognizes this legitimacy.95 These two sources for moral truth or 
human knowledge are mutually inclusive or complementary. Although they may differ 
in approaches, they are not mutually exclusive.96 The temptation is to prefer one and 
reject the other. Some moral truths may be arrived at from natural law but they will be 
insufficient for a holistic approach. But Cessario claims the Christian can arrive at the 
very “essence of things” from two different perspectives: Firstly, “The believer peers 
into the actual economy of salvation and beholds what even the angels long to see. As a 
communication of the truth about God and the secret purpose of his will (Eph. 1:19) . . . 
But this knowledge comes only through faith in Christ.”97 Secondly, the Christian 
profits from universal perspective from “the unchanging force of the natural law of 
peoples and of its universal principles”.98 Therefore: 
This results in a knowledge of natural law and virtue that holds true 
for all humankind. Just as the angels gaze on the same truth in the 
morning and in the evening, so faith and reason bring the human 
person face to face with the single truth that remains rooted in the 
divine being and is made know ‘from seeing the light of the gospel of 
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For Cessario then, both natural and gospel laws are complementary. However, Cessario 
contends that the truths of faith surpass the scope of human intellect:  
They cannot be measured by the human intellect’s inherent criteria for 
evidence. In believing therefore, the intellect, under the impulse of the 
will’s command, effected by grace, assents to what exceeds its natural 
requirements and capacities, namely, the truthfulness of God 
revealing.100 
 
The Revelation of God in history has an impact even in human moral conduct. 
The reason for this is to promote the welfare of the human race.101 Appealing to St. 
Gregory of Nyssa, Cessario affirms: “Only the believer grasps that the goal of a 
virtuous life is that we become like God himself.”102  
 We must be attentive to the relationship between claims of intellect and 
Christian faith.103 For this reason Cessario proposes: “For the Christian believer, the 
theological life amounts to the exercise of both the three theological virtues, faith, hope 
and Charity, and the moral virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.”104 It is 
imperative then for Cessario to explain how human nature can develop through the 
virtues; hence he must consider both the acquired and infused virtues. In sum Cessario 
posits that there are: 
Two sets of virtues in conjunction with the claim that two ends or 
perfections are open to the human creature. One is natural end or 
perfection that is connatural to the inborn capacities native to the human 
person; the other is supernatural end or perfection that is possible only 
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We can consequently talk of human nature and acquired virtue and human nature and 
infused virtue.  
2.3.1 Human Nature and Acquired Virtue 
The acquired virtues as the name indicates are those virtues that are acquired through 
repetition. Traditionally, such virtues are prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance. 
Cessario holds that the acquired virtues provide one way for human nature to develop: 
“Obviously a single action cannot produce the kind of permanent disposition in our 
psychological structure which constitutes a habitus. The development of habitus 
requires a series of repeated actions.”106 Aristotle argues in his Nicomachean Ethics that 
the development of virtue requires the help of a legislator in order to have the right kind 
of habituation.107 But the Christian tradition according to Cessario adopts a more 
theological-anthropological approach centered on individual’s disposition to the 
development and habituation of virtue.108  
Our conception of human nature in the previous section does not inhibit the 
development of virtue. Cessario citing Yves Simon echoes the variables, which are 
involved in the development of habitus: 
Again the number of repetitions required to establish a habit varies 
greatly from person to person, as well as from case to case. How 
many times do you have to smoke marijuana to develop the habit? 
How many times do you have to take opium? I personally would not 
want to experiment with any of that stuff, because you never know. 
Do we know how may readings it takes to memorize a poem? Does it 
take more to memorize texts in a foreign language? Nonsense verse? 
It all depends on the person. Speaking in general, we know that it 
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takes younger people less time to do it than it takes older people. 
Moreover, some rare individuals can get anything committed to 
memory by glancing at it just once. But these are exceptions to the 
rule. The law of habit calls for repetition.109 
 
Cessario explains here that mere repetition by itself does not explain the growth of a 
virtuous habitus. But he agrees with Aquinas on the context in which repetition 
produces virtue namely: “Insofar as acts of such virtue proceed from reason under the 
power and rule such good is established.”110 In this sense, Cessario uses habit very 
restrictively. He uses it only in connection to reason. Hence, an authentic development 
of virtue demands that the requirements of reason have to be applied.111 Reason 
becomes a principle for the development of virtue.  
Aquinas describes the virtues as dispositions that grow out of man’s nature and 
at the same time not natural to man. 112 By nature man possesses the seeds or 
inclinations which give rise to the virtues, but not the virtues themselves – considered 
as stable dispositions towards particular kinds of actions. Importantly, Aquinas does 
describe these seeds of virtue as a sort of habit: deep-seated stable dispositions that 
allow man to act in accord with his end.113 This kind of dispositions are called “innate 
goodness” by Michele Ferrero as he details in his dissertation, The Cultivation of Virtue 
in Matteo Ricci’s The True meaning of the Lord of Heaven: Issues for Moral 
Theology.114 While the acquired habits Ferrero calls “Acquired goodness” which is 
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proper to the actualization of the innate goodness through our free will and right 
reason.115 Citing Matteo Ricci, Ferrero states: “If this free and creative actualization of 
the potency to goodness is constant it takes the name of ‘virtue’. ‘Virtue’ belongs 
therefore to the second kind of goodness: it is the result of one’s own efforts.”116  
From the above, Cessario also argues that virtue in general provides a natural or 
innate inclination towards freely choosing and performing an action: “Virtue establishes 
in us a kind of second nature, since it provides a steady inclination for freely 
performing good actions in the same way nature itself operates with respect to 
necessary actions, such as sight and digestion.”117 Therefore, within the human nature 
and through acquired virtues lies natural principles or seeds of virtue or goodness. 
 The virtues are meaningless if they are not attuned to particular ends or goals 
within human nature. To underscore the impact acquired virtue has on human nature, he 
writes: 
The one who possesses an acquired virtue attains a particular good of 
human nature, such as steadfastness in the face of difficulties, towards 
which the virtue- in this example, fortitude- strives. Furthermore, the 
acquired virtue enables the one who develops it to act after the 
fashion of a habitus-formed act, that is, promptly, easily, and with a 
measure of satisfaction and joy.118 
 
Cessario notes a relevant question in discussing the acquired virtues: what happens 
when one who possesses acquired virtue commits sin? Cessario responds that personal 
sin does not initially destroy any acquired virtue an individual may have developed.119 
Still it remains a matter of grave concern. It will take a repeated vice to replace a virtue 
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acquired through repeated action.120 Cessario acknowledges that sin can affect the 
acquired virtue but differently than it does the infused virtues.121 The difference lies in 
the relationship between the infused virtues and the life of faith: “Since the infused 
virtues rely on the graced relationship between the believer and Christ, a decisive 
rupture in that relationship, such as one caused by serious sin, can only result in the 
effective loss of the infused virtues.” 122  However, the acquired virtues operates 
differently because it will take a repeated vice to replace a virtue. Cessario concludes by 
citing Aquinas: “Although without grace one cannot avoid mortal sin, so as never to sin 
mortally, yet one is not hindered from acquiring a habitus of virtue whereby one can 
abstain from evil deeds for the most part, and especially from those which are very 
much opposed to reason.”123 
2.3.2 Human Nature and Infused Virtues 
The infused virtues are the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. Cessario 
points out that writers like Philip the Chancellor, John de la Rochelle, Albert the Great 
and Odo Rigaud in their treatises neglected to define whether the theological virtues 
were infused or not.124 He also admits: “The medieval schoolmen, influenced by the 
Augustinian view that the virtues of the philosophers counted for nothing towards 
salvation, accepted the infusion of the moral virtues as given in Christian teaching.”125 
For example, immediately after defining grace as a habit that affects the very essence 
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with the infusion of grace, God bestows new first principles, or new seeds of virtue on 
man.126	
But there are other scholars who disputed the necessity of the infused virtues. 
For example Duns Scotus as cited by Cessario argued against the infused virtues: 
“Although many things are said about these infused moral virtues, in particular, that 
they are necessary on account of [supernatural] mode, mean, and end, in fact there 
seems no reason to hold for infused moral virtues, rather the acquired virtues 
suffice.”127 In like manner, Mary Beth Igham and Metchtild Dreyer posit in The 
Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus: An Introduction, that moral goodness is 
achievable only through the right use of reason and not through infused virtues.128 	
Contrary to the above, Cessario argues that the primary principle for the 
existence of the infused virtues is the call of the Christian to share in the divine life: 
“Since divine love only follows upon the divine initiative, this participation in God’s 
very life amounts to something entirely above nature’s abilities.”129 The primary 
theological principle Cessario operates is the vocation of the Christian believer to 
participate in the divine life and this serves as the primary principle for the existence 
of the infused virtues.130 Cessario here displays the Thomistic notion of the concept of 
participation outlined earlier. Aquinas himself argues: “For it belongs to limitless 
power to bring us to limitless good. Such a good is life eternal, consisting in the joyful 
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possession of God himself.”131 This conception raises the question whether humanity 
can attain perfect bliss without God? In view of this Aquinas sustains: “There can be 
no complete and final happiness for us save in the vision of God.”132 Cessario citing 
Thomas Gilby concludes:  
First, that man has been created by God in his nature and natural 
powers, not as a heartless joke, but with some natural expectancy of 
such development that he will reach to his fulfilment or happiness. 
Second, that this end can be reached only by the pure gift of grace 
quite beyond his deserving by any natural efforts of his own.133 
The infused virtues therefore show that human nature can be elevated to 
beatific fellowship with God. “This elevation of human nature’s destiny requires a 
proportionate elevation of human nature’s capacities,” Cessario argues.134 Based on 
this elevation, he is convinced that human nature requires supplementary capacities.135 
In his view, the one source that can generate this additional capacity for the believer is 
the power of the Holy Spirit.136 The Holy Spirit can create capacities and shape the 
human destiny proportionate to supernatural beatitude. St. Paul captures this in his 
exhortation to the Galatians: “For through the Spirit, by faith, we wait for the hope of 
righteousness” (Gal. 5:5). Cessario links grace and the Holy Spirit in order to re-state 
the relevance and impact of the infused virtues on human nature. 
 The activity of the infused virtues in nature is predicated by the activity of God 
himself: 
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The existence of the infused virtues reveals God’s providential plan 
whereby he chooses to endow the order of grace with the same kind 
of provisions already established for the order of nature. Recall that 
the infused moral virtues include authentically graced activities. As a 
result, the one who acts with such a habitus actually participates in the 
merits of Christ’s sacrificial death and resurrection. The infused 
virtues belong to the kind of life lived in the church of faith and 
sacraments . . . The reality of the infused virtues implies that the 
Christian moral life possesses all the characteristic of an intrinsic 
morality, though transformed by the power of faith.137 
 
Therefore, one can claim that the infused virtues perfect human nature and the spiritual 
life of an individual through the action of God.138 Having seen how virtue is conceived 
from the perspectives of human nature, natural and gospel laws, it is important to further 
the argument by considering in particular the Christian understanding of virtue 
according to Cessario. 
2.4 Understanding Christian Virtue Ethics 
Joseph Fuchs in Is there a Christian Ethics? distinguished between two levels of 
Christian ethics; the categorical level- comprising of various types of virtues and 
values like justice and charity, and the transcendental level comprising of attitudes and 
norms that go beyond yet diffuse the various moral categories, like faith, and love.139 
Fuchs argues that Christian ethics has its distinctive characteristic only at the 
transcendent level, but on the categorical level its norms, values and virtues considered 
materially are simply human, adding nothing specifically Christian.140  
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Conscious of the distinction made by Fuchs, Cessario argues that in virtue 
ethics there is a Christian character in the both the categorical and transcendent level. 
This is captured in his definition of Christian virtue. Cessario makes reference to 
Aquinas’ citation of the Augustinian definition of virtue in the Summa Theologiae 
namely: “Virtue is a good quality of mind, by which one lives righteously, of which no 
one can make bad use, which God works in us without us.”141 Following Aquinas’ 
explanations, Cessario considers this under four causal variants, which he examines 
within his general Christian teleological framework. 142 Cessario’s examination is 
intended to bring out the Christian dimension of virtue ethics, which Fuchs seem to 
deny or reduce its relevance. 
The first is what he calls the formal cause: “Virtue is good quality of mind.” 
Virtue for Aquinas belongs to the generic category of quality – it is qualified as good. 
Aristotle calls this quality Habitus.143 Aquinas develops such an Aristotelian concept 
and stresses the importance it has in shaping human conduct. Cessario reiterates:  
The scholastic theologians understood the important function that 
habitus has in shaping human conduct. Accordingly, they described 
habitus as holding a middle position between potency- the capacity 
for action- and full actuality- actually doing something . . . A person 
without any habitus lacks what is required for sure comportment, and 
finds any kind of purposeful activity difficult and burdensome.144  
 
Therefore, habitus as understood by Aquinas and interpreted by Cessario connotes the 
perfection of human capacity that empowers a person not only to act, but also to act 
well: 
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The virtues really alter the particular instances in which they inhere, 
these good habitus modify or shape the psychological capacities of 
the human person. But this happens in a way that respects the virtuous 
person’s ability to express a full range of creativity and human 
initiative.145 
 
Habitus has been considered differently by different fields. For example fields 
of enquiry like social and political sciences argue that habitus is emergent of a social 
system. Andreas Pickel supporting this claim argues that habitus should not be 
conceptualized as the property of an individual instead it should be seen as a property 
of a social system.146 But the Aristotelian tradition posits that it is the property first of 
an individual person.147 Nonetheless, in orientating the habitus one encounters others 
and therefore it admittedly takes on a social dimension.   
The use of the concept of habitus in Christian theology is often misunderstood, 
especially the fact that habitus is acquired through repeated activity. Pinckaers argues 
in “Virtue is not a Habit” that habitus in the true scholastic sense means total openness 
to creative activity, not unnatural repetition.148 Also according to Jacques-M Pohier in 
an article “Psychology and Virtue,” the post-conciliar theologians were often not in 
favour of the concept as it presented a too mechanical view of Christian growth and 
very unsuitable to meet the required standards of a personalist moral theology.149  
Regardless of the mechanical interpretations of habitus, Cessario identifies other 
authors within the Thomistic tradition who accept the advantage habitus offers to virtue 
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ethics and Christian beliefs. For example, Vernon Bourke in his article “The Role of 
Habitus in the Thomistic Metaphysics of Potency and Act” supports the argument by 
addressing the subject from a magisterial perspective.150 Cessario himself expresses the 
advantages that lie within a proper conception of habitus in the Thomist tradition.151 He 
notes that the Christian believer has the natural ability to perform certain actions, but 
still needs to be aided by faith.152 Bearing this in mind Cessario proceeds to make a 
connection between habitus, Christian faith, conversion and freedom. It is a connection 
that produces a modification process which proceeds from who the human person is to 
who he/she ought to be. This is a process we shall explore in the succeeding chapter. In 
the interim, the habitus’ modification of the psychological capacities of the person is 
expected to bring about faithfulness with the Christian experience:   
New Testament belief does not produce boring conformity; rather the 
Christian experiences a kind of second-nature conformity to gospel 
values that makes living an upright life prompt, joyful, and easy. 
Since virtue is supple, the virtuous person can decide and act on moral 
issues that result from even the most complex circumstances of the 
moral life.153  
 
Therefore, Christian virtue does not deny the Christian the ability of creativeness and 
the proper use of initiative as noted by Cessario.154 
 The second part of the definition is what he calls the material cause. Cessario 
establishes the fact that virtue epitomizes a moral or spiritual reality.155 He notes that 
virtue strictly speaking has no material cause. This is explainable by considering the 
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subjects of virtues, which are all the rational powers of the human soul; intellect and 
will representing the rational appetite and the sense appetites.  Therefore, it is 
immaterial. Nevertheless, we can speak of the same subjects of virtue as providing their 
material cause.156 Accordingly, Aquinas himself argues, to posses human nature in 
itself is not sufficient to produce virtue. Virtue develops by some deliberate exercise of 
the human capacities.157 In this case one can argue that the exercise of the human 
capacities can indeed become the material cause. This being the case, Christian virtue is 
developed through deliberate free choice.158  
 Thirdly, the efficient cause: “Which God works in us without us.” This is in line 
with the categorization made in chapter one sub-section 1.5.4.2.1. Human nature 
endows humanity with natural abilities that are operative within such a nature, which 
Aquinas and others call the acquired virtues.159 But the definition given above denotes 
the infused virtues are endowed by deific grace in and through the power of the Holy 
Spirit.160 According to Cessario, the Holy Spirit is the efficient cause of virtue in the 
Christian.161 This is what gives this set of virtues a Christian outlook. Cessario justifies 
his position as follows: “Because their origin and development depend on the divine 
agency, the infused moral virtues function only within the broader context of the 
theological life of faith, of hope, and of charity.”162  
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Following the second part of the definition “works in us without us”, it could be 
grimly conjectured that human effort is almost not needed. But divine activity does not 
negate human endeavour.163 Bejczy captures this more aptly when he writes: “Virtue is 
basically a gift of God which requires a consensus of the human will in order to become 
meritorious.”164 The implication of the phrase “God working in us without us” does not 
negate human freedom.  
 The fourth part of the definition is about the final cause: “By which no one 
lives righteously, of which no one can make bad use.” The final end for every virtue is 
determined by the performance of a virtuous action.165 Accordingly, “each of the 
virtues formally marks off an area of human endeavour, but without specificity the 
exact shape that every choice will take.”166  
2.4.1 Virtue Ethics And Christian Faith 
Pope John Paul II in Veritatis Splendor declares: 
In Jesus Christ and in his Spirit, the Christian is a ‘new creation’, a 
child of God; by his actions he shows his likeness or unlikeness to 
the image of the Son who is the first-born among many brethren (cf. 
Rom. 8:29), he lives out his fidelity or infidelity to the gift of the 
Spirit, and he opens or closes himself to eternal life, to the 
communion of vision, love and happiness with God the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit.167 
 
The Christian faith proposes to offer believers a new way of life. It is a way of life that 
illuminates the recta ratio (right reason) via the power of Christ, the light of the world. 
Such illumination is evident in Christian living as exemplified in the practice of 
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community life in the Acts of the Apostles: “Now the company of those who believed 
were of one heart and soul, and no one said that any of the things which they possessed 
was his own, but they had everything in common” (Acts 4:32). The place of community 
becomes the foundation for Cessario to link virtue and Christian faith. According to 
Cessario: “An objective as noble and arduous as maintaining a common life tells us 
something important about the character of ‘those who believed’.”168  
The character of the believers in their effort to live a community life has 
undergone transformation through the grace of Christ in the Holy Spirit. That is why 
the New Testament chooses the imagery such as the Vine and the Branches (John 15:1-
11) to depict the transformation effected by Christ. Hence, “The text from Acts makes it 
clear that the church announces not only a transformation of persons, but also the 
formation of communion of persons.”169 Therefore, one of the goods which Christian 
virtue offers is the inner desire to participate, first in the Trinitarian community of God 
the Father, Son and Holy Spirit and second in the community of believers. 
 Cessario illustrates how language of virtue found in the Rule of St. Benedict 
provides an engaging platform for moral theologians and for Christian. St. Benedict 
modified a form of community life, which existed in the East to the specific 
requirements of Western Christianity.170 Compared to other precepts, the Rule provides 
a moderate path between individual zeal and formulaic institutionalism. Benedict’s 
concerns were the needs of monks in a community environment, namely, to establish 
due order, to foster an understanding of the relational nature of the human person, and 
to provide a spiritual father to support and strengthen the individual’s ascetic effort and 
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the spiritual growth that is required for the fulfilment of the human vocation granted to 
the human person as a Christian.171   
To further elucidate the relationship virtue ethics has with the Christian faith, 
Cessario admits a challenge being faced by theological ethicists with regards to 
Christian moral life and moral wisdom endowed by nature through reason.172 The 
question arises: what is the difference between Christian morality and natural morality? 
There are polarized answers to this. On the one hand there can be a humanist reduction 
of the content of all Christian moral teaching to only what reason makes accessible. On 
the other, there can be a fundamentalist limitation of all moral instruction to only 
whatever the New Testament imparts.173 Richard McCormick suggests in an article 
titled “Does Religious Faith Add to Ethical Perception?” that belief makes available a 
new approach to fulfil otherwise quite natural moral precepts as cited by Cessario.174 
Others argue that the difference lies in the fact that Christian morality invests in a 
sacramental system with its own set of rules and obligations. Grisez takes this position 
when he suggests in The Way of the Lord Jesus, that ones choice to follow Christ 
especially within the context of the church sacraments constitutes a distinctively 
Christian activity.175 Grisez does not take into account the infused virtues as integral 
components of that vocation. 
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 But for Cessario none of the above views is able to show the difference or give 
a vivid description of the relationship between virtue ethics as a moral philosophical 
field and theological ethics. He assumes the realist position which is in line with 
Aquinas’ explanation of “rectitude appetitus”: “Now human virtue, as we have said, is 
virtue as it corresponds to the perfect notion of virtue which requires rectitude of 
appetite, for such a virtue not only confers faculty of doing well but also causes the 
performing of a good action.”176  
Every ethical approach employed toward attaining these goals and ends must 
acknowledge what Geach calls “built-in teleologies”.177 Because of this sanctifying 
grace must also respect these built-in teleologies, the end of which should be the 
flourishing of the human person. Even though Cessario accepts that human experience 
offers humanity countless ways of achieving such flourishing, he strongly underscores 
the pivotal role the virtues play in the up building of the believers’ lives through grace:  
For the Christian the ultimate reasonable good remains the 
achievement of the goal which Paul announces to Titus; ‘for the grace 
of God has appeared for the salvation of all people, training us to 
renounce irreligion and worldly passions, and to live sober, upright, 
and godly lives in this world, awaiting our blessed hope, the 
appearing of the glory of our great God and saviour Jesus Christ’ 
(Titus 2:11-13).178 
 
The implication of the above quote is that the Christian faith offers an entirely 
new dimension to its adherents. As habitus is achieved through repetitions so is the 
Christian moral life perfected through constant conversion. Therefore, the dialogue 
between virtue ethics and the Christian faith is on-going. 
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 The Christian moral life in order to endure must be opened to change and 
development. The behavioural sciences offer a great deal on human development.179 
Cessario accepts that Christian theology has a lot to learn from other sciences and even 
other non-Christian religions with regard to growth in Christian virtue, for instance the 
use of enneagram in spirituality and moral theology for self-discovery.180 But Cessario 
cautions that such interplay requires genuine theological surveillance and application.181  
 What Cessario attempts to achieve by this reflection is to establish a realist 
theological stance in moral theology from the perspective of virtue ethics. He also 
acknowledges the fact that other theologians do not necessarily share in this 
position.182 The overarching question which shall be left unanswered here is the 
relationship between nature and supernatural: whether the Christian is a spiritual being 
in human nature or a natural being in search of a spiritual nature.  
The realist position about the Christian faith proposes a call to a transformative 
life. Cessario citing Rahner argues that it is a conversion that is progressive within the 
mystery of God.183  
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2.4.2 Virtues Ethics and Christian Tradition: A Biblical Connection 
In chapter one, the need of moral theology to break from methods of casuistry and 
moral manuals was outlined. Against this background it is easy to see why the moral 
theology of the time has been characterized as unbiblical, un-ecumenical, casuistic, 
minimalist, ‘domestic’ in its concerns, legalistic and sin-centered. Moral theology was 
effectively a discipline separated from the rest of theology. The renewal of moral 
theology was explicitly called for by Vatican II in its Decree on Priestly Formation in 
the revision of ecclesiastical studies, but its directives had a much broader sweep than 
just preparation for the ministry of the confessional. As it states: “Other theological 
disciplines should also be renewed by livelier contact with the mystery of Christ and 
the history of salvation.”184  
As emphasized by Optatam Totius, foundational to a Christian understanding of 
morality is the place of scripture. Christian tradition has always emphasized the 
importance of personal transformation through the Scriptures. Gregory L. Jones in an 
article “Formed and Transformed by Scripture: Character, Community, and Authority 
in Biblical Interpretation” argues:  
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Readers who attempt to remain detached and neutral in their 
interpretation of the Bible will typically understand it less deeply than 
those who discipline their lives by studying Scripture as the vehicle of 
God’s word . . . The call of Scripture is for us to be open to the 
transformation of our lives and to see the necessity of such 
transformation.185  
 
As briefly discussed in previous section, Cessario furthers this discussion from the 
perspective of the New Testament account of personal transformation through grace 
and virtues.186 Such a transformation is emphasized even by different traditions as 
represented by classical writers like Plato, Aristotle, patristic Fathers and medieval 
theologians like Aquinas.187 And according to Ellen F. Davis in an article “Preserving 
Virtues: Renewing the Tradition of the Sages”: “Virtue is practiced within particular 
traditions, each of which retells history in distinctive ways. The Christian Bible (the 
Old and New Testaments) is one such narrative recounting history.”188 Davis gives 
reasons why we turn to Scripture:  
The reason for us to turn to Scripture . . . is to enable a genuine renewal 
of the virtue tradition from a perspective that is both ancient and fresh. 
We must begin again by building on the foundation of Scripture, 
because it has been too long since the virtues . . . were living 
theological concepts.189  
 
Recall from chapter one the observation that there is no explicit theology of 
virtue in the Scriptures. Rather particular virtues are articulated, encouraged and 
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practiced. Cessario in building the foundations of scripture finds a connection between 
the classical and biblical views of virtue ethics in St. Paul’s letter to the Colossians: 
Put to death therefore what is earthly in you: fornication, impurity, 
passion, evil desire, covetousness, which is idolatry. On account of 
these the wrath of God is coming. In these you once walked, when you 
lived in them. But now put them all away: anger, wrath, malice, slander 
and foul talk from your mouth. Do not lie to one another, seeing that 
you have put off the old nature with its practices and have put on the 
new nature, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its 
creator (3:5-10). 
 
According to Christian tradition virtues are not only acquired but also exercised. 
Exercising the virtues effectively, “inescapably brings the person into relationship with 
others. This happens either directly, as in the obvious case of justice, or indirectly, as 
when others benefit from one who possesses the virtues of personal discipline, 
temperance, and fortitude.”190 The engagement therefore transcends the individual to 
the level of the community, as this thesis will detail in succeeding sections. It is often 
argued by opposing theories that the practice of virtue is a platform for self-
preoccupation, sometimes at the expense of others who may need our time and 
attention to important things.191 However, in line with the main focus of this thesis, 
Cessario contends: “Christian theology understands the virtuous life as profoundly 
relational. On the other hand, self-regarding individualism does affect the actual 
situation of secular morality.”192 De facto, this is conditioned by veritatis vitae of 
Aquinas.  
Within the Christian tradition of virtues there exists an underlining principle 
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Aquinas: “Truth of life is the kind of truth by which something exists as true, not by 
which someone speaks what is true. Like everything else one’s life is called true on the 
basis of its reaching its rule and norm, namely divine law; by measuring up to this, a 
life has uprightness.”193 Conformity to lex aeterna by individuals and communities and 
the practice of the virtues give concrete expression to the truthfulness of life.194 In 
addition, the Christian believer’s conformity to Christ through the sacraments and faith 
heightens the opportunities to attain the truth of life. Although Aquinas himself would 
seem to have neglected reflecting the mediating role of Christ in the economy of the 
virtues, this lex aeterna is represented by the church’s magisterial teachings. The next 
section shall look at the connection between virtue ethics and magisterial teachings. 
2.4.3 Virtue Ethics and Magisterial Teachings 
Cessario writes: “A virtuous life can only unfold within the overarching irradiation of 
Eternal Law, Natural Law, and the Gospel law of grace.”195 In other words the virtuous 
life brings an individual into union with God and humanity within a community. 
Presenting a model of the church as a community, he expounds: “The Church of Christ 
holds as a foundational principle that the more one is united to God through the 
rhythms of a virtuous life lived in some kind of community with friends, the more one 
discovers his or her own ‘personality’.” 196 Pope Benedict in his first Encyclical Letter 
Deus Caritas Est stresses the fact that ones union with God takes place without the lost 
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of personal identity: “This union is no mere fusion, a sinking in the nameless ocean of 
the Divine.”197  
 To adequately understand the interface between virtue ethics and magisterial 
teaching one has to again highlight the theological witness of Aquinas. According to 
Cessario, Aquinas’ theological views to the Christian virtues tradition which is found 
in the Secunda Pars and Summa Theologiae has been of great influence on magisterial 
teaching.198 In order words the church draws from the teaching of Aquinas’ inspiration 
on the virtues. However, the magisterial teaching on the virtues is very minimal. As 
earlier observed in chapter one, the church has not presented a full document on the 
virtues, except for the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1992), and a few references 
made in some encyclicals. 
It is evident to Cessario that through his analytic and dialectic skills, Aquinas 
gives a vivid description of the Christian moral life that deals with human nature.199 
Aquinas does this by summarizing the established tradition of the Fathers, the monastic 
authors and earlier scholastics.200 To be precise, Aquinas’ efforts manifest the fact that 
what gauges virtues and virtuous activities perfects human creatures, that is, by what is 
divinely ordered to make each human person happy.201 Human nature according to 
Cessario following Aquinas becomes the measure for virtuous human behaviour.202  
In the opinion of Cessario, the above statement is teleological in nature. At this 
point, Cessario makes a connection with the encyclical letter of Pope John Paul II, 
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Veritatis Splendor. This document discusses the relationship between the moral good, 
virtues, human behaviour, and Christian anthropology: “Activity is morally good when 
it attests to and expresses the voluntary ordering of the person to his ultimate end and 
the conformity of a concrete action with the human good as it is acknowledged in its 
truth by reason.”203 In chapter two of the same encyclical letter, the pope draws upon 
the thought of Aquinas. According to Cessario the chapter makes references to the 
virtues of Christian life: 
It is the “heart” converted to the Lord and to the love of what is good 
which is really the source of true judgments of conscience. Indeed, in 
order to ‘prove what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and 
perfect’ (Rom. 12:2), knowledge of God’s law in general is certainly 
necessary, but it is not sufficient: what is essential is a sort of 
“connaturality” between man and the true good (Cf. St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q.45, a. 2.). Such a connaturality is 
rooted in and develops through the virtuous attitudes of the individual 
himself: prudence and the other cardinal virtues, and even before these 
the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. This is the meaning of 
Jesus’ saying: “He who does what is true comes to the light” (Jn. 
3:21).204 
 
 The Catechism of the Catholic Church does contain important reflections on 
the virtues as previously noted. It reminds us: “A virtue is a habitual and firm 
disposition to do the good. It allows the person not only to perform good acts, but to 
give the best of himself. The virtuous person tends toward the good with all his sensory 
and spiritual powers; he pursues the good and chooses it in concrete actions.”205 Pope 
Benedict XVI summarizes the virtues in Deus Caritas Est.206 
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What we have tried to do in previous sections is to examine Cessario’s 
treatment of virtue ethics from a theological-anthropological perspective. The next 
section is going to look at how Cessario links his conception of the human person and 
how the virtues develop in the human person. 
2.5 Virtue/Habitus Development: A Dynamic Process  
In our earlier discussions we argued that virtues are attitudes, dispositions, or character 
traits that enable us to be and to act in ways that develop potentials within an 
individual. However, the one question that remains unanswered is how does a person 
develop habitus? I shall examine how Cessario answers the above question within his 
understanding of the human person. 
 2.5.1 Habitus Development 
Cessario in interpreting Aquinas argues that the concept of habitus presupposes 
development:   
Habitus supposes a conception of the human person as open to 
development and modifications from both natural and divine causes. 
Furthermore, habitus points up the difference between what derives 
from authentically personal activity and what remains rooted in the 
biological givens of temperament or personality type. Aquinas 
himself clearly understood that each human person possessed certain 
natural endowments, as distinct from habitus, which establish, within 
the limits set by common nature, the range of expression achievable 
by personal effort.207 
 
The realist anthropology according to Cessario recognizes the fact that people display 
different aptitudes for moral development.208 This is not to accept in Blaise Pascal’s 
remark: “What is true on one side of the Pyrenees is false on the other.”209 The core of 
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the moral life involves educative and developmental processes. And the progress of 
virtue or growth of vice depends upon how successfully one applies these processes.  
One of the concepts central to habitus development is capacity. William 
Mattison III observes the following:   
We have capacity for greatness, and also great destructives, to both 
ourselves and others. Particularly in the formative college years, but 
even throughout our lives, our lives are furnished, and each of us can 
become the sort of person who is pleased with, or who regrets, who he 
or she is.210   
 
Capacity as used here refers to the actual or potential ability to perform a virtuous act. 
Ian Burkitt defines capacity in an article “Technologies of the Self: Habitus and 
Capacities”: “Capacities are the ensemble actual potentials to carry out an action and 
there is dialectical relationship between acts and capacities: the latter being the products 
of prior activities, in which individuals develop, refine, or modify their capacity for 
action.”211 And Pierre Bourdieu detailed also in Distinction: A Social Critique of the 
Judgment of Taste that habitus when considered along with capacity becomes a 
generative formula that accounts for judgments and practices. 212  So habitus for 
Bourdieu becomes a structuring structure, which organizes and directs actions or 
capacities.213 Burkitt and Bourdieu show the link between habitus and capacity. 
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 Therefore, Cessario acknowledges this link between habitus and capacity by 
affirming:  
Habitus provide the whole person with settled capacities for action 
which surpass the simple ability to exercise will. In fact, one author 
describes habitus as ‘metaphysical Perfectant’. Such a perfection 
heightens our human capacities to such an extent that those who act 
with ‘habituated’ intellect, will, and appetites approach the optimum 
performance of the strongest and most perfect human being.214 
 
Habitus and capacity produce a perfect human person.215 Considering the views of 
Burkitt, Bourdieu and Cessario we hold that habitus is oriented towards being and 
doing. Burkitt adds to this elucidation by further claiming that “habitus-capacity” 
suggests the possibility of doing something, or acting in ways that are creative and not 
wholly predetermined.216 This requires a developmental process. To some degree this 
repudiates the claims that habitus can be monotonous. 
According to Cessario, since habitus and capacity are directed towards action 
there are three conditions necessary for its development. Firstly, habitus cannot be said 
to be rightly so if its capacity is only to perform one kind of action.217  In other words 
the possessor of the habitus must be able to engage in diverse kinds of activity or what 
Thomas de Vio Cajetan calls “variety in Parts”.218 Capacity then enjoys the ability of 
versatility in action.219 What Cessario, Aquinas and Burkitt are saying is that the most 
authentic development of habitus consists in the fact that it is not automated to perform 
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in just a particular way but must be open to a variety of actions which may change 
depending on circumstantial evidences. 
The second required condition pertains to some degree to the person.220 In 
addition to the ability of diverse realizations of activity, “capacity must possess a 
certain malleability or suppleness as regards undergoing change.”221  Burkitt also agrees 
with Cessario but puts it differently: “Habitus . . . is not bound to eternal repetition, for 
complex and human activity must be flexible and adaptable to various situations.”222 
Cessario further buttresses his argument on the flexibility and suppleness of capacity by 
distinguishing between the inherent activity of the part of the body like the eye which 
has the ability of sight and the actual activity of the conscious being or subject who 
freely chooses to act in a particular way.223 For Cessario the intellect and will become 
fundamental places where habitus is formed and the ability to exercise freely certain 
kinds of activity actuated.224 But he adds, both the habitus and activity must be in line 
with reason and the sense appetites.225 This condition and the first stated above are 
interpretatively two sides of the same coin.  
The third condition necessary for the development of habitus is the agent 
itself.226 Theological ethics teaches that habitus has two sources of development: 
human agent and divine benevolence (infused habitus).227 As a Christian theologian, 
Cessario argues from the perspective of divine benevolence that because habitus is 
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directly given through the activity of the Holy Spirit they are properly called infused- 
the theological virtues. For Cessario the activity of the Holy Spirit finds meaning within 
the New Testament Kerygma which elicits twofold change in the agent: First, image 
restoration which consists in the rectification of disordered appetite and second the 
acquisition of the whole collection of graced benefactions.228  
It is evident that Cessario does not reject the contributions of secular sciences 
that suggest behavioural and environmental constructs in the development of habitus. 
However, Christian theology can appropriate scientific findings only in so far as they 
do not compromise the human person and his/her telos. But in this potential dialogue, 
the approach of Cessario is to primarily reiterate the framework of the realist theology.   
Virtues are developed through learning and practice.229 Aristotle held that a 
person could improve his or her character by practicing self-discipline, while a good 
character can be corrupted by repeated self-indulgence.230 For example, the ability to 
excel as an athlete or footballer or tennis requires learning, constant and untiring 
practice for hours, so too our capacity to be just, prudent, merciful and courageous. For 
a habit to be acquired in some cases it has to displace another vice.231  
The above explains why virtues are sometimes called habits. John Locke in his 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding states that habit is “the power or ability in 
Man, of doing the same thing . . . forward, and ready upon every occasion to break into 
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action.”232 However, the principle of habit involves both constancy and change.233 
Carlisle argues: 
On the one hand, it is through habit that beings –whether human, 
animal, vegetal or mineral-hold their shape through time; they remain 
the same (or approximately the same) even in movement, for they 
repeatedly follow certain patterns and sequences. In this way, habit 
forms part of an individual’s stable identity- and it may even constitute 
this identity. On the other hand, we can acquire habits only because we 
are changed by our actions and experiences.234 
 
It means, once they are acquired, they become characteristic of a person. For example, a 
person who has developed the virtue of generosity is often referred to as a generous 
person because he or she tends to be generous in all circumstances not only in particular 
instances. Hence, Mattison claims: “Having a virtue is not simply an indicator of past 
action, but more importantly a dynamic disposition to act well in the future . . . Every 
new opportunity for moral action is not begun from scratch, but rather with an 
inclination to act well.”235 Cessario’s three conditions necessary for the development of 
habitus falls within Mattison and Carlisle’s conceptions of habit.  
 But Cessario ignores some distinctions on habit. First, he does not show the 
distinction between idiosyncratic, individual habits and collective habits, or custom.236 
Second, he does not show the distinction between active and passive habit, that is 
acquiring a habit in a specific way of acting or by mere sensation.237 Third, he does not 
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show how habit can be a source or a result of an action.238 Cessario simply generalizes 
his concept of habit. 
Furthermore, there is another important element in the development of habitus 
which Cessario seems to neglect. It is the element of intentionality. On intentionality, 
Mattison argues: “The reason habits develop has everything to do with 
intentionality.”239 For him, “intention is the a goal or purpose toward which we direct 
ourselves. It is the specification of our desire.”240 Acting intentionally therefore pertains 
to reason and will. To buttress this point Mattison gives an example:  
For instance, consider two other people besides your friend Joe who is 
cheap. Mary is generous, and does as much as she can to help those in 
need. While Joe is, unfortunately, still cheap, Mary is generous. A 
third person, Lucy, is also accustomed to donating money to charitable 
causes. Yet in Lucy’s case, she only does this in public settings, as 
when the collection goes around in the church, or when a club is 
raising money in her dorm. She is doing it in order to look generous in 
front of others. In fact, if she had an opportunity to be generous with 
no one watching, there is little chance she would donate the money. 
She does not have the same habit as stingy Joe, because she does 
indeed donate money at times. But neither does she develop the same 
habit as generous Mary, even though both consistently perform similar 
acts of donating money to those in need. The difference between these 
latter two is their intentionality.241 
 
Mattison concludes: “Thus habits are related to, but not equated with, performing 
certain types of actions. This relationship is cyclical. It is often through repetition of 
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2.5.2 Christian Conversion: The Growth of the Christian Virtues 
Raymond F. Paloutzain, James T. Richardson, and Lewis R. Rambo in an article 
“Religious Conversion and Personality Change” argue that conversion as used in 
Christian theology is indeed relevant and apt in our discussion of the development and 
quality of habitus and personality.243 Recent researches reveal that beliefs lie at the 
heart of personality and adaptive functioning and that they give us unique insights into 
such personality and functioning.244  
From a religious perspective conversion can have a huge impact on personality. 
This explains why one of the central concerns of the early Fathers of the Church was 
to offer strong moral instructions for those newly converted to the Christian faith.245 
Such instructions were centred on the application of the summary of the 
commandments made by Jesus in Luke 10:27 “You shall love the Lord your God with 
all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all your 
mind; and your neighbour as yourself”.246  
Nevertheless, Cessario also observes that the theology of the Fathers did not 
engage in speculating how one might distinguish the human and divine elements in the 
moral life. 247  However, medieval thinkers like Aquinas were influenced in their 
understanding of the presence of a moral instruction apart from the one announced by 
Jesus. They found warrant for this idea in the text of St. Paul: “When Gentiles who have 
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not the law do by nature what the law requires, they are a law unto themselves, even 
though they do not have the law.” (Rom. 2:14).248 Traditionally, this assertion of St. 
Paul has supported the idea of a moral law that is written in the hearts of people and this 
can be called the natural moral code innate in every human person. Therefore, at the 
core of conversion in the life of a Christian is the moral demand called for by natural 
and divine laws. 
This prompts the question can an individual do good without grace? Cessario 
buttresses his answer through Aquinas’ position by arguing that although an individual 
may successfully perform certain human actions apart from divine assistance, a person 
cannot perform the whole good which is connatural to human flourishing without 
grace.249 He argues metaphorically: “So a sick man is capable of some movement by 
himself, yet he cannot move perfectly with the movement of a healthy man unless he is 
healed by the aid of medicine.”250 Cessario thinks that the above Thomistic conclusion 
is similar to the conclusions reached by St. Paul in Rom. 8:22-23. This text suggests an 
internal struggle or tension within the Christian in living the moral life.251 It is a tension 
which Cessario feels has a fundamental importance: “The medieval theologians 
explained how this tension can contribute to growth in Christian virtue.”252  
 Cessario concludes that Christian living always requires an honest acceptance of 
the possibility of growth in daily response to the call of Jesus Christ. This implies 
acknowledgement of our sins yet relying on the special grace of God for the forgiveness 
																																																								
248 Ibid. 
249 Ibid., 30. 
250 ST I-II, q. 109, a. 2.  
251 For further reading on the struggle between the spirit and the flesh see J. Louis 
Martyn, Theological Issues in the Letters of Paul (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997), 
251-265. 
252 Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 30. 
	 137 
according to his mercy.253 However, the outflow of personal energy is of utmost 
importance.254 Realist moral theology therefore will have the features of a theology that 
attends to the workings of both nature and grace. Along these lines, Stephen J. Duffy in 
The Dynamics of Grace: Perspectives in Theological Anthropology	 argues within the 
tradition of Aquinas that grace does not destroy nature but perfects it: “Grace is either 
uncreated, God’s own self as the gracious giver, or a created gift superadded to natural 
human powers and rendering their acts meritorious.”255 Divine grace elevates those 
human virtues that have been formed by repeated deliberate acts, because man is 
wounded by sin, and cannot easily maintain a moral balance. Through the sacraments 
and the help of the Holy Spirit, Christ offers the grace needed to persevere and to 
adequately and genuinely respond to his love by keeping his commandment of love.256 
For Cessario, divine grace animates both the infused and theological virtues.257 The 
practice of virtue by the human person requires both grace and the constant call to 
conversion. 
2.5.3 Habitus and Personality 
According to Cessario, Aristotle’s account of hexis in the Nicomachean Ethics provides 
Christian theologians with a psychological foundation needed for a comprehensive 
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discourse of virtue ethics. 258  Nevertheless, Nicomachean Ethics only offers one 
constituent part towards a comprehensive and sensible theological appropriation of 
habitus.259 The other component part is the intellectual discoveries and presuppositions 
of the behavioural sciences.260 It is important that one takes account of personality in 
discussing habitus/virtues. Personality has been defined differently by behavioural 
sciences but none is universally accepted.261 The idea and experience therefore is 
elusive.262  
Charles S. Carver and Michael F. Scheier Perspectives on Personality suggest a 
working definition: “Personality is a dynamic organization, inside the person, of 
psychological systems that create the person’s characteristic patterns of behaviour, 
thoughts, and feelings.”263 And Nathan Brody and Howard Ehrlichman in Personality 
Psychology: The Science of Individuality define personality: “The sum total of a 
person’s thoughts, feelings, desires, intentions, and action tendencies.”264 The concept 
of personality when used concerns the existence of individual differences and 
intrapersonal functioning.265 The term personality is also used in a descriptive way; for 
example “she has a warm and friendly personality.266 The definitions seen above 
include cognitive, motivational, and behavioural process.  
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Cessario accepts that developmental psychology deals with factors that 
contribute to the shaping of personal traits, and hence they offer valuable insights to 
character.267 Cessario suggests that even though such insights reveal much in an 
individual’s traits and character formation, moral theology has to be cautious in the 
application of these insights because: “Behavioural scientists do not necessarily share 
the common and fundamental assumption about the spiritual character of the human 
person that is indispensable to an authentic Christian teaching.” 268   He further 
expounds:  
Christian theology can critically appropriate scientific findings, 
provided their underlying anthropological suppositions do not reduce 
the human individual to its material components or remain agnostic 
about the basic constitution or ultimate destiny of the human person. 
The freedom and dignity of God’s children surpass the limits 
established by all forms of psychological determinism.269 
 
From the above citation, Cessario identifies one of the primary tasks of realist 
moral theology is to explicate how moral development affects the intrinsic make-up of 
the human person.270 The implication here is that habitus can modify the whole of a 
person. Cessario develops his argument following Aquinas’ discussions on the acquired 
habitus; that human capacities develop as a result of proper activity, through the 
combined actions of free choice and intelligence.271 Such a development does not only 
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affect the individual’s acts but his/her very self that is his/her personality.272 Habitus in 
this sense brings about personal transformation.  
Christian doctrine asserts that the extent of the change can reach to 
the very core of a human person’s selfhood and identity. For 
example, the virtue of filial piety can effectively alter the rebellious 
and disaffected adolescent so that the young person becomes an 
honest and respectful member of the household. Christian theology, 
supported by the New Testament’s assertion of the radical power 
that grace holds out to the human person, supposes that such a 
virtuous transformation of the self can occur in many circumstances. 
Habitus provides the metaphysical basis for elaborating a moral 
theology confident enough of itself to give serious attention to this 
kind of person transformation.273 
 
Cessario differentiates between a positive habitus and a negative habitus by 
applying Aquinas’ philosophical categories of the essence of quality. Quality originates 
from an actual internal ordering of substance’s parts. It makes things to be different in 
the way cold gruel is different from hot soup.274 “Quality does not amount simply to 
placing a thing within its proper classification or to an extrinsic, merely ephemeral 
modification of a subject. Quality means to possess oneself in a determined way.”275 
Therefore, to speak of habitus as a quality refers to a real modification of a person’s 
moral character. In this sense, vicious habitus produces a vicious individual, which is a 
negative habitus; virtuous habitus, that is a positive, produces a virtuous person.  
Cessario’s argument is elaborated when he introduces the subject of capital 
punishment to his discourse on habitus development, which also connects to his 
reflections on Christian conversion outlined in preceded sections. Aquinas posits that in 
the case of capital punishment, the development of a vicious habitus in a given 
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individual can reach a point where something of the excellence which belongs to 
human nature disappears.276 Cessario writes: “Aquinas justified capital punishment on 
the basis that the one who possessed chronically bad habitus, actually lost a large 
measure of personal dignity so that the moral theologian could no longer designate the 
object of the direct killing as human in an unqualified sense.”277 Cessario differs here 
with Aquinas. He believes that the potentiality inherent in each created being is never 
lost; the person rather is open to moral reform: 
Accordingly, Christian theology insists against the common 
tendency to suppose that patterns of sinful behaviour, even when 
supported by repeated actions, definitively establish one’s personal 
identity. Virtue makes a real saint, but vicious habitus leave the 
person in a state of disordered potential. At the same time, the 
conviction that habitus represents a genuine qualification of one’s 
person- clinical psychologists may prefer to use the expression 
“personality” here- allows realist moral theology to affirm that the 
radical correction of moral disorders always remains feasible.278 
 
Cessario argues that ‘quality’ describes a progressive appreciation or 
depreciation of the moral capacities of the human person.279 Fittingly, Aquinas claims 
that for a quality to be described as a habitus it must attain a certain degree of 
permanence.280 Hence he distinguishes habitus from disposition on the basis of how 
easily the two kinds of qualification change.281 According to Cessario: “Since the 
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moral life requires free choice to develop, the measure or value of a given quality, that 
is, whether it embodies a virtue or a vice, will result from how well or ill such choice 
conforms to the requirements of authentic moral wisdom.”282 Eternal law, lex aeterna 
becomes the standard rule in evaluating habitus, which is an essential aspect of an 
individual’s personality and not human laws and sciences. 
2.6 Virtue Ethics and the Human Person 
In order to understand the theological framework in which Cessario operates, it is 
important to identify his theology of the human person as Imago Dei, which I shall 
examine in the next sub-section. This will enable us to further understand how 
Cessario employs the participatory model in his theology on the virtues as indicated in 
a previous section. Gaven Kerr captures in an article Aquinas: Metaphysics, Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy how the participation in Aquinas’ metaphysics works:  
Firstly, when something receives in a particular fashion what pertains 
universally to another, it is said to participate in that other; for example, 
a species (‘man’) is said to participate in its genus (‘animal’) and an 
individual (Socrates) is said to participate in its species (‘man’) because 
they (the species and the individual) do not possess the intelligible 
structure of that in which they participate according to its full 
universality. Secondly, a subject is said to participate in the accidents 
that it has (for instance, a man is a certain colour, and thereby 
participates in the colour of which he is), and matter is said to 
participate in the formal structure that it has (for instance, the matter of 
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a statue participates in the shape of that statue in order to be the statue 
in question). Thirdly, an effect can be said to participate in its cause, 
especially when the effect is not equal to the power of that cause. The 
effect particularizes and determines the scope of the cause; for the 
effect acts as the determinate recipient of the power of the cause. The 
effect receives from its cause only that which is necessary for the 
production of the effect. It is in this way that a cause is participated in 
by its effect. 283 
 
In sum, one can say that the human person can become virtuous through participation 
and activity. Participation through the supernatural union with God is made possible 
through Grace, and for Aquinas only a rational being is capable of this union since he 
alone can know God.284 In the words of Aquinas:  
The perfection of the rational creature consists not only in what belongs 
to it in respect of its nature, but also in that which it acquires through a 
supernatural participation of Divine goodness. Hence it was said above 
(I-II, Q. 3, A. 8) that man’s ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural 
vision of God.285  
 
The Vatican II document Gaudium et Spes emphasized the same point by stressing that 
as intelligent beings humanity reaches its final perfection in two ways: First through 
“wisdom which gently draws the human mind to seek and love what is true and 
good,”286 and second, through activity in the application of reasoning reaching out to 
other reality particularly through the moral virtues.287 It follows that the human person 
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is deified by divine wisdom through participation in the creative work of God and 
through human activity.288  
 The section below will deal with the theological foundations of the human 
person by positing an understanding of the human person as Imago Dei. The 
anthropological foundations are in-built within the theological foundations. It is my 
intention to show that a theological foundation will elaborate how the human person is 
an individual but at the same time a relational being.289 
2.6.1 The Human Person as Imago Dei 
Since virtue ethics and moral theology as a theological science is concerned with the 
human person it is important to consider the nature of the creature whose good it 
directs. 290  According to Cessario: “The theological doctrine of the Imago Dei 
recapitulates what theologians have said about the origin and nature of the human 
creature. It also controls theological reflection on the nature of human action.”291 Gula 
similarly states: “The Biblical witness to the mystery of creation provides the 
theological foundation for understanding the ultimate place of God and human life as a 
reflection of God.”292  Cessario confirms: “The earliest witnesses of the Christian 
tradition support the theological postulate that every individual instance of human 
nature bears the image of God.”293 This is constantly re-echoed in church documents. 
Again, Vatican II in Gaudium et Spes states: “For sacred scripture teaches that 
humankind was created ‘in the image of God’ with the capacity to know and love its 
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creator, and was divinely appointed with authority over all earthly creatures, to rule 
and use them and glorify God.”294  
There are varied approaches to ‘image’. Cessario adopts Aquinas’ version 
which is based on the classical tradition. Firstly, when image is used in connection 
with the human person it denotes a similitude or likeness: “A true image must not only 
resemble its original in something characteristic of its species, but also originate from 
what it images. According to this exact norm, then, only the eternal Son himself 
manifests the perfect image of God in an absolute similitude of species.”295 Secondly, 
image belongs to the genus of signs. That is to say the image of God in the human 
person can exist either as an instrumental sign or as a formal sign. Explaining this 
Cessario says:  
An instrumental sign points beyond itself, as when a road marker on the 
New Jersey Turnpike tells me that New York is 100 miles down the 
road. When I see the sign, I gain an image of New York, but I still 
behold the fields of New Jersey, not the Empire State Building. A 
formal sign reveals something about what it inheres in, as when a 
healthy complexion persuades me that I am beholding a healthy person. 
Every human creature points toward God, whereas only the saints 
reveal the God in whose image they are created.296  
 
We can see the participatory model of Aquinas clearly at work in the distinctions of 
images which he employs. While all humanity carry the instrumental sign, only the 
virtuous reveal the formal sign. 
Furthermore, the human person created in the image of God has a Trinitarian 
dimension. Gula articulates: “The Trinitarian doctrine implies a communitarian 
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understanding of being human. The Trinitarian vision sees that no one exists by 
oneself, but only in relationship to others.”297 Aquinas emphasizes this point when he 
says that the image of God in us signifies an image both of the divine nature of Christ 
and of the divine Persons of the Trinity.298 The community of the three persons of the 
Trinity is represented in each of us through our participation in the triune God: “For the 
being of God is understood as event and relationship, but only through an 
epistemology of participation.”299 Aquinas himself teaches that the image of the trinity 
is found in our activities of thinking and acting.300 Also John Edward Sullivan in The 
Image of God: The Doctrine of St. Augustine and Its Influence draws upon the riches of 
the teachings of the Fathers especially on the Trinity to explore the concept of Imago 
Dei.301 All these conceptions are foundational to Cessario’s reflections on the image. 
The implication is that our complete imaging of the Trinity consists in some 
actualization of our human capacities. 302  Cessario distinguishes natural and 
Supernatural image of God. In the former, the natural order without sanctifying grace 
elevates the person to share in the divine life, “the God thus attained in knowledge is 
reached not in his very self, but rather according to the soul’s own proper mode of 
being and as the cause to that being.”303 While in the latter, the human person is aided 
by grace.304 
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To say that the human person is an Imago Dei has both theological and 
anthropological implications. It is important to note that the human person has to be 
understood from a theological-anthropological perspective in doing moral theology 
today. It means that the human person cannot be fully understood without reference to 
God. Such an understanding leads to a better articulation of ethics. However, Cessario 
does not consider the eschatological aspect of the Imago Dei. But Mark S. Medley 
identifies an eschatological dimension to the human person in his book Imago Trinitas: 
Toward a Relational Understanding of Becoming Human. Medley rather talks of 
Imago Trinitas and not Imago Dei. He does this from five theses: God constitutes 
human person; Imago Trinitas points to the human person as theonomous; Imago 
Trinitas affirms personhood as ineffable, concrete and ecstatic, points to life of 
communion with others and with all of creation; As an iconic metaphor poised in a 
balance between particularity and communion; Therefore Imago Trinitas affirms the 
eschatological aspect of human personhood.305 The use of Imago Dei by Cessario and 
Imago Trinitas by Medley in relation to the human person capture both the theological, 
anthropological and eschatological dimension of the human person. 
Theological prepositions on the human person may not be treated in complete 
isolation from philosophical assumptions. Cessario is aware that philosophical 
assumptions adversely influence the development of moral philosophy and in turn the 
shape moral theology.306 Therefore, Cessario opines that since moral theology is a 
scientific enquiry that shapes human behaviour, the moral theologian must be informed 
about the conclusions of anthropology and other behavioural sciences as highlighted 
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earlier on in this chapter.307 And Benedict Ashley reasons in Theologies of the Body: 
Humanist and Christian: “A right understanding of science and of history, guided by 
the light of the Gospel, surely leads to the contemplation of the Triune God.”308 
Appreciating the place of theology in this endeavour, Cessario asserts: “While the 
philosophical justification for confidence about the analogous structure of nature and 
action distracts some moral philosophers, moral theologians enjoy an advantage 
afforded them by their commitment to and dependence on revealed truth.”309 St. 
Augustine in his Confessions realises this advantage when he writes that the Christians 
have sure knowledge about their destiny and how to reach it from revealed truth rather 
than in philosophical speculation.310  
From the foregoing, Cessario wishes to establish a sound theological 
anthropology that explains the complete meaning of the Christian faith about creation 
by developing an understanding of the relationship between human nature and human 
person.311 Since he traces the nature of the human person to God: “God constitutes the 
objective happiness of every person. Since complete happiness for the human person is 
found only in the happiness that results from God’s own happiness, the moral 
theologian finds true consolation in the guidance that divine revelation gives for the 
moral life.”312 
Therefore, in trying to understand the human person from the perspective of the 
Christian doctrine of Imago Dei, Cessario is trying to understand the origin and nature 
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of the human person in connection with his actions within the moral spectrum. His 
theology of the Imago Dei is built around the substantive view as shall see in the last 
chapter of this thesis. 
Our concern so far has been to show how the human person made in the image 
of God attains that image of conformity with his or her maker.  The last existential 
state of the Imago Dei is beholding God face to face.313 God becomes the beginning 
and end of the Imago Dei.  The most basic principle of the Christian moral life is the 
awareness that every person bears the dignity of being made in the image of God. 314 
The person has been given an immortal soul and through the gifts of intelligence and 
reason enables it to understand the order of things established in his creation. God has 
also given us a free will to seek and love what is true, good, and beautiful.  
The achievement of the fullness of the Imago Dei in the Christian moral life is 
one that seeks to cultivate and practice virtue. Hence, Douglas John Hall in Imaging 
God: Dominion as Stewardship, argues: “To be Imago Dei does not mean to have 
something, but to be and do something: to image God.”315 And Medley also reiterates 
the fact that the divine image is not a thing, but a process.316 Hall aptly captures: 
“Imago Dei therefore indicates openness, transcendality, alterity, participation, and 
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relatedness. Hence, human beings are created for loving communion and 
interconnection with the Divine, with one another, self and with all creation.”317 
Therefore, our understanding of the human person as Imago Dei and Imago 
Trinitas stresses that humanity and relatedness are intertwined so that the deeper one’s 
participation in relationships is, the more human one becomes. Since the individual and 
community are necessary to grow in God’s image, the fundamental responsibility of 
being the Imago Dei and for living in community is to give oneself. A deeper 
participation in the human community enhances the humanity of each person within 
the community while the failure to establish community diminishes the humanity of 
all.318  
2.6.2 Relationship Between Person(s) and Communities  
In order to understand the dynamics in any human community one must understand 
how parts relate to the whole.319  According to Cessario, there exists a general bond of 
relationship within the human species.320 Yet there is a distinguishing relationship that 
exists between an individual person as Imago Dei and the common good of the 
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society.321 At the same time, each individual person is unique in his or her own distinct 
way.  
Cessario in order to adequately explain the relationships that exist between a 
person within the human community introduces a distinction between a human 
individual and a person. It is a distinction which I find very technical and inexplicit. He 
argues:  
By their preoccupation with the “self” as a particular center of 
consciousness and volition, the philosophers of the Enlightenment 
broke with earlier philosophical traditions and their way of accounting 
for the individuality of each human being within the species. Because of 
the theology of incarnation, Christian thinkers had always upheld the 
distinction between an individual instance of human nature and the 
human person; whereas Christ possesses two individual and concrete 
natures, in the mystery of the hypostatic union, he remains one divine 
Person. And so the Christian tradition developed . . . a heightened 
awareness of the unique dignity that belongs to human personhood.322  
 
Accordingly, the Christian tradition has always taught of the uniqueness of the human 
personhood.323 Cessario cites Pope John Paul II who in his encyclical letter Centesimus 
Annus emphasized the care and responsibility that the church accords to the human 
person as a unique being: “We are not dealing here with man in the ‘abstract’, but with 
the real, ‘concrete’, ‘historical’ man. We are dealing with each individual, since each 
one is included in the mystery of the Redemption. And through this mystery Christ has 
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united himself with each one for ever.”324 Cessario appeals to incarnational theology to 
show the link between a person and community. 
Cessario also borrows the arguments of Jacques Maritain detailed in The 
Person and the Common Good: “The human being is caught between two poles; a 
material pole, which, in reality, does not concern the true person but rather the shadow 
of personality or what, in the strict sense, is called individuality, and a spiritual pole, 
which does concern true personality.”325 He goes further that while the individual qua 
individual can be subordinated to larger societal interests, the individual qua person 
enjoys an excellence that surpasses that of the whole human social order and, because 
of the divine design, finds rest and perfection only in union with God.326 However, 
Cessario observes that the above assertion raises questions for Christian ethics: “Does 
a human being considered simply as an individual member of the species enjoy certain 
prerogatives, such as the freedom to marry, that even the state, for its own legitimate 
interests, cannot restrict?”327 Even though Cessario does not attempt to answer the 
question raised above, he confirms the distinctive place the Church accords to the 
human person in the community: “The origin, the subject and the purpose of all social 
institutions is and should be the human person, whose life of its nature absolutely 
needs to be lived in society.”328 It follows that the person cannot live independently of 
the community.  
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Invariably, there is connection between human persons in society by way of 
their status within that society, be it economic, social or religious. The above 
connection between the person and society raises the question of the principle of 
subsidiary, because the Church understands a social community as an “ordered whole” 
that can exist in varying interdependent ways.329 Again the concept of subsidiary raises 
questions about power, distribution of goods and ordering of the society. This thesis 
does not intend to discuss the dynamics of the principle of subsidiary. Simply put, 
Cessario identifies the implication of the principle of subsidiary as follows:  
A community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal 
life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its 
functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to 
coordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always 
with a view to the common good.330 
 
Explaining this Cessario says: “The church considers social community as an ‘ordered 
whole’ that can exist in diversely independent ways: at the same time, it is important to 
recall that subordination does not spell obliteration.”331  
Cessario observes that in any attempt to consider human community 
holistically, theologians would have to take into consideration two important factors: 
“First, the ordering of the whole to the common good, and second, the achievement of 
diverse ends within the same community.”332 When not considered, two effects can 
result. Firstly, there may be radical individualism, which destroys the due ordering of 
human society. Secondly, it may result in totalitarianism, which undermines personal 
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dignity that each member of the community ought to enjoy.333 Therefore, the virtue of 
justice must consider these two extremes by means of prudence. And Cessario captures 
this more aptly: “True social justice aims to establish a human community that is 
readied for participation in the beatific communion of the saints, one which, because of 
the infused virtue of justice, already appears in some ways among those who belong to 
Christ.”334 
Cessario identifies three forms of human community, namely: the natural 
family, the political community and the church as the new community. He applies the 
virtues of justice and charity to these forms of community to better illustrate the 
connectedness between the person and the community.335 In the first form, he says: 
The natural family represents the whole that in the created order best 
realizes the divine design; as the domestic church, the family finds 
its deepest origin in the sacramental bond between wife and husband. 
Since it arises from natural processes, however, the unity of the 
whole excludes the ‘otherness’ that justice requires, though not the 
exercise of charity, according to St. Paul, Christian marriage 
represents in a symbolic way.336 
 
The primary orientation of the community has its originality from the natural family 
upon which every other form is built.  
Secondly, the political or civic community entails a perfect expression of 
human society whose end is the bene vivere humanum, the good of human prosperity 
for the community.337 The human good must be built upon the virtue of justice within 
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to the good it follows that the chief community is the one that aims at the chief human 
good that exists.”338 Therefore, Cessario argues: “The achievement of a just political 
order lacks the ultimate perfection that consists in loving God above all things, but as 
an authentic secondary end, the human polis embodies its own degree of perfection 
that the universal call to sanctity must respect.”339 Within the political society, justice 
alone does not provide the complete virtue for a more perfect and humane community. 
This being the case, Cessario introduces the third form of community, namely 
the church, “the ‘new community’ of elect.”340 This new community springs up from 
the unique bonds that charity establishes among the members of Christ’s body. 
According to Cessario, this community supersedes every form of human community: 
“The new law of evangelical justice reigns, so that within the church the end of all 
order is beatitudo, the blessed response of the saints in God.”341 Cessario gives an 
ecclesiological approach and places the church as the model of true community 
because of the virtue of love that is the foundation of a community as the church.  
 The three distinct forms of community represent various “common goods” 
though different, but provide the enabling environment for the practice of the virtues. 
Nonetheless, human experience cuts across all three forms of community. The practice 
of virtue therefore can be meaningfully exercised in the home, within the polis and in 
the church. To endure and prosper, communities need institutional structures, but these 
should serve community. The church is one of those institutionalized structures which 
has been at the service of community.  
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2.6.3 Persons Networking within Communio 
We have seen how Cessario brings out the distinctive relationship between an 
individual human person as an Imago Dei and the community from the perspective of 
the virtue of justice. Here he seeks to explain the activity of the persons in the 
community by taking the virtue of charity as a starting point. Cessario identifies how 
Aquinas in the Summa Theologica gives a comprehensive account of what he calls the 
objects of the virtue of charity.342 Aquinas enumerates the different categories of 
persons that form the church, invariably forming a communicatio of charity.343  
Communicatio as used by Cessario is a term derived from the concept 
communicatio idiomatum, which is a Christological concept that explains the 
interaction of a deity with humanity.344 The concept is most often used with reference 
to Christ. But Johann Hamann a moral philosopher in Writings in Philosophy and 
Language argues that the concept should apply not only to Christ but should be 
generalized to cover all human action.345 However, Cessario borrows the concept 
communicatio and uses it in a restrictive sense to imply a process of interaction within 
the human family as understood from the perspective of the virtue of charity or love. 
But since the concept is originally Christological, Cessario brings in Christ in his 
discourse who becomes the central figure in the communicatio. This explicates further 
the concept of participation but with an ecclesiological slant. His effort is to show in 
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the words of Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Life in his community is at the same time both 
personalizing and socializing.”346 
Cessario states that Christian love primarily is the love of God but it involves 
self and others: “The New Testament makes it abundantly clear that Christian love by 
its very nature reaches out and embraces the whole order of creation” (1 John 4:21).347 
The question “who is my neighbour?” (Luke 10:29) challenges us to an inquiry about 
the persons that make the communicatio of charity.348 Furthering into this inquiry 
Cessario notes:  
Any person can authentically love only on account of his or her share in 
that unique communicatio which God establishes within the human 
family through the incarnation of his only son. But so that theological 
charity does not become indistinguishably conflated with other forms of 
human affectivity nor the church mistaken for whatsoever human 
community, the moral theologian must examine carefully what makes 
for divine charity.349 
 
Therefore, Aquinas argues that membership of the communicatio is based in 
terms of the ratio formalis objecti as cited by Cessario.350 In other words: “Only the 
good God is the First Friend for every member in the communicatio of charity; and his 
unlimited goodness subsequently forms the radical ground for every manifestation of 
authentic friendship.”351 Going further he sustains: “At the same time, the gospels 
make it clearer that even though God alone is the sole explanation for charity, other 
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persons, whom the New Testament refers to as ‘neighbour’, can enter into the 
communicatio.”352 The communicatio therefore establishes a relationship between the 
persons participating. Cessario appeals to scripture to further explicate the participatory 
model at work within the communicatio:  
The New commandment explicitly speaks about these relationships 
when it enjoins that ‘You shall love the Lord your God with all your 
heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all 
your mind; and your neighbour as yourself’ (Luke 10:27). And in his 
last discourse, Jesus himself says: “I give you a new commandment, 
that you love one another. Just as I have loved you, you also should 
love one another” (John 13:34).   
 
To help understand Jesus’ injunction of loving others as ourselves, Cessario elucidates: 
“Only persons constitute the only true terms of the love of benevolence, they are the 
true ‘objects’ of charity.”353  
From the foregoing we can decipher that there are three classes within the 
communicatio which are to be considered: God, oneself and the neighbour: 
The proper and formal object of course is God, the Principal Friend to 
whom everything is referred; God alone remains the reason why we 
love ourselves and our neighbour. Next, each believer constitutes an 
object of charity for him or herself. Then, charity goes out to the 
neighbour, both angels and men, who either participate in or are called 
to participate in the fellowship of God’s love (communicatio 
beatitudinis).354 
 
There are three important questions that Cessario brings to the fore: First, how are we 
to love ourselves in charity? Second, how are we to love our neighbour? Third, among 
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neighbours how are we to love those who are sinners, and enemies? Basically the 
questions are two, with the third as a corollary of the second.  
Firstly, the New Testament demands love of neighbour as ones love for self as 
we have seen in previous biblical citations. By implication to be able to love the 
neighbour a person must first love him or herself.  Even Aristotle in Nicomachean 
Ethics remarks: “Friendly feelings towards others flow from a person’s own feelings 
towards himself or herself.”355 Aquinas too in Summa Theologiae maintains: “Just as 
unity is presupposed to union, so our love for ourselves is the model and root of 
friendship; for our friendship for others consists precisely in the fact that our attitude to 
them is the same as to ourselves.”356 But Cessario draws our attention to the fact that 
love of self is beyond egoism; for genuine self-love never apes self-centered and 
egoistic love. 357  The proper love of self has both psychological and physical 
implications. He advocates for a genuine understanding of love of self and particularly 
love of our bodies. He rejects any form of disguised Manichaeism, and unwarranted 
asceticism that is injurious to the body.358 
Secondly, the Christian demand to love oneself also extends to the neighbour. 
Cessario explains that loving one’s neighbours seems a simple task when understood 
from the standpoint of loving those who love us back. But it is challenged when one 
has to love others outside the communicatio, that is people considered to be sinners or 
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hardened criminals.359 The question thus is: how can sinners, who by definition are 
those who have exchanged the good of beatitude for the apparent goods of finite 
capacity, fit into the communicatio?360 Notice that Cessario is justifying his position of 
the Church being the model par excellence of community. Answering the above 
question, Cessario alludes to Aquinas’ explanation:  
For by definition, the sinner is not God’s friend. While it is true that 
sinners are not actual sharers in the communicatio beatitudinis, they 
still remain until death potential sharers in it. Charity urges us then to 
promote their return to God’s goodness. This means that we should 
love them in such a way as to ensure that they come to participate 
fully in the mystery of Christ’s love. Christ’s own example and his 
teaching, especially the parables of the lost sheep and the prodigal son, 
amply emphasize this central Christian concern.361  
 
Cessario further appeals to St. Augustine who introduces a judgment of mercy in 
human relationship.362 The inclusion of mercy is what makes the church different with 
the civil society. The approach to the virtue of mercy is somewhat different between 
the church and the state. In the latter mercy is unmerited it is simply given while in the 
former it has to be earned. 
Third, Cessario captures another demand of communicatio which insists the 
person must also love the neighbour who is an “enemy”. The  “enemy” here can refer to 
personal enemies, or the enemies of the communities to which one belongs; the family, 
the fatherland, even the church.363 Cessario makes a distinction between a sinner and an 
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First, to love an enemy as such, i.e., sub ratione inimici, would be the 
same thing as to love a sinner as a sinner . . . We can recognize that 
there is a distinction to be made between a sinner and an enemy; the 
sinner remains someone who fails to keep God’s law, but a person can 
become an enemy through no personal fault. One example is the soldier 
enlisted in the service of an enemy army. In this case, the communicatio 
of charity first requires that the offense be removed – in the example of 
the soldier, whatever precipitated the hostilities- by the guilty party . . . 
At the same time, the teaching of the gospel enjoins us to love the 
individual enemy, even with the predilection that exhibits the perfection 
of charity (see Matt. 5: 43-48).364 
 
Of course, it may be possible to find utilitarian motives for ignoring or letting 
go of past sins, but “Only Christ makes it possible to love the enemy in a way that 
transcends self-referential love.”365 This means that loving the enemy transcends even 
the willingness of an individual to love the sinner or enemy according to the demands 
of the gospel. That is why Cessario insists: “The love that one renders to an enemy 
does not, by the very fact that she or he is an enemy, make the love a better one to 
pursue. In fact, all things being equal, to love a friend is both better and more 
meritorious.”366 It is a love that is tough yet demanded by the gospel values. This is 
because: “Charity breaks down all barriers, of nationality, of race, of class, of 
culture.”367 
 In conclusion, western theological tradition has always taught that God, the 
self, the neighbour (foe and friend) are the constituent elements that form the 
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man must love, one is above him, namely God; another is himself; the third is close to 
him, namely his neighbour; and the fourth is beneath him, namely his own body.”368  
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
At this juncture, we may note some particular aspects of Cessario’s work. Primarily, he 
considers himself faithful to Aquinas, yet his Resourcement Thomism is shaped by 
way of a reading of Thomist themes found in the Patristic Era. He is also committed to 
moral realism that supports a doctrinally Christocentric approach to moral theology 
and the virtues.   
 Our reading of Cessario analyse the classical virtues individually. Rather, he 
tends to thematically discuss them from the general conditions necessary for 
establishing a construct named Christian virtue ethics.369  
Most significantly, this chapter brings out the basic elements in the works of 
Cessario that make for the theology of virtue from the perspective of the value of the 
community. At the heart of all this is the fact that Cessario operates from a standpoint 
of an explicit theology.  Christ becomes the paradigmatic figure and by extension the 
human person as an Imago Dei and the community. In general Cessario appeals to the 
dynamics within ecclesiology and communicatio to bring out the relational aspect of 
virtue ethics. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
JAMES F. KEENAN SJ: A PERSONALIST-PASTORAL APPROACH. 
3.0 Introduction  
James F. Keenan is a Jesuit priest specializing in fundamental moral theology. He 
obtained his BA at Fordham University Bronx, New York in 1976. He pursued his 
Masters in Divinity (M. Div) at Weston Jesuit School of Theology, Cambridge, Mass. 
in 1982. Soon afterwards, he received his S.T.L in 1984, and in 1988 his S.T.D both 
from Gregorian University, Rome. Presently he is a Professor of Moral Theology in 
the Department of Theology Boston College.  
Keenan’s research interests are widespread including the History of Moral 
Theology1 and the revival of St. Thomas Aquinas’s works.2 His book Goodness and 
Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae serves as foundational to his 
development of thoughts on Aquinas and later the virtues.3 Other areas of research 
interest are the New Testament Ethics, the human body,4 and ethical issues on 
HIV/AIDS and genetics.5 Keenan has edited, authored and co-authored many books 
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Academics, 1995), 59-73. 
	 164 
and written many articles that bear on virtue ethics and other ethical issues.6 Such is 
his output that Thomas Ryan in his article, “Christian Ethics: Moral Dilemmas or 
Something More,” considers Keenan as one of the leading contemporary theologians.7 
With reference to virtue ethics some of Keenan’s works include: “Proposing Cardinal 
Virtues,”8 and his co-authored books with Daniel Harrington and Joseph Kotva.9 In 
his many other works Keenan attempts to describe the present challenge of espousing 
virtue ethics.10  
Keenan currently serves as member of Board of Directors, Catholic 
Theological Society of America (CTSA) (2012 to date); Fellow, Institute for 
Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh; Fellow, Center of 
Theological Inquiry, Princeton; Editorial Board Member of Theological Studies (1991 
to date). Keenan’s interest in bioethics has also earned him the Chair, Catholic 
Theological Coalition on HIV/AIDS Prevention (1997 to date).  
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Our task in this chapter is to show how Keenan builds a theology of virtue on 
the relational aspect of the human person, for the human person takes primacy of 
place in his theological reflections. For Keenan virtue ethics is person-based ethics 
rather than act-based ethics, because virtues, not principles, are the sources for 
understanding normative conduct.11 Furthermore, Keenan is convinced that to have a 
viable moral theology we must understand the person(s) as agent rather than objects; 
and as agents we are relational.12  
3.1 Situating James F. Keenan  
The first task in this section is to place Keenan within the current moral debate on the 
revival of virtue ethics. As previously noted, Keenan proposes seven distinct periods 
in the history of moral theology: Patristic, penitentials, scholastics, confessional 
manuals, casuistry, moral manuals and contemporary moral theology.13 Each era, he 
contends was either marked by avoiding sin, or on becoming a disciple of Christ.14  
As seen in chapter one of this thesis, the Penitentials consequently eclipsed the 
tradition of the Fathers that depended on Scripture and the virtues.15 For example, 
Mahoney affirms that St. Augustine along with saints Ambrose and Gregory viewed 
the whole moral life in the categories of the four cardinal virtues in unison with 
charity.16 These writers emphasized the interiority of the Christian and also the 
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outward expression of that interiority.17 In like manner the moral theology that 
evolved during the scholastic era naturally depended on the virtues. 18  Keenan 
articulates:  
Inasmuch as theology was seen as a science investigating God and the 
human, moral theology specifically studied humanity as responding 
lovingly to the initiative of God. This study was then highly 
anthropological . . . and naturally depended on the virtues to outline an 
appropriate moral identity.19  
 
 A significant feature of his work is the use of history in doing moral theology: 
“James Keenan, professor of Moral Theology, has worked extensively on the history 
of Catholic Moral theology, in the revival of interest in virtue ethics.”20 One of his 
influences is Bernard Lonergan. Lonergan in Method in Theology explains that history 
in theology is not the mere coalition of historical data; rather it is an understanding 
that has an interpretative function.21 Thus, history as a functional specialty is a 
judgment of precisely what is going forward in the data of the past uncovered and 
comprehended.22 History for Lonergan is the fact of a dynamic forward, affirmed on 
the basis of historical evidence.23 
Keenan draws upon Lonergan’s work, by also writing of history from such a 
functional specialty perspective. Richard Gula in the review of Paul and Virtue Ethics 
has also noted that Keenan presents the historical dynamism of the virtues.24 However, 
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the dynamism of the virtues raises the all-important issue of hermeneutics, which 
according to Gula was not address in the book.25 Other historians of moral theology, 
such as Henry Lea, Mahoney, and Gallagher have influenced Keenan a great deal in 
the way they capture the history of moral theology.26  
To further situate Keenan, it is necessary to identify why he writes on virtue 
ethics. He sees in virtue ethics “a comprehensive approach to all of Christian life, not 
simply an exercise in character formation divorced from Christian faith and life.”27 
Therefore virtue ethics allows him to further the integration between moral theology 
and Scripture, by engaging in dialogue with biblical studies. For example in his 
collaborative work with Harrington he identifies those virtues that are Scripture 
based.28 Gula in the above mentioned review comments:  
Collaborative interdisciplinary projects in biblical studies and ethics 
are rare. All too often, biblical scholars and moral theologians work 
separately when trying to relate to each other’s disciplines . . . But 
together they help realize Vatican II’s vision of enriching moral 
theology by drawing more fully from Scripture.29 
 
This approach is dialogical. The dialogical perspective is further made visible in the 
ways Keenan sees the virtues as capable of bridging the gap between moral theology 
and other fields of theology like liturgy, spirituality and others.30 
Keenan’s works offer a positive engagement for scholars, pastors and lay 
faithful with a “heuristic probe” intended to generate further dialogue.31  From this 
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context, he intends to communicate with “thinking” Christians on something that is 
profoundly foundational to individuals, families, the church and the entire 
community.32 In this sense Keenan’s audience becomes the ordinary Christian. 
Secondly, Keenan wishes to sustain the renewed interest in the revival of 
virtue ethics. Chapter one has shown how both philosophers and theologians neglected 
virtue ethics for a long time. Keenan, like other current theologians makes his 
theological contributions to resonate with his philosophical counterparts.  
Thirdly, Keenan challenges us to think of the virtues not in the classical 
expression as perfecting individual powers within an individual person but rather as 
rightly realizing the ways that we are related.33 People are relational in three ways: 
generally, specifically, and uniquely.34 We shall return to these themes later. Charles 
Curran supports Keenan’s argumentation by writing:  
Yes, much individual diversity exists, but there still remains a 
minimal understanding of those virtues that must form a part of 
every Christian life. One can spell out the virtues of the Christian life 
common to all Christians only in the sense of a loosely arranged 
minimum common to all.35  
 
In this context Keenan proposes a new categorization of virtues.36  
Keenan can be identified as a Revisionist Thomist. The revisionist movement 
is a recent theological movement that attempts to reformulate the meaning of truth-
																																																																																																																																																														
31 Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, xii. 
32 James F. Keenan, Virtue for Ordinary Christians (Franklin: Sheed & Ward, 1999), 
vii. 
33 Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 122. 
34 Keenan, “Proposing Cardinal Virtues,” 723. 
35 Curran, “Virtue: The Catholic Moral Tradition Today,” 54. 
36 Ibid. 
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claims of Christian traditions from various critical perspectives.37 Revisionism as an 
ethical method, evaluates the rightness or wrongness of an act in terms of the human 
person adequately considered and how the act impacts its dimensions, aside from the 
subjective motivation or moral goodness of the agent choosing the act.38 David Tracy 
who is a prime-shaper of the revisionist theology writes in Blessed Rage For Order: 
The New Pluralism in Theology expressing the fundamental insight of the revisionist 
theology: “The task of Christian theology intrinsically involves a commitment to 
investigate critically both the Christian faith in its several expressions and 
contemporary experience in its several cultural expressions.”39 To do this Tracy 
proposes five theses:  
-First Thesis: There are two principal sources for theology; the Christian texts and 
common human experience and language. 
-Second Thesis: A Critical correlation of the results of the investigations of the two 
sources of theology. 
-Third Thesis: The principal method of investigation of the source can be described as 
the phenomenology of the “religious dimension” present in everyday and scientific 
experience and language. 
-Fourth Thesis: The principal method of investigation of the source “the Christian 
tradition” can be described as an Historical and Hermeneutical investigation of 
classical Christian texts.  
																																																								
37 New Catholic Encyclopedia 2nd ed., s.v, “Revisionist Theology.” There are other 
designations given to revisionist theology: “Reductionist theology”, or “The 
Emerging Church”. 
38 See Louis Janssens, “Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations,” Louvain 
Studies 8 (1980): 3-29; Todd A. Salzman, What are they Saying About Catholic 
Ethical Method? (New York: Paulist Press, 2003), 134. 
39 David Tracy, Blessed Rage For Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (New 
York: Seabury Press, 1975), 45.  
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-Fifth Thesis: To know the truth-status of the results of one’s investigations into the 
meaning of both common human experience and the Christian texts the theologian 
should employ an explicitly transcendental or metaphysical mode of reflection.40  
Keenan operates out of similar commitments. He presents the appropriateness 
of his chosen categories of virtue ethics as fundamental aspect within Christian 
tradition.41 This represents a responsibility to the tradition.42 Yet, while Keenan 
defends the classical tradition of the virtues, as Aquinas understood them, he applies 
his revisionist skills by proposing new virtues to meet contemporary experiences.  
As argued by Todd A. Salzman in What are they Saying About Catholic 
Ethical Method revisionism as a movement came in as a response to the call of 
Vatican II for the renewal of moral theology43 This project has resulted in the 
reconstruction of moral theology.44 As already noted, the retrieval of virtue ethics was 
an effort to re-construct one of the aspects the manuals of moral theology 
overlooked.45 The overall enterprise is aimed at providing an explicit normative 
method that is conducive to generalized human experience.46 This is what Dale 
Jamieson in “Method and Moral Theory,” calls “dominant conception” which makes 
particular moral theories explicit and universal by making vivid their coercive 
power.47 However, revisionism as method accepts the fact that there are many sources 
of moral knowledge. One of those is tradition. The revisionists have a unique 
																																																								
40 Ibid., 43-56. 
41 Keenan, Jesus and Virtue Ethics, xiv. 
42 Tracy, Blessed Rage For Order, 44. 
43  Salzman, What are they Saying About Catholic Ethical Method? 6. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid. Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes, no. 44; See Charles Curran, The Catholic Moral 
Tradition Today: A Synthesis (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 
1999), 48. 
47 Dale Jamieson, “Method and Moral Theory,” in Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter 
Singer (Malden: Blackwell, 1991), 477.  
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understanding of Tradition which shapes their ethical theories. 48  According to 
Salzman revisionism creates a dialectical process of constructing a synthetic whole 
with the various sources of moral knowledge.49 This dialectical process is quite 
evident in Keenan, as he weaves around the Thomistic virtues with his proposed 
virtues to provide a hermeneutical lens for contemporary moral life.  
One of the fundamental aspects to revisionists is historical consciousness.50 
We have already recognized this feature of Keenan’s work. According to historical 
consciousness worldview, a moral theory must be based on reality that is dynamic and 
evolving. 51  The vitality and changing mode proposed by the revisionists also 
emphasize that meaning must be retained. Keenan writes history from such a 
perspective.  
Fourthly, Keenan observes in Virtues for Ordinary Christians that there is a 
constant criticism that virtues are soft, inexact, and lofty. Instead he presents them as 
tangible, realistic, expedient, essential, and person-centered yet in communion with 
others. He advances that virtues are not ideas, but liveable practices, exercised by 
individuals within a relational context. 52  
Keenan has been influenced by so many sources. This is evident in his effort in 
ranging wide in the Catholic tradition especially theologians like St. Augustine and St. 
Thomas Aquinas. He is also influenced by modern developments in moral theology, 
classical work, popular culture and personal experiences.53 Another major influence is 
Alasdair MacIntyre, as we shall examine in the succeeding section. Some revisionists 
																																																								
48 Salzman, What are they Saying About Catholic Ethical Method? 138. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 57. 
51 Ibid., 56 & 136. See also Grisez, The Way of The Lord, 106. 
52 Keenan, Virtues for Ordinary Christians, vii. 
53 See Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, xiii. 
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theologians like Haring, Fuchs, Bruno Schuller, Louis Janssens and Curran have 
influenced Keenan. Curran for example has developed the social-responsibility model 
to incorporate fields like virtue ethics.  
Keenan can also be situated as a personalist moral theologian. In his review of 
Linda Hogan’s work Confronting the Truth: Conscience in Catholic Tradition, 
Keenan identifies himself as a personalist moral theologian: “Like this reviewer, 
Hogan clearly is among the personalists.”54 Personalist moral theologians accentuate 
the value of the human person by seeking to explore in a deeper sense the meaning 
and nature of the human person. They reject for example Hegelian idealism that 
neglects the reality of human existence. 55  Instead they emphasize the radical 
difference between persons and non-persons and the irreducibility of the person to 
impersonal spiritual or material factors. They also affirm the dignity of persons, a 
concern for the person’s subjectivity and self-determination, with particular emphasis 
on the social (relational) nature of the person.56  
 As observed in chapter one, moral theology became reduced to a legalism 
(rule based ethics) and as a result neglected the human person. Charles Curran in The 
Origins of Moral Theology in the United States: Three Different Approaches argues 
that the legalistic model is inappropriate in doing moral theology today.57 Along this 
line Richard Gula re-echoes in an article “The Shifting Landscape of Moral 
Theology”:  
																																																								
54 James F. Keenan, “A Review of Confronting the Truth: Conscience in Catholic 
Tradition,” by Linda Hogan, The Tablet (April 21, 2001): 508. 
55  Thomas D. Williams, “Personalism,” Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy 
plato.stanford.edu/entries/personalism first published November, 12 2009 with a 
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56 Ibid. 
57  Charles Curran, The Origins of Moral Theology in the United States: Three 
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The first generation of post-conciliar moral theologians, such as 
Bernard Haring, Josef Fuchs, Bruno Schuller, and Louis Janssens in 
Europe, and Richard McCormick and Charles Curran in the United 
States, were largely concerned with clarifying the rightness and 
wrongness of actions and solving moral problems. But they were 
beginning to make this analysis in a personalistic, rather than legalistic, 
context. One of the great contributions of these first generation of 
revisionists was to shift the axis of the moral life away from the law-
obligation model that focused on individual acts and toward the 
personal, relational-responsibility model that gave centrality to the 
person.58 
 
The human person as a concept in both philosophy and theology has two aspects: the 
human person as individual and rational, and the human person as relational.59 
Unfortunately, the former has been emphasized historically more than the latter.60  
Keenan adopts Thomistic personalism which avoids the extremes of over-
emphasizes of the person as individual and rational on the one hand and the person as 
relational on the other hand.  Instead, Thomism stresses the metaphysical distinction 
between individuality and personality and establishes a more balanced position.61 
Keenan emphasizes both the person as an individual and the person as relational.62 He 
concludes:  
Note . . . virtues call us to help one another. In previous centuries, 
the virtues of purity, meekness, modesty and vigilance were 
signalled as Christian virtues. They promoted a type of Christian 
who measured and parsed his every movement. The virtues from the 
scriptures do not promote, however, a private piety: reconciliation, 
mercy, charity, hope and humility call us to recognize the need we 
have for one another. They provide ways of helping us to forge 
forward on the way of the Lord, recognizing that we should never 
																																																								
58 Richard Gula, “The Shifting Landscape of Moral Theology,” Church (Spring, 
2009)http://www.churchmagazine.org/issue/0903/upf_shifting_landscape.php 
(accessed October 17, 2013). 
59 Brian Johnstone, “What Does it Mean to be a Person?,” Studia Moralia, 48/1 
(2010): 125.  
60 Ibid. 
61 See  Maritain, The Person and Common Good, 9. 
62 See Keenan, “Proposing Cardinal Virtues,” 723-729. 
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outdistance one another, but rather that we should strive together for 
the finish line.63 
 
3.2 An Over-all Theological Structure 
Keenan’s general theological structure on the virtues is built around the human 
person. MacIntyre argues that contemporary ethics has fragmented and disintegrated, 
and we now live in a state of ‘moral disagreement’. Each person has his or own moral 
position and dismisses any other’s by simply saying, ‘well that’s your opinion.’64 He 
claims that the above disintegration occurred because ethicists have depersonalized 
ethics.65  
Keenan follows MacIntyre in proposing that ethics should be re-
personalized.66 To achieve this aim, MacIntyre suggests that ethics has to address the 
questions: what type of people we ought to become? rather than asking the rightness 
and wrongness of an action.67 Following this insight, Keenan remarks:  
Christian ethicists immediately recognized the importance of this 
question. Who other than Jesus Christ beckoned us more to consider the 
question about the people we could become? In his invitation to us to 
become, by his grace, his disciples, children of God, and heirs of the 
kingdom, Christ in the Scriptures has always extended to us a call to 
answer the question: who ought we to become?68 
 
While MacIntyre writes as a moral philosopher Keenan writes as a moral theologian. 
Keenan sets out his own agenda to address the threefold question of “who are we?”, 
“Who ought we to become?” and “How do we get there?”69 Because of the centrality 
																																																								
63 Keenan, “What is Virtue Ethics,” 404. 
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67 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed. 
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of this threefold question, it is reflected in most of Keenan’s works.70 We shall 
elaborate on this threefold question in the next section. 
 In Virtues for Ordinary Christians, Keenan approaches the virtues by taking 
familiar patterns of Christian life from the perspectives of the family, school, parish, 
and commerce.71 He picks one virtue and interlaces it with the existential human 
experience. He applies same methodology in other works. For example in an article 
titled: “Proposing Cardinal Virtues”, Keenan applies the virtues in the case of Mrs. 
Bergmeier.72 He accepts the traditional list of the virtues but goes further to add other 
ones like fidelity, self-esteem, hospitality, gratitude, truthfulness, etc.73 In other 
situations he proposes other virtues of fidelity, and self-care.74 He gives reason why 
the classical list is inadequate: 	
The virtues are . . . traditional teleological, (i.e., end-oriented) guides 
that collectively aim for the right realization of the human person. As 
teleological, they need to be continually realized and redefined; their 
final expression remains outstanding. The mature person is 
constantly growing in the virtues. This means that virtue is always at 
once looking for expression in action and when a virtue is realized in 
																																																								
70 Ibid., 35-74; see also Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 1-8. 
71 Keenan, Virtues for Ordinary Christians. See also MacIntyre, After Virtue, xiii. 
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activity and the effects. But none of these looked at how much Mrs. Bergmeier was 
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73 Keenan, Virtues for Ordinary Christians, 37-134. 
74 Ibid., 720-721. 
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action it make the person more virtuous. Thus the more we grow in 
virtue, the more we are able to recognize our need of further growth . 
. . The nature of virtue is . . . historically dynamic; being in 
themselves goal-oriented, virtues require being continually 
considered, understood, acquired, developed and reformulated.75 
 
Keenan’s revisionist tendencies are very evident in his reformulation project 
of the virtues. However, lacunae can develop in his work that may be the inevitable 
result of his approach. He has allowed himself to be interpreted either as being too 
liberal or even sitting on the fence, because often he does not offer strong conclusions 
or be definite in his answer. 
Keenan is pro-active in proposing sets of new virtues, which he thinks are 
transcultural and transgenerational: Justice, fidelity, self-care, and prudence.76 He 
considers them transcultural because as persons we are relational generally, 
specifically and uniquely.77 However, he does not take into account the variances in 
different cultures that may be at odds.  
Keenan also approaches the virtues from the perspective of sexual ethics.78 
This further explains Keenan’s desire to re-evaluate virtue ethics to meet 
contemporary challenges. It is also to establish or further the discourse with other 
fields of study.79 Keenan’s work has a pastoral outlook. One can say it involves a 
cyclical and dialectical movement of theory and practice.  
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This chapter proceeds by outlining his anthropological vision through an 
appraisal of the question of identity that is foundational to his theological 
configuration on virtue. The chapter will thereafter consider particular themes on 
virtue ethics, which will articulate the dialectical movement mentioned above. 
3. 3 Anthropological Vision of the Question of Identity  
Virtue ethics is an ethical approach that fuses together ‘who we are’ and ‘what we 
do’. Gula affirms: “In the idiom of traditional Catholic moral theology, actio sequitur 
esse: who we are shapes what we do. Then there is the dialectical return: What we do 
in turn shapes who we are.”80 The question therefore is of identity and human action. 
Keenan develops MacIntyre’ s idea in explaining the teleological scheme inherent in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics by identifying the dynamics between “man-as-he-
happens-to-be” and “man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature” and the 
ethical science to make the transition from the former state to the latter.81 The 
threefold question I have renamed ‘anthropological vision of the question of identity’. 
 MacIntyre argues in line with the older tradition that ethics becomes the 
viable science that can make real the transition from “man-as-he-happens-to-be” to 
“man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature”. MacIntyre explains further 
the function ethics plays in such interface.82 The scheme gets complicated but not 
changed when it is placed within the framework of theistic beliefs, either Christian, 
Jewish, or Islamic.83 He writes: 
The precepts of ethics now have to be understood not only as 
teleological injunctions, but also as expressions of a divinely ordained 
law. The table of virtues and vices has to be amended and added to and 
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a concept of sin is added to the Aristotelian concept of error. The law of 
God requires a new kind of respect and awe. The true end of man can 
no longer be completely achieved in this world, but only in another. 
Yet the threefold structure of untutored human-nature-as-it –happens-to 
be, human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos and the precepts 
of rational ethics as the means for the transition from one to the other 
remains central to the theistic understanding of evaluative thought and 
judgment.84 
 
The philosophical articulation of the transition between the aforementioned 
states via ethics is extremely broad. Ethics has three main branches, meta-ethics, 
normative ethics and applied ethics, each of which has sub-branches.85 Keenan 
specifically appeals to virtue as a branch of normative ethics. To adequately answer 
the first question namely “who are we?” he provides the context of a discipleship that 
is conducive to growth and self-understanding.  
3.3.1 Who are We? Within the Context of Discipleship 
The question “who are we?” covers a wide range of dimensions in the human life 
including physical, psychological, historical, philosophical and theological 
dimensions. It will be beyond the scope of this thesis to explain the above 
dimensions. Rather it restricts our understanding of ‘who we are’ within the 
theological dimension by reflecting on discipleship as Keenan suggests. As Michael 
G. Lawler and Todd A. Salzman in “Virtue Ethics: Natural and Christian” affirm: 
“Virtue ethics answers the question ‘who am I to become”.86 Discipleship within 
Christian tradition entails becoming like Jesus. Hence, “The New Testament invites 
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the followers of Jesus to become and be like Jesus and, because they are like him, to 
do as he did.”87 
A deeper insight to the above question of identity is developed by Vincent 
MacNamara who explains ‘who I am’ in his book, The Call to be Human: Making 
Sense of Morality: “I am talking about who I have become with my unique 
configuration of desires, fears, prejudices, longings, hurts, jealousies, envies. It is not 
a clean slate that takes on the burden of moral life. But a very particular person, 
heavy with the legacy of its past.”88  
According to Keenan, the answer to the Question Who are we? Is simply: “A 
disciple of Jesus, made in the image and likeness of God.”89 Being a disciple offers a 
crucial and overarching identity to the Christian. “In that identity, Christians define 
themselves not only in relationship to Jesus but also in relation to themselves and to 
fellow Christians, because following Jesus has always been a communal activity and 
is never a solitary action.”90 He therefore agrees with MacNamara’s conception of 
“who am I” as cited above, without articulating the negative aspects named by 
MacNamara. Indeed, Keenan’s work is quite optimistic about the person.  
The concept of discipleship when looked at from MacNamara’s conception of 
“Who am I?” denotes the concept self-understanding. But the understanding of 
discipleship in the first century and the changing understanding of the twenty-first 
century concept of self-understanding may be conflicting. 91  Conscious of this, 
Keenan chooses to stick to “discipleship” as the proper foundation of Christian 
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ethics.92 This is because it offers a suitable context in answering the first question of 
identity that explains human nature within teleological and theological constructs. A 
further question can be raised here: “who is a disciple?” According to Harrington, the 
disciple is one who wants to be with Jesus and to share his mission in every era.93 The 
disciple belongs to a new family, and takes on a simple lifestyle, and learns to 
subordinate personal needs for the sake of the mission itself. 94  Furthering his 
argument on discipleship, Keenan draws upon the works of Fritz Tillman and Klaus 
Demmer to explicate the concept of being a disciple from different perspective but 
with a conceptual unity.95 
Tillmann (1874-1953) was originally a German Biblical scholar. 
Unfortunately his career as biblical scholar came to an end in 1912 by a decree of the 
Consistorial Congregation, upon which he turned to moral theology. In his earlier 
mentioned work The Master Calls he graphically shows the fundamental idea of what 
it means to follow Christ.96 His influence in moral theology concerned the personal 
effect that Jesus’ self-understanding had on the community of disciples.97 On this, 
Tillmann developed a theology of Christian search for the good within the framework 
of being a true disciple of Christ.98 Tillmann showed that to be a disciple of Jesus was 
never disconnected from either the love of neighbour or a concern for the needs of the 
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world.99 He further conveys that each individual is incorporated into the family of 
God through baptism, by the indwelling of the spirit of God.100 
To link this up with virtue, Tillmann introduces the concept of perfection.101 
He posits that baptism is a universal call to perfection.102 By using the term perfection 
he moves readily to the discussion on the virtues because of how they perfect all that 
is human. He re-echoes Christ’s sayings that the birthplace of moral actions, either 
good or bad is man’s interior dispositions.103 In sum, discipleship is a call to 
perfection by practicing the virtues.  
This forms the basis for which Keenan approaches the virtues from the 
perspective of discipleship. For both Tillmann and Keenan through baptism and other 
sacraments, a new relationship ensues. Keenan affirms: “This new relationship calls 
us to take notice of the imprint of God’s self within ourselves. There, within, we are 
called to allow the work of God to continue in the development of our interior 
dispositions.”104 Jesus says:  
Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself 
unless it remains on the vine, so neither can you unless you abide in 
me. I am the vine and you are the branches. He who abides in me, 
and I in him, he bears fruit; for without me you can do nothing (Jn. 
15:4ff).  
 
This metaphor describes the union or connection between Jesus and the disciple. The 
disciple’s identity becomes incorporated into the identity of the master who calls:  
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The organic connection between the branch and its vine is the 
necessary condition for the former’s growth, flowering and fruit. The 
figure primarily describes the union of Christ and His disciples; 
nevertheless it reveals with incomparable clarity the general thought 
of the saviour: only as long as the vital union between Him and His 
followers persists do they remain His disciples and bear fruit as His 
followers.105 
 
Tillmann discusses the relational character of what it means to be a disciple by way 
of love of God, love of neighbour and love of self, in which Jesus becomes the model 
and motive of the disciple.106 Because of his appeals to scripture, Tillman became 
very influential in reviving biblical thought in moral theology.   
Accordingly, Keenan makes the same claims as Tillmann: “The entire moral 
life is organized and shaped by our following of Jesus.”107 Discipleship is therefore a 
response to the love which God has shown to each person. It is also a response to the 
self as a “thou” and a participation in God’s continuous creative activity: “He is the 
unsurpassable goal who always goes before us, making our call to follow him a 
dynamic movement.”108  
The second moral theologian Keenan draws upon is Klaus Demmer, a German 
theologian. For Demmer also, the first step to understanding revelation and the 
human person is to understand Jesus.109 Demmer goes further than Tillmann to add 
that history plays a vital role in shaping our understanding of ‘who we are’.110 He 
argues that our self-understanding has to be placed within the context of history: 
“God reveals God’s self to all people in an historical event and shares with them 
indestructible meaning, a situation exists in which no historical event could be 
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prevented from acquiring some dimensions of meaning.” 111  Keenan therefore 
contends: “Like Jesus of Nazareth, our self-understanding must be situated in history. 
Thus, just as Jesus reveals to us his self-understanding in history, so too we must 
work out in history that self-understanding of ourselves in Jesus.”112 Jesus reveals to 
us the Father. Such a revelation reveals the relationship between Jesus and the Father. 
It follows that those who become disciples of Christ now share in this self-
understanding; they not only understand the Father through the Son but they 
understand themselves as well.113 Keenan further gives an eschatological side of this 
self-understanding.114 
Like Tillmann, Demmer maintains that Jesus is the model and animator, the 
goal and the cause of all Christian action.115 For Demmer, as for Tillmann, even 
though Christ is and remains the model of the disciple, the moral life of the person is 
not devoid of conflict and limitations.116 Sin becomes an existential predicament. 
Hence, who we are does not consist only in the positives of our lives but also the 
negatives. In chapter one we saw how the manualists facilitated the phobia of sin. But 
sin or human weakness must find some experiential content in order to be less 
abstract.117 In this context, sin is understood in relation to a person’s vocation which 
forms part of his/her identity as a disciple.118 This would bring about a true sense of 
personal responsibility. 
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The implications for Keenan are twofold: Firstly, in order to understand who 
we are, the context of discipleship serves as a great paradigm. Secondly, as disciples, 
we partake in the self-understanding of Jesus. 119  This means: “By his self-
understanding Jesus entered into a radical openness to the will of God, and that in that 
openness he freed us from sin and death; in turn, Jesus made possible our ability to 
hear and respond to his call to follow in his footsteps.”120 Scripture is rich with 
imagery of walking in Jesus’ footsteps. But among others Keenan finds the answer 
Jesus gave to the question, “And who is my neighbour?” more appealing. He answers 
the question with the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37).121  
 From the parable of the Good Samaritan Jesus teaches us not to look for a 
neighbour to love but rather we should be neighbours who love.122 In virtue ethics we 
can appreciate the fact that being precedes doing.123 According to Keenan, this is one 
of the lessons of the parable of the Good Samaritan.124  At the end of the discourse 
Jesus instructed the man “go and do the same”. It does not end there for Jesus himself 
became the greatest exemplar: “I have given you an example, that as I have done to 
you, so you also should do” (John 13:15).  
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To become authentic moral exemplars we must be ready to engage with the 
question of ‘who we are’. It remains the question of self-knowledge, that is critical 
and honest. In using the language of virtues one can ask ‘am I just, brave, temperate, 
and prudent?’125 Answering this would depend on the level of self-knowledge each 
individual has and the ability to respond to spontaneous situations like in the story of 
the Good Samaritan. Keenan suggests that we use Aquinas’s cardinal virtues to aid 
self-reflection.126 However, he later presents his own agenda by proposing other 
virtues, as we shall see later. On the whole Keenan’s approach is Christocentric.  
3.3.2 “Who Ought we Become?” 
According to Keenan: “The second question embodies a vision of the type of person 
we ought to become.”127 The above question suggests an end, a goal which humanity 
is poised to achieve. Keenan argues that often in ethical reflection, the goal is where 
we begin.128 For instance, the Christian faith as expressed in the New Testament 
begins with the inauguration of the kingdom of God and it inevitably becomes the 
goal of the Christian journey. 129  This is a typical Thomistic method, being 
teleological in nature.130 Aquinas held that the end of the human person is the first 
ethical consideration. For Keenan life is defined by the goal in view: “From an ethical 
viewpoint, the end is the quintessential point of departure, since strong ethical 
systems always start with the end. The goal always defines the agenda being pursued. 
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The agenda, from start to finish, is shaped by the end.”131  The kingdom in this case 
becomes the goal. Therefore, God becomes the end.132 
What we ought to become is determined by a lot of factors depending on the 
actual context. For example, for a young man in the Greek tradition, becoming a hero 
was the “ought” of his life. But that may differ for a Christian young man today. 
Keenan explains further, that the goal or end of the Christian life has an 
eschatological dimension:  
In the Christian tradition in general and in Paul’s case in particular the 
answer to this question is shaped in large part by hope for the fullness 
of eternal life with God as the goal or telos of human existence. Like 
Jesus and many of his Jewish contemporaries, Paul thought about his 
goal or end (telos) in eschatological or apocalyptic terms: “If somehow 
I may attain the resurrection from the dead” (Phil. 3:11). Like them, 
Paul regarded resurrection as part of the scenario of future events 
culminating in the full manifestation of God’s rule and justice in the 
Kingdom of God (“Thy Kingdom come,” Matt. 6:10).133 
 
Keenan is arguing that the concept of the kingdom provides actual substantive 
guidance in becoming “who ought we become”.134 What Keenan is doing is drawing 
a link between the present and the eschatological dimension of the human person. 
 Keenan acknowledges that identifying the human telos has undergone 
historical development.135 He contrasts the current revival with approaches that 
ignored the end of man.136 For example, Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) represents the 
era that overlooked the end of man.137 Durkheim’s sociological definition of religion 
in his last book The Elementary forms of the Religious Life states: “A religion is a 
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unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things 
set apart and forbidden-beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral 
community called a church, all those who adhere to them.”138 This definition is 
explained by Alan Aldridge in his commentarial work, Religion in the Contemporary 
World: A Sociological Introduction: “Most strikingly, Durkheim’s definition contains 
no reference to God, or the gods, or spiritual beings, or the transcendent, or another 
world, or the soul, or life after death.” 139 Therefore, in Durkheim’s terms:  
The sacred is a social construct: Sacredness is conferred not by God but 
by society: There is no qualitative difference between Lourdes, Jerusalem 
and Mecca on the one hand, and Anne Hathaway’s Cottage, Wembley 
Stadium (the ‘home’ of Association football) or the Tupelo shack where 
Elvis Presley was born.140  
 
Effectively, what Durkheim is suggesting is that God, as the telos of all human 
endeavour should be bracketed out.141 Keenan criticizes Durkheim’s removal of 
religious goals:  
Having removed the religious purposes of moral teachings, he 
supposed that the stuff of the moral tradition could be kept intact. Thus 
religious tradition taught us to treat all people equally either because 
God commanded it, because God would reward or punish us if we do 
not, because we share in God as being images of God, or because it was 
our destiny to be one with God and every human. Durkheim effectively 
deleted the clauses beginning with the word because.142 
 
Keenan further articulates: “Durkheim could make the claim that moral educators 
would be able to weave the moral fabric of society completely on their own, in part, 
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because he believed that the end of moral systems was detached from the contents of 
such systems.”143 But MacIntyre argues differently that every ethical theory must 
have its own end or it runs the risk of being vague.144 
Keenan upholds that the difference between Durkheim and MacIntyre is 
largely based on the function of the end in the clarification of their moral theories:  
Does the end simply motivate us, or does it actually shape the contents 
of morality? Does union with God simply move us to assume a virtuous 
life, or does it shape the content of Aquinas’ virtues? Is the kingdom of 
God the end, the because that prompts us to live rightly, or is it also that 
which determines the content of the Christian agenda? Durkheim 
basically claimed the former, while MacIntyre claims the latter in all 
these cases.145  
 
What we ought become can find meaning within the end. And the end according to 
Keenan is more than a motivator.146 However, the content of the end may differ. For 
example, in Aristotle’s view the end consists in achieving happiness or flourishing by 
cultivating the virtues and avoiding vices.147 Aristotelian ethics have a common 
ground with Christian ethics from the standpoint of happiness which is the end of 
virtue. However, Keenan notes that they differ in the content of the flourishing.148 
Keenan uses the parable of the labourers in the field who entered the work force at 
different times (Matt. 20:1-16) to show the differences. Accordingly, from the 
Christian perspective, the remit is not based on merit but on the pure generosity and 
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mercy of the master.149 In comparison, Aristotle would insist on strict justice. The 
same can be said of the “good thief” in Luke 23:39-43.150 In both cases, Keenan 
posits that mercy becomes the core virtue for Christian ethics:  
Without mercy we do not have Christian ethics. Mercy is constitutive 
of the kingdom, and therefore, inasmuch as it pertains to the end, mercy 
precedes and shapes the content of Christianity. Thus the kingdom does 
not simply provide a motivation for morality. As morality’s end, it also 
gives shape to the contents of Christian ethics. In short, all ethical 
systems have an end and that end is defining.151  
 
Hence, Keenan’s persistence in the reconstruction of virtue ethics. 
For Keenan, the Kingdom of God is the end for Christian ethics and so plays a 
defining role in our becoming “who we ought to become”. In this context, therefore, 
he agrees with MacIntyre who argues in favour of a telos in any ethical approach, 
theoretical or practical. But unlike MacIntyre a moral philosopher, Keenan as a 
theologian realizes the eschatological dimension to the kingdom as “the already-but-
not yet.”152 He explains: “Because the end is not yet fully realized, it is not fully 
recognized, articulated, or understood. In a manner of speaking, the kingdom as end 
is at times barely discernible. It beckons us to discover it, proclaim it, and enter it. 
But it remains on the horizon of our expectations.”153  
Within this eschatological dynamic, Keenan “proposes the notion of 
“Christian Idealism” as a framework to understanding and articulating the type of 
people that the kingdom of God requires us to become.”154 By Christian idealism 
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Keenan means seeing the end or telos through the realistic context of history viewed 
from the perspective of divine knowledge.155 He conceives history as the accumulated 
evidence of our human experiences.156 It understands the reality that God has made 
through human experience.157 Therefore, the idealism he speaks about is within 
human experience, the capability to achieve our goals and purpose within the moral 
law. Christian idealism for Keenan is realizing ideas in history through human 
experience. This presents a dynamic view of moral theology as a whole and in 
particular virtue ethics.158   
This approach brings to the fore the relevance of human growth. Aligning 
human growth with the end of human life becomes an imperative: “Setting this end 
means that the fundamental task of the moral life is to develop a vision and to strive 
to attain it. Inasmuch as that vision is who we ought to become, then, the key insight 
is that we should always aim at growth.”159 Human growth can be understood from 
different perspectives. But Keenan restricts his understanding to the Christian life by 
citing 1 Cor. 3:2 “I fed you with milk, not solid food, for you were not ready for it. 
And even now you are not yet ready.” This verse points to the significance of 
spiritual maturity as a process. Virtue ethics considered from this context may be call 
ethics of growth.160  Therefore, ‘who we can become’ is a member of the kingdom of 
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God.161 In other words we can become who we are only in union with the risen Lord. 
Keenan writes:  
Who other than Jesus Christ beckoned us more to consider the question 
about the people we could become? In his invitation to us to become, 
by his grace, his disciples, children of God, and heirs of the kingdom, 
Christ in the scripture has always extended to us a call to answer the 
question: who ought we to become?”162 
 
 Ultimately, Keenan concludes that for us to achieve the end or goal that is the 
kingdom of God we need to apply the virtues. In answering the question “who ought 
we become?” may have both an individualistic and corporate implications. Having 
become virtuous individually, we consequently influence the lives of other people 
around us. MacIntyre captures it better:  
When recurrently the tradition of the virtues is regenerated, it is 
always in everyday life, it is always through the engagement by plain 
persons in a variety of practices, including those of making and 
sustaining families and households, schools, clinics, and local forms 
of political community.163  
 
3.3.3 “How do we Get there?” 
The above question can be reformulated: “What means do we employ in order to 
know who we are,” or “how do we become that which we strive?” While deontology 
and consequentialism focus on moral duties and outcomes, the proponents of virtue 
ethics, by contrast, emphasize behavioural dispositions in order to ‘know who we are’ 
and ‘what we ought become’. Since the virtues provide the means to attaining the 
human end, Keenan suggests that in order to get to the end one needs prudence.164 
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Following the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, Keenan holds that prudence is not 
simply caution.165 In his view: 
Prudence is rather the virtue of a person whose feet are on the 
ground and who thinks both practically and realistically. Prudence 
belongs to the person who not only sets realistic ends, but sets out to 
attain them. The prudent person is precisely the person who knows 
how to grow.166 
 
The choice of prudence does not underestimate other virtues. I have decided to 
restrict myself only to prudence but Keenan’s suggestion is much wider.167 I shall 
explain below why I chose prudence.  
  Firstly, prudence recognizes the ends to which a person is naturally inclined. 
It establishes the agenda by which one can pursue those ends and directs the agent’s 
own performance of the pursued activity. Furthermore, it measures the rightness of 
the actions taken. Prudence, in short, guides the agent to living a self- directed life 
that seeks integration.168 Secondly, Prudence covers a broad spectrum of human life 
with an animating role. For example Aquinas points out: “Prudence is of good 
counsel about matters regarding man’s entire life and the end of human life.”169 
Thirdly, prudence connects both the intellectual and moral virtues. Aquinas himself 
writes: “Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in making a choice about the 
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 Crook notes that there are three acts in the smooth operation of prudence: 
deliberation, decision-making, and action or promptness. Of these, Keenan 
emphasizes deliberation. 171  Aquinas uses counsel instead of deliberation even 
though he considers them as synonymous. Aquinas states that counsel denotes a 
research of the reason about human actions.172 He uses the same word as Aristotle, 
eubulia. He refers to eubulia in the Secunda Secundae as being of “good counsel or 
rather a disposition to take good counsel”.173 These are the two senses in which 
Keenan uses deliberation. The emphasis on deliberation by Keenan exonerates virtue 
ethicist from the charge of self-centeredness. Deliberation or counsel promotes a 
particular good end congenial to individual and groups. That is why Aquinas himself 
notes: “There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an evil end, or discovering 
evil means for attaining a good end.”174  
Keenan makes a more relational and experiential explanation when he 
affirms: “The first sign of real prudence is finding the right person to give us 
advice.”175 From this standpoint: “Deliberation is the counterpart of precipitancy or 
rashness.”176 Pithily, we think before we speak. Keenan cites St. Augustine who 
writes:  
I will earnestly desire you to make the acquaintance of persons 
whose wisdom is more profound, whose eloquence is greater, whose 
knowledge is more comprehensive, whose conscience is freer of all 
contagion of sin, and who will therefore instruct you rightly by word 
and example.177  
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An individual seeking counsel must seek the right person(s). For example, to quit 
drinking one cannot seek counsel from someone who is equally a heavy drinker. Such 
a person must seek the counsel of one who knows the difference between moderate 
and excessive drinking.178 Although counsel or deliberation is important for any 
voluntary moral action, the final decision has to be made by the individual. 
Unfortunately, Keenan does not emphasise this point strongly, as it could have 
formed a good basis for his relational model. 
Keenan like Aristotle says: “Finding prudence is finding the middle point.”179 
It is about finding the mean of the particular action in question. He explains the mean 
as follows: “Prudence looks for the moderating advisor, it does so because it realizes 
that all of prudence is precisely getting to the middle point or the mean between 
extremes. As Aquinas says, virtue is the mean . . . neither too little nor too much.”180 
In order to find the mean, Keenan argues we must have a clear idea of who 
the agent is.181 This makes him different from Aristotle. This is because the mean of 
virtue is not something static, for no two means are the same. This shows the 
difficulty in prudence. Bearing this in mind Keenan further observes: “In a manner of 
speaking, a virtue ought to fit a person the way a glove fits one’s hand. There is a 
certain tailor-made feel to a virtue, which prompts Aquinas to call virtue one’s second 
nature.”182 
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 By and large what virtue ethics offers also includes setting of the agenda of 
the end and the means to accomplish the end. By way of extension, virtuous living 
involves the whole of human life: “It sees every moment as the possibility for 
acquiring or developing a virtue.”183 This explains why Aquinas himself underscores 
the fact that every human action is a moral action.184 I am therefore what I do. 
Keenan pictorially puts it:  
The way I take breakfast, the way I leave home, the way I drive to 
work, the way I greet people in the morning are all exercises that affect 
me. My morning exercises make me in part the person I will be for the 
rest of the day. They make me become what I do . . . The person who 
exercises by running eventually becomes a runner just as the one who 
dances becomes a dancer. From that insight Thomas, like Aristotle 
before him, sees that intended, habitual activity in the sports arena is no 
different from any other arena of life. If we can develop ourselves 
physically we can develop ourselves morally by intended, habitual 
activity.185 
 
3.4 Virtues: The Habits of Being 
In this section, Keenan is trying to show how virtue ethics encompasses everyday 
living. According to Aquinas, every voluntary human action is a moral action as 
indicated above. Morality therefore cannot be reduced to only actions of seemingly 
great importance: “The way we talk, the time we spend, the plans we make, the 
relationships we develop all constitute the moral life. Morality is not primarily the 
study of grave actions: “Rather it is the study of human living.”186  Human action is 
built on the following premises as argued by Martin E. P. Seligman in Authentic 
Happiness: Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize your Potential for Lasting 
Fulfilment: “There is a human ‘nature’, that actions proceed from character, and 
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character comes in two forms, both equally fundamental- bad character, and good or 
virtuous (angelic) character.”187 Therefore, good and bad characters are reflected in 
everyday life.188  
Human living as we know through daily experiences is multifaceted and 
complex. To deal with these complexities, Keenan observes that one has to form 
relevant and vital character traits or habits or practices.189   This thesis is attentive to 
the distinction that Servais Pinckaers makes between habit and virtue in his work 
“Virtue is not a Habit”. Pinckaers says virtue is not a “habit” in the ordinary meaning 
of the term. For him habits can be automated actions bereft of reasoning while virtues 
are those stable characters that always ensure practical reason and will.190 Therefore, 
the usage of habit here is not in the ordinary sense as observed by Pinckaers but 
rather in a stricter sense. Any reference to habit here shall not be in the ordinary 
sense. I apply the sense as used by Aristotle: “Now character [ēthos], as the word 
itself indicates, is that which is developed from habit [ethos]; and anything is 
habituated which, as a result of guidance which is not innate, through being changed 
a certain way repeatedly [pollakis], is eventually capable of acting in that way.”191 
MacIntyre supports the tradition of using virtues in the strict sense. For him 
practices are activities that help influence the development of dispositions to perform 
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particular acts.192 Keenan believes that to be able to deal with the changing demands 
of the moral life we have to adopt certain relevant practices.193 According to Keenan 
there are simple daily activities that are taken for granted and they demand us to 
constantly adopt practices to handle them. For instance:  
Waking up, eating breakfast, showering, going to work, writing letters, 
making calls, establishing new relations, playing sports, entertaining, 
driving, doing laundry, preparing meals, taking notes, using the 
computer, wearing clothes, dining, going to bed, reading, walking 
through shopping malls, relating to parents and children, listening, 
watching TV and brushing our teeth.194  
 
As simple as they seem, they are regular practices that eventually become habits 
through repeated actions and they effectively become deep-seated in us and they 
constitute a fundamental part of our entire existence. Any human science that does 
not use character as a basic idea will not be able to provide an authentic account of 
human action.195  
Keenan essentially writes to impact ordinary life. However, one might ask 
whether he does not go too far in making a virtue out of every human action? 
Furthermore, he does make it look too ordinary and overly simplistic. Unfortunately, 
there seem to be an ambiguity in Keenan’s usage of habit. To some extent Keenan 
identifies virtues with Pinckaers’ ordinary sense of the word habits, rather than the 
stricter sense. Even though Keenan has identified many practices that become habits, 
he does try to sift between them. Some practices engage us more than others namely; 
states of life and occupation.196  
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Firstly, by state of life Keenan means our status either as married or single 
people; religious included here.197 By way of contrast between the family life and the 
religious life, he suggests, the privacy and independence that religious or clerical life 
requires are foreign to the responsibilities of family life.198 Therefore: “These state-
of-life practices form the most profound habits in each of us.”199 Secondly, our 
occupation constitutes formative practices. Keenan further elucidates this point by 
citing his father’s experience as a cop: 
Before being a state investigator, my dad was a New York City police 
officer for twenty years. That ‘practice’ had its own language . . . and 
its own hierarchy of values. The ‘force’ had its stories, and he told them 
as concretely and specifically as he lived them. On Manhattan South 
Homicide Squad, he came into contact regularly with people who 
literally used others. He despised these pushers and pimps, but 
developed a profound respect for drug addicts and prostitutes; he saw 
regularly that though they fought (usually unsuccessfully) for dignity 
and survival, they still managed to think of and protect their neighbour. 
As result my dad habitually walked away from hypocrites and anyone 
else who exaggerated their condition. He loved integrity and hated 
liars. Likewise his practice of investigating several “suspects” before 
making a “determination” made him a man slow to judge. Once he 
made his decision, however, he did not change his mind easily. He was 
not a teacher, doctor, nurse, priest, or sanitation engineer, he was a cop: 
twenty years of practice made him one.200 
 
As we have seen, habits are formed through repeated actions. This is by implication 
applicable to all forms of habits whether good and bad.  
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 Keenan considers the negative habits that people form and later would want to 
drop. He asserts that people undermine what the moral life entails by forgetting just 
how ingrained our habits are and just how long it took to form them:  
Instead we get rather simplistic ideas that moral action and moral 
change are simply a matter of intention or will. We think, for instance, 
that after twenty years of using the practice of cursing that suddenly we 
are going to give up on Ash Wednesday and we are stunned at our lack 
of moral purpose when suddenly, two days later, we find ourselves 
blurting out some profanity. For ten years we developed the habit of 
thinking poorly of one particular person. We relish these thoughts and 
on occasion we let slip to others these private estimations. Yet, with 
firm purpose we resolve never to think ill of this person again. But as 
soon as something goes wrong, we know whose fault it is.201 
 
The picture painted above seems grim and inundated with pessimism about our 
inability to drop acquired bad habits. That is not the point Keenan is trying to convey. 
He states unequivocally:  
Until we realize the importance of practices and how they affect us 
habitually we will continue the useless practice of making unattainable 
resolves. Those intentions will be nothing more than expressions of 
wishful thinking unless we begin to engage other practices that can 
correct not only our ways of thinking, but also our ways of perceiving 
and handling reality.202 
 
Essentially, Keenan is saying we need to develop more healthy habits or practices in 
order to root out the negative ones.  We find the analogy which Jesus offers in 
Matthew 12: 43-45 very pertinent in this scenario. 
The question remains, how does one root out a bad habit with a good one? 
Keenan, unfortunately, does not offer us the explicit procedural techniques to go 
about this. He rather offers general insights, as we shall see in the succeeding 
paragraphs. Perhaps, this indicates the difficulty virtue ethics faces in terms of 
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availability of principles that can assist the formation of character and the direction of 
human conduct.  
On the other hand, in one’s efforts to drop certain bad habits a person can 
experience an inner battle which C. G. Jung in Dreams captures: “It is towards 
oneself that one has the strongest resistances.”203 In the same vein Jessica Macbeth in 
Sun Over Mountain: A Course in Creative Imagination argues:  
There is a part of us that always says No to any change in ourselves or 
in our lives. We can call it reasonable caution, we can call it cowardice 
or stupidity- it all depends on how we are feeling about the situation 
and ourselves at the moment. And there is another part of us that 
always wants to leap forward into new experiences and new ways of 
being. We can call this bravery or foolhardiness or stupidity, again 
depending on how we feel about what is happening . . . There is a part 
of us, an old and cunning part, which regards all new experiences and 
new ideas with extreme doubt. It says, ‘I survived yesterday just the 
way I am. If I were to change now, I might not survive. Why go 
looking for trouble?’ This part of us also collects experiences, and then 
forms judgments based on very simplistic assessments of those 
experiences.204 
 
This is the portrait of a human being fully alive. Life has an inner dynamism that 
tends to grow, to be expressed, to be shared, be conserved and lived.205  
 Keenan may not have offered us explicit procedural techniques but he offers 
four basic insights to the moral dynamic life within the perspective of change.206 
Firstly, the decision to change a particular aspect of one’s life always occurs in some 
context.207 Let me articulate this point in a story about my father Mr. John Zaggi. I 
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grew up to know my dad to be a heavy drinker. He goes to work and never comes 
home till late at night. A few times he made efforts to stop drinking but failed, and 
like Keenan will say: “Like the seed thrown on shallow or rocky ground, decisions 
that are not deeply rooted inevitably have short lives.”208 That was what happened to 
my dad in his efforts to stop drinking. But in 1984, my mother was sick with a 
chronic stomach ulcer. On 23rd February 1984, my dad went drinking while my 
mother was dying at home with no one to help. I was only eleven years old. With the 
help of neighbours my mother was taken to the hospital and immediately operated 
upon. When my dad came back in the night he was heavily drunk and he could not 
even comprehend the extent of the situation when I told him mum was taken to the 
hospital. The following day his head was clear enough to process the events of the 
previous day. He left for the hospital. Mum was in a coma for two days. The most 
amazing thing happened: dad for the first time went two days without drinking 
alcohol. He sat at mum’s bedside. On her gaining consciousness, my dad kneeled 
down and pleaded to mum to forgive him and promised to stop drinking from that 
day onward. This is the context that changed my dad and till this day never drank. 
Keenan offers two categories to change: a person can wake up and resolve to change 
without previous reflection, and on the other hand others do not and cannot change 
their habits so quickly.209 For the people in the second category it can be a long, 
tortuous and gruesome journey.  
 It is important to draw a contrast between Keenan’s story of his father and my 
father’s story. This contrast will bring out the two aspects of virtue ethics that are 





through habituation, that is through good activity. They develop through an 
awareness of one’s dispositions of the good and of the struggles others are 
experiencing. While in my father’s case, virtue comes about through a counter-habit 
to form a new disposition of not drinking. These two aspects of virtue ethics are not 
mutually exclusive. They may differ in motivational sources but the end that they 
both seek is the same, namely the good of the human person. 
Secondly, Keenan highlights that for change to be effective it must be 
personal and intentional.210 By this he means each individual must recognize his or 
her uniqueness as a condition for determining which practices are helpful, and which 
are not, in rooting out a particular bad habit or developing a good habit. This 
emphasizes self-knowledge. An understanding of our personalities can help us find 
situations in which we will thrive, and help us avoid situations in which we will 
experience too much anxiety. Self-awareness and personal growth depend on a 
deeper understanding of the circumstances in which good character flourishes and of 
the roots of good character in human nature, whether understood from a scientific, 
philosophical, or religious point of view. 
Thirdly, because of the importance of moral growth, we must guard against 
the false belief that we have no need for improvement.211 In order to improve, Keenan 
suggests that we must be attentive to the counsel of people who occasionally and 
frequently urge us to greater growth: “Appreciative self-knowledge without the 
willingness to listen to others leads to lives illustrated by those who believed that they 
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chapter dealing with deliberation as an act of prudence. Furthermore, and pertinent to 
this thesis, it also highlights the relational value of virtue ethics. 
Fourthly, each time we move from our bad habits to healthy ones, it is largely 
due not only to our individual efforts and support of friends but more importantly the 
grace of God.213 Andre Louf in Tuning to Grace: The Quest for God captures this 
point clearly talking about the battle of St. Paul with human imperfections and the 
grace of God:  
Important here was not Paul’s strength, or his personal victory over 
temptation, but only his continuing in it, and so continuing in grace. For 
grace does not connect with our strength or our virtue, but only with 
our weakness . . . For it is precisely the place where the surprise of the 
grace of Jesus comes over us.214   
 
Keenan is showing the connection between the acquired virtues and the 
infused virtues. According to the Thomistic tradition, grace is freely given but yet 
permits meritorious participation.215 This Thomistic thought has been challenged by 
the Reformed tradition, which believes that we are saved by grace alone and no 
human action is required. Such a contrast has challenged ecumenical discourse in 
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The essence of the place of grace is vivid in the consideration of humanity as 
frail, yet subsumed into the sphere of God’s general creative activity.217 This is 
because the life of a Christian is a progressive growth to perfection through virtue.	By 
implication, our actions express our nature. It will be valid to ask, if our nature has 
been shaped in part by factors over which we have no control, are we responsible for 
our actions? Attempting to answer this question in its entirety will be beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. However, it can be given perspective to some degree when 
considered within the framework of virtues in the context of Christian growth in the 
ensuing section.	
3.5 Virtue Ethics and the Christian Call to Growth 
In a previous section we looked at how Keenan answers the question of “who are 
we?” within the context of discipleship. This implies growth because the disciple 
continuously learns. Therefore, from this perspective, the Christian life is a call to 
growth through virtue. For Keenan:  
This seemingly obvious yet healthy maxim is not, however, readily 
found in the long history of moral theology. There we seldom find 
challenges such as, Are you maturing? or Are you becoming a better 
person before Christ for the church? Nor do we find questions asking, 
Are you doing enough? or Are you growing up?218 
 
Instead what was obtainable was a “spiritual pathology.”219 This establishes a great 
gap, with which Keenan is very dissatisfied with and wishes to fill. 
To do this Keenan briefly examines the Christian call to growth from four 
perspectives. 220  Firstly, he takes the example of the gospels and scriptures. 221 
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Scripture for example, expresses the call of God to humanity especially in the New 
Testament. Jesus always calls us to follow him. This call according to Keenan has 
always been understood as a call to advance, a call to growth. He cites St. Paul who 
stresses: “Forgetting what lies behind and straining forward to what lies ahead, I press 
on toward the goal for the prize of the upward call to God in Christ Jesus” (Phil. 3:13-
14). St. Paul uses the metaphor of running or journey to depict spiritual and moral 
moving or growth of the believer. For Keenan, the gospel story is full of “moving” 
characters: 
The shepherds hurry to the stable as the Magi follow the star; 
Zacchaeus climbs a tree and Levi leaves his table; the woman with the 
haemorrhage pushes through the crowd and the paralytic finds the Lord 
by entering through a roof; the prodigal son and his father rush toward 
one another; Jairus and Nicodemus break ranks to see Jesus and 
Cornelius visits Peter. The Gospels are filled with stories of people 
literally striding in their passage to the Lord.222 
 
He gives a metaphorical application of the stories and likens them to the Christian 
growth. Effectively, from his revisionist perspective, Keenan is advocating that 
current theology has to be dynamic. And that the Christian life encapsulates both the 
sinful and sinless moments of life. 
 Secondly, in the early centuries of the church, the church Fathers did not 
allow the scripture’s stories of growth to be lost in church’s tradition. Keenan appeals 
to St. Gregory the Great who writes: “In this place one is never permitted to stand 
because unless one strives for the heights, one will slide into the depths.”223 
Accordingly, the early Fathers like Ignatius of Antioch, John Chrysostom, Ambrose 
and Augustine exhorted believers to follow Christ by bettering the community and 
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showing love to their neighbours. Even though they talked about sin, their central 
focus was reflecting on the Gospels, the call of Christ and the virtues.224 Keenan 
following the exhortations of the early Fathers came to the conclusion:  
The preachers of the first five centuries are careful to urge us onto the 
right way. For this reason they appeal to the virtues. By concentrating 
on virtues or character building, they do not fasten attention primarily 
on pitfalls or obstacles. They attend, rather, to practices that can better 
the pilgrim. Though virtues assist the traveller to harness weaknesses 
and overcome liabilities, their overriding function is to develop 
strengths. The profoundly personal and positive emphasis of the virtues 
that we find in the early sermons of the gospels stand in sharp contrast 
to the later obsession with sinful acts.225 
 
In the above citation, Keenan brings out the connection between preaching the gospel 
and invoking the virtues. This has always been the approach of the early Fathers, and 
most importantly Augustine and Ambrose as we saw in chapter one.226 The same 
approach is also present in the great saints, such as Dominic, Francis, Clare, because 
of the importance of pedagogical guidance towards growth. 
 Thirdly, Aquinas, in line with other thirteenth century scholars like those 
mentioned in chapter one, structured his Summa Theologiae in line with the 
suggested movement: the movement of God to us; our responsive movement to God; 
and the meeting of the two movements in the divinity and humanity in Christ. 
Incisively, Aquinas says: “We may reduce the whole of moral matters to the 
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consideration of the virtues.”227 According to Keenan then: “Aquinas like Augustine 
finds in the virtues the proper mode of instructing those who read the Gospel.”228 
 Fourthly, contrary to the moral growth and discipleship which the Gospels 
emphasize, moral theology at times prioritised sin and wrongdoing. A person’s moral 
worth was determined by a person’s sinfulness or sinlessness.229 A close reading of 
the Penitentials, the scholastics, the casuists and the Manualists, reveal a huge 
number of sinful acts and very few words about being good persons, or growth in the 
Christian life. This did not encourage growth among the believing community.  
 The call to moral growth through the virtues is a call that acknowledges the 
human weakness that is in need of divine assistance:  
Certainly this moral call to grow and to better ourselves is not a call to 
make ourselves into other gods. That was what those who ate from 
Eden’s Tree wanted, what those who built the tower of Babel wanted, 
or what those like the Bishop Pelagius advocated, thinking that by our 
own efforts we could become perfect. Again Paul gives us clear insight: 
‘Not that I have obtained this or am already perfect; but I press on to 
make it my own, because Christ Jesus has made me his own’ (Phil. 
3:12). The call to strive, to grow, is not a matter of choice. Rather, 
Christ has called us and given us the grace that commands us to 
respond. On God’s account, we must move forward.230  
 
Being virtuous means living according to the order God has inscribed in human 
nature.  Of course, human nature is also wounded by sin.  Because of sin, humans 
have certain negative inclinations (e.g., toward selfishness, greed or lust) that are in 
fact not God-given, but the sinful distortions of our nature.  Therefore, we need grace 
to heal us of these distorted inclinations.  
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 What Keenan is doing is that he is trying to create a balance between 
Thomistic ideas on grace and merit and avoid the mistake of treating grace in 
isolation to human action. He is therefore affirming the reality of human action as a 
cooperation of the whole of our natural capacities to God’s action through grace.231 
3.6 Virtue Ethics and The Human Person  
MacIntyre, Keenan and other contemporary ethicists assert the importance of 
personalizing ethics.232 They all argue that the human person should be at the center 
of all ethical reflections. In a previous section I introduced the case-study of Mrs. 
Bergmeier in the context of making a point that the human person can be neglected 
by other ethical approaches.233 At this point we turn to examine it in order to 
articulate the claim that virtue ethics is more person centered than action centered. 
Keenan uses the story to show the incompleteness of other ethical theories and 
proposes that virtue ethics offers a better approach. 
 Firstly, let us examine how the deontologists and the proportionalists 
responded to the case of Mrs. Bergmeier.  According to Keenan, the deontologists 
reaffirmed the position held for several years, namely: any act of sexual relations 
outside marriage is always intrinsically immoral and sinful. 234  It was a 
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straightforward answer for them: Mrs. Bergmeier’s actions were wrong irrespective 
of the end in view. Keenan is very biased against the deontologists. He does not 
consider reasons why the deontologist condemned Mrs. Bergmeier. In contrast he is 
more sympathetic to the proportionalists who found the case challenging. 235 
According to Keenan the proportionalists rather than challenge the deontologists 
argued amongst themselves by raising two concerns. The first type has to do with her 
action, so they asked what was the object of Mrs. Bergmeier’s activity? Was her 
action an extension of her marriage, or a contradiction of her marriage? In other 
words did her action compromise the institution of marriage? The second concern is 
the effect of the action – on the guard, the husband, the children, and her new child.236 
Keenan highlights a lacuna in the entire debate: 
 Nowhere did anyone ask how this action affected Mrs. Bergmeier. 
Instead, the entire case concerned how her action affected others. 
Reflection on this omission leads to the question: What should be at the 
center of any discussion involving the famous case of Mrs. Bergmeier? 
Should the acts of intercourse and the effects of those acts be at the 
center of ethical discussion, as they were for the deontologists and the 
proportionalists? Or should Mrs. Bergmeier be at the center?237 
 
For Keenan what is most important is placing Mrs. Bergmeier as a moral agent not 
her moral action or the consequences of that action.238  
Virtue ethics is an agent-based ethics; however, the whole spectrum of ethics I 
believe considers both the person and the action. This is in line with Frankena’s 
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“double-aspect” ethics.239 In this context further reflections on harmonizing the 
different ethical theories are pertinent, although may be beyond the scope of this 
thesis. But to highlight the problem, there are arguments among some moral 
philosophers on the auxiliary and independent nature of virtue ethics.  Keenan 
synthesizes the arguments: 
 Certainly, some like William Frankena and Bruno Schüller find that 
virtue ethics cannot be an independent method of moral reasoning. For 
them, virtues merely augment an existing method; they do not supply 
specific directives for determining right or wrong conduct. Frankena 
and Schüller claim that principles and rules direct, while virtues merely 
enable us to perform what the principles command. Thus virtues are 
auxiliary and derivative . . . But Martha Nussbaum argues that the 
Greeks used virtues precisely to judge moral conduct: virtues can 
provide the standards of morally right conduct. Virtues not principles 
are the source for understanding normative conduct. In fact, principles 
and rules are derived from virtues: they are directives that obtain their 
content from the virtuous activity which humanity enjoins. As opposed 
to the auxiliary use that they are assigned by others, in this schema the 
virtues are adequate life-guides.240  
 
In sum, the deontologists see virtues as performing only supporting role. For instance, 
John Rawls in Theory of Justice holds that virtues are dispositions to act on moral 
imperatives by restructuring duty in motivational categories. 241  For the 
consequentialists, virtues only play an instrumental role. In this sense virtue is seen as 
disposition that produces non-moral consequences.242 
However, the virtues go beyond these restrictive roles. They are life-guides to 
the human person towards self-knowledge, and self-actualization. The quest to find 
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an ethics that is person centered is prevalent in the works of notable philosophers and 
theologians, even though they differ in their general theoretical.243   
Keenan raises a necessary question: “What are the virtues that make one a 
‘moral Person’?”244 He observes that any attempt to answer the above question must 
take into cognizance of two concerns: Firstly, he acknowledges the claims of culture. 
It belongs to local communities to determine practices that form a moral person.245 
For example, the warrior was the archetypal or ideal excellent person in Homeric 
culture, thereby placing emphasis on the virtue of bravery or courage.  In comparison, 
for Aristotle and the Greek philosophical tradition the excellent person was the 
person of prudence.246 Cultural ambivalence is a challenge to not only to virtue ethics 
but ethics in general.  
Secondly, we have the claims of individual differences. Owen Flanagan in 
Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism argues that no 
normative portrait can be borne out of a single anthropological perspective.247 Keenan 
expresses a similar idea that saints and heroes do not adequately provide normative 
standards that can be universally accepted as to the kind of person we ought to be: 
“Saint Elizabeth was not Mahatma Gandhi; St. John the Baptizer was not the Little 
Flower.”248 He further argues, because they are uniquely different they should not be 
taken as role models as warned by Flanagan and Caroline Walker Bynum in Holy 
Feast and Holy Fast. Bynum for example argues: “Medieval hagiographers pointed 
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out repeatedly that saints are not even primarily ‘models’ for ordinary mortals; the 
saints are far too dangerous for that . . . Rather, they should be loved, venerated, and 
meditated upon as moments in which the other that is God breaks through into the 
mundane world, saturating it with meaning.”249 The claim that Bynum makes is that 
people can become morally excellent by just simply being themselves.250 The saints 
have always been an original, never an imitation.251 Reading closely into Keenan’s 
presuppositions one can assume that he has to some extent bought into the American 
concept of individualism.  
This thesis does not accept the above notion of exemplars. This is because, as 
Aristotle himself says: “We ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and 
opinions of experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom not less 
than to demonstration; for, because experience has given them an eye, they see 
aright.”252  Also Patrick M. Clark in an article “The Case for an Exemplarist 
Approach to Virtue in Catholic Moral Theology” argues that particular exemplars 
rather than abstract concepts, serve as the deepest foundation of practical reason 
which further determines the shape and function of a theological theory of virtue.253 
He further contends that the definition of moral goodness has to be traced to the 
particular expression of that goodness experientially through the lives of particular 
people.254  
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At the heart of the New Testament is a call to be imitators of Christ and the 
Saints: “So that you may not become sluggish, but imitators of those who, through 
faith and patience, are inheriting the promises” (Heb. 6:12); “Therefore, since we are 
surrounded by so great a cloud of witnesses, let us rid ourselves of every burden and 
sin that clings to us and persevere in running the race that lies before us.” (Heb. 12:1); 
“Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ.” (1 Cor. 11:1); “Join with others in being 
imitators of me, brothers, and observe those who thus conduct themselves according 
to the model you have in us (Phil 3:17).” Vatican II in Lumen Gentium, 50 affirms:  
For when we look at the lives of those who have faithfully followed 
Christ, we are inspired with a new reason for seeking the city which 
is to come (Heb. 13:14; 11:10). At the same time we are shown a 
most safe path by which . . . we will be able to arrive at perfect union 
with Christ, that is holiness. In the lives of those who shared in our 
humanity and yet were transformed into especially successfully 
images of Christ (2 Cor. 3:18), God vividly manifests to men his 
presence and his face. He speaks to us in them, and gives us a sign of 
his kingdom, to which we are powerfully drawn, surrounded as we 
are by so many witnesses (Heb. 12:1), and having such an argument 
for the truth of the gospel. 
 
Lawler and Salzman add another dimension: “The dynamic of virtue begins with 
imitation of role models but concludes with authentic morality through personal 
decision and responsibility.”255 It is an imitation that respects our individuality and 
uniqueness, at the same time our connectedness as family of God.  
 Feasibly, any effort to describe the ideal qualities of the excellent moral 
person will meet with challenges because of the variances in the claims of culture and 
uniqueness of individuals. Acknowledging this fact spurs Keenan to identify just 
some minimal conditions that must be made in order to call a person a virtuous 
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person.256 Earlier on he argues that everyone is unique but here he is prepared to 
create a universal category. This shows the tension inherent in virtue ethics. Keenan 
thus, attempts to resolve this tension. 
He accepts MacIntyre’s claims that the virtues of justice and prudence exist 
universally prior to any culture’s specific claim of them. Keenan therefore argues that 
the cardinal virtues are functional tools in seeking to understand the human person.257 
They play a heuristic function, by which he means they are cardinal virtues that serve 
as guides to a wider understanding of the threefold questions of identify. 258 He 
explains further: “They do not fill in the claims of either culture or the individual.”259 
It would seem as if Keenan accepts the universal character of the virtues of justice 
and prudence, which MacIntyre proposes, yet elsewhere he slightly fills out his 
position by saying:  
Cultures give flesh to the skeletal cardinal virtues. This thickening 
differentiates, then, one virtue in one culture from a similar one in 
another. Justice, fidelity and self-care in a Buddhist culture have 
somewhat similar and somewhat different meanings than they do in a 
liberal or Confucian context.260  
 
In this context, what is justice in one culture might be a vice in another. But the entire 
endeavour of Keenan is not to validate the specificity of cultural claims on who and 
what an excellent person is but to identify qualities of the minimally virtuous person 
independent of any claims.261 
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 In the light of the above argument, Keenan insists that the cardinal virtues 
express what minimally constitute the virtuous person.  He argues: 
Philosophers and theologians have recognized that being virtuous is 
more than having a particular habit of acting, e.g. generosity. Rather, it 
means having a fundamental set of related virtues that enable a person 
to live and act morally well. The cardinal virtues have the task of 
making a person sufficiently, rightly ordered to perform morally right 
actions. Beyond the cardinal virtues, other virtues are certainly 
important, but the cardinal virtues perfect the fundamental 
anthropological dimensions of being human that are needed for 
integrated virtuous behaviour. Thus Thomas Aquinas describes the four 
virtues as principles of integration both in the person and in the action 
itself.262 
 
Keenan believes that the cardinal virtues define to a large extent both what a human 
person should primarily become and the principal actions the person should engage 
regardless of an individual’s religion. Therefore, the cardinal virtues are transcultural 
and transgenerational because of our common understanding of right living.263 In this 
context therefore, the doors of cultural absolutism and religious differences have been 
considerably shut by virtue ethics.264 Keenan thus argues from an anthropological 
perspective than a theological standpoint.  
Considering the traditional Thomistic list of virtues, Keenan proceeds to 
recommend a new set of cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, fidelity and self-care. 
What more, this set of virtue are capable of furthering our understanding of the 
person. According to Keenan, we are relational in three ways: “Generally, 
specifically, and uniquely.”265 But Lawler and Salzman, offer us different set of triad 
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than the ones offered by Keenan: “generally, particularly and selfishly.”266 Using 
Keenan’s triad, each of these relational ways of being requires a concomitant cardinal 
virtue: “As a relational being in general, we are called to justice. As relational being 
specifically, we are called to fidelity. As a relational being uniquely, we are called to 
self-care.” 267  By way of distinguishing them from Aquinas’ structure, Keenan 
contends:  
None is ethically prior to the other; they have equally urgent claims and 
they should be pursued as ends in themselves. Thus we are not called to 
be faithful and just in order to be faithful. None is auxiliary to the 
others. Each is a distinctive virtue, none being a subset or subcategory 
of the others. They are cardinal.268 
 
The fourth cardinal virtue in the list proposed by Keenan is prudence. According to 
Keenan, prudence is the virtue that defines what constitutes the just, faithful, and self-
caring mode of life for a person.269 These proposed virtues shall be examined in the 
next sub-section.  
 I shall conclude this section by summarizing how Keenan applies these 
virtues to the case of Mrs. Bergmeier.270  Firstly, from the viewpoint of justice, she 
showed love to her neighbours and demonstrated as well their equality, by protecting 
the neighbour.271 In general, Mrs. Bergmeier was true to the demands of the society 
that protected marriage until the point of violating the institutional claims of 
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marriage. Keenan notes: “But this violation is not pursued for its own sake.”272 
Secondly, from the standpoint of fidelity, Mrs. Bergmeier had a profound love for her 
husband and children, as the entire story attempts to show. This fidelity made her 
sacrifice her happiness, and dignity in order to save the family from imminent death. 
Thirdly, from the demands of self-care, some would think she was careless and 
thought less about herself. But Keenan argues differently:  
A person who lacks self-care could not possibly endure the emotional 
burden of such a decision. Without that virtue, shame, self-loathing, and 
hatred would most likely materialize in her life and eventually become 
insurmountable. Only a person who can be caring of herself as she is 
faithful to her husband and children and just in fighting for fellow 
citizens could live with this decision.273 
 
Fourthly and finally, knowing the above assertion is the prerogative of 
prudence. Keenan conceives: “Prudence needs to guide us about justice, fidelity and 
self-care.”274 Perhaps a close look at the virtues of justice, fidelity and self- care one 
can see the possibility of conflict or tension. Keenan recalls the movie, Terminator 
II. In the movie Arnold Schwarzenegger is to find a boy who is to save the world. As 
the story unfolds, the boy rather than go with Arnold deliberately goes first to save 
his mother Linda Hamilton. “The boy suspends the fate of all humanity (the issue of 
Justice) to save his mother (the issue of fidelity).”275 In other instances too the three 
cardinal virtues come into conflict as in the story of the Greek drama Antigone.276 
Admittedly, tension of interest may occur but in general these virtues are not in 
conflict.  
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3.7 Virtue Ethics and Sexual Ethics: The Human Person and Relationality 
Considered  
The previous section introduced the ways in which as persons we are relational. Louis 
Janssens in his essay “Personalist Morals,” aptly explains the human person is 
adequately considered when taken as a historical subject in corporeality who stands in 
relation to the world, to other persons, to social structures, and to God, and who is a 
unique originality within the context of being fundamentally equal with all other 
persons as existing beings.277 MacNamara further explains, as persons we have a 
shared history: hopes, passions, desires, aspirations, and needs.278 It follows that a 
person can be himself or herself only when opened to others. It is going beyond 
oneself: relationship and gift to another thus become part of what it means to be a 
person.279 
Based on the above premises, Keenan argues: “Our relationality generally is 
always directed by an ordered appreciation for the common good, in which we treat 
all people as equal. And our traditional way of labelling this reciprocal relationship of 
members is called “common good”. Gaudium et Spes talking about common good 
states:  
Because human relationships intensify and extend gradually to the 
whole universe, the common good, that is to say, this set of social 
conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individual 
members, to reach their fulfilment more fully and more easily, so 
today takes on an increasingly universal complexion and consequently 
involves rights and duties with respect to the whole human race. Every 
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social group must take account of the needs and legitimate aspirations 
of other groups, and further the common good of the entire human 
family.280  
 
The same document previously expresses that individuals exist for their own sake and 
yet they only fulfil themselves by making a gift of themselves to others.281 Keenan 
does not give a definition of the common good. This is one of the lacunae identified 
in his work. However, his interest is to show the relational nature of virtue ethics. As 
members of the human race, we are expected to respond to all members in general 
equally and impartially.282 
 The above statement finds appropriate context when virtue ethics is linked to 
sexual ethics. Keenan in his article “Virtue Ethics and Sexual Ethics,” considers 
“sexual ethics in the key of virtue, that is, a relational person based ethics”.283 John 
Grabowski in Sex and Virtue: An Introduction to Sexual Ethics reiterates: “All virtues 
are inherently interpersonal – that is, they are acquired in and sustained by specific 
communities and their practices. This is nowhere more evident than in regard to the 
relational reality that is human sexuality.”284 This means that our sexuality is an 
essential dimension of our capacity for connectedness.  
However, our society is in a crisis of sexuality: the apparent scandal of sexual 
abuses within the church and society as a whole, hedonism and the increasing debate 
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on homosexuality and bestiality are indicative of this fact.285 These have prompted a 
call for a more credible articulation of Catholic sexual ethics.286 As with the rest of 
moral theology, there is a demand and work towards reconstruction. And Christine E. 
Gudorf in Body, Sex, and Pleasure: Reconstructing Christian Sexual Ethics suggests:  
The first step in reconstructing Christian sexual ethics is to understand 
at best human sexuality itself, and in this day and age this means 
consulting biological science and social science, as well as the 
experience of human individuals and communities. I do not suggest that 
Masters and Johnson or Bell and Weinberg replace the Bible, church 
Fathers, and the classic theologians as more or less infallible 
authorities. Sexuality is a social construct in which biology is only one 
part. Neither are the social sciences of themselves capable of defining 
or interpreting human sexuality. But we must take seriously the broad 
areas of scientific consensus regarding reproduction, sexual response, 
sexual difference, and the development of sexual identity and 
orientation.287  
 
Lisa Cahill in Between the Sexes: Foundations for a Christian Ethics of Sexuality, 
suggests four sources for such reconstruction of Christian sexual ethics: scripture, 
theological tradition, philosophical accounts of the human person, and descriptive 
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explanations of the lived reality of persons and societies.288 All these proposals by 
both Gudorf and Cahill are quite engaging but Keenan proposes a different approach 
that posits a theological schema, which gives primary credence to the human person, 
we turn to virtue ethics.289  
As this thesis has indicated in the last section, we are relational in three ways: 
Generally, specifically, and uniquely.290 Earlier on we discussed them briefly in 
relation to the case of Mrs. Bergmeier, but here we shall look at how Keenan 
examines these three distinct spheres of human relationality from the standpoint of 
virtue ethics and sexual ethics. This is to show how virtue ethics is in dialogue with 
other fields of study and how compatible it is to these fields and how it is not self-
centered as charged.  
3.7.1 Virtue Ethics, Sexual Ethics and Human Person as Relational Being 
in General: Justice 
Our relational nature as human beings finds definition and vision in our 
understanding of the Triune God as a Trinity. The doctrine of the trinity teaches God 
as a community of persons: “Let us make man in our own image and likeness” (Gen. 
1: 26-27). In this light, personal existence, then, can never be seen as an ‘I’ in 
isolation, but always as ‘I’ and ‘you’ in relationship. In the words of Gula: “Human 
existence does not precede relationship, but is born of relationship and nurtured by it. 
To be a human person is to be essentially directed towards others.”291 
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From the above background, the first relational configuration that Keenan 
proposes is our relationality in general.   The structure of this relationality in general 
is always to be directed by a methodical understanding of the common good.292 For 
example including another person who is mostly left out in our team efforts, and the 
understanding that cooperation is better than isolation, initiates a sense of the 
common good.293 The concepts of relationality and common good presuppose that we 
are by nature social beings.294  Appropriately capturing this concept is the line of the 
English Poet John Donne, “No man is an Island”.295 James Hanigan also delineates in 
his book, As I have Loved You: The Challenge of Christian Ethics:  
To recognize the social nature of the human person is to recognize that 
human beings need one another in order to be what they are-human. 
Human life is not possible in isolation; human development cannot 
take place apart from a human community . . . Human life needs other 
human lives in order to be human.296 
 
Therefore, the adjoining virtue to our relationality as social beings is the virtue 
of justice according to Keenan.297 This is because justice is about universality and 
impartiality.298 Our consciousness and responsiveness to justice theoretically and 
practically explains how our individual existence is a shared existence. Our individual 
goals are justified only when they respect the forms of inter-dependence which 
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constitute our relational selves: “From the point of view of justice, then, we need to 
ask whether our moral choices and actions detract from the value of true community or 
promote the kind of self-giving which sustains the well-being of life together.”299  
For Keenan the virtue of justice substantiates the claims that apart from 
specific relations we belong to, we are expected to respond equally and impartially to 
all.300 He accepts Paul Ricoeur’s claims that from time immemorial justice has 
always been associated with equality.301 Any discourse on justice raises the question 
of “right”. But Keenan remarks: “Because justice has always been considered the 
primary virtue or principle, the notion of conflict arises precisely because ethicists are 
no longer convinced that justice alone adequately covers “the right”.302 To this end 
various ethicists make different claims. For example, Frankena suggests the principle 
of beneficence to complement the principle of justice.303 While the Christian ethicists 
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress propose beneficence, and autonomy to 
complement justice.304 Keenan himself, as already noted, proposes fidelity and self-
care and finally mercy.305 This is to suggest not a conflict but a variety of approaches 
that may be legitimate to each based on the parameters within which they seek to 
work. 
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Most scholars in their discourses treat justice as a principle.306 But Keenan 
treats justice here as a virtue. He is trying to bring out the lacuna inherent in other 
theoretical frameworks. When justice is treated as a principle it becomes more 
academic and strictly anthropological but when treated as virtue it addresses everyday 
life and appeals to ordinary people ands so encompasses both theological and 
anthropological concerns. By implication, Keenan wants to show that virtue ethics is 
more holistic. Following Aquinas’ definition of justice, Keenan reiterates that justice 
is the virtue that “perfects” or orders the will, it inclines us to good relationships with 
other people.307 In other words, justice is the virtue of acting and being that enhances 
relations with others. And these relations are part of the constituent aspect of our 
identities within the moral spectrum. Therefore, justice as a virtue is concerned not 
only with people’s external activities but primarily their inner dispositions.308  
Sexual ethics in its basic form is relational both in being as sexual persons and 
in expression. The question remains, how does justice as a virtue correspond to 
sexual ethics? Considering the presupposition Keenan offers us earlier on, on our 
relationality in general, specifically and uniquely, we can apply justice to sexual 
ethics by learning to appreciate the other person as possessing a dignity that belongs 
to being human and made in the image and likeness of God.309 Since justice by 
definition is relational, the same can be said of human sexuality. At the center of 
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justice is the concept of equality.310 Therefore in sexual relations, the virtue of justice 
commands us to treat the other person with equality. It directs us to deal with the 
other person not as an object of sexual gratification but as a co-subject.311 According 
to Keenan justice demands that the person we are in relationship with is not taken for 
granted, rights not compromised and dignity upheld and protected at all times.312 
 The virtue of justice when applied to relationship goes across-the-board. It is 
not limited only to the person we are in relationship with, but it makes us conscious 
of cases of inequality or indignity prevalent in and around us.313 According to Keenan 
the virtue of justice is enhanced by mercy. Because the virtue of mercy motivates us 
to respond in a timely way to the needs of people. Aquinas maintains that the sum 
total of the Christian religion consists in mercy. This explains why Keenan correlates 
mercy with justice: “A justice informed by mercy is vigorously alert to those who are 
particularly vulnerable.”314 He therefore calls it justice-mercy.315 Keenan states that 
the importance of justice-mercy is very urgent especially with the current wave of 
child abuse that has beclouded and dented the church, which is a vice against 
justice.316 He also identifies the abuse of vulnerable adults, and rape.317 Furthermore, 
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justice invites people always to recognize situations when the commercialization of 
sex and the trafficking of minors dehumanize others. These are clear indications of 
the importance of the virtue of justice in sexual ethics.318  
The virtue of justice continues to be relevant as people not only engage in 
becoming instruments or catalysts for change in compromised situations but that they 
as persons enter into the turmoil of the other person’s life.319 In clear terms Keenan 
affirms: “Justice in sexual ethics requires us to recognize, support, and promote the 
equality of genders, with the understanding that such work still has much to 
accomplish.”320  
How can the virtue of justice be taught and sustained? We have so far looked 
at the general scope of the relationship between justice and virtue and have come to 
the conclusion that they are indeed compatible. In what practical ways can we foster 
this compatibility? Keenan suggests that catholic justice informed by mercy in the 
context of sexual ethics can be taught as a curriculum in our schools.321 It can also be 
developed as part of the religious programs taught in parishes, perhaps for first 
communion and confirmation classes and also adults’ on-going formation. Again the 
priest can talk about it from the pulpit.322 Keenan is convinced of this approach 
because:  
It helps us see that our sexuality, where we are most capable of 
expressing, receiving, and mutually sharing love, is the embodiment of 
our most vulnerable dimensions. It is where through intimacy we leave 
ourselves open to the other. For this reason the church’s long history of 
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privileging justice easily extends its interest into the realm of sexual 
ethics.323  
 
The identification of concrete practices that can bring about transformation of 
peoples’ character as well as feasible social and cultural obstacles to human sexual 
flourishing is essential especially in contemporary culture that trivializes sex. Parents, 
teachers, pastors and civil leaders have to go back to the drawing boards for re-
orientation. However, Keenan fails to show how virtue ethics can and does respond to 
the current issues of contraception, homosexuality and pornography from a justice 
perspective. 
 3.7.2 Virtue Ethics, Sexual Ethics and Persons as Relational Beings 
Specifically: Fidelity 
Specifically, each human person is bounded with particular persons within the bonds 
of family or friendship. St. Paul in his first letter to Timothy imparts that we are to 
provide for these particular persons, and “especially for family members” (Tim 5:8). 
And St. Augustine in The City of God exhorts that we are to love in general all within 
our ambit.324 In the Summa Theologiae Aquinas holds that as persons we have an 
obligation towards those we are specifically close to.325 Accordingly:  
If justice urges us to treat all people equally, then fidelity makes 
different claims on us. Fidelity is the virtue that nurtures and sustains 
the bonds of those special relationships that we enjoy whether by 
blood, marriage, love, or sacrament. Fidelity requires that we treat 
with special care those who are closer to us. If justice rests on 
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The partiality identified by Keenan here is what Lawler and Salzman call “Legitimate 
partiality”.327 Indeed, Henry Newman in Sermon 5 endorses this legitimate partiality 
when he writes: “The best preparation for loving the world at large, and loving it duly 
and wisely [under the guidance of prudence], is to cultivate an intimate friendship and 
affection toward those who are immediately about us.”328  
Keenan considers fidelity as the virtue that enhances this kind of relationality. 
He draws upon the works of Niebuhr and Ricoeur who argue on love that challenges 
justice.329 He underscores the conflict in the application of the word love as evident in 
the work of William Werpehowski,  “‘Agape’ and Special Relations,” and other 
theologians.330 For instance Werpehowski highlights the conflict between love in 
general and love in particular. Karl Rahner as cited by Keenan would say love or 
charity is transcendental.331 According to Keenan, the protestant theologians use the 
word “love more concretely as being as categorical as justice.”332 This tension is both 
conceptual and practical. For the Protestant theologians, love is particular while 
justice is universal.333 While the Catholic theologians argue that love seeks justice.334 
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Because of this conflict, Keenan chooses the word fidelity, which he finds more apt 
in expressing the fundamental aspect of sustaining special bonds: “I prefer to name 
this virtue fidelity rather than love, because of the above confusion in the use of the 
word ‘love’”.335 There are some theologians similar to Keenan who use the word 
fidelity as well, such as Paul Waddell, Carol Gilligan and Margaret Farley.336 Keenan 
develops their different insights. Waddell for instance recaptures the teachings of 
Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas on friendship. According to Keenan, Waddell:  
Highlights an often forgotten dimension of the life of Jesus. Not only did 
Jesus teach and heal those who followed him, he also befriended them, 
called them together, played, laughed, and ate with them. His gatherings 
with friends were so noteworthy that they scandalized the teachers of the 
law. Yet, these were moral activities. Just as Jesus’ life sets the norm we 
follow- being just as he is just- so too are we called to follow him in 
friendship- being a friend as he is a friend.337 
 
Carol Gilligan’s book In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and 
Women’s Development suggests that each person is supposed to have two concerns: 
Firstly, to be just and to be able to stand alone to see the moral terrain as it is. 
Secondly to be faithful through friendships so as not to become isolated and 
incapable of meeting the other as a friend not as a task.338 Fidelity in friendships or 
relationships becomes a key concept in discussing moral life. When exercised, 
fidelity becomes a virtue in friendship. In this light, the application of the virtue of 
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fidelity by Keenan seeks to show that virtues as inner dispositions must find 
expression in the way people relate. 
 Fidelity is a virtue that encompasses all of human relationships. However, 
Keenan notes that fidelity as a virtue over time has been spoken less about: “Until 
recently, however, despite parental efforts, the virtue of fidelity has received little 
notice from . . . moral teachers.”339 What has become commonplace is that people 
have been taught not to be unfaithful, and little is taught on the dynamics or ways in 
which people can be more faithful.340  Keenan is suggesting that parents should teach 
their children on the ways to be faithful. 341  He is therefore advocating for a 
resurgence of the theology of fidelity. 
 Teaching fidelity and trying to be faithful is an arduous task as Keenan 
notes.342 It is easier for two people to do a particular thing that they both love doing 
but difficult to engage in an enterprise that both have varied interests. This is one of 
the challenges that the virtue of fidelity can face. Yet fidelity is a call to engage and 
disengage. Fidelity makes claims on us to engage in concrete and practical practices 
that can lead to a better understanding of the demands of the moral life and the 
Christian call to be friends of Jesus and one another:  
This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved 
you. Greater love has no one than this, that someone lay down his life 
for his friends. You are my friends if you do what I command you. No 
longer do I call you servants, for the servant does not know what his 
master is doing; but I have called you friends, for all that I have heard 
from my Father I have made known to you (John 15:12-15). 
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There is another side to the challenge of fidelity: It is the seeming conflict with 
justice. Fidelity and justice are two distinct concepts but they appear to be 
competitive in some sense.343 Keenan addresses this suspicion:  
 The drama of Antigone is caught as she stands between supporting a 
universal peace for her whole city and obeying Creon’s law, or else 
tending to her brother who remains unburied outside the city walls. 
But Greek culture is not the only setting for conflicts between justice 
and fidelity. The American movie industry regularly depicts justice 
calling us away from our special relationships. A lawyer abandons 
her father’s defense and becomes his accuser of crimes against 
humanity in The Music Box. A wife rejects her husband’s commands 
and participates in a civil rights demonstration in A Long Walk 
Home, and a mother campaigns against apartheid while a teenage 
daughter feels neglected in A World Apart.344 
 
On the other hand: “In Scent of a Woman a prep school student decides not to report 
on his friends despite the harm that they have caused to the entire school.”345 And in 
Terminator the young man abandons the demands of the community and goes first to 
rescue his mother as cited earlier. The above examples demonstrate how we can be 
caught between two opposing claims. Yet Keenan argues that although justice and 
fidelity are distinct, they are not in contradiction:  
All societies call us to be faithful to the long-standing relationships 
we have. Fidelity differs from justice in that the latter calls us to treat 
with impartiality all people, while fidelity recognizes that we each 
are constituted by a variety of specific interpersonal relationships. A 
fidelity informed by mercy then leads us toward approaching 
prudently and fearlessly those whom we love. It demands that we 
privilege the particular relationships that we enjoy.346 
 
Keenan contextualizes the virtue of fidelity in his article “Virtue Ethics and 
Sexual Ethics”. As a background to this, Aelred of Rievaulx’s Spiritual Friendship, 
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articulates: “We cannot be just until we are in relationship and again we cannot be 
just in a relationship until we are faithful.” 347  Within the experience of any 
relationship we are called to be faithful at all times and unambiguously when in a 
sexual relationship.348 Wadell encapsulates the above statement when he articulates 
that the entire scope of the moral life is what happens to us in relationships be they 
sexual or non-sexual.349 This experience always involves a movement: a movement 
from isolation to communion that generates and transmits a sense of sharing in the 
identity of another person.350 It is a sharing that brings about belonging but yet in 
belonging we become distinct. So justice and fidelity in sexual ethics are intrinsically 
linked yet different as earlier noted.351 
 The specific interpersonal relationship is what Wadell calls “preferential 
Love”.352 This may be criticized conceptually for being selfish, but based on practical 
knowledge we are connected both generally and specifically as we have seen earlier 
on. However, our being faithful to specific relationships do not set us against our 
relationship in general. According to Keenan, fidelity simply demands that we 
privilege the particular relationship we enjoy.353 
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 Fidelity makes some basic claims on persons in all sexual relations. Firstly:  
Being informed by mercy Catholic fidelity anticipates the chaos of our 
sexuality and sexual relationships. Fidelity teaches us to be no fools in 
entering sexual relationships. It reminds us that entering into a sexual 
relationship with another means entering into an intimate complexity where 
we need to recognize the inevitable yet unpredictable moments of upheaval 
and confusion attendant to such intimacy.354  
 
Such an awareness requires that we do not walk out of every loving relationship: 
“Fidelity calls us never to abandon our lover, to recognize rather that our sexual love 
must deepen, embrace, and extend through intimacy.”355 Effectively, Keenan is 
saying we should more fervently apply all skills available both physically and 
emotionally to sustain and defend all our loving relationships.356  
Secondly, fidelity demands a consideration of the other person.357 We have 
been dissatisfied with the approach of doing ethics in which emphasis is laid on 
individuals and particular actions. But the moral life is what takes place within us 
when we stand with others. It implies that we stand not over and against others but in 
connection. Such a connection is very often unappreciated. Consideration of the other 
person is indicative of the fact that sexual ethics is not just about an individual but an 
individual in relationship.358 It is a consideration that respects the feelings, anxieties 
and uniqueness of the other as well. 
 Thirdly, fidelity demands honesty in the sexual expression of the 
relationship. 359  By implication, fidelity requires honesty, patience, and intense 
reflective sensitivity to the other person in all forms of interactions. These can be 
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considered as sub-virtues of fidelity. Fourthly, fidelity privileges dialogue. It opens 
up genuine avenues and modes for two people to ably express their needs, hopes, 
fears and desires as alluded to in the second claim. Keenan agrees with Andre Guidon 
on the fact that sex is a form of communication: “This fidelity helps the Christian to 
grow further in love and in humanity. It sees sex itself as a language that expresses in 
a variety of ways the human person in openness and in pursuit of the other.”360 
 The pinnacle of the relevance of the virtue fidelity in sexual relationship is the 
welcoming of children forming part of the bond. Rather than considering the sexual 
union from the negative side of no divorce, Keenan opts for a more positive approach 
as he emphasizes the procreative experience through the bond. Therefore: “Catholics 
are intensely interested in the nature of marriage as the place where faithful love and 
procreativity concretely flourishes.”361 
3.7.3 Virtue Ethics, Sexual Ethics and Human Person as Relational Being 
Uniquely: Self-Care. 
The virtue of self-care has a theological justification in Matthew 22:39 “Love your 
neighbour as yourself.”362 Loving yourself is a command by Christ. But this is to be 
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differentiated with self-centeredness or egoism. Self-care according to Keenan is the 
virtue that enables an individual become conscious of the demands the self evokes, 
namely that one be accountable to oneself.363 This is a pivotal aspect in all human 
relations.364 
 In recent times, psychological studies have shown that one of the greatest 
setbacks to healthy human living is poor self-care.365 From this backdrop, self-care is 
the virtue that permits healthy self-love and invites reflection on our unique self that is 
a gift of God that should be accepted, appreciated and protected.366 Each human 
person is unique, and a self that belongs to oneself and yet relational.  
With reference to virtue ethics, Keenan opines that while other proposed 
virtues cannot meet the concerns of the self, self-care is the one virtue that addresses 
the unique relationship of the moral agent with self.367 Here, Keenan does not use 
terms like self-love and self-esteem or self- respect.368 However, in a later work he 
uses similar terms especially self-esteem.369 He treats self-esteem here only as a 
subgroup of self-care. He defines self-care in this context as the unique responsibility 
to care for oneself affectively, mentally, physically, and spiritually.370 According to 
Bristow this implies self-possession, self-mastery, and self-determination.371 Similarly, 
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it implies self-consciousness although not in the terms of Descartes,372 or John 
Locke, 373  or David Hume conceptualization. 374  Rather he refers to it as a 
consciousness that a person possesses about self that is practical and reflective in a 
virtuous way.375  
 Keenan is aware that his proposal of self-care as a virtue has some objections. 
It sounds too egoistic and selfish. And he observes that some Christian activists may 
argue against it from the dimension of Christ’s death on the cross for humanity.376 In 
other words had Jesus considered self-care as a virtue he would not have died.377 But 
Keenan argues:  
But we have every reason to believe that the historical Jesus took care 
of himself; we need only think of how often he is contrasted with John 
the Baptizer. Likewise we have no reason to suppose that Jesus 
suffered from lack of self-esteem. In fact, I think we can say that it 
was precisely because Jesus knew the virtue of fidelity, justice, and 
self-care that the agony in the Garden was so painful. He was a man 
who loved God, humanity, his friends, and himself: his conflict, like 
all true conflicts was to determine which relationship made the greater 
claim on him.378 
 
The above example of the passion of Christ elaborates the functional unity 
among the virtues proposed by Keenan in relation to human relationality: that for the 
common good Christ died which is justice imbued with mercy, that for the fidelity he 
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professes to the Father he accepted to die, that for self-care, he considers the “I-thou-
we” as the ultimate principle.  
Evidently, the other two virtues that we have previously looked at deal with 
the other person(s). Keenan states that the acting individual is overshadowed with 
giving out of his/her person. With reference to sexual ethics, a person therefore stands 
the risk of self-neglect and he/she runs the danger of being taken advantage of within 
and outside the scope of the relationship especially with regard to sex.379 It behoves 
the individual not to let himself or herself be taken advantage of. This is in the case 
where the person is not a minor. What happens in the case of a minor? Keenan does 
not proffer an answer. This is where the virtue of justice comes into play as we are all 
called to be aware of the vulnerability of people around be they minors or adults.380 
 The virtue of self-care enables the individual to become more aware of one’s 
“capabilities, whether and when one can sustain a sexual relationship”.381 Keenan 
identifies a danger of peer pressure, cultural disvalues that can pressure one into 
sexual relationships that are casual and may be injurious to the person and inevitably 
to the other partner.382 But self-care according to him is the virtue that encourages 
people not to succumb to such pressures and disvalues. He cautions:  
Self-care might also lead us to acknowledge that we have long been 
inhibited and fearful of intimacy, touch, or sexual expression. 
Prudential self-care informed by mercy leads some people to delay 
as precipitous sexual intimacy, but for others it gently prods them to 
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The virtue of self-care according to Keenan is the one virtue that enables us as 
individuals to enter into our histories in order to initiate a healing process instead of 
repression.384 The ability to face one’s very own dark sides can be challenging. But 
coming to terms with our sexual issues can help reduce the risk of other extremes:  
Self-care invites us to be as patient with ourselves as we are with 
others and invites us to not look to sexual experiences as a way, for 
instance, of resolving problems of self-esteem. Self-care invites us to 
see sexual relationships as goods to be pursued but precisely within a 
virtuous context.”385  
 
He cautions that self-care can be self-absorbing in which an individual person 
becomes the end of all. 
 By and large, Keenan has succeeded in giving an approach that articulates the 
fact that the narrative of each of the virtues within the context of the human person 
does not stand on its own. Therefore, in discussing the virtues with regard to the 
human person, Keenan approaches them from a relational perspective. One of the 
must central theses so far articulated is that our actions and our relationships emanate 
from our identity. And the Christian identity as we know is relational. One must love 
oneself before loving another.386 Equally, human sexuality is an essential aspect of 
our human capacity for connectedness. A society or persons that promote 
individualism that is devoid of virtuous living fails to offer a veritable context for a 
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3.8 Christian Virtue Ethics: Providing A Communal Setting 
This chapter has so far shown how Keenan underscores the relational character of the 
human person within the framework of virtue ethics from a general anthropological 
perspective. This is against the backdrop of the individualistic model of morality that 
dominated catholic moral theology as identified in chapter one. Keenan declares:  
A fairly individualistic personal model of morality dominated 
theological ethics; my sins were my sins, my merit was my merit; my 
grace was my grace. The Christian belonged to a church, but 
responsibility, like identity, was not collectively understood. Though 
there were hints of a language that saw the church as a community of 
faith, for the most part those concepts were secondary . . . Thus we 
may have had a communion of saints, but they were singularly named. 
We did not celebrate communities but rather heroic individuals (and 
we still do).387 
 
There is the conviction in Keenan that although we celebrate individual lives of 
holiness we are intrinsically interdependent and the bonds of community have great 
impact on all our discourses and activities.388 Keenan stresses the fact that there has 
to be a shift to a relational anthropology that has its foundation in theology.389 That is 
why he finds virtue ethics more appealing in this enterprise.  
To do this, Keenan draws upon the work of Spohn, Go and Do Likewise: 
Jesus and Ethics.390 In this book, Spohn appeals to Christian worship as the practice 
that shapes Christian identity: “The Christian identity is relational rather than 
individualist. The relevant question is no longer Who am I? but Whose am I? 
Christians have been claimed by God and by a community so that their destiny is 
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bound up with others.”391 For Spohn the Christian identity in the New Testament 
comes from commitment and identification with others as well as with God.392 It is 
patently clear that the modern understanding of “self” and “identity” is mutilated. For 
instance, the Newsweek of June 29, 1998, reported the story of a woman in Nebraska 
who planned to “Exchange vows with herself in front of a mirror and 200 friends and 
relatives at a ceremony where she will marry herself, in a celebration of the fact that 
she is ‘happy with herself’”.393 
 Against this backdrop, Christian identity is resoundingly communal by first 
being committed to the master. St. Paul writes: “We do not live to ourselves, and we 
do not die to ourselves. If we live, we live to the Lord and if we die we die to the 
Lord; so then, whether we live or whether we die we are the Lord.” (Rom. 14:7-8). 
Therefore: “Belonging to this gracious Lord liberates us from self-centered 
existence.”394 It is vital that we find a setting to explore the communal nature of 
virtue ethics from a theological standpoint that is Christocentric. This section shall 
seek to consider how Keenan explores the Eucharist as a setting. From the outset one 
can argue that he sees the unambiguous place of the Eucharist in the Christian life. 
3.8.1 The Eucharist: An Authentic Communal Setting for Virtue 
The place of the Eucharist in the life of the believer is important viewed from the 
understanding of individual identity noted in the previous section. More practically 
Keenan affirms: “Specially in the practice of the Eucharist, we find the spiritual 
practice where this relational identification with Christ is regularly fostered. In the 
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practice of the Eucharist we become what we do (or eat and drink): We become the 
body of Christ.”395 The Eucharist effects transformation of its recipients: “For this 
reason, the Eucharist is therefore the paradigm of the community of faith. Through 
the Eucharist we become like Christ.”396 Far from being completely so, we are 
confronted with the reality of the tension between what we actually do become in the 
Eucharist and what we could become in and through the Eucharist. Spohn further 
explains:  
Unfortunately, these lofty meanings bear scant resemblance to most 
worship services this side of the eschaton. The actual gatherings at 
the Lord’s Table manifest our disunity and divisions as much as any 
unity we have in Christ. Denominational fissures . . . Congregations 
defined by race, class, ethnic origin, riven by sexual politics.397 
 
For example, Joel Van Amberg in A Real Presence examines conflicts in Augsburg at 
the time of the Protestant Reformation over the meaning and celebration of the 
Eucharist. He situates the theological debate within the milieu of the crisis between 
guild members and the leading citizens in the city council.398 Thomas Rausch in 
Reconciling Faith and Reason argues that what ought to unite us namely the liturgy 
apparently divides us. For example, we find a polarization among Catholics of their 
understanding of whether the mass is a sacrifice or a meal.399 
From the above examples, Keenan accepts the fact that the divine initiative 
also encounters shortcomings as expressed earlier by Spohn.400 By our estimation this 
assertion generates the following questions: If through the Eucharist we become like 
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Christ, why then the tension? Is the Eucharist incapable of truly transforming us into 
another Christ? Or are we just unable as individuals to avail ourselves of the 
transforming power of the Eucharist? It is interesting to note that both Spohn and 
Keenan hold that the scandal of division is appropriate because it pervades the 
gospels’ accounts.401  
To explain the appropriateness, Spohn thinks that the Eucharist becomes a 
place of celebration which warrants the practices of forgiveness and solidarity.402 
While for Keenan it helps us to understand ourselves as the people called together 
through virtuous conformity.403 These two concepts of forgiveness and solidarity 
emphasize the social and spiritual dynamics of the Eucharist that engender practical 
living. 
 Keenan raises very important questions: “What then are the practices that help 
shape such virtuous conformity as a response to the gift of God in the Eucharist? 
How do our prayerfulness, our community spirit, our participation, our gestures, and 
our use of music and language in the liturgy allow us to be shaped by the one we 
seek? 404 We must understand the Eucharist as the locus for becoming a community 
of disciples. This will enable us consider the liturgy of the Eucharist as a sequence of 
personified activities that are capable of transforming us through the enabling Grace 
of God.   
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The whole liturgy of the Eucharist is divided into two parts: the Liturgy of the 
word and the Liturgy of the Eucharist.405 Below, I shall show how Keenan describes 
the different aspects of these parts of the Mass in the light of our communal 
encounter and challenge of reliving the call of becoming the virtuous community of 
disciples. 
3.8.1.1 The Liturgy of the Word: Virtuous Moral Implication 
There are moral practices, which the Eucharist engenders. Firstly, the Eucharist as a 
celebration begins with the sign of the cross. Theologically the cross is a symbol of 
liberation from sin and guilt.406 All participating in the celebration are invited to 
communally make this sign. This further indicates the reality of our common 
experience of sin and guilt.407  And according to Keenan: “Guilt and shame have no 
lasting claim on us not because we are good, but because Christ by the cross has 
taken away our sins by his mercy. When we sign ourselves by the cross, we are set 
free from guilt so as to be free to live for ourselves and for others.”408 But Keenan is 
concerned whether the action is allowed to navigate through the very being of the 
participants in order to evoke a true sense of value.  
The moral implication is that the sign of the cross is not only a sign of being 
claimed by Christ but it is also a sign of identifying ourselves with each other as a 
liberated people.409 Forgiveness therefore cannot be absent from any Eucharistic 
celebration: “The community that shares Christian worship enacts forgiveness ritually 
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so that it can perform forgiveness away from the table.”410 But on the contrary, the 
cross rather than becoming a liberating force has been used to shame, imprison, 
torture or harm other people:  
That Christians have used the cross as some sort of weapon of their 
own to promote their purported righteousness over others’ purported 
wickedness is the great Christian obscenity. Whenever we separate 
our understanding of the cross from God’s mercy, we inevitably risk 
again morally deplorable conduct, for we forget how our 
righteousness was won. For this reason the practice of cross burning 
in the United States was so obscene: In whitened, hooded sheets, 
members of the Ku Klux Klan burned the cross as a symbol of racial 
threat and racial violence.411 
 
A proper understanding of the gratuitousness of the gift of Christ’s liberation through 
the cross deepens our appreciation of the mercy of God: “Through the cross we are 
signed by our redemption, but on the road to sanctification we call for mercy. This 
communal practice highlights the on-going reconciliation of ourselves with God; we 
never celebrate the Eucharist without it. It is a remarkably habitual liturgical 
practice.”412 Mercy therefore becomes an important virtue in Christian living. This 
explains why Keenan interlaces mercy with his proposed virtues as highlighted in 
previous sections. The link between God’s mercy and us is expressed in the Gloria 
whereby all again sing to the glory of God which is an act of gratitude and a sign of 
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humility.413 This effectively makes the believing family ready to receive the narrative 
of the Lord in the readings.414  
Secondly, Keenan highlights the importance of the celebration of the word. 
Citing Hauerwas who states in A Community of Character the Christian task is to get 
the narrative of Jesus right.415 The following questions are pertinent: How do we get 
this narrative of Jesus right? How do we receive it? Or how is this narrative translated 
into actual living? Furthermore, what is the role of the preacher in unfolding the 
narrative? Is the preacher able to make alive the Word and its meaning to the life of 
the living community? Should the preacher be seen as a model, a trail blazer or 
simply a messenger or proclaimer?416  
The proper reception of the narrative of the word largely depends on the 
disposition of both the leader and the led.417 From a broader perspective, the word 
when not well celebrated makes the profession of the faith a mere recitation without 
real encounter with Jesus in our lived experiences. The celebration of the word ends 
with the prayers of the faithful which should be formative prayers reflecting the needs 
of the church and our personal needs and appreciation for the encounter. The 





413 See Margaret Daly-Denton, “When in Music God is Glorified,” in The Word is 
Flesh and Blood: The Eucharist and Sacred Scripture, ed. Vivian Boland and 
Thomas McCarthy (Dublin: Dominican Publications, 2012), 54-64. 
414 Ibid. See Kevin W. Irwin, Models of the Eucharist (New York: Paulist Press, 
2005), 102-104. 
415 Hauerwas, A Community of Character. 
416 Harington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 158. 
417 Ibid. 
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3.8.1.2 Liturgy of the Eucharist: Virtuous Moral Implications 
In the liturgy of the Eucharist:  
Here we enter into an extended prayer that calls us to remember. In 
doing so, we turn to the act of memory, our most affective, 
historical, rational practice . . . to bring back our hearts to our 
recollections . . . we define ourselves, with the priest, with the 
community, and with God, and so we sing ‘Holy, Holy, Holy’”418 
 
Central to the celebration is the Eucharistic prayer(s), is another narrative that shapes 
us, a narrative told over and over again which calls us into the reception of the body 
and blood of Christ.419 Keenan brings out the effectiveness of the narrative: 
By entering the narrative of deliverance, humility, and mercy, we 
become, like Christ himself, characters in the narrative of salvation. 
The story of our salvation leads inevitably to the self-understanding 
that just as Jesus’ death was for us, so too is the meal for us. But the 
narrative of our salvation does not end with us; rather it empowers us 
as a community of disciples to follow Christ and serve and feed others 
with the word and sacrament.420 
 
The moral practice that is borne out of the Eucharist is the continuous call to 
interiorization, service and reconciliation.  
Shortly before the reception of the Eucharist, the Lord’s Prayer is proclaimed. 
As a community we share in the same fatherhood of God and through the prayer we 
bring our past, our present and the future into his care. Indeed it our shared humanity. 
We are reminded of the need for the virtues of reconciliation and forgiveness in the 
Our Father and the kiss of peace. 421  Mattison makes this point more explicit 
underlying how the seven virtues are intertwined in the prayer of Our Father:  
																																																								
418 Ibid.  




Our Father, who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name. (Faith). Thy 
kingdom come, (Hope). Thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven. 
(Love). Give us this day our daily bread, (Prudence). And forgive us 
our trespasses, as we forgive those who trespass against us. (Justice). 
Lead us not into temptation, (Temperance). But deliver us from evil. 
(Fortitude).422   
 
We finally receive the body and blood of Christ, that which brings inner 
transformation and a disposition towards virtuous works. The entire liturgy concludes 
with the sending forth to proclaim the gospel with our lives: “Having been fed, 
fortified, and sustained on the journey of the community of discipleship, we turn to 
serve God and one another.”423  
The deep implication of the Eucharist is transformative, that is becoming that 
which we eat namely Christ and becoming servants to others. Therefore, Eucharist 
used as a context by Keenan does not only explain our communality but also is 
indicative of certain virtues that are shared: the virtues of mercy, forgiveness, and 
humility. The Eucharist we can finally say, enables us grow in virtue. 
3.9 Concluding Remarks 
It cannot be over-emphasized that since Vatican II, moral theology has been called to 
renewal and reunion with the fields of dogmatic theology, ascetic theology, and 
biblical theology, but at the same time retaining its coherent, developmental, and 
anthropological vision of the human person.424 The premier works of Fritz Tillmann, 
Gerard Gilleman on scripture and moral theology are worth noting. 425  Later 
																																																								
422 Mattison III, Introducing Moral Theology, 399. 
423 Ibid., 159. 
424 James F. Keenan, A History of Catholic Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century: 
From Confessing Sins to Liberating Consciences (London: Continuum, 2010), 59. 
425 Tillmann, The Master Calls; Gérard Gilleman, The Primary of Charity in Moral 
Theology (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1959). 
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theologians like Spohn came on board to distinctly specify how moral theologians 
read and interpret the scriptures:  
When theologians turn to the Scripture for moral guidance they are 
not acting like moral philosophers. They turn to a history rather than 
a theory of ethics, to a canonical text whose credential is inspiration 
by God and not merely logical consistency. Christians turn to 
Scripture to discover more than the right thing to do; they want to act 
in a way that responds to the God of their lives.426 
 
Spohn names six models for approaching scripture in order to comprehend its value 
for moral instruction. But he notes that the six models are not signs of chaos but 
rather of the irreducible richness of the Scripture itself.427 Spohn identifies the 
command of God model with Dietrich Bonhoeffer.428 The second model is ‘Scripture 
as reminder’ identified with Josef Fuchs.429 Alongside this model is the work of 
Bruno Schüller who argues that the scripture does not provide moral instruction but 
moral exhortation.430 The third model is the hermeneutics of liberation identifiable 
with Gustavo Gutiérrez.431 Richard Niebuhr represents the fourth model that typifies 
God’s action in human history and is called the responsibility ethics.432 Discipleship 
is the fifth model and names like Stanley Hauerwas, John Howard Yoder, Sally 
																																																								
426 William C. Spohn, What are they Saying about Scripture and Ethics? (Mahwah: 
Paulist Press, 1984), 1. 
427 Ibid., 3. 
428 See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship (New York: Macmillan, 1963). 
429 Josef Fuchs, Natural Law: A Theological Investigation (New York: Sheed and 
Ward, 1965). 
430 See Bruno Schüller, “The Debate on the Specific Character of a Christian Ethics: 
Some Remarks,” in Readings in Moral Theology No. 2: The Distinctiveness of 
Christian Ethics, ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1980). 
431 Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation (New York: Orbis Press, 1973). 
Other works on feminism, black theology and neo-colonization can be categorized 
under this model. 
432 Niebuhr, The Responsible Self. 
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McFague standout.433 The last model is Spohn’s own model that he calls “scripture as 
basis for responding to love”.434 In a later work that we have seen earlier on he argues 
that virtue ethics was “the most appropriate avenue for engaging scripture”.435  
Therefore, theoretically Keenan can be identified with the model of Spohn but 
he goes a little further to apply the virtues in a pastoral way. However, we wish to 
note that in his attempt to apply the virtue of justice, Keenan seemingly ignores the 
relevance of law. Perhaps, it is a deliberate attempt to break ranks with the emphasis 
on law by the deontologists. However, law remains vital in all moral reflections. To 
adequately underscore the place of law in the virtue of justice, we must decipher the 
four key elements which Aquinas identifies in his definition of law which serves the 
common good: 1. Law is a dictate of reason, 2. Law must be made by proper 
authority, 3. Law must be properly promulgated or made known, 4. Law must be 
directed to the common good of the group under consideration.436  
It is imperative that such structures are modified to suit changing challenges 
as history progresses. However, this must be done with care. The autonomy 
suggested by Beauchamp and Childress can be misinterpreted to mean license for 
permissiveness and perversion within the western culture. 437  Some of these 
modifications can have adverse effects the basic structures like the family.438 That is 
why virtue ethics remains relevant in today’s moral landscape. 
The fundamental notion that all virtues are interpersonal cannot be 
																																																								
433  See Hauerwas, A Community of Character; Yoder, Politics of Jesus; Sally 
McFague, Speaking in Parables (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975). 
434 Spohn, What are they Saying, 106. 
435 Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 27. 
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437 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 
438 See Gula, Reason Informed by Faith, 68. 
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disputed.439 The virtues whether infused or acquired are relentlessly practiced by 
individuals and maintained, encouraged by specific communities. 440 As Keenan 
observed earlier on, the Christian community must see to it that members practice 
virtue; this call is valid for the church, the small prayer groups within the parish and 
most importantly within the family unit which is considered the domestic church. The 
family is very foundational in acquiring and practicing virtue. Technically, Keenan 
may be challenged for not extensively examining the family as the locus for virtuous 
actions. 
I wish to finally remark that there are two basic areas in which virtue ethics in 
its communal and personal praxis becomes indispensable namely, justice and practice 
of sexuality. The abuses in the history of the church and within family circles have 
made this call even more urgent. But the answer to this can be found in the true 
application of the virtue of justice and self-care. And Grabowski captures it better 
when he writes:  
A full answer to the crisis of sexuality in the contemporary church 
and society can only be found in people who by their lives and 
practices proclaim a countercultural alternative to its trivialization- 
people whose masculinity-femininity is a sacramental sign of ‘the 
sincere gift of self’, whose sexual practices foster authentic human 
flourishing, whose sexuality is imbued with virtue. This lived 
witness of the human vocation to communion within marriages, 
families, religious vocations, and the single life is both a sign of 
participation in the One whose very being is Gift and whose life as a 
Trinity of Persons is an eternal communion of love.441 
To appeal to virtue ethics offers an opportunity to communities and individuals to 
discuss character traits, and dispositions that can help communities.442  
																																																								
439 Grabowski, Sex and Virtue, 163. 
440 Ibid. See also Cessario, Introduction to Moral Theology, 193-195. See also chapter 
two of this dissertation section 24.1 note 124. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 JOSEPH J. KOTVA JR.: VIRTUE ETHICS: AN ECUMENICAL APPROACH. 
4.0 Introduction  
Joseph J. Kotva Jr, a pastor of the Mennonite Church, is a scholar in Christian ethics 
concentrating in clergy ethics, medical ethics and virtue ethics.1 Kotva acquired his BA 
in 1985 at the Eastern Mennonite College Harrisonburg, VA and in 1987 obtained his 
MA at the Associated Mennonite Biblical Seminary, Elkhart, IN. Kotva completed his 
Ph.D. in Theology and Ethics in 1994 at the Fordham University, Bronx NY. 
Currently, he is the Executive Director of the Anabaptist Center for Health Care Ethics 
(ACHE). Since 2002, he has been Adjunct Professor at the Associated Mennonite 
Biblical Seminary, IN. He was a member of the Ethics Committee Lehigh Valley 
Hospital, Muhlenberg from June 1997 to 2003.  
																																																								
1 The Mennonite church is an upshot of the Anabaptist movement. After years of 
biblical studies, a small group of young scholars felt dissatisfied with Martin Luther 
and Ulrich Zwingli because they were not radical enough in their use of scripture to 
criticize church practices. See Joseph J. Kotva Jr., “The Anabaptist Tradition: 
Religious Beliefs and Health Care Decisions,” Park Ridge Center Handbook Series, 
2002. It should be noted that the Reformed Tradition held that the reformed Christians 
should believe and practice only those things explicitly taught in Scripture hence the 
slogan sola scriptura, sola Gratias and sola Fide. See Alister E. McGrath, Christian 
Theology: An Introduction 3rd ed. (Malden: Blackwell, 2001), 65-80. James Gustafson 
argues that because of this slogan debates within Protestant ethics took place within 
boundaries of Scripture. Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1979), 21. Some of Kotva’s works: Joseph J. Kotva Jr., 
“Clergy Ethics as Modeling Vulnerability,” AMBS Alumni News (Fall 2000): 1-2; 
Joseph J. Kotva Jr., “The Christian Pastor’s Role in Medical Ethics,” Second Opinion 
(March 2001): 22-48. Joseph J. Kotva Jr., “An Appeal for a Christian Virtue Ethic,” 
Thought (June 1992): 158-180; “An Ethical Reading of The Gift of Presence: Nursing 
and the Relevance of Virtue,” Mennonite Medical Messenger (April-June1993): 34-39; 
“Christian Virtue Ethics and the ‘Sectarian Temptation’,” The Heythrop Journal 
(January1994): 35-52; James Keenan and Joseph J. Kotva Jr. eds.,  Practice What You 
Preach: Virtues, Ethics, and Power in the Lives of Pastoral Ministers and Their 
Congregations (Wisconsin: Sheed & Ward, 1999).  
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 This chapter turns to Joseph J. Kotva in order to hear a voice from the 
Reformed tradition on virtue ethics. Firstly, we shall proceed by locating him within a 
philosophical and theological tradition.      
4.1 Situating Joseph J. Kotva  
Cessario and Keenan both worked from the unexamined assumption that virtue ethics is 
compatible with Christian theology. However, Kotva, because virtue ethics has a pre-
Christian and primarily Greek framework, does not begin with such an assumption. He 
must therefore establish the link between the intrinsic morality of Aristotle and the 
divine morality of the Christian faith. This is the primary task of The Christian Case for 
Virtue Ethics.2 The later part of this section shall show why and how Kotva believes 
this link is important for the mutual benefit of virtue ethics and Christian faith. 
Although, Kotva agrees with Aquinas that some aspects of Aristotle’s ethics can 
be apt for Christian ethics,3 and he acknowledges the immense contributions Aquinas 
offered in the adaptation of Aristotelian ethical framework on the virtues, Aquinas does 
not play a major role in Kotva’s works.4 Rather, he focuses on contemporary neo-
Aristotelian approaches to virtue ethics. Kotva’s dialoguing partners are mostly Neo-
Aristotelian philosophers: Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum, Nancy Sherman, and 
Edmund L. Pincoffs.5 And among the theologians the following are worthy of mention, 
																																																								
2 Ibid., 2. This major work on virtue was Kotva’s Ph. D dissertation, which he 
restructured into a book. Chapter six of this same book is a shortened version of his 
article “Christian Virtue Ethics and the ‘Sectarian Temptation’”, first published in The 
Heythrop Journal, 1994. 
3 Ibid., 1. In the ST, especially the Secunda Pars, Aquinas explicitly shows how 
Aristotle’s Ethics can be integrated into Christian theology and even Scripture. 
4 Ibid. 
5 MacIntyre, After Virtue; Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 
1988); Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and 
Tradition (London: Duckworth, 1990); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of 
Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986); “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,” in 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. XIII Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, ed. 
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Hendrikus Berkhof, James F. Keenan, Romanus Cessario.6 These moral philosophers 
and theologians offer a viable moral vision through virtue ethics for Kotva. He appeals 
to Neo-Aristotelian views on virtue ethics not because Aristotle previously had a 
Christian soteriology – because obviously he had not – but to find common ground 
between Aristotle’s philosophies with Christian beliefs.7 
 Kotva makes four broad claims. The first, mentioned already, is how virtue 
ethics is compatible and valuable in offering credibility to Christian convictions about 
the moral life. From this perspective, Kotva accuses other Christian ethicists of doing 
too little to argue on the need for Christians to support virtue ethics over non-virtue 
theories.8 Kotva finds the works of William Frankena and Philip Quinn uninspiring 
because they reject virtue ethics as an ethical approach. For example, Frankena in an 
article “Conversations with Carney and Hauerwas” writes: “I do not see . . .why a 
religious framework requires us to think in aretaic or virtue, rather than in deontic or 
obligation, terms. My impression is that, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the divine law 
conception of ethics has been at least as prevalent as the EV (Ethics of Virtues) one.”9 
And Philip Quinn in “Is Athens Revived Jerusalem Denied,” argues from the same 
																																																																																																																																																																
Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr. and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 32-53; Nancy Sherman The Fabric of 
Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Edmund L. 
Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues: Against Reductivism in Ethics (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1986). 
6 Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics 2nd ed.; Hendrikus Berkhof, 
Christian Faith:  An Introduction to the Study of Faith, revised ed. Trans. Seird 
Woudstra (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1986); Kotva, The Christian Case for 
Virtue Ethics, ix; Keenan, Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa 
Theologiae. Kotva acknowledges the mentorship of Keenan as his lecturer.  
7  Kent Reames, “A Review of Christian Case.” 
http://www.academicroom.com/bookreview/christian-case-virtue-ethics (accessed 
March 27, 2014). 
8 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 48. 
9 Ibid. For original citation see William Frankena, Journal of Religious Ethics 3 
(Spring 1975): 53. 
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position by articulating that the typical Christian tradition emphasises duty over virtue, 
an approach more Kantian than Aristotelian.10  
Quinn also conveys misgivings about whether virtue ethics is congenial to a 
fully Christian emphasis on God’s grace. For Quinn because of the fallen state of man, 
humanity will more respond to a divine command theory rooted in Kantian ethics of 
duty.11 He therefore concludes, we cannot turn to an Aristotelian virtue theory because 
it will mean rebuffing some basic Christian claims such as grace.12 Kotva, in response, 
argues that humanity in its fallen state stands far more in need of grace than reliance on 
some sort of divine-command theory. The issue of grace will become an important 
point for Kotva, influenced largely by his Reformed background. Frankena and Quinn 
are stating the obvious looking at the history of moral theology and its emphasis on 
obligation and rules. But it also highlights the neglect of an approach like virtue ethics. 
Kotva writing in defence of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics argues: “It is compatible 
with, and readily amended to, and useful in expressing Christian convictions and modes 
of moral reasoning.”13  
 It is very important according to Kotva for authors to illustrate how compatible 
virtue ethics is with Christian beliefs. As an example, Kotva notes the work of Paul 
																																																								
10 Philip Quinn, “A Response to Hauerwas: Is Athens Revived Jerusalem Denied,” 
Asbury Theological Journal 45 (1990): 49-57. 
11 See William C. Spohn, “The Return of Virtue Ethics,” Theological Studies 53 
(1992): 63.  
12 Ibid. There are other scholars who have expressed same misgivings. For example 
Gilbert Meilaender, The Theory of Practice of Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1984), x, 36; Richard Taylor, Ethics, Faith and Reason (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 22-25. This book was reprinted with a different title as 
Virtue Ethics: An Introduction (Interlaken: Linden Books, 1991); see also Eilert 
Herms, “Virtue: A Neglected Concept in Protestant Ethics,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 35 (6): 481-495. In sum all these scholars do not provide coherent work to 
justify how appealing and compatible virtue ethics is to Christian theology. 
13 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 1. 
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Wadell, entitled Friendship and the Moral Life. Wadell argues that if friendship is 
considered a virtue then it is compatible with Christian convictions because charity:  
Is not only a single virtue, but a comprehensive description of what he 
(Aquinas) took the fullness of life to be. To be human is to seek and 
enjoy friendship with God, a friendship which begins in this world by 
grace, is strengthened through the virtues, and is brought to perfection 
by the spirit.14  
 
Kotva himself correlates virtue ethics with contemporary Christian theology by 
highlighting the actual links between it and Christian theology in themes like 
sanctification, Christology and theological anthropology.15  These themes are best 
understood when we have a grasp of the Reformed Tradition, to which we shall return 
later. 
Second, he seeks to establish the claim that Christian life is essentially social or 
communal in nature and practice. Kotva proceeds with the process of correlation 
between systematic theology, moral theology and scripture by underlining the 
connections between Matthew and Paul in the New Testament. He examines issues 
relating to dispositions and basic attitudes that bring out outstanding examples with 
virtue ethics from a communal context.16 Again, we shall return to this in the later part 
of this chapter. 
 The third claim is slightly connected to the second. Basically Kotva’s self-
conscious approach has an ecumenical tone.17 He attempts to correlate contemporary 
Protestant and Roman Catholic theology, by appealing to shared-Christian beliefs. His 
method is an example of a goal he seeks, by drawing on theologians that represent 
																																																								
14 Paul Wadell, Friendship and the Moral Life, xvii. The italicized word is mine. 
15 See Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 69-93. 
16 Ibid., 103-134. 
17 Ibid., 2. 
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different traditions – for example Norman C. Kraus (a Mennonite), Hendrikus Berkhof 
(Reformed Tradition), and Edward Schillebeeckx (Catholic tradition).18  
 Fourth, he claims to address the criticisms of Christian virtue ethics as couched 
by authors like Wolfgang Schrage, outlined in the general introduction.19 These argue 
that virtue ethics is “self-centered” and not “other-centered”. But Kotva argues that 
since the Christian life is essentially social, “true human excellence, the true human 
good includes loving service to God and others.”20 By implication, we are to a great 
extent influenced by our social connections. Citing Berkhof, Kotva concludes: 
Unless we assume that one simply wills to be a certain kind of person, 
attention to how we are influenced by specific relationships, policies, 
practices, and actions is essential. Failure to attend to these influences is 
a denial of our finite, historical, and embodied nature. We are not angels 
standing outside our actions, untouched by our beliefs, histories, 
relationships, desires, and personal characteristics. As part of God’s 
natural, created order, we are shaped in profound ways by biological, 
social, and historical forces.21  
 
Kotva’s theology is shaped by his Reformed tradition. James M. Gustafson, in 
Theology and Ethics offers us three general elements in Reformed tradition: the sense 
of powerful order of the sovereignty of God, the centrality of religious affections in 
moral life, and the understanding of human life in relation to the powerful Other which 
requires all of human activity be ordered properly in relation to what can be discerned 
about the purpose of God.22 This thesis proposes to read Kotva in the light of these 
																																																								
18  Kent Reames, “A Review of Christian Case,” 
http://www.academicroom.com/bookreview/christian-case-virtue-ethics (accessed May 
19, 2014). 
19 Schrage, The Ethics of the New Testament; Lohse, Theological Ethics of the New 
Testament. 
20 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 145. 
21 Ibid., 146. See Berkhof, Christian Faith:  An Introduction to the Study of Faith, 189-
190. 
22 James M. Gustafson, Theology and Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), 164. For 
example Jonathan Edwards in The Nature of True Virtue synthesizes these three 
Elements when he writes: “True virtue, most essentially consists in benevolence to 
being in general.” He goes on to say true virtue consists “in love to God; the Being of 
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three elements, all of which provide a theocentric morality. Effectively, Kotva is 
influenced by these three general elements of Reformed Tradition. All human 
affections, therefore, have to be ordered towards God since he is the supreme, 
governing and ultimate end of everything: 
The end of morality goes beyond morality to the glorification of 
God. And God is glorified when life is ordered with particular goods 
in their proportionate relations to each other, and to him as the 
greatest good. There is nothing short of transformation of our vision 
in being rightly oriented by love to God; there is reordering of our 
particular objects of valuation and of our affections in being turned 
from self towards the objective reality of Being, God.23 
 
The conceptual articulation of Kotva on sanctification, Christology and 
theological anthropology with connection to virtue finds expression from the above 
theological supposition of the Reformed Tradition as proposed by Gustafson. This 
approach by Kotva is a respectful response to the suspicions that Protestant ethics 
traditionally held of virtue ethics. Charles E. Curran in “Virtue: The Catholic 
Tradition,” stresses the above suspicion:  
Protestant ethics has tended to be suspicious of a virtue ethics 
approach because of its understanding of justification and its fear of 
any ethic based on the principle of human flourishing and striving 
for perfection. Protestantism has generally insisted on God’s 
gracious gift and has been fearful of the latent Pelagianism (we are 
saved by our own efforts) in Catholic understandings of salvation 
and morality.24  
Elizabeth Agnew Cochran in an article “Faith, Love, and Stoic Assent: Reconsidering 
Virtue in the Reformed Tradition” also expresses the same concerns:  
For Martin Luther, John Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards, the 
possession or absence of faith plays a crucial role in determining a 
Christian’s status before God. Because faith is connected to 
salvation, these theologians resist the notion that faith is a virtue: 
																																																																																																																																																																
beings, infinitely greatest and best”. See Jonathan Edwards, The Nature of True Virtue 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), 3, 14. 
23 Ibid., 176. 
24 Curran, “Virtue: The Catholic Tradition,” 51. 
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humans cannot pursue virtue until they have been justified, and faith 
is a condition for justification and in some sense prior to it.25  
Jonathan Edwards for example discards the claims that faith is a virtue. For him faith 
cannot be obtained prior to conversion but accepts charity and hope as a virtue. 
Considering faith as virtue denotes that humans can be virtuous before receiving God’s 
grace.26   
Although in Kotva, such suspicion is giving way to a convergence of ideas on 
virtue ethics based on character, this does not mean that divergences do not still exist. It 
is to be noted that Kotva is conscious of the tensions especially as expressed by a 
scholar from the Reformed Tradition, Gilbert Meilaender. Although not rejecting virtue 
ethics, Meilaender in Theory and Practice expresses the tension between self-mastery of 
virtue and a self that is perfectly passive before God: 
Thinking about virtue directs our attention inward upon the self and its 
capacities for self-mastery and self-realization . . . True virtue is not 
possible as a human achievement; it cannot be thought of in terms of 
self-mastery. Indeed it requires once more again that moment of naked 
faith in which the self is perfectly passive before God.27  
 
The Catholic tradition has consistently taught of a proper love of the self, not 
towards the individual as the absolute, but as a part of God’s gracious reign and love.28 
Kotva tries to work through the apparent tension by considering sanctification, 
Christology and theological anthropology with virtue ethics, as we shall see later. But in 
																																																								
25 Elizabeth Agnew Cochran, “Faith, Love, and Stoic Assent: Reconsidering Virtue in 
the Reformed Tradition,” Journal of Moral Theology, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2014): 199.   
26 See Kenneth P. Minkema et al. eds., Miscellany 682, The Works of Jonathan 
Edwards 26 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957-2008). Luther who took 
same position even before Edwards influenced Edwards. See Martin Luther, Freedom 
of Christians, Luther’s works, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald, & Helnut T. 
Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia, 1986), 31: 343. 
27 Meilaender, The Theory and Practice of Virtue, 104 & 117. 
28 Curran, “Virtue: The Catholic Tradition,” 55 
	 259 
the interim we should note that according to the Reformed tradition sanctification, its 
beginning, continuation and eventual completion completely depends on God’s grace.29 
 
 Kotva’s major work is The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics. Most of his other 
works are articles, which give interpretative application of his main ideas, for example, 
Practice what you Preach. This book captures the link between theory and practice, 
thereby stressing the relevance of virtue and practice. And some of his earlier works 
like “An Appeal for a Christian Virtue Ethic,” “Christian Virtue Ethics and the 
Sectarian Temptation” are foundational to his main work. Because of the concise nature 
of some of these works it will be difficult to tease out a general theoretical framework. 
This being the case, they shall be subsumed into the general proceedings of this 
chapter. 
 The chapter shall proceed by outlining his understanding of the nature of virtue 
ethics. Then the thesis shall undertake to examine the community value of virtue 
ethics, as presented by Kotva.  
 
4.2 The Nature of Christian Virtue Ethics 
Kotva accepts that there is little coherence on the precise nature or content of the 
virtues.30 The historical data provided in chapter one outlines the differences in the 
usage of the concept. MacIntyre makes the same point in an article “The Nature of the 
Virtues,” writing:  
Homer, Sophocles, Aristotle, the New Testament and Medieval thinkers 
differ from each other in too many ways. They offer us different and 
incompatible lists of the virtues; they give a different rank order of 
																																																								
29 Chan, The Ten Commandments and the Beatitudes: Biblical Studies and Ethics for 
Real Life, 14. 
30 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 23. 
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importance to different virtues; and they have different incompatible 
theories of virtue.31   
 
Julia Hynes in her article “Virtue Theory: A Defence Against Consequentialism and 
Deontology in Medical Ethical Arena” explains why there are gaps between views of 
different virtue ethicists as argued by Kotva and MacIntyre. According to Hynes 
examples often provided are separate from the Aristotelian-Thomistic traditions.32 In 
this context Kotva appeals only to the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition for only this 
tradition gives a better rendering to the Christian appeal on virtue ethics, in dealing 
with the various versions of virtue. 
Spohn also explains that in these diverse examples, different traditions and 
cultures give different meaning to a particular virtue.33 For example, courage in Greek 
culture is brevity in war and in another culture it may mean following one’s conscience 
against social pressure. But despite the above, MacIntyre argues that there is a core 
concept which turns out to prove the entire tradition of virtue has a conceptual unity: 
“One of the features of the concept of virtue . . . is that it always requires for its 
application the acceptance of some prior account of certain features of social and moral 
life in terms of which it has to be defined or explained.”34  
Furthering this discussion on a core to virtue ethics, Kotva offers us six 
conceptual generalizations or accounts that are according to him widely accepted. 
Virtue in relation to human good or end, virtues incorporate both the intellectual or 
																																																								
31 Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Nature of the Virtues” Hastings Center Report Vol. 11, 
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33 Spohn, Go and Do Likewise, 28. 
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rational and affective self, virtues intertwined with dispositions and capacities, virtues 
as stable aspects of character, virtuous actions and performances.35  
 First, according to Kotva, the virtues must be understood in connection to the 
human telos or human good.36 Aristotle introduces his teleological virtue ethics by 
reflecting on the human end. For him happiness or flourishing is the human end in 
cultivating virtues. The German theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg in Theology and the 
Kingdom of God criticizes Aristotle’s construct. He argues that happiness in itself 
cannot prove the presence of “good” as evil people can find happiness in their bad 
actions.37 Such a conception of happiness leads to a degenerative autonomy. In this 
sense Pannenberg finds Aristotle concept of human end inadequate because there are 
no parameters to judge one’s sense of happiness. For Aquinas however, the concept of 
the human end a functional purpose that is theocentric. And Jean Porter in The 
Recovery of Virtue writes that Aquinas’ theory of morality presupposes an account of 
the natural human good.38 It is a human good that is inextricably connected to a good 
human action. And as Ralph McInerny posits in Ethica Thomistica: The Moral 
Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas the key to Aquinas’ moral theory is the concept of 
functional purpose of human action.39 Aquinas himself argues: 
Acting with purpose is a function of a human being, and he never does 
so without knowing what he is about. Yet many beings are not aware of 
an end, for either they are quite without consciousness, thus insentient 
things, or they do not recognize the meaning of end and purpose, thus 




35 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 23-26. 
36 Ibid., 23. 
37  Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the kingdom of God (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1975), 106. 
38 Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, 68-69. 
39 Ralph McInerny Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas 
(Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 1.  
40 ST I-II, q.1, a. 2 
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Aquinas agrees that human beings always act for an end, but argues that the true 
ultimate end of human beings happens solely in communion with God. In other words, 
the Kingdom of God is where human beings find happiness.41 No secular or human-
made happiness, like Aristotelian “eudemonian” ethics, can ever replace the perfect 
happiness that God wants all believers to experience in life.  
Sarah Conly in an article “Flourishing and the Failure of the Ethics of Virtue” 
refutes the teleological nature of virtue ethics by arguing that it does not provide a 
plausible account of why character should be prior in our evaluation of human end.42 
Kotva taking a lead from Aquinas’ argumentation without referencing him, rejects 
Conly’s position when he says:  
The telos underlines our notion of what counts as a virtue and how 
virtues should be understood. The telos helps this way: when we picture 
the best kind of life for humans to live, we also see the traits, 
dispositions, and capacities that contribute to or detract from that kind of 
life. The virtues are those states of character that enable or contribute to 
the realization of the human good. The vices are those that detract from 
or hinder the realization of the good.43 
 
The teleological dimension remains a central aspect of virtue ethics. This assumption is 
buttressed by the fact that the human person by his or her nature is purpose-driven, 
with ends or goals to achieve. This does not mean that the end is achievable by a 
simple leap. Hence, Kotva applies MacIntyre’s teleological scheme utilised by James 
Keenan as outlined in the previous chapter.44  
MacIntyre makes an important contrast between what man is and what he could 
be: “Within that teleological scheme there is a fundamental contrast between man-as-
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he-happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realizes-his-essential-nature.” 45 
MacIntyre goes further to propose the viable method to achieve a transition: “Ethics is 
the science which is to enable men to understand how they make the transition from 
the former state to the latter . . . Ethics therefore in this view presupposes some account 
. . . of the essence of man as a rational animal and above all some account of the 
human telos.”46  
The above presuppositions by MacIntyre suggest a bi-partite structure of man-
as-he happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realizes-his-essential-nature. The 
third part is the method to make the transition. But Kotva develops MacIntyre’s bi-
partite structure into a tripartite structure namely: 1. Man-as-he happens-to-be and 2. 
Man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realizes-his-essential-nature. 3. Those capacities, 
dispositions, inclinations, habits that will make the transition from 1 to 2.47 This is very 
Thomistic.  
Conversely, while Keenan interprets MacIntyre within a general theoretical 
frame of human identity, Kotva reads MacIntyre within a specific framework of human 
end or good. But on the whole the teleological categories named by MacIntyre, and 
developed by Keenan and Kotva suggest that human nature is tailored towards an end 
and providing the means to that end is what virtue ethics is concerned with. This 
explains why “within a teleological virtue ethics certain kinds of actions, habits, 
capacities and inclinations are discouraged because they direct us away from our true 
nature. Other kinds of actions, habits, capacities, and inclinations are encouraged 
because they lead us toward our true end.”48  
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The purported teleological scheme as MacIntyre argues fits into most 
theological or theoretical frameworks: Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Liberal theory etc., 
but more importantly within the plurality of Christian traditions. This stimulates a 
challenge to look at how Kotva adopts an ecumenical tone. We shall discuss this in the 
next sub-section.49 But in general, all that ethics offers to any of the above theological 
or theoretical frameworks is it serves as a conductor from what we are to what or who 
we can be. This is further coordinated by natural perfection of the human good as 
experienced by all religions. Accordingly, natural perfection of the human good 
consists in acting in harmony with virtue within the content of the human end.50  
The question remains, what is the content of the human good or end? 
According to Kotva the content of the human telos consists in three perspectives: First, 
it consists in the practice of the various virtues. It means that the telos requires activity. 
As Aristotle himself held, human good consists in activity.51 Activity is defined and 
expressed by one’s traits and dispositions. Amelie O. Rorty who argues in “Virtues and 
Their Vicissitudes” better expresses this idea: “Traits do not, of course, form actions in 
isolation. Individual virtues determine appropriate actions. They . . . function within a 
supportive, directing, and sometimes oppositional network.”52  This explains why 
Kotva maintains that a teleological virtue ethics encourages certain kinds of action like 
kindness, generosity, respect etc. and discourages vices like meanness, murder, stealing 
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etc. 53  The ultimate end of these actions is the human good. Therefore, Kotva 
conclusively says:  
The human good or telos requires activity, not any kind of activity, 
but activity that exemplifies the virtues. The telos is not a static state 
or something one obtains and then clings to. Rather, the human good 
consists largely of a certain way of living of a certain kind of activity 
. . . consistent with the various virtues.54  
 
Even though Kotva is seeking to prove how compatible virtue ethics is with Christian 
beliefs, he finds himself appealing indirectly to natural law especially in his conception 
of the human good by stressing the aspect of natural perfection as seen earlier. Such an 
approach establishes a ready point of reference and convergence with other traditions 
that may not be Christian.  
Like MacIntyre, Kotva argues that to understand the notion of human telos, it is 
vital to comment on the way concepts have a functional role by providing evaluative 
judgment. For example, concepts such as “watch”, “knife”, “farmer” generate such 
judgments:  
If we want to know what a “good farmer” is, we look to the point, 
purpose, role, or function of a farmer-maximizing crop yield without 
devastating the land, for example. A good farmer is one who well 
fulfils the function, role, or purpose of a farmer. A bad or poor 
farmer is one who does not fulfil well the same function, role, or 
purpose.55 
 
The above concepts cannot be defined independently of evaluative criteria. In the same 
way, a teleological ethics like virtue ethics suggests that the concept “human” is akin to 
the functional concepts mentioned above. According to MacIntyre, the concept human 
should be “understood as having an essential nature and an essential purpose for 
function . . . Man stands to ‘good man’ as ‘watch’ stands to ‘good watch’ or ‘farmer’ to 
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‘good farmer.”56 Therefore, virtue ethics serves such a functional evaluative role to the 
understanding of the human person. It is required by a person in order to examine his 
present state with reference to his or her activity, emotions, and desires against the 
ultimate end.57 Kotva argues in the same way: 
Evaluating a particular watch according to the function and purpose 
of watches, we can evaluate our current human nature and activity 
according to the true function or purpose or role of humans. That is, 
we can evaluate who we are and what we do against our true nature 
or telos, against the excellent performance of the functions or 
purpose characteristic of humans.58 
 
 A pertinent question at this stage will be what then is the ultimate end of the 
human good? Unfortunately, Kotva does not clearly answer this question. However, to 
answer this question we have to go back to Aquinas himself. Aquinas in Summa 
Contra Gentiles writes: “Every agent acts for the sake of an end.”59 According to 
Georg Wieland in “Happiness (Ia IIae, qq. 1-5)”: “Human action and the 
corresponding end only appear as a special case of cosmic movement.”60 While in the 
Secunda Pars of the ST Aquinas concentrates on actions that proceed from reason and 
free will which he calls human actions. It is in this context that he answers the 
question, “in what does the final end of the human life and actions consist?” Opinions 
may differ. For example, the politician considers power the final end, and the hedonist 
pleasure. But for Aquinas human end lies in divine goodness.61 And Davies in The 
Thought of Thomas Aquinas interprets Aquinas to mean that happiness is not merely a 
matter of ‘what turns you on’. It is something that has to be comprehended while 
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bearing in mind that human life has an end.62 Aquinas holds that there can only be one 
final end for all human beings:  
The object of the will, that is the human appetite, is the Good without 
reserve, just as the object of the mind is the True without reserve. 
Clearly, then, nothing can satisfy our will except such goodness, which 
is found, not in anything created, but God alone. Everything created is 
a derivative good.63 
 
In a later article Aquinas concludes:  
Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision 
of the divine essence. To make this clear, two points must be observed. 
First, that people are not perfectly happy so long as something remains 
for them to desire and seek: secondly, that the perfection of any power 
is determined by the nature of its object . . . [Now] the intellect attains 
perfection in so far as it knows the essence of a thing . . . [and] . . . for 
perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very essence of the 
first cause.64 
 
Aquinas does not introduce this proposition in an argumentative way but applies it in a 
descriptive way such that he stresses how humans through knowledge, love, free will 
and activity can attain this end which is God. 
Second, according to Kotva, another aspect of the human telos is closely related 
to the first, namely those virtues that lead us to the telos are integral parts of the end 
itself.65  The idea of a human good or end includes the idea of becoming a certain kind 
of person. In this sense then virtues become a means to an end. But according to Kotva 
they are not mere means, for they are a constituent part of the goal itself.66 We shall 
return to the teleological nature of virtue ethics in the succeeding section. 
Third, the content of the human good is both individual and corporate.67 This 
gives perspective to our thesis statement namely the community or relational value of 
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virtue ethics. Paralleled to the above consideration, Rorty upholds: “Action takes place 
in a social world. It is, in the end, our social and political relation to others that keeps 
our virtues in whatever precariously appropriate balance they have.”68 Kotva therefore 
sustains:  
The human telos is found in common projects, shared activities, and 
intimate relationships. Things like friendship, shared activities, and 
larger political affiliations are part of and essential to the human good. 
They are ends and activities we seek for their own sake. Such 
relationships have an intrinsic worth, and from a virtue perspective it is 
absurd to think of the human good apart from such interconnections. 
Social connections are valued for their instrumental benefits. But their 
worth is much deeper and more pervasive than instrumental gain: they 
provide the very form and mode in which the human good is realized.69 
  
Fourth, the virtues should be understood holistically. This means that the 
various virtues include both the intellectual or rational part of the self and the affective 
or desiring part of the self. This is because referencing the virtues includes the whole 
range of human feelings and thinking faculties.70 Similarly, Nancy Sherman in The 
Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue writes: “To act rightly is to act in 
affect and conduct. It is to be emotionally engaged, and not merely to have the affect as 
accompaniment or instrument. It is to reason and see in a way that brings to bear the 
lessons of the heart as much as the lessons for a calmer intellect.”71 In like manner, 
Kotva concludes: “The sum of the virtues encompass the fields of both intellect and 
will.” 72  This is what G. Simon Harak in Virtuous Passions: The Formation of 
Christian Character calls “the organic unity of the moral agent”.73  
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Fifth, there is the generalization that virtues incorporate tendencies, dispositions 
and capacities. The underlining aspect of this fifth point is not the dispositions or 
tendencies themselves but the scope of the virtues. The general scope of the virtues for 
Kotva includes “all those states of character or character traits that influence how we 
choose and act. The virtues include states of character that provide for continuity in 
one’s actions.”74  According to Kotva, the virtues comprise dispositions to aptly 
respond in a certain way in related situations. It is a reaction that must be merited by a 
sense of continuity.75 For example in applying the virtue of justice a virtuous person 
must seek to be just without prejudices always. In this context, virtues must be stable 
qualities in an individual. According to Kotva: “We do not lose or gain virtues 
overnight or in a single act. One occasionally acts ‘out of character’ or in discontinuity 
with his or her character. In general, however, one acts in accord with one’s virtues and 
vices . . . One does not suddenly gain or lose virtue.”76 This triggers the point of the 
stability of the virtues.  
Kotva observes that the stability of the virtue depends largely upon the moral 
education and development of the virtues. R. B. Brandt in an article “The Structure of 
Virtue” calls this the formation of intention.77 The stability of virtue should withstand 
all adverse situations. This is expressed more aptly by Stephen Hudson in “Character 
Traits and Desires” when he writes, a virtuous person “must be principled and must 
have the capacity, the strength of will, to act as he should despite temptations”.78 Kotva 





77 R. B. Brandt, “The Structure of Virtue,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. XIII 
Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, ed. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling and 
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78 Stephen Hudson, “Character Traits and Desires,” Ethics 90 (1980): 539-549. 
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dispositions to pursue particular ends by applying the most appropriate means 
necessary to achieving those ends in view.79 It involves a coordination of both 
disposition or capacity and means.80  
Sixth, authentic virtuous actions according to Kotva may sometimes be 
performed “instrumentally” but must always be performed “for their own sake”. He 
explains: 
Just and courageous actions can be performed because of the goods or 
ends they cause, such as survival, self-respect, and the respect of others. 
But for those acts to be truly virtuous, they must also be performed for 
their own sake- that is, performed simply because they are just or 
courageous actions. They must be ends in themselves. They must be the 
kinds of actions that would be valued even if they failed to achieve their 
goals or led to unexpected ill consequences.81 
 
The claim we are making here is that authentic virtuous action is more than learning 
balanced deliberation, or learning to make decisions that will produce desired ends 
especially general ends of welfare and preservation of one’s life. It is learning to value 
the actions that result or may not result in the desired ends and also the kind of person 
who performs the actions.82  
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 In summary, virtues are those infused and acquired qualities of character that 
are central to the achievement of all human ends. Spohn summarizes the common 
features of virtue ethics: Virtue ethics is concerned with the character of the agent; 
dispositions, tendencies and capacities are also constituent parts; it is concerned with 
human flourishing which has both individual and social dimensions.83 Hence the 
emphasis on cultural shaping of virtues and the connection between manifestations of 
virtue, common existential human traits, and ultimately human agency takes center 
stage. Therefore, in whatever form virtue ethics is presented it must have these 
common features. 
 
4.3 Virtue Ethics: An Ethics of “Being” or “Doing”? 
The historical sketch of Chapter One outlined the shift in moral theology in recent 
generations. Gula describes this as a move towards an “ethics of being” or “character 
ethics”. 84  Metaphorically, it may be described, as the challenge of man who has been 
able to conquer outer space but still unable to conquer the inner space which is his very 
being. Over the years, actions which are likened to outer space took precedence over 
inner dispositions, the core of the person. For example Thomas Beauchamp and James 
Childress’s definition of virtue in Principles of Bio-medical Ethics highlight the above 
point: “Virtues are settled habits and dispositions to do what we ought to do.”85 
According to William May in an article “Virtues in Professional Life”, such a definition 
subordinates being with action.86 Gula cautions:  
If we talk too exclusively of actions, we are in danger of regarding 
them as something outside ourselves and as having a reality of their 
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own. But actions are always expressions of a person. Moral 
goodness is a quality of the person, constituted not by rule-keeping 
behaviour alone, but by cultivating certain virtues, attitudes, and 
outlooks.87 
 
The above approach sums together ‘to do what we ought do’ with ‘to be what we ought 
to be’.88 This is outlined by the current renewal of moral theology with reference to 
virtue ethics that constructs a theology of both being and doing.  
Kotva from the above premises reasserts two perspectives: First, “being” 
precedes “doing” which he calls the priority of being.89 However, it is apparent that one 
cannot talk of an action without first talking of or about the agent or subject of the 
action. Most human actions are preceded by intentionality. This does not deny the fact 
that some actions are spontaneously carried out without any prior reflection. In any case 
being precedes doing. Second, Kotva connects being with doing.90  
According to Kotva, both being and doing constitute interdependent concerns 
and must be taken jointly in any all-inclusive undertaking in moral theology because, 
right actions are intrinsically linked to right judgment emanating from a good 
character.91  In this context, one of the connecting elements between being and doing is 
the choices an individual makes. In connection to the above comment, William E. May 
in An Introduction to Moral Theology argues that the actions of a person are not 
something that accidentally occur to an individual; they are rather the external 
expressions of a person’s choice, the revelation of a person’s moral identity, that is, his 
or her being a moral being.92 He further states: 
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For at the core of an action, as human and personal, is a free, self-
determining choice, which as such is something spiritual and abides 
within the person, determining the very being of the person. The 
Scriptures, particularly the New Testament, are very clear about this. 
Jesus thought that it is not what enters a person that defiles him or 
her; rather, it is what flows from the person, from his heart or her 
heart, from the core of his or her being, from his or her choice (cf. 
Matt. 15:10-20; Mk. 7:14:23).93 
 
Being as a subjective reality cannot be treated in isolation of character and 
action, character and action become the locus for the definition of an individual’s 
identity. This point is made clearer by the definition of character by Grisez: “Character 
is the integral existential identity of the person- the entire person in all his or her 
dimensions as shaped by morally good and bad choices- considered as a disposition to 
further choices.”94 It follows necessarily that we shape our character and our identity by 
the very choices we make. For example, if I want to be a hospitable person, then I have 
to choose to be hospitable to people in a consistent way. It is apparent therefore, that 
who we are, including our character, influences our choices and actions.95  
Similarly, Kotva further argues that in order to adequately analyse actions we 
have to be concerned first with the kind of people we are. This is illustrated by the 
following examples and it is necessary I give the full passage because it summarizes 
how our character influences our choices or judgments and our choices in turn influence 
our character: 
Most of us do not go to just any one when we seek moral advice. We 
do not ask moral advice from young children or persons known for 
their dishonesty. Rather, we seek people who are trustworthy, 
honest, courageous and wise. In so doing we acknowledge the 
importance of the virtues. We seek people of moral maturity because 
we know they are the best suited for giving moral advice. They are, 
for example, the most likely to identify the issues correctly and be 
honest with us. Thus, states of character are important in identifying 
and communicating the right. Many women confronting unwanted 
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pregnancies never consider abortion, even though our society treats 
abortion as a matter of personal choice. These women carry the 
fetuses to term then either care for the children themselves or put the 
babies up for adoption. Their view of themselves and their vision of 
the world precludes the question of abortion. Thus, their characters 
not only delineate how moral questions are handled, but what they 
conform as moral questions. For these women, abortion is not a 
moral question or matter of choice. Most of us have a few glaring 
character faults or at least know someone with such limits. One may 
have a compulsive personality, a short temper, or a problem with 
fidelity. Often the difficulty here is not with knowing the right, but 
doing it. People lacking in temperance, patience, or fidelity often 
knowhow they should act but find themselves unable. Thus, their 
states of character greatly influence their ability to do the right.96 
 
The inferences from the above illustrations are that one’s state of being can affect the 
performance of an action either rightly or wrongly. The two perspectives of being 
preceding doing and the interdependence of the two is summed up in the above 
illustration. Therefore, Kotva concludes: “We act out of who we are.”97 Virtue ethics 
must deal with being good and doing good in order to be holistic.98 In the words of 
May, “One’s being does not free-float behind one’s deeds; it should manifest itself in 
doing.”99 
 
4.4  Virtue Ethics: Ecumenical Perspective 
Lawler and Salzman in “Virtue Ethics: Natural and Christian” give a good account of 
Christian virtue ethics.100 They first examine natural virtue ethics deriving from the 
Aristotelian tradition and its contemporary personification. Then they consider 
Christian virtue ethics deriving from the following of Jesus Christ, and then they draw 
a contrast between natural and Christian virtue ethics.101 Nevertheless, their narrative 
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does not take into account the multivalent nature of Christian tradition but draws upon 
one tradition only. However, Kotva as we mentioned earlier sets out in Christian Case 
for Virtue Ethics to argue that theologians advocating virtue ethics have failed to show 
why Christians may find virtue ethics appealing. He argues that virtue theory is both 
compatible with and helpful in giving voice to Christian moral living.102  
Kotva’s assumption is confronted by the challenge of pluralism within 
Christian tradition. He accepts the reality that there exist differences within the 
Christian tradition when he writes: “This work does not focus on denominational or 
sectarian distinctions. Rather, it argues that a virtue framework is helpful in expressing 
the basic Christian journey founded in Scripture and classical Catholic doctrine.”103 He 
further articulates: 
There are many differences with Christianity. The Lutherans are not 
Mennonites, and neither groups is Roman Catholic. Still, it is likely 
that Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics, and Reformation 
Christians (including groups from the “radical” end of the 
reformation) share substantial ground. This shared ground makes it 
intelligible to speak about the Christian tradition, however difficult it 
may be to define its boundaries. We can talk about the Christian 
tradition without additional qualifiers like “Roman Catholics” or 
“Lutheran”. After all, it makes sense to have a “Dictionary of Church 
History” or a “Dictionary of Christian Theology”. While we may 
disagree on what to exclude from such dictionaries, we will agree on 
much that must be included.104 
 
Aware of the above differences, Kotva deals with theological categories that appeal to 
numerous Christian traditions. The attractiveness of virtue ethics forms the basis for an 
ecumenical perspective that is foundational within various fields of Christian enquiries: 
Theology, Scripture, Systematic and Biblical Studies.105 Likewise, Keenan argues in his 
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co-authored book with Harrington, Jesus and Virtue Ethics, that virtue ethics unites 
fields of theology that have been long isolated from each other. It provides a bridge 
between ascetic and moral theology, between liturgy and moral theology, between 
scripture and moral theology.106  
One of the greatest points of reference between the different faith expressions 
within Christianity is the Scripture. In a later section we shall see how Kotva applies 
this to develop an understanding of the corporate dimension of virtue ethic. Kotva 
expresses that whatever he proposes as an ecumenical framework may not be applied 
strictly by all Christian denominations but may be modified. He states: “The 
implication is that differing Christian communities will find a general Christian virtue 
ethics in its basic framework and outline, helpful in expressing their moral 
convictions.”107  His framework is therefore not definitive but suggestive, readily 
opened to adaptations.  
To be able to provide such a framework, Kotva identifies three theological links 
and parallels between virtue ethics and Christian convictions: sanctification or self-
transformation and dependency on the grace of God, Christology, that is Jesus as the 
true human end, and Christian anthropology.108 To undertake to explain these three 
categories, Kotva examines various theologians from different Christian traditions. He 
explains: “The discussion of each theological category draws on authors from more 
than one Christian tradition. This is done to show that the proposed correlations 
between the theological categories and virtue theory are possible readings across 
denominational lines.”109 In each of the categories highlighted above, Kotva treats 
different theologians in order to offer readings of theological classifications within a 
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wider Christian tradition.110 The ecumenical approach Kotva takes does not attempt to 
explain how different Christian traditions conceive virtues based on their individual 
different readings. One will assume that his efforts would have been to delineate how 
each of these traditions understands virtue ethics but rather he seeks to establish the 
correlating lines within a general or broader theological framework. The succeeding 
sections shall seek to connect the above themes with virtue ethics.  
4.4.1 Sanctification, The Grace Of God and Virtue Ethics 
Meilaender in The Theory and Practice of Virtue advances the thesis that virtue ethics 
is naturally harmonious and compatible with a life of sanctification, development and 
holiness.111 Kotva acknowledges Hauerwas, in Character and the Christian Life, for 
highlighting the systematic link between virtue ethics and sanctification.112 Kotva 
defines sanctification as follows: “Sanctification involves the growth and 
transformation of oneself and one’s character towards a partially determinate picture of 
the human good or end.”113 Spohn also in Go and Do Likewise: Jesus and Ethics and  
“The Return to Virtue Ethics” makes the same claim that virtue ethics provides an 
appropriate context for genuine Christian sanctification.114  
 The task in this sub-section is to define the aspects of sanctification that are 
connected to virtue ethics drawing upon three distinct theologians each representing a 
tradition as illustrated by Kotva: John Macquarrie, representing the Anglican 
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tradition,115 Millard Erikson, of the Baptist Conference,116 and Hendrikus Berkhof  who 
is Dutch Reformed.117 Kotva uses a method of dialogue between three authors and 
correlates their ideas. We may call this a correlational methodology. It is a method in 
practical theology that engages in dialogue in which negative analogy is dropped and 
positive analogy, which has mutual influential relationship is adopted. 118  
Unfortunately, Kotva does not represent the Catholic tradition here but introduces it in 
the second category dealing with Christology. This makes his ecumenical approach to 
be hypothetically incomplete. Perhaps, it demonstrates the misgivings the Reformed 
Tradition has always had on the Catholic position on sanctification by human merit.   
Kotva justifies his choice of these three authors by stating that although they are 
from different traditions and use varied theological methods, they agree on the central 
importance on sanctification. Existentialism and transcendental Thomism methodically 
influence Macquarrie, while Erikson is a conservative evangelical influenced by sola 
Scriptura maxim, and Berkhof is “neo-Barthian”.119 However different their theological 
methods are, they all agree that sanctification is compatible with virtue ethics.  
 Firstly, according to Kotva, Hendrikus Berkhof sees sanctification as a process 
that begins with repentance, justification and faith. Christ becomes the goal of the entire 
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process, hence he speaks of “conformity to Christ”.120 In his valuation, God has a 
purpose for humanity, which involves a covenantal relationship requiring constant 
transformation, a transformation into becoming Christ-like.121 It is a transformation that 
is not static or final but dynamic, it involves a struggle both within the self and 
without.122 Berkhof’s conception of sanctification, beginning only at repentance, by 
implication denies the possibility of an individual becoming virtuous even before 
acquiring the virtues especially faith. This is very typical of the Reformed Tradition. 
However, Kotva attempts to develop a common ground with other varying traditions. I 
doubt whether he is successful because of Berkhof’s nuanced position.  
   Like virtue ethics sanctification according to Berkhof involves becoming a 
certain kind of person: It involves freedom from destructive customs and practices, and 
freedom for a transforming love of the world and neighbour. It involves becoming the 
sort of person who often performs acts of faith and love spontaneously, out of who one 
is. But this involves self-examination. If we are to progress in faith toward the goal, we 
must sometimes ask if we are acting and growing in freedom and love.123 This idea 
resonates with the tripartite anthropological vision of Keenan as discussed in the 
previous chapter.124 Berkhof’s transformative process of sanctification is on-going, like 
virtue, as virtue is not attained in one day or by a singular virtuous act. In this context, 
the virtuous person through sanctification or self-transformation grows from who 
he/she is into who he/she can become. This involves a deliberate choice of action which 
has a teleological aim of achieving the highest good which is God. Therefore, God 
becomes the highest good for all Christians despite their differences in tradition. 
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 Secondly, Millard Erikson similarly designates that Christ is the goal of 
sanctification. He also considers sanctification as a process that lasts a lifetime, 
beginning with conversion. 125  Erikson uses concepts like regeneration and 
restoration. 126  Like Berkhof, sanctification for Erikson is becoming like Christ. 
According to him this is not a superficial or external resemblance: “Likeness to Christ 
involves a whole set of characteristics or qualities which make something what it is.”127 
This implies that the life-long process of sanctification demands a change of character, 
a development of certain dispositions. Simply put, it demands certain kinds of virtues 
that are Christ-like. Erikson suggests a list of those kinds of virtues, love, joy, peace, 
patience, kindness, goodness, self-control, faithfulness and gentleness.128 Erikson is 
more theological and practical than Berkhof. 
 Thirdly, Macquarrie argues that in sanctification there is first the entry into the 
Christian life which proceeds to growth.129 Both Berkhof and Erikson miss this point. 
Sanctification has a unitary process that is initiated by God and man has only to 
cooperate.130 Like Erikson, Macquarrie affirms that sanctification is called “an imitation 
of Christ”. For him:  
This is not an external “imitation” of Christ but rather, in 
Bonhoeffer’s language, a “conformation” of the Christian to Christ. 
Yet while the giftlike character of this life must always be stressed, it 
is also a life that makes demands and requires a genuine “synergy” or 
coworking, between the supporting grace of God and the free human 
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According to Kotva’s evaluation, Macquarrie’s accounts are similar to those of Berkhof 
and Erikson. But Macquarrie goes further to specifically state that the structure of the 
Christian life can be expounded in many ways but most particularly through the 
theological virtues, faith, hopes and love.132 He explains further, the virtue of faith for 
Macquarrie is a commitment and acceptance as man’s responsible decision by gracious 
approach and self-disclosure of being.133 It is an appropriation of the event of Jesus 
Christ- the incarnation, cross, and resurrection.134 Hope is not to be confused with the 
optimism that characterizes some era of history, when human power and knowledge are 
expanding and it seems that man can build for himself a secure and prosperous future. 
Thus, the Christian hope is in God’s activity and presence in the world.135 It is 
eschatological as well in the sense that it gazes onwardly to the consummation of the 
divine work in creation and reconciliation, while love, the greatest of them all, leads to 
a community. 136 Both ontologically and theologically, love is letting-be.  According to 
Macquarrie: 
Love is letting-be, not of course in the sense of standing off from 
someone or something, but in the positive and active sense of 
enabling-to-be . . . Most typically, “letting-be” means helping a 
person into the full realization of his potentials for being; and the 
greatest love will be costly, since it will be accompanied by the 
spending of one’s own being.137  
  
In sum, Kotva posits that the three theologians’ descriptions of sanctification are 
akin to virtue ethics.138 He summarizes their accounts:  
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Sanctification is a teleological process that involves the 
transformation of the self and the development of character traits or 
virtues. The end or goal of sanctification can be variously designated 
but is frequently discussed in terms of likeness or conformity to 
Christ. Conformity to Christ thus provides a sense of sanctification’s 
goal. It provides each author with a broad vision of the end to which 
sanctification moves, an end that includes certain traits and virtues. 
Sanctification is also a process . . . where one moves from the kind-
of-person-one-is to the kind-of-person-one-is-called-by-God-to-be.139
 
Apparently, the concept of sanctification is akin to the concept of virtue theory. But 
their seeming departing line is the idea of dependency on the grace of God which 
sanctification introduces.140 Our dependency on the grace of God according to Kotva 
does not repudiate human activity and struggle in moral transformation.141 Kotva 
seems to move away from the traditional Reformed position of being saved by grace 
alone, but does not explicitly show that. Furthermore, he detects a lacuna in the earlier 
tradition of virtue ethics for the lack of emphasis on Grace.142 It follows that his 
introduction of grace is intended to fill the lacuna. 
By introducing the concept of grace Kotva establishes a substantive link 
between sanctification and virtue ethics. This explains why he will later propose a 
reformulation of virtue ethics by placing emphasis on the need of God’s grace. But in 
the interim, we can acknowledge that all three authors accept that we are active 
partners with the grace of God in the transformative process of sanctification.143 This 
shows a shift from the traditional teachings on grace within the Reformed Tradition but 
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considered from Calvin’s concept of “irresistible grace of God”.144 Kotva makes a shift 
in order to accommodate other traditions’ teaching on grace. To create the ecumenical 
platform, grace has to be understood within the context of being active partners with 
God. To this end, Stephen J. Duffy in Dynamics of Grace writes: “Actual grace which 
is God’s grace is both operative and cooperative . . . Where grace is operative, God 
acts and humans are passive; where it is cooperative, God’s action elicits our active, 
free response.”145 An ethics that is concerned with moral growth invariably has to 
accentuate God’s grace. “Growth continues through out one’s life, but growth is 
possible only because of divine grace working in us.”146  
The moral growth very often uses the metaphor of struggle with inclinations. 
St. Paul expresses this struggle in Romans 7:19 “For the good that I want, I do not do, 
but I practice the very evil that I do not want.” This is a cry of helplessness. But the 
priority of God’s grace in such a struggle becomes an immutable answer.  
From this context, Kotva insists that virtue ethics must be tailor-made to 
integrate this concern. However, he notes that there are scholars who express suspicion 
that virtue ethics cannot accommodate the Christian belief in the grace of God. For 
example Philip Quinn in “Is Athens Revived Jerusalem Denied?” expresses this 
misgiving.147 But other scholars like Solomon Yiu and J. M. Vorster argue alongside 
Kotva:  
Virtue ethics that are divinely grounded by the grace of God, guide 
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humans in the pursuit of life purpose, goal and destiny which is the 
Kingdom of God. Only God himself, the God of the Kingdom, is the 
source providing a sound foundation in reality for virtues as well as the 
ultimate good.148 
J. R. Wilson also argues that Christian virtues are formed on the foundation of God’s 
grace; humans must come before God with a contrite heart and recognise that only the 
work of the Spirit in our lives enables the Christian life.149 The virtue of faith becomes 
the principal virtue leading to the appropriate response of God’s grace in each 
person.150 From this perspective therefore we can talk of the infused virtues as grace-
centred virtues. The concept of virtue when considered from the perspective of grace 
reaffirms the fact that the Christian response to the call of God is not a remote ideal. It 
is a construct that is both cooperative and operative as noted earlier. Christian virtue 
ethics is ontologically grounded in God the source of all virtues.151 The inevitability of 
divine grace for the cultivation of virtues remains important to the historical Reformed 
tradition. 
Berkhof, Erickson, and Macquarrie all establish an ontological framework in 
which a person is elevated and given a new nature and faculties are bestowed with new 
abilities by reason of sanctification and the virtues as perduring dispositions. All three 
authors use the theological concepts of conformity and imitation. These two concepts 
imply compliance, identification and internalization. Virtue ethics finds internalization 
as a proper construct of the concepts of conformity and imitation.  
																																																								
148 Solomon Yiu & J. M Vorster, “The goal of Christian virtue ethics: From ontological 
foundation and covenant relationship to the Kingdom of God’, In die Skriflig/In Luce 
Verbi 2013, 47(1), Art. #689, http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/ids.v47i1.689 (accessed May 1, 
2014). 
149 J.R., Wilson, Gospel Virtue: Practicing faith, Hope & Love in Uncertain Times, 
(Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 1998), 34-35. 
150 B.W. Farley, In Praise of Virtue: An Exploration of the Biblical Virtue in a 
Christian Context (Grand Rapid: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995), 
62-63. 
151 Yiu &Vorster, “The goal of Christian virtue ethics,” 5. 
	 285 
4.4.2 Christology and Virtue Ethics: Jesus as the true Human end   
In the preceding sub-section Kotva offered an account of three authors on 
sanctification. He identifies that all three authors delineate the end of sanctification to 
be “conformity with Christ”. Our present sub-section furthers the dialogue on the idea 
of Christ as the paradigmatic human person.152 According to Kotva: “Its central claim is 
that an adequate Christology includes the notion that Jesus of Nazareth embodies the 
true human good or end. Jesus Christ is not just another human being, but the 
paradigmatic human being.”153  
There are two reasons why Kotva introduces Christology in his discourse of 
virtue ethics.  Firstly, he wishes to show that Christian virtue ethics is teleological in 
nature, with Jesus Christ being its telos: “By looking at Christology, we see that the life 
and way of Jesus of Nazareth helps provide the end’s content.”154 Secondly, he argues 
against some Christian ethicists who consider Jesus to be irrelevant in constructing 
ethics. For example John H. Yoder in The Politics of Jesus argues that Jesus should not 
be seen as a model for normative ethics, because Jesus offered only a spiritual message 
and not an ethical message.155 He contends that Jesus had a different world-view that 
was apocalyptic.156 Yoder proposes that our new ethics should be developed on a 
mixture of common sense, natural wisdom, and “the nature of things” based around 
what is suitable, relevant and effective, an “ethic of the situation”.157 But contrary to 
Yoder’s extreme position, Kotva argues in line with Hans Urs von Balthasar’s proposal 
in his “Nine Propositions on Christian Ethics” that Christ in the first thesis is “concrete 
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norm”. 158 As St. Bonaventure articulates in his Sentences, Christ is the exemplar of the 
virtues: “exemplar excitativum virtutum”.159 Kotva although accepts that our new ethics 
must reflect Yoder’s propositions of common sense, and natural wisdom, he holds that 
an appeal to Christology makes such an engagement more definitive and substantive. 
Hence, the Christological perspective Kotva offers is intended to argue that Jesus’ 
normative humanity is not to be neglected in any Christian discourse on ethics.160  
To expand on the above claim, Kotva constructs a close reading of three further 
authors with varying theological traditions: C. Norman Kraus, representing the 
Mennonite tradition, Hendrikus Berkhof representing the Dutch Reformed tradition, 
and Edward Schillebeeckx representing the Catholic tradition. Kotva only outlines their 
points of convergence on Jesus’ true end but ignores their varying points of divergences 
because he uses a correlational methodology that neglects polemics. It is not my 
intention to outline the divergences either.  
Firstly, C. Norman Kraus, in Jesus Christ Our Lord, offers a Christology from a 
disciples’ standpoint.161  In a later book, God Our Saviour, which became a companion 
book to Jesus Christ Our Lord, Kraus expresses his convictions that Christian theology 
essentially begins with the belief that Jesus is the normative revelation of God to 
humanity.162 According to him this conviction is informed by Jesus’ total identity and 
the impact of his relating with people in his teaching and entire ministry.163 Interpreting 
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Kraus, Kotva assumes that Christ’s entire life depicts two intertwined aspects of 
incarnation; in Jesus we see God and he shows in us what it means to be fully human.164 
Therefore, Christians historically have tried to voice their convictions that “Jesus was 
‘Immanuel, God with us.’165 Kraus according to Kotva argues that Christians have an 
idea of who they are and who they can become in and through Jesus:  
What is extraordinary and even miraculous in all of this is that Jesus 
realized the full potential of the image of God within the existential 
boundaries of sinful humanity . . . Thus Jesus fulfilled the sinless 
image of God in and for humanity and became the paradigm for all 
humanity as ‘children of God (John 1:12-13).166 
 
By Kotva’s assessment: 
Christ became the human paradigm because he realized our full 
human potential. He resisted selfish temptations, identified with the 
weak and oppressed, made love his motivation and guide, responded 
in love to both friends and enemies, was obedient to God (even to 
death), and found self-fulfilment in relationship with God rather than 
in autonomy. In short, the same way of being and acting that moves 
Christians to see God in Christ is what makes Christ our model and 
paradigm. In his complete identification with humanity, humanity 
reaches its goal in him.167  
 
There are two important concepts which will help bring out the link between 
Kraus’ Christology and virtue ethics: knowledge and discipleship.168 “The quest is to 
know Christ and his import for our lives is not, according to Kraus, limited to the 
intellect. It is in discipleship, following Christ, that we both learn who he is and are 
ourselves transformed toward that goal.”169 According to Kotva, Jesus becomes the 
model for the Christian disciple and:  
Virtue theory often uses the master/apprentice model to describe the 
process of oral education and the acquisition of the virtues. It is in 
being guided by, following after, and imitating masters or worthy 
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examples that we learn to recognize and embody the emotional and 
intellectual dispositions, habits, and skills designated by the virtues.170 
 
Kraus’ Christology has an ethical dimension because of his understanding of 
discipleship.171 For him as disciples we are called to obedience to the master Jesus who 
is our model, complemented by self-transformation under the tutorage of Christ.172 
Therefore, the place of moral exemplars remains crucially important in virtuous living. 
In sum, Kotva brings out the basic elements in Kraus’ Christology that to appropriate 
virtue ethics, Christians know who they are and their end because they have seen it in 
Jesus. The transition is effective through a master/apprentice relationship with Jesus.173 
Secondly, Hendrikus Berkhof of the Dutch Reformed tradition argues, 
especially in Christian Faith, that Jesus is the true human end.174 According to Berkhof, 
the most essential question that comes to the fore is the question of Jesus’ identity: 
“Who do you say I am?”175 For Berkhof, historical investigations are insufficient to 
offer us adequate answer; hence we have to turn to faith.176 In turning to faith we ask 
“what does faith see in this Jesus? Or what does faith say he is?”177 By Kotva’s 
estimation, “Faith’s decision about Jesus is not a blind leap. It is a decision justified by 
the total picture of Jesus’s person and life.”178 Berkhof, argues that one’s faith must be 
rooted and find expression from Jesus’ sonship within a covenantal relationship of 
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mutual love. 179  According to Kotva, Jesus’ normative and paradigmatic role is 
emphasized by Berkhof by stressing Jesus’ humanity: 
Indeed, for Berkhof it is Jesus’ humanity that leads faith to make 
claims about his unique origins. The historical encounter with Jesus 
and the way he realized his human existence (seen in light of both 
God’s previous dealings with Israel and the resurrection) drives faith 
to view him as the true human come from God. In other words, faith 
sees a new creative act of God in Jesus because Jesus fully realized 
human existence as it was divinely intended. 180 
 
Berkhof like Kraus believes that Jesus is the created extension of God outside 
God (“Jesus is the image of the Unseen God . . .” Col. 1: 15). Therefore, we know our 
telos because we have seen that in Christ.181 Berkhof’s Christology is a horizontal 
Christology, which acknowledges more the humanity of Jesus than his divinity. Hence 
he denies the pre-existence of Jesus before his birth.182 Kotva does not identify the 
heretical extremity in Berkhof’s Christology because of the style or methodology of 
correlation which he employs. This does not offer a comprehensive approach to virtue. 
Both the divinity and humanity of Jesus make for a better approach to virtue. 
 Thirdly, Edward Schillebeeckx is a controversial Catholic theologian. He is 
commonly considered as one of the less extreme of ‘progressive’ Flemish theologians 
because of his liberal and unorthodox positions.183 According to Kotva, Schillebeeckx 
in two of his major works Jesus: An Experiment in Christology and Christ; The 
Experience of Jesus as Lord underscores the import of historical investigations about 
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Jesus.184 A historical investigation on the question of historical Jesus, the encounter of 
the early Christians with Jesus and place of Christian faith and practice should be built 
upon.185 According to Kotva, while Kraus and Berkhof stress the “total picture” of 
Jesus, Schillebeeckx emphasizes our need of a narrative Christology.186 He argues: “If 
we are going to encounter and communicate Jesus of Nazareth, we need to tell and retell 
his story – a story that starts with Israel, continues in Jesus’ life, teaching, death and 
resurrection, and persists in the life of the church and the promise of a future not yet 
realized.”187 From this perspective, Schillebeeckx argues “Christians learn to express . . 
. the content of what ‘God’ is and the content of what ‘humanity’ can be from the career 
of Jesus.”188 Thus, in Jesus we understand our true purpose and end.189  
 The three authors then agree that Christians know of their true end precisely in 
the person of Christ.190 According to Kotva:  
This claim that the human telos is seen in Christ is not trivial. It 
asserts that we can find clues to our true nature and end by looking at 
a specific point in history. It claims, moreover, that such clues are 
normative. Whatever else we may say or discover about our true end, 
it must conform to the shape and pattern of Jesus’ entire way.191 
 
Considering the presuppositions so far articulated by the above authors vis-à-vis our 
particular discussions on virtues, one sees the connection that Jesus is not only the end 
or goal but also a model for the formation of character and behaviour inevitably a 
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transformation of self into the likeness of Christ. “Christian faith” according to Kotva, 
“is becoming a certain sort of person. It is a matter of becoming like Jesus.”192 
Therefore, virtue ethics can fully embrace the assertions that Christians make 
about the normative nature of Jesus’ being and teachings.193 In sum:  
A Christian adoption of virtue theory could affirm Jesus as providing 
essential clues to our true nature. Because of Christ we have a vision 
of where our journey should take us. Because of Christ, we can 
contrast who-we-are with who-we-could-be and focus on habits, 
capacities, interests, precepts, injunctions, prohibitions, and skills 
consistent with the move from the former to the latter.194 
 






4.5 Theological (Christian) Anthropology and Virtue Ethics 
In the previous chapter, Keenan delineated how virtue ethics is concerned with the 
human person. In like manner, Kotva argues that virtue ethics has a central core which 
is the understanding of the human person as a self-forming and determining agent.196 
The Christological concepts of the previous sub-section are important for theological 
anthropology. Kotva introduces two basic trends in Christian anthropology: human 
freedom and our communal nature to better express this anthropology. However, the 
methodology Kotva applies varies from the two previous sections. While he reviews 
and correlates the works of different authors in the last two sections, here he synthesizes 
																																																								
192 Ibid., 89. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid., 90. 
195 See Paul L. Lehmann, Ethics in Christian Context (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1963), 121. 
196 Kotva, Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 26. 
	 292 
the general basic ideas in the two aspects of Christian anthropology named above and 
goes further to show their distinctive roles. 
 Firstly, the Christian accounts of human freedom agree that we are neither 
totally determined nor totally free.197 For him such an understanding is derivable from 
the understanding of the two concepts of behaviourism and voluntarism. It is pertinent 
to briefly explain what these two concepts mean in order to comprehend why Kotva 
uses them.  
Behaviourism as a science operates from the assumption that condenses all 
human actions to observable behavioural patterns that are completely external, 
implicitly beyond an individual’s control. In other words, it takes into account socio-
cultural and physical variables from the environment as well as variables from the 
biological history of the person.198 In behaviourism the overt variables are not only the 
object of study but also the key object of interest.199 In sum, it considers why we do 
what we do, and what we should and should not do.200 We have to differentiate two 
varying concepts within behaviourism; radical behaviourism and theoretical 
behaviourism. For radical behaviourism internal dispositions of the person are 
insignificant.201 For example Burrhus Frederic Skinner on the one hand in most of his 
works argues that behaviour should be studied in its own right and not considered as a 
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pointer of unspecified internal mechanism. 202  On the other hand theoretical 
behaviourism attempts to understand the internal states of a person, where each state is 
defined by equivalent histories.203 It sees internal states simply as theoretical constructs 
based on information. However, both radical and theoretical behaviourism can be 
reduced to the theory of determinism, a notion that human behaviour is determined 
solely by heredity and environment. For example, “Delinquency is blamed on bad 
environment; famous artists acknowledge debts to parents and teachers; and some 
behavioural traits, such as alcoholism, schizophrenia, and IQ, are acknowledged to 
have a genitive component.”204 Nevertheless, individuals still receive either blame or 
praise. This implies that there is something more than heredity and environment in 
human behaviour, namely that people have the free will or freedom to choose their 
actions.205 Accordingly, the concept of voluntarism becomes pertinent. 
Voluntarism is a school of thought that presupposes that the ultimate nature of 
reality is based on the will not intellect or emotions. This is so when considered from a 
metaphysical perspective. But when considered from the perspective of action it 
becomes any action based on non-coercion. Combining the two perspectives, one can 
conclude that it is the will that determines right and wrong actions. But Mark Murphy 
in a well-written article entitled “Theological Voluntarism” argues that within 
normative voluntarism there is what he calls theological voluntarism. It holds that 
certain actions have their moral significances in divine will, for example the absolute 
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obligation to obey God. 206 Theological voluntarism is an aspect of divine command 
theory. 
 According to Kotva, the understanding of the agency of virtue falls mid-way 
between the two conceptions of behaviourism and voluntarism.207  He takes this 
position because neither behaviourism nor voluntarism can explain how and why we 
acquire the virtues. For example behaviourism claims to communicate to us how we 
can modify the environment in order that people act virtuously, but it may not specify 
what virtue means.208 We have seen that virtue is an acquired human quality rather 
than an inherited temperament like in behaviourism.209 Hence, it has to fall mid-way, 
for both behaviourism and voluntarism are extremes: 
The former reduces everything to mindless behavioral manipulation. 
The latter does not consider the way our actions influence who we 
become: it projects a self standing behind or above its acts that is not 
altered by those acts. The latter is also unconcerned with the virtues 
because they play no role in choice and action. In the former, we do 
not participate in the formation of our character. In the latter, our 
character is largely irrelevant.210 
 
 Conversely, virtue ethics according to Kotva:  
Acknowledges that we choose and act without being completely 
determined. Yet an explanation of our choices and actions must refer 
to our desires, states of character, and personal history. In other 
words, virtue theory assumes that we are embodied creatures whose 
choices and actions are neither completely determined nor 
completely free.211 
 
The implication is that contemporary virtue theory must transcend the construct of 
reducing all human actions to external cause or to a self free from body, history, 
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perceptions, imagination and beliefs.212 Therefore, since Kotva is arguing in favour of 
Christian case for virtue ethics, Murphy’s conception of theological voluntarism should 
have a place within Kotva’s conceptualizations. 
For virtue ethics to have a focus like other ethical theories it requires human 
agency. To show that virtue ethics is different both in concept and content from 
behaviourism and voluntarism, Kotva offers the following reasons: Firstly, virtue ethics 
offers a comprehensive account of human agency. Secondly, because virtue ethics 
encompasses feelings, and intellect, tendencies, dispositions and capacities, these would 
demand human agency to be manifested tangibly and operationally. Thirdly, talking 
about virtue ethics entails the formation and shaping of character through human 
agency. Equally, determinants of character are unimportant unless they are involved in 
the process of choosing and acting.213 “In short, we shape ourselves and each other 
toward or away from the virtues by our choices, actions, and interaction.”214 Kotva 
therefore concludes that human agency is vital to virtue ethics:  
We develop and help form our tendencies and dispositions through 
our choices and actions. But those tendencies and dispositions also 
inform and direct our choices and actions. We are not, as the 
behaviorist account suggests, simply at the mercy of forces outside 
our control; we help form our own and each other’s character. We 
also are not, contrary to the voluntarist account, free from the 
constraints of character. Past choices and actions influence the kind 
of persons we become, and the kind of person we become informs 
our choices and actions.  
 
From the above we have seen how and why virtue ethics to be meaningful needs 
human agency. The two elements that stand out here are that virtue ethics is goal 
oriented and so needs some form of agency, and within the agency is the element of 
reflexivity. In this context, virtue ethics transforms the agent because the agent 
																																																								
212 Ibid. 
213 Ibid. 28. 
214 Ibid. 
	 296 
embodies the virtues. Human agency becomes an invaluable concept in discussing 
freedom. This is because an explanation of our choices and actions must refer to our 
inner dispositions, formed character and personal history. Consequently, according to 
Kotva: 
Virtue ethics works with an understanding of the self as a self-
forming and determining agent. This understanding of agency falls 
somewhere between behaviourism and voluntarism. It acknowledges 
that we choose and act without being completely determined . . .  In 
other words, virtue theory assumes that we are embodied creatures 
whose choices and actions are neither completely determined nor 
completely free.215 
 
The implication is that human freedom from the perspective of Christian 
anthropology cannot be completely limited or unlimited. It is defined according to what 
Vincent MacNamara in The Truth in Love calls “freedom to see and freedom to do”.216 
The link to virtue is found in Kotva’s statement: “Freedom allows us to choose between 
competing options, but it also means that through our choices we play a key role in the 
development of our character, goals, and desires.”217 In other words it is called freedom 
of self-determination. This involves personal choices and relationships.218 
 Secondly, the theological anthropology in the creation account of Genesis is 
basically communal in nature.219 It posits that relationships and corporate action are 
intrinsic to virtue ethics. Kotva articulates: “We acquire the virtues in the company of 
others. And while the goal of our journey involves individual growth, it also involves 
common projects, shared activities, and intimate relationships.”220 The liberating action 
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of God in the Old Testament to the people of Israel as a nation, an imagery given by 
Paul of the church as a body in the New Testament both emphasizes the communal 
nature purported by theological anthropology.221 Kotva is relentless in arguing that 
Jesus himself, the telos of the Christian life does not typify an individualistic gospel: 
“Instead, he serves others, celebrates with others, and proclaims a community of mutual 
service and love.”222  
 Christian anthropology therefore has always viewed the individual in 
community. “The self does not exist in a vacuum, and self-realization requires the 
presence of others.”223 The theological stands of Berkhof, Erickson, and Macquarrie, on 
personal sanctification have communal overtures. However, they only scratch the 
surface. In the next section we shall have an in-depth examination of the communal 
nature of virtue ethics from the biblical narratives of Matthew and St. Paul. 
 
 
4.6 Virtue Ethics and Its Biblical Connections: Gospel of Matthew and St. Paul 
The call of Vatican II in Optatam Totius, 16 for moral theologians to draw more 
abundantly from Scripture has been positively responded to by many theologians within 
the Catholic tradition. Within the Protestant and Reformed traditions, the scriptures 
were already a valued source. For example, the aforementioned Meilaender in showing 
how the virtues are consistent with the call to sanctification and holiness, utilises the 
New Testament.224 Similarly, Kotva constructs a virtue ethics framework for moral 
theology that appeals to the gospel of Matthew and the epistles of St. Paul. Among other 
aspects identified by Kotva within this framework is the individual and corporate nature 
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of virtue ethics.225 Most recently the two co-authored books by Keenan and Harrington, 
explore in concrete ways how Scripture and moral theology can integrate with virtue 
ethics.226 Such interaction needs to proceed cautiously as remarked by James Bretzke in 
an article “Christian Ethics and Scripture”.227 Another approach is that of Joseph 
Woodill in The Fellowship of Life: Virtue Ethics and Orthodox Christianity, where he 
explored the Eastern patristic writings to reveal that the early church developed both 
personal and communal objectives for closeness with the Lord and one another.228 
 The aim of this section is to demonstrate how Kotva recognizes the 
compatibility between scripture and virtue ethics by specifically examining Matthew’s 
Gospel and the Pauline Writings. Kotva argues that both Matthew and Paul can be read 
from a virtue perspective, even though in Matthew the element of law is prominent as 
well. But “Kotva argues that we should understand Matthean references to law as 
Nussbaum understands the place of law in a virtue ethic, namely as exemplary and 
paradigmatic. Law exists to help shape the character of Christians in accord with the 
virtues.”229  
Therefore, this thesis does not consider virtue ethics as a complete alternative to 
other moral principles like deontology and consequentialism. All three normative 
principles are important in doing ethics today. Hence, Gregory Trianosky in an article 
“What is Virtue Ethics All About?” argues: “Rules themselves do not tell us how to 
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apply them in specific situations, let alone how to apply them well.”230 He further 
observes: “Much of right conduct cannot be codified in rules and principles. Moral 
situations are too complex.”231 We can conclude with Spohn: “Persons of wisdom and 
prudence whose virtue incorporates and appreciation of the basic principles of moral 
rightness will make the best judgment.”232 So, the virtue ethics that this thesis adopts 
still admits to the important relationship with the law.   
Before we proceed Kotva justifies his choice of Matthew and Paul by stating:  
One benefit of choosing Matthew and Paul is that they represent the 
predominant New Testament genres (gospel and epistle). Another 
benefit is that a cursory view of either Matthew or Paul suggests 
incompatibility with virtue ethics. Matthew can be read as 
supporting either a law based ethic (5:17-18) or an ethic based on the 
principle of love (22:36-40). Similarly, the popular image of Paul as 
preoccupied with grace and faith leaves little room for ethics, let 
alone an ethic focusing on the formation of virtuous people. 
However, . . . the first Gospel and Paul’s letters readily connect with 
virtue theory.233 
 
By no means does Kotva argue that Matthew and Paul deliberately developed explicit 
virtue ethic. But rather Matthew and Paul have a virtue ethics approach in so far as 
“their concerns, themes, patterns of moral reasoning, and use of language fit well with 
the basic virtue framework.”234 It is therefore the hermeneutical model of reading and 
application that enables Kotva to make such fitting assumption.  
Kotva interprets Matthew and Paul closely but with slight nuance. He looks at 
Matthew from the perspectives of internal qualities of feelings and dispositions. Then he 
examines the relationship between master and disciple and the understanding of virtue 
ethics and Christian morality from individual and corporate perspectives. While he 
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gives primacy to how Paul emphasizes persons as moral examples. Then he examines 
internal qualities too, and his understanding of morality as both individual and 
corporate.235 Our writer is aware that not everything in Matthew and Paul has an 
apparent correlative to virtue ethics.236 
 The next move is to place Matthew and Paul side by side from the standpoints of 
their internal qualities and their understanding of virtue ethics as being individual and 
corporate. This is to explicitly show the Reformed Tradition emphasis on Scripture.237 
The characteristic hermeneutics employed by this tradition is the literary approach 
whereby the interpreter recognizes the intended sense or meaning of the text. Such an 
approach is critiqued by Schneiders:  
The author’s intention is not actually available to the reader once the 
author can no longer be interrogated . . . Appeal to the meaning 
intended by the author is not only impossible in fact but undesirable in 
principle, since it would greatly limit the potential richness of meaning 
of the text.238 
 
 Aware of the above, Kotva interacts with Matthew and Paul from what Schneiders calls 
“The World Before the Text”.239 This methodology gives room for appropriation and an 
encounter between the text and reader. Therefore, Kotva enters into and appropriates the 
world of meaning between Matthew and Paul which they project from the perspective 
of virtue ethics. Furthermore, the Reformed Tradition emphasizes the soteriological 
contents of the biblical text or texts.  
  4.6.1 Internal Merits of Matthew Paralleled with Virtue Ethics 
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According to Kotva, Matthew’s Gospel presents us with a noticeable parallel with virtue 
ethics based on the fact that both are concerned with “internal” qualities of human 
action.240 To demonstrate this Kotva argues that Matthew depicts the kind of people and 
actions that are commendable and worthy of sharing in God’s beatific vision. This 
highlights the soteriological importance the Reformed Tradition has as previously 
mentioned. To further this course, Kotva looks at the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5:1-
12).241 According to Donald Senior in his book Matthew, the beatitudes:  
Underscore the eschatological perspective of Jesus’ mission, lifting 
up those virtues, attitudes, and characteristic actions that define 
authentic discipleship . . . The literary form, declaring ‘blessed’ 
those who exhibit a particular behaviour or disposition, has biblical 
precedents, particularly in the Wisdom and prophetic literature (see 
Sirach 25: 7-9; 48: 1-11; Isa. 30: 18; 32:20).242 
 
Those declared blessed are “the poor in spirit”, “those who hunger and thirst for 
righteousness”, and those who are “pure in heart”. According to Kotva, “these and other 
blessings presuppose human action, they also commend a posture reflecting certain 
attitudes and feelings.”243 This approach is made more visible in the six antitheses (5: 
21-48) that follow, two of which create a shift from external action to internal 
dispositions; Jesus not only condemns murder but definitively cautions against anger, 
the predisposition to murder, he not only condemns adultery but lust, which is the root 
of adultery. There is a shift from overt actions to dispositions and feelings.244 Senior 
also reiterates: “The series of antitheses . . . deals with human relationships and each 
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calls for a more exacting fidelity to the law on the level of both actions and interior 
disposition.”245 The central point both Kotva and Senior are making is echoed more by 
Jesus when he addresses the question: a good tree produces good fruits and a bad tree 
produces bad fruits (see Matt. 3:8, 10:15-20; 12:33) and that the measure of a person is 
found in whatever comes out of the person (see Matt. 15:10-20).246 
 The importance of the internal qualities or disposition stressed by Matthew’s 
account does not negate explicit human actions: “Matthew does not advocate a morality 
of pure intention and never rejects action as unimportant. Indeed, the parables of the two 
sons (Matt. 21:28-31), the parable of the talents (25:31-46) make clear the considerable 
weight Matthew attaches to action.” 247  And Schrage affirms that Matthew also 
emphasizes both the internal and external.248  
 According to Kotva the interest of Matthew in both the internal and external 
establishes a link with virtue ethics. 249 Specifically, virtue ethics is interested in 
tendencies, feelings and dispositions, as Matthew. 250  Also, “like Matthew’s 
understanding of the connection between internal and external, virtue ethics sees an 
intimate link between states of character and action, between, ‘being’ and  ‘doing’.”251 It 
remains valid therefore, that virtues are characteristic ways of behaving that make both 
persons and actions good.252 Dialectic is fashioned between being and doing, between 
internal and external as we have seen in an earlier section.  
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Kotva has so far shown how both Matthew and virtue ethics are correlated. But 
he observes that both seem to view the internal as having precedence over external as 
also suggested by Roger Mohrlang, in Matthew and Paul: A Comparison of Ethical 
Perspectives.253 
  4.6.2 Matthew’s Personal and Communal Ethics 
At the heart of the virtue approach to ethics is “community”. A person’s character traits 
are not developed in isolation, but within and by the communities to which one belongs, 
including family, church, school, and other private and public associations. As people 
grow and mature, their personalities are deeply affected by the values that their 
community prizes, by the personality traits that they encourage. They are also 
influenced by the role models that their communities put forth for imitation through 
traditional stories, fiction, movies, television, and so on. The virtue approach urges us to 
pay attention to the contours of our communities and the habits of character they 
encourage and instil. “Virtue theory views relationships and corporate activity as 
essential to both the true human end and the journey toward that end.”254 This implies 
that the human end is not achieved on a single leap but it involves a process, a 
movement towards. That being the case, Kotva follows Schrage who argues that 
Matthew’s ethics is both individual and corporate.255 
 We must first acknowledge the individual or personal character that is associated 
with Jesus’ choice of the disciples. The narrative of this call in Matthew 4: 18-22; 9:9 
validates this claim.256 Their personal or individual call is reflected in their leaving 
behind their nearest and dearest: for example, James and John leaving behind their 
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father in Matt. 4: 22. 257  Jesus also exemplifies this personal perspective in his 
interaction. According to Kotva, Jesus: 
 Interacts with crowds, but also specific, concrete individuals (e.g., 
8:2-15). He talks about socially observable actions but also about the 
individual’s attitudes and feelings (e.g., 5:21-24). And, most 
strikingly, Jesus tells us that God rejoices more over finding one lost 
‘sheep’ than over ninety-nine that were never lost (18:12-14).258  
 
As individuals called by Jesus, the disciples were expected to exhibit particular 
character traits which virtue ethics advocates. Seymour Chatman in Story and Discourse 
argues that the story embraces not only “events” but also “characters”.259 And character 
for Chatman is a paradigm of traits.260 He further defines a trait as a personal quality of 
a character that persists over a part or the whole narrative.261 Consequently, Matthew 
portrays Jesus as being “obedient” to God (see 3:15; 4:1-11) and also compassionate to 
the crowds (9:36; 14:14). This is a personal quality that runs through the whole of 
Jesus’ ministerial work. To further elucidate this point Jack Dean Kingsbury in Matthew 
as Story argues that Matthew uses each of the disciples to display both positive and 
negative character traits, namely: loyalty, love, attentiveness, obedience, trust and 
humility, fear, doubt and despair.262 This also establishes a link with virtue ethics, which 
may be considered as an interpretative reading of the narrative of Matthew. The 
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connecting point is that virtue ethics is character centered and Matthew displays the 
character traits of Jesus and the disciples. Kotva therefore uses character traits as a 
hermeneutics to reading Matthew. This is the foundation to Kotva’s identification of 
virtue framework in Matthew. 
Another connecting theme between Matthew and virtue ethics is role modelling, 
which becomes an application of the hermeneutics he applies in reading Matthew. 
Kotva shows this by identifying various elements in the book of Matthew which point 
to specific individuals as moral exemplars; references made of the prophets (5:10-12), 
Abel (23:35), John the Baptist (21:32) etc., are noted by Matthew as being archetypes of 
virtuous living.263 Obviously, Jesus remains the model par excellence according to 
Matthew (27: 4; 19; 10: 24-25; 38-39; 16: 24). Kotva citing Mohrlang sums up:  
Matthew’s pointing to Jesus and others as examples of models is 
significant from the perspective of virtue theory . . . We can learn 
from persons of practical wisdom even if they are not present. We 
gain insight by observing how such persons handled situations 
similar or analogous to our own . . . Thus, from virtue theory’s 
perspective, Matthew’s offering of specific people and groups as 
models or examples is noteworthy.264 
 
However, the call of Jesus initiated towards individuals had a public dimension. 
They were called to be gatherers of people. That means their individual call was aimed 
at public administration. Also another reason why Jesus called the disciples was that 
they could be with him. Therefore, Matthew’s ethics according to Kotva involves 
relationships and corporate activity.265 One of the pericopes which captures this sense of 
corporate or communal activity is Matt. 16:13-18:35. 266  These texts concern the 
regulating of life with the Christian community. And Matt. 18 further highlights the 
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relational character existing within the Christian community.267 Kotva argues that sin is 
one of the concepts addressed in Matt. 18 that has significant implications for both the 
individual and community.268 The significance is evident in the process applied to deal 
with sin in vv.15-20. Harrington suggests two aspects to this end. Firstly, the pericope 
suggests that moral discernment and moral wrongs are not simply personal matters.269 
They concern the community of the church as indicated in vv. 15-17. The idea of two or 
more gathered in his name favours our argument.  
Secondly, the text suggests a process that brings out forgiveness and 
reconciliation as indicated in v.15 “You have regained that one”. Kotva affirms: “This 
focus on restoration suggests that the Gospel presumes our moral interdependence. It is 
precisely because we are not morally self-sufficient that Matthew’s Jesus outlines a 
process for helping one who is straying from the path. 270  Kotva in an article 
“Transformed in Prayer” states that in the Lord’s prayer in Matt. 6:9-13 we seek not 
only that my sins be forgiven, but that our sins be forgiven.271 For him to pray in this 
way is to recognize that others are also the children of God; it is to share in the mutual 
need for forgiveness and deliverance.272 Kotva therefore concludes: 
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This is comparable to virtue theory’s claim that from infancy onward 
we depend on each other for our moral development. We depend, for 
example, on instruction and guidance from parents, models, and 
friends. Although Matthew does not fully develop or spell out this 
view, he appears to agree: our moral development depends on the 
presence and help of others.273 
 
Another relevant aspect that Kotva finds consistent between Matthew and Virtue 
ethics is the principle of the law of love.274 According to him Matthew’s Jesus exhorts 
love of enemies (5:44), the “golden rule” (7:12) and the greatest law is love of God and 
love of neighbour (22:36-40).275 Matthew’s ethics is also one of justice (12:18, 20; 
23:23), and mercy (9:13; 12:7).276 Kotva argues that Matthew’s ethics cannot be 
restricted to these hermeneutical principles alone, because these principles in Matthew 
are not self-interpreting or individually sufficient.  
He also argues that Matthew deontological tone or law language has an 
educative function.277 But for the purpose of this work, this thesis wishes to only 
emphasize that love is indeed the essence of the law’s demand. Mohrlang who posits 
that love serves as a “critical principle by which the individual commandments of the 
law and tradition are to be read, interpreted and evaluated” corroborates the above.278 
In sum, Matthew, similar to virtue ethics, visualizes the Christian life to be both 
individual and corporate. Ogletree supports this conclusion when he writes that the call 
for a new way of life in the New Testament involves community of friendship.279 
Therefore, it necessitates mutual recognition, care, support and service within the 
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community.280 It means that persons have to develop genuine friendship within the 
community: 
From a virtue perspective, good friendships are both intrinsically 
valuable and instrumentally essential to our moral formation. Friends 
advise and correct us, invite us into their values and commitments, 
serve as moral mirrors, occasion imitation and emulation, provide 
windows into other ways of seeing and experiencing the world, 
protect us from boredom and burnout, and shape our self-image and 
self-understanding as well as understanding others.281 
 
 
4.4.3 Internal Merits of Paul Paralleled with Virtue Ethics 
The previous sub-section has shown how Kotva forms a correlation between Matthew 
and virtue ethics. The same method shall be applied in this sub-section. It will show 
how Paul correlates with virtue ethics in the same themes as in his treatment of 
Matthew: internal merits, a moral worldview that is both individual and corporate and 
moral exemplars.282 As we review Kotva’s work we shall see how both writers, Paul 
and Matthew have points of convergences on the above themes. This explains our 
earlier assertion that the correlational model is concerned only with areas of mutual 
relationship. Above all, Kotva aims at showing how in his reading of both biblical 
authors, he can highlight the importance of virtue ethics within the biblical tradition. 
This may not be the direct intention of the biblical authors themselves. 
 Kotva begins by affirming how Matthew and Paul are interested in both action 
and internal dispositions.283 This is to show how virtue ethics is concerned with both 
being and doing. According to Kotva this concern is expressed in Paul’s espousal of 
virtue and vice lists: “Immorality, impurity, licentiousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmity, 
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strife, jealousy, anger, selfishness, dissension, party spirit, envy, drunkenness (Gal. 
5:19-21)”. Sam K. Williams in his work Galatians, notes that two-thirds of these vices 
are sins emanating from within, which is the heart.284 While the virtues are nine as listed 
by Paul in Galatians, love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, faithfulness, goodness, 
gentleness and self-control (5:22-23). 285  Williams calls them “multiple traits of 
character”.286 Paul’s lists of virtues and vices have to do with internal qualities as well.  
 Kotva like other biblical scholars observes: “These lists do not show Paul was 
explicitly working from a ‘virtue ethic.”287 He explains that such lists were common in 
Paul’s time.288 Kotva contends that Paul himself did not refer to them as “virtues” or 
“vices” but rather works of “flesh” and works of the “Spirit”.289 According to Kotva’s 
deduction: 
What these lists do show is that Paul considered dispositions and 
attitudes important and that he assumed that such interior aspects 
come to expression in action. By appropriating these long, 
unsystematic, and loosely connected lists, Paul depicts or portrays 
both the kind of people Christians are called to be and the kinds of 
actions appropriate to those people.290 
 
There are aspects other than virtue and vices in which Paul shows considerable interest 
about inner dispositions.291 For example, Paul appealing to the Corinthians: “Let us 
cleanse ourselves from every defilement of body and spirit, bringing holiness to 
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completion in the fear of God” (2 Cor. 7:1). He also talks about the renewing of the 
heart in Rom. 5:5; 8:27).  
Kotva is implying that the New Testament writings especially Paul’s epistles are 
more concerned with who we are, the inner dispositions that form the new man or 
woman. In sum, Paul is interested in practical actions that are defined by inner qualities, 
attitudes and dispositions. It is the latter that gives birth to the former.292 
  4.6.4  Paul’s Personal and Communal Ethics 
Kotva acknowledges that like Matthew, Paul also conceives the Christian life to be both 
personal and communal.293 It is important to note here that Paul’s individual ethic 
cannot be comprehended independent of his communal ethic. For example in Rom. 
12:3; 1 Cor. 12:11; Eph. 4:7, Paul conveys that each individual has his or her own 
measure of faith. But this individual value of faith cannot be explained independent of 
the community. This assumption is supported by Robert H. Mounce in Romans: The 
New American Commentary that Paul reminded them as the human body is made up of 
different parts performing different tasks so also in Christ many members form one 
body (cf. 1 Cor. 12:12-31).294 He further writes: 
Unity in diversity is the theme that runs through this section. This 
unity, . . . was only possible because the members were “in Christ,” 
that is, joined by faith they had become a part of the body of Christ. 
Since they were all members of one body, it follows that ‘each 
belong[ed] to all the others (v.5). The Christian faith is essentially a 
corporate experience. Although each member has come to faith by a 
separate and individual act of faith, the believing community lives 
out its Christian experience in fellowship with one another. John 
Donne’s ‘No man is an Island’ is true of the church of Jesus Christ. 
‘Lone Ranger Christianity’ is a contradiction in terms.295 
 
																																																								
292 Ibid., 121. 
293 Ibid.  
294 Robert H. Mounce, Romans: The New American Commentary Vol. 27 (Nashville: 
Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1995), 234. 
295 Ibid. 
	 311 
That is why in vv. 6-8 of chapter 12, Paul lists seven gifts and encourages the Romans 
to apply their individual gifts for the benefit of the entire church: If a person’s gift is 
service, then he or she has to serve others; if it is teaching or encouraging then he or she 
must provide guidance for what people ought to do.296  
P. Stuhlmacher in Paul’s Letter to the Romans divides the seven gifts into two: 
prophetic activity and service.297  Hence, Kotva affirms: “Like the many parts of a body, 
the church includes many different people with many different abilities and gifts. Yet 
the individuals’ abilities and gifts find their purpose and are to be used for the benefit of 
one another.”298 In this sense, Kotva holds that Paul’s emphasis on building up the 
church fits well with virtue ethic’s social or communal dimension.299 The individual 
does not live in isolation because “community is the nurturing context within which the 
individual is expected to live.”300 Within the nurturing context of community, striving to 
become more just, understanding, patient, and compassionate, is challenging.301 
According to Kotva, Paul assumes our moral interdependence when he addresses 
the issue of excommunication for a man living with his stepmother (1 Cor. 5: 1-8).302 
The implication of such an action is emphasized later in 1 Cor. 15:33 that “Bad 
company ruins good morals.” This highlights the truthfulness of our ability to influence 
one another.  
The emphasis so far has been the corporate and inter-reliant aspects of Paul’s 
ethics. Kotva stresses that this does not undervalue the place of an individual in the 
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whole scheme of things.303 Paul himself says each person will be judged according to 
what he or she has done (Rom. 2:6; 14:4, 10, 12; 1 Cor. 4:5; 2 Cor. 5:10). He further 
insists that each person should examine his or her work so as to be sure he is not 
running in vain (Gal. 2:2; Phil. 2:16; 3:10-16).304  
What Kotva is trying to show is that Paul’s concept of the Christian life 
incorporates both individual and community: “Individual gifts and abilities find their 
proper setting in the church. We are individually accountable before God, but we are 
also morally interdependent and can influence each other for good or for ill.”305 This 
statement is replete with challenges to our modern life of individualism. It is indeed 
evident that the over-emphasis of the self over others or community can pose a huge 
threat to our present call to an appreciation of the relational value inherent in virtue 
ethics. Kotva therefore suggests, as did Keenan, that the classical approach to virtue 
ethics needs reformulation.306  In the next section, we shall examine the two themes 
suggested by Kotva that can help reformulate and enhance the current approach to 
virtue ethics: grace and forgiveness.  
 
4.7 Reformulating Virtue Ethics: Necessary Elements 
The exposition of both Matthew’s Paul’s theological insights on virtues as seen above 
challenge a reformulation of the virtues to meet contemporary demands. The 
reformulation does not indicate a rejection of the virtues as insufficient but stresses a 
complementary progression with the existing virtues as articulated by both Matthew and 
Paul. Kotva suggests two areas in which this reformulation can take place: Grace and 
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forgiveness. Grace shall be looked at from the theology of St. Paul while forgiveness 
from the theological approach of Matthew’s gospel. 
4.7.1 Grace 
There is a challenge in teasing out the parallels present between Matthew, St. Paul and 
virtue ethics. According to Kotva, this lacuna is in the area of the grace of God, and the 
implications for moral growth.307 At the centre of this moral growth is the concept of 
transformation. This is aptly expressed in our discussions on sanctification in section 
4.4.1. The whole concept of transformation is linked to the concept of sin. The lack of 
grace therefore can pose a challenge to ones transformation and existence. Paul J. 
Achtemeier in Romans: Interpretation writes:  
It remains true that for a creature to survive, it must enjoy the 
creator’s continuing favour. Such favour by the creator is then to be 
accepted by the creature as the only source of its continuing 
existence. Such a favourable disposition by the creator toward his 
creation Paul calls “grace”.308 
 
Although Achtemeier can be accused of undervaluing human efforts, a point we shall 
see later as the section progresses, essentially, he is trying to show the explicit role 
grace plays in Pauline theology.309 Mohrlang captures it better when he says: “Paul’s 
ethics are fundamentally grounded in the concept of grace and thoroughly dependent 
on the initiating and energizing work of God himself in the human heart.”310 
Therefore, Kotva agrees with Achtemeier, Mohrlang and Robert O’Toole that it is the 
grace of God that permeates the theological articulations of St. Paul: 
God is the source of everything, including every right deed (Rom. 
8:28; 1 Cor. 3:21-23; 8:6; Phil. 1:6; 2:13). The contributions for the 
Jerusalem poor, for example, are attributed to God’s grace (2 Cor. 
																																																								
307 Ibid. 
308 Paul J. Achtemeier, Romans: Interpretation (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1985), 
16. 
309 The whole of parts Two, three, and four of Achtemeier’s book are interpretative 
discourses on grace. In fact the central theme in Romans is Grace. 
310 Mohrlang, Matthew and Paul, 118. 
	 314 
8:1; 9: 8, 14). So is Paul’s ministry (Rom. 15:15; 1 Cor. 3:5-7; 15:10; 
2 Cor. 5-6; 4:7; Gal. 1:15-16).311 
 
Such a theological datum flows from Paul’s understanding of two central themes: 
human nature and the incompleteness of the law to redeem humanity through mere 
observance. Kotva captures this clearly: 
In Paul’s understanding, humanity, when alienated from God, is 
incapable of consistently doing what is right, even when we want to 
do it (Rom. 3:9-10, 22-23; 7:9-25; . . . 2:14-15). We are enslaved by 
the alliance of law, sin, and death. It is God’s work through Christ 
that frees us from these powers (Rom. 6:3-14; 7:4-6; 7:24-8:4; Gal 
5:1). In Christ we are set free for love and service (Gal. 5:13). The 
Christ event also creates community (Rom. 12: 3-8; 1 Cor. 1:10-13; 
3:3; 12:12-31) and tears down racial, social, and gender alienation 
(Gal. 3:26-28).312 
 
The grace Paul speaks of is personified in Christ: “Christian living flows from God’s act 
in Christ and is empowered by the Spirit’s continuing presence.”313 However, the power 
of the spirit is no guarantee of a sin-free life.314 It is to be noted here that the full 
implementation of God’s grace depends on the human response it receives. 315 
According to Achtemeier the human response is expressed in what Paul calls “faith” or 
“trust” in God.316 Conversely, human effort becomes important. Therefore, Kotva 
concludes: “Grace does not eliminate the need for human effort.”317 This is expressed in 
his moral exhortations to his listeners. For example, Paul exhorts the Philippians to 
work out their salvation (2:12). His constant reiteration about imitating him in his 
struggles with the Gospel also indicates this human effort demanded. “Paul’s vision of 
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the Christian life does not exclude the need for human effort or separate the life of faith 
from the moral life, but Paul’s focus on grace does add an element never mentioned in 
the earlier discussion of virtue theory.”318 We can see that Kotva does not treat grace 
here as a virtue but as a theological concept that further elucidates the link between the 
theological virtues and the human virtues. 
This element of grace emphasizes God’s activity in the lives of individuals. It 
shows how as individuals empowered by grace and personal efforts; people can live an 
ordered moral life. 
4.7.2 Forgiveness 
The classical list of virtues in chapter one does not include forgiveness. Although it can 
be argued that the virtue of love encompasses forgiveness. However, forgiveness 
demands some attention. As Kotva himself explains forgiveness and reconciliation are 
essential to community’s life and practice.319 
Kotva restates the focus of forgiveness in Matthew’s gospel evident in the 
“Lords prayer” (6:10-13). The prayer establishes an anthropological and theological link 
in our seeking for God’s forgiveness: the possibility of receiving forgiveness from God 
depends on our ability to forgive others (6:14-15). Arch Bishop Desmond Tutu at the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission highlights this point after the abolition of 
apartheid, when he says: “No Future without Forgiveness.”320 Forgiveness is not only to 
be received but most be given. The full implication of forgiveness within the Christian 
tradition is reciprocal in nature. The life of Jesus is inundated by acts of forgiveness 
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from beginning to end. According to Kotva Jesus contends in Matt. 5:23-24 that 
forgiveness takes precedence over liturgical rites.321 Hence, Jesus would always give 
forgiveness to the sinner even when considered blasphemous by the Jewish authorities. 
He not only forgave people who had sinned against His Father and even those who had 
personally sinned against him.322 
As noted at the beginning of this section, virtue theory contains nothing 
specifically linked to forgiveness. At the same time, there is nothing from the classical 
tradition of virtue theory that would suggests any tension with the concept of 
forgiveness introduced here as a virtue.323 Rather, it modifies the concept of justice as a 
virtue, and deepens the virtue of love of neighbour even the love of enemies. 
Forgiveness has hardly been a traditional value in world affairs. William Bole 
argues that the concept is foreign to most secular political philosophies in the West and 
is peripheral to the tradition of Christian just-war teaching – or was, until Pope John 
Paul II issued his ground-breaking 2002 World Day of Peace message titled, “No Peace 
without Justice, No Justice without Forgiveness”.324 Bole suggests:  
Our concept of forgiveness needs to be open enough to let aggrieved 
people voice their anger, as we Americans needed to do after the 
atrocities of September 11, 2001. It needs to be challenging enough so 
that people examine their own faults, as we Americans also needed to 
do after 9/11. It also should be strong enough to allow for justice – and 
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In sum, the language of both Matthew and Paul fits satisfactorily with the 
language of virtue ethics in expressing Kotva’s insistence on Christians appropriating 
the virtue framework. 
 
4.8 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter concludes with a few observations. Firstly, it is important that Kotva 
argues it is appropriate that Christian theology should turn to virtue ethics as an ethical 
approach that is holistic and compatible with Christian beliefs. Such an appeal creates 
continuity of ideas between historical luminaries on virtue ethics and contemporary 
ethical approaches as seen in chapter one. Secondly, this thesis observes that although 
Kotva seeks to advance an approach that is ecumenical in nature he makes no in-depth 
reference to Aquinas who is today considered as one of the most influence figures in 
Christian theology. Thirdly, to promote his correlational theology he deals only with 
convergences. This approach can be short-sighted. For example, the correlation 
between Matthew and Paul does not take into account many factors; their varying 
methodology, their audiences, and cultural influences. More so, the questions asked 




A Comparative Investigation Based On Key Themes And Related Traditions: 
Convergences And Divergences 
5.0 Introduction 
In the last three previous chapters, we outlined some aspects of the works of Cessario, 
Keenan and Kotva on the virtues as they relate to the core theme of this thesis namely 
the relational value of virtue ethics. However, this thesis also considered other themes, 
which on first glance may not be a part of the main focus of this thesis but form vital 
elements of the entire structure of virtue ethics. Simply put, the general content of the 
theologians under study concern a common ethical method. In this sense we can say 
similarities abound. However there are some gaps and nuances. As the chapter 
progresses, it is our intention to structure these convergences and divergences with a 
view to drawing a conclusion.  
 This entire chapter shall be divided into three sections: section one will 
examine the convergences and divergences based on tradition and some themes. Some 
of the questions include how do they scholars differ based on their traditions? Is there a 
way they complement each other? Since virtue ethics covers a wide area in moral field, 
the section shall consider specific themes like, the nature of virtue ethics, the 
development of virtue and their use of Scripture. Because virtue ethics is a person-
centered ethic, section two will turn to an appraisal of the human person.  The section 
shall utilise the typology of Millard J. Erickson – substantive, relational and functional 
views – in order to further tease out the convergences and divergences of the authors.1 
The third section shall be an analysis based on the relational approaches of our 
interlocutors. It shall identify a lacuna in their approach and make a proposal for 
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further study on an all-inclusive approach that encompasses the environment. The 




5.1 Justifying Comparative Reading based on Traditions 
Before turning to the comparative study itself, it is important to reassert the value and 
possibility of comparative study. In particular, we will draw upon the reasonableness 
of commensurability as advanced by C. Taylor, and A. Jonsen and S. Toulmin. C. 
Taylor argues in Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity: “Human 
reason is comparative in nature. All criteria standing besides others all methods co-
existing with other methods, that none is standing completely independent of the 
other.”2 A more convincing argument is put forward by A. Jonsen and S. Toulmin in 
The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning: “Practical reasoning in Ethics 
is not a matter of drawing formal deductions from variable axioms, but of exercising 
judgment – that is weighing considerations against one another.”3 Taylor, Jonsen and 
Toulmin as seen above provide us with some tools that serve as foundational to an 
engaging comparative reading based on the expository materials provided in chapters 
two, three and four.  
 There are however challenges to this approach. Other scholars, such as T. S. 
Kuhn, R. Rorty, R. Chang, and H. Sankey argue that reasoning at its depth is 
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necessarily incommensurable. 4 These authors argue that things cannot be compared 
because they are simply facts without formative guidelines. Reacting to this 
disagreement, H. Patrick Glenn in Legal Traditions of the World claims that their idea 
is an outcome of the Western thought which holds that there should be no existing 
teaching that should obstruct our individual charismatic, rational and decision-making 
capacity. 5  Ultimately, this current is originally a by-product of 17th century 
Enlightenment that accentuated reason and individualism over tradition and faith. The 
rejection of incommensurability is based on a reductionist account of the person and 
reasoning that ignores and rejects the powers of imagination, mystery, sentiments and 
feelings.6 But the framework offered by commensurability does respect the above. 
Therefore, commensurability fits into the general frame of virtue ethics which is 
foundational to this chapter. The question that begs answer is “what then is tradition?” 
In everyday language, tradition is conceived as the past with its impact on the 
present. The anthropologist Nelson H. H. Graburn in an article “What is Tradition?” 
considers tradition as: “The name given to those cultural features which, in situations 
of change, were to be continued to be handed on, thought about, preserved and not 
lost.”7 Conversely, traditional thinking is frequently contrasted with progressive or 
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no. 1 (October, 2008): 6-25. 
7  Nelson H. H. Graburn, “What is Tradition?” 
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-
sexuality/What%20is%20tradition.pdf (accessed October 6, 2014).  
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self-determining thinking.8 Such a conception construes tradition as an opposite of 
modernization.9 But this dissertation conceives tradition as an operative concept with 
historical, theoretical and practical connotations. This is because the dissertation also 
accepts that: “History, with its relativizing effect, tell us, however, that we are all part 
of a tradition or traditions.”10 More importantly, “our consciousness of being exposed 
to the past and its effects must be coupled with our interpretative response. We must 
interpret what our tradition is proposing to us”.11 In our present context, the traditions 
we are engaging with are Ressourcement Thomism, Personalist-revisionist Thomism 
and Reformed traditions as respectively represented by Cessario, Keenan, and Kotva. 
 A. Kronman emphasizes the significance of placing these theologians within 
their respective traditions. In an article “Precedent and Tradition,” he argues that 
tradition is a common feature within human society which enables us to encase a 
common factor and it also furthers our comprehension of variances between 
identifying features of the person.12 Another importance is that theoretical constructs 
and their applications are hugely determined by ones tradition.13 For example, Aquinas 
is essentially from the Aristotelian tradition. Some of his theoretical paradigms or 
concepts are typically Aristotelian. The same can be said of Cessario or Keenan. 
 A note of caution here, studying different traditions and contrasting individual 
authors based on their traditions can engender an academic scenario that simply 
justifies one over another with no regard to their strengths and history of their ideas 
and the questions they seek to address. As a result a genuine interaction between 
																																																								
8 Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, 1. 
9 Graburn, “What is Tradition?” 
10 Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, 2. 
11  Mealey, The Identity of Christian Morality, 126. Mealey examines the three 
Ricoeurian categories of tradition and concludes that there is dialectic between past 
and present for the reasons of continuity as well as innovation. See pages 125-8. 
12 A. Kronman, “Precedent and Tradition,” 99 Yale Law Journal (1990): 1029. 
13 Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, 3. 
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traditions is compromised. Therefore, the purpose of the comparative investigation in 
this chapter is to facilitate an on-going dialogue between the authors’ traditions with 
respect to virtue ethics. Glenn reiterates this objective more clearly:  
A theory of tradition should therefore not be thought of as a present, or 
perhaps future construction, but rather as a present device, or method, 
for thinking multiple traditions. It is a method for expanding knowledge 
and understanding, involving movement from within one tradition to 
another, using all of the teaching of both (or all) of the traditions to 
facilitate this process. Thinking theoretically about tradition means 
suspending conviction in a given tradition at least to the point of 
hearing, and learning, from another tradition.14  
 
This further underscores the importance of dialogue within different theological 
traditions. In this sense we can argue: “There is no exclusive method and much to be 
said about the virtues, and defects, of different methods. There are questions of 
efficiency, but there are also larger and more obscure questions of compatibility of 
various methods with the traditions themselves.”15 
Therefore, in what follows, this dissertation shall seek to contrast the three 
theologians and their respective traditions with a view to exposing and synthesizing the 
dynamism within each and also within the general structure of virtue ethics. The 
intention here is not to only show how independently each stands but how all can form 
an organic whole.  
 
5.2 Convergences and Divergences based on Tradition. 
Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) and MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981) 
have provoked much engagement in deeper inquiries based on particular traditions. In 
chapter two of this thesis, Cessario was identified as a Ressourcement Thomist. He is 
																																																								
14 Ibid., 4. 
15 Ibid., 6-11. 
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also considered as a moral realist. 16  Chapter three classified Keenan as both a 
personalist and Revisionist Thomist. 17  Finally, chapter four considered Kotva as 
belonging to the Reformed tradition and a neo-Aristotelian.18 The focus of the sections 
below is to establish areas of significant intersections and divergences based on 
traditions between Cessario, Keenan and Kotva.  
One of the principal features shared by Cessario, Keenan, and Kotva is the fact 
that virtue ethics has a tradition that goes back to Aristotle and sustained by Aquinas. 
The renewal and return to the virtue ethics of Aristotle and Aquinas resonates with all 
three theologians under study. Anscombe had originally contended that philosophers 
and perhaps theologians interested in morality should start afresh by returning to 
Aristotle’s work on practical reason and virtue.19 Consequently, the terminology and 
method of neo-Aristotelian philosophy associated has grown in prominence. However, 
for many, Aristotle’s works could not be retrieved adequately without reference to 
Aquinas, developing into a distinctly contemporary stream of Aristotelian-Thomism. 
Anscombe herself is such an example as her work directed towards Thomism. Mary 
Geach writes:  
Anscombe drew upon [Aquinas] to unknowable extent: she said to me 
that it aroused prejudice in people to tell them that a thought came from 
him: to my sister she said that to ascribe a thought to him made people 
																																																								
16 See section 2.1 of chapter two. This thesis is conscious of the fact that there are 
different versions within the ressourcement movement but what is common among 
them is the ideology of returning to sources. For example, evangelical ressourcement. 
See Robert E. Webber, Ancient-Future Faith: Rethinking Evangelicalism for a 
Postmodern World (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1999); D. H. Williams, Retrieving the 
Tradition and Renewing Evangelicalism: A Primer for Suspicious Protestants (Grand 
Rapids; Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1999).  
17 See section 3.1 of chapter three, especially. In these pages a deeper explanation is 
given to the concepts. 
18 See section 4.1. 
19 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy.” 
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boringly ignore the interest of it, whether they were for Aquinas or 
against him.20 
 
Through the intellectual influence of Aquinas, many moral philosophers and 
theologians have become neo-Aristotelians such as Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, 
and Rosalind Hursthouse. Specifically, scholars who turned to Aquinas as part of 
developing their neo-Aristotelian concepts of virtue ethics relied heavily on the Summa 
Theologiae. Although Kotva prefers to be catalogued as neo-Aristotelian rather than 
Aristotelian-Thomist, the three theologians of this thesis fit into this development.   
 The question remains “why do these authors turn to Aquinas’s accounts on the 
virtues?” One of the discernable reasons is that Aquinas gives a more detailed and 
systematic account than Aristotle. Foot in an essay “Virtues and Vices” argues along 
this line:  
By and large Aquinas followed Aristotle- sometimes even heroically- 
where Aristotle gave opinion, and where St. Thomas is on his own, as 
in developing the doctrine of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and 
charity, and in his theocentric doctrine of happiness, he still used an 
Aristotelian framework where he can: as for instance in speaking of 
happiness as man’s last end. However there are different emphasis and 
new elements in Aquinas’ ethics: Often he works things out in far more 
detail than Aristotle did, it is possible to learn a great deal from Aquinas 
that one could not have got from Aristotle. It is my opinion that the 
Summa Theologica is one of the best sources we have for moral 
philosophy, and theology and moreover that St. Thomas’s ethical 
writings are as useful to the atheist as to the Catholic or other Christian 
believer.21 
 
It follows that Aquinas could be said to be the perfect student of Aristotle.22 We can 
therefore argue that looking for Aristotle for inspiration will be tantamount to looking 
																																																								
20 Mary Geach, “Introduction,” in From Plato to Wittgenstein: Essays by G. E. M. 
Anscombe, ed. Mary Geach and Luke Gormally, XIII-XX (Charlottesville: Imprint 
Academic, 2011), xix. 
21 Foot, “Virtues and Vices,” 1-2. The second italicized words are mine. 
22 See Kerr, After Aquinas, 9. In a general scale Aquinas understood that some 
Aristotelian concepts could appropriately be applied into Christian theology.  
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for Aquinas. 23  Nevertheless, those we classify as Thomists still differ in their 
interpretations of Aquinas. As Fergus Kerr outlines, there are various versions of 
Thomism.24 So although, Cessario, Keenan, and Kotva share in the Thomistic tradition 
especially with respect to the virtue, to what extent are they Thomists? This question 
shall be answered later in this sub-section. 
 Following the Thomist tradition, Cessario, Keenan, and Kotva all agree with 
Aquinas’ lists and synthesis of the cardinal or moral virtues and the theological virtues, 
because they have both theological and anthropological significance. For example, 
Cessario emphasizes the theological aspects of Aquinas’s notion of virtues.25 Cessario 
frankly confesses to the influence Aquinas: “Although the theology of the virtues 
presented . . . draws upon many sources, the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas remains a 
central influence. In the thirteenth century, Aquinas distinguished himself by 
developing a moral theology of the virtues.”26 But Cessario is more than a mere reader 
of Aquinas; rather he interprets and integrates issues of great relevance for 
contemporary society with Aquinas’s concepts. For example he interprets the virtues of 
charity alongside communio and the realization of friendship and integrates fortitude 
with Christian anthropology of human emotions.27 In general, Cessario’s theology of 
the virtues reveals the depth of Aquinas’s theological reflections and which further 
attests an active intellectual tradition with great potentiality in theology today.28 
																																																								
23 See Candace Volger, “Aristotle, Aquinas, Anscombe and the New Virtue Ethics.” 
http://www.academia.edu/2500806/Aristotle_Aquinas_Anscombe_and_the_New_Virt
ue_Ethics (accessed November 5, 2014).   
24 Kerr, After Aquinas. 
25 See chapter two. 
26 Ibid., 5. 
27 Cessario, The Virtues, or The Examined Life, 61-157. 
28 Cessario, A Short History of Thomism, see chapter two of this thesis. 
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 Keenan like Cessario believes that the Thomistic tradition serves a fitting 
foundation for the revival of virtue ethics.29 The influence of Aquinas on Keenan 
originates from his first major work Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’s 
Summa Theologiae.30 Through careful analysis of the text, he delineates the distinction 
between rightness and goodness in Aquinas, pointing to the virtues as a form of moral 
goodness.31 He accepts Aquinas’s lists of infused and acquired virtues. He writes:  
In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle gives us eleven different virtues 
that are necessary for citizens to engage. Friendship, magnanimity, 
and practical wisdom are some of these. In the “Second Part” of the 
Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas takes from Plato, Cicero, 
Ambrose, Gregory, and Augustine the four cardinal virtues: prudence, 
justice, temperance, and fortitude. To these he adds the three 
theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity.32 
 
 However, he finds the list of Aquinas insufficient. Keenan, although a Thomist in 
origin, ranges widely within the Catholic tradition.33 
 Although Kotva does not consider himself to be a Thomist, our reading of his 
entire framework echoes strongly the Thomistic framework. With an apparent paradox, 
he asserts in the introduction of Christian Case for Virtue Ethics:  
St. Thomas does not play a direct or major role in this book. Yet a 
plausible summary of the books argument is that Thomas was right all 
along: Aristotle’s Ethics are notably well-suited to the Christian moral 
life . . . While Thomas is seldom mentioned, this book can be 
reasonably described as arguing for the resumption of Thomas’s basic 
project.34 
 
Kotva would prefer to be positioned as a neo-Aristotelian because of the influence of 
other neo-Aristotelian moral philosophers like MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum and 
																																																								
29 See Keenan, “Virtue Ethics,” 84; see also Odozor, Moral Theology in the Age of 
Renewal, 259. 
30 Keenan, Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. 
31 Ibid., 94-96, 124-127, 101. 
32 Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 3-4.  
33 Ibid., xiii. 
34 Kotva, Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 1.  
	 327 
Nancy Sherman.35 But as we have argued earlier, and quietly admitted to by Kotva, to 
seek for Aristotle implies seeking for Aquinas. The primary project of Kotva is to show 
how compatible the virtues are with Christian faith. Therefore, Aquinas cannot but be a 
basic reference point for any synthesis of the virtues with Christian faith. Aquinas has 
been considered by some scholars to be one of the greatest teleologists. For example, 
Stephen Pope in “Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas,” argues: “Aquinas’s 
Ethics is founded upon a profoundly teleological view of created reality in general and 
human nature in particular: Everything that exist acts purposefully for an end.”36 In 
like manner, Kotva argues that virtue ethics is a teleological ethic.37 We can therefore 
hold that Kotva’s account of the virtues is from the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.  
 Therefore, all three scholars share a common commitment to the Aristotelian-
Thomistic tradition in their explanations of the virtues. In other words, what Aristotle 
and Aquinas have said on the virtues is largely captured, interpreted, analyzed and 
applied by Cessario, Keenan, and Kotva. Their individual style though may differ. But 
to what extent can we say they are committed to the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition?  
Firstly, we shall consider Cessario within the ressourcement-Thomist tradition, 
a tradition that places him at variance with Keenan and Kotva. In general terms, 
ressourcement is considered today as an important aspect of twentieth century catholic 
theology.38  William F. Murphy’s article “Thomism and the Nouvelle Théologié” 
maintains that the relationship between Aquinas and the ressourcement was important 
																																																								
35 See MacIntyre, After Virtue; Whose Justice? Which Rationality; Nussbaum, The 
Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy; Sherman, 
The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue. 
36 Stephen Pope, “Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas,” in The Ethics of 
Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 
32.  
37 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 17. 
38 See note 14 on the different versions within the ressourcement movement. 
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leading to the Second Vatican Council.39 American historian John W. O’Malley goes 
further in What Happened at Vatican II? He argues that ressourcement is present in 
every form of renewal. He writes  “In brief, some form of ressourcement lay behind 
every reform movement in Western Christianity – and behind every reform movement 
in Western culture- at least up to the Enlightenment.”40 
 The early part of chapter two of this thesis showed how other theologians 
considered Cessario as a ressourcement-Thomist.41 Cessario does not only go back to 
Aquinas as source but as far as the patristic Fathers whom Aquinas himself cited. The 
advantage of this approach is not to sub-plant the existing tradition but to create a unity 
of ideas. Additionally, this approach would enable him offer an appropriate reading of 
Aquinas’ text and contexts. Flynn stresses this point when he cites Yves Congar: 
One day the balance will be drawn up, but already the positive quality 
can be sensed. What would a little later be called ‘Ressourcement’ 
was then at the heart of our efforts. It was not a matter of 
mechanically replacing some theses by other theses or of creating a 
‘revolution’ but of appealing as Péguy did, from one tradition less 
profound to another more profound.42 
																																																								
39 William F. Murphy, “Thomism and the Nouvelle Théologié,” Josephinum Journal of 
Theology. Vol. 18, no. 1(2011): 4.  
40 John W. O’Malley, What Happened at Vatican II? (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2008), 41. For various forms of reform movement see Gabriel Flynn, 
“Introduction: The Twentieth-Century Renaissance in Catholic Theology,” in 
Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology, ed. 
Gabriel Flynn and Paul D. Murray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4. For 
further reading on biblical renewal see Benedict T. Viviano, “The Renewal of Biblical 
Studies in France 1934-1954 as an Element in Theological Ressourcement,” in 
Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology, 
305-317. For Liturgical renewal see Keith F. Pecklers, “Ressourcement and the 
Renewal of Catholic Liturgy: On Celebrating the New Rite,” in Ressourcement: A 
Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology, 318-332. On the 
influence of ressourcement on general Christian theology, see Policraticus, Culture and 
Theology: The Ressourcement Movement (Part 1) http://vox-
nova.com/2008/03/30/culture-and-theology-the-ressourcement-movement-part-1/ 
(accessed April 13, 2015). 
41 See section 2.1 of chapter two. 
42 Flynn, “Introduction: The Twentieth-Century Renaissance in Catholic Theology,” 4. 
Originally from Yves Congar, “The Brother I have Known,” trans. Boniface Ramsey. 
The Thomist 49 (1985): 499. 
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In this sense the profound Thomistic tradition on the virtues remains fundamentally 
important. Cessario realizes this great potential in retrieving the teachings of Aquinas 
and the Fathers.43  
 In retrieving Aquinas’s teachings on the virtues, Cessario bears in mind what 
Stephen Fields in “Ressourcement and the Retrieval of Thomism for the Contemporary 
World” calls “the narrative of modernity”.44 This concept has two sides: Firstly, any 
solutions to modern problems must therefore entail a radical reworking of the roots of 
thought and culture. Secondly is the opposite of the first in that it conceives modernity 
as the disintegration of a homogeneity.45 Cessario’s work resonates with Fields’ first 
proposal. For example, Cessario writes:  
The Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, inspired by the patristic texts and 
aided by classical philosophy, developed different models to explain the 
dynamic of the . . . virtues. But the voluntarist emphasises associated 
with the via moderna and the harvest of Medieval theology cut short the 
development of this paradigm.46 
 
To overcome the ‘short-cutting’ and successfully recover the theological 
synthesis of Aquinas on the virtues, Cessario goes back to the patristic Fathers. He 
writes elsewhere:  
																																																								
43  Even though the prospects of ressourcement were evidently huge yet it was 
criticized. For example M.-Michel Labourdette criticizes it by the use of the term 
Nouvelle Théologié (New theology),  Also Aidan Nichols feared that ressourcement 
was hatching a new anti-intellectualism into theology. See Aidan Nichols, “Thomism 
and the Nouvelle Théologié,” The Thomist 64 (2000): 7. Proponents of Ressourcement 
like Congar were reproached. See Congar, “The Brother I have Known,” 500. The 
tension that ensued led to the Encyclical Letter of Pius XII, Humani Generis online 
version, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xii/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
xii_enc_12081950_humani-generis_en.html (accessed October 9, 2014).  
44  Stephen M. Fields, “Ressourcement and the Retrieval of Thomism for the 
Contemporary World,” in Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-
Century Catholic Theology, ed. Gabriel Flynn and Paul D. Murray (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 358.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Cessario, The Moral and Theological Ethics, 3. 
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In order to explicate what Christians believe about the moral life, 
theological ethics has long employed both the vocabulary and the 
rhetoric of virtue theory. Arguably, one can discover the substance of a 
well-developed theology of virtue even in the earliest Patristic writers. 
But fourth century Christian apologist, Lactantius, gave the subject of 
virtue in the Christian life its first embellished treatment in his Divine 
Institutiones.47 
 
This is the typical methodology of the ressourcement theologians. Cessario will make 
use of extensive citations from the patristic Fathers. For example in The Moral Virtues 
and Theological Ethics, he cites St. Augustine who in Enarrationes in Psalmos 83, no. 
II identifies the virtues with Christ.48 Cessario later builds on this Christocentric role 
and places Jesus as the paradigmatic model for a virtuous life – so central in the 
Patristic Fathers.49 Elsewhere, he argues: “Without an effective union with Christ, no 
human person can in practice achieve the perfection of the moral life that conduces to 
beatific fellowship.”50  
M.-D Chenu in Introduction to the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas articulates a  
criticism of many that Aquinas makes very little reference of Christ in the Secundar 
Pars of the Summa Theologica.51 Cessario acknowledges this criticism while utilising 
the Patristic authors to fill out the framework of Aquinas. In his effort to respond to the 
above charge, Cessario simply downplays the severity of the charge by explaining that 
the absence of the frequent referencing of Christ in the Secundar Pars “happens simply 
because of Aquinas’ methodological presuppositions in developing the Summa 
Theologiae”.52 
																																																								
47 Ibid., 1. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Cessario, Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 2nd ed., 21-2. 
50 Cessario, The Virtues, or the Examined Life, 4. 
51 See M.-D Chenu, Introduction to the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. A.-M 
Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964), 314. 
52 Ibid. The italicized word is mine. 
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 Further examples of this use of sources can be seen in his work The Virtues, or 
the Examined Life, where he builds chapter one on St. Augustine’s work De Genesi ad 
litteram, Book IV, and Origen’s commentary on the Songs of Songs.53 He also makes 
numerous references of other Church Fathers like Gregory of Nyssa and St. 
Ambrose.54  
 Cessario, in order to maintain the above tradition retains the lists of virtues 
itemized by Aquinas: the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity and the 
four moral virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. To this effect, he 
does not see the need to introduce other virtues. This is to maintain his traditional 
Thomist style as a ressourcement theologian. He only explains the existing virtues 
within the parameters of theological-anthropology. It implies that the ressourcement 
theology can be said to be more conservative and not very opened to much creativity 
and innovation of ideas.  
 In comparison, Keenan as a Revisionist Thomist accepts Aquinas’s position on 
the virtues yet he is not uncritical.55 Accordingly, his revisionist grounding makes him 
argue that the lists of virtues as given by Aquinas are inadequate to meet the exigencies 
of modern society. For example, the concept of justice in Aquinas’s category does not 
sufficiently meet with the challenges or demands on the person from family, friends, 
and perhaps community, for they may demand particular ways of relating contrary to 
being just in a general sense. While Aquinas and Cessario argue that the cardinal virtue 
of justice is supported by temperance and fortitude and none contradicts the other, 
																																																								
53 Cessario, The Virtues, or the Examined Life, 3-9; See Origen, The Song of Songs: 
Commentary, trans. R.  P. Lawson (London: Ancient Christian Writers, 1957). 
54 Ibid. Some of their works are: St. Gregory of Nyssa, Orationes de Beatitudinibus, 
Sermon 1. The English edition, St. Gregory of Nyssa, The Lord’s Prayer and the 
Beatitudes, trans. Hilda Graef (London: Ancient Christian Writers, 1954); St. 
Ambrose, Commentary on Luke, BK 2, chap. 19, No. 22 (cd14: 39). 
55 See Odozor, Moral Theology in the Age of Renewal, 258. 
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Keenan argues differently: “The moral person cannot only be just; the demands to care 
for a loved one may conflict with the call to be fair to everyone.”56  
Therefore, he suggests new list of virtues, which will take care of the above 
concern. The reconstruction of the classical list of virtues shows one of the advantages 
of revisionist methodology. As an approach it is dialectical, and so a more progressive 
and dynamic method than ressourcement. However, it is prone to oversimplification of 
concepts and also runs the risk of functioning only within the mindset of modernity, a 
temptation that can undermine a renewal based on return that is basic to ressourcement 
theology.57 
 Kotva’s approach is based on the Reformed tradition, in dialogue with the 
contemporary neo-Aristotelianism. Kotva follows the works of non-theological writers 
like MacIntyre. Drawing on non-theological authors can bring challenges. Hauerwas 
argues that the approach of neo-Aristotelianism with the implied distinction between 
nature and grace is problematic.58 Yet unlike Hauerwas, Kotva is attempting to avoid 
the extreme positions of his tradition through dialogue especially on key concepts with 
the Reformed tradition such as grace and Christology. It is unfortunate that he does not 
continue the dialogue with Aquinas. However, the dialogue of ideas – his key 
methodological approach – leads him to common ground between varying traditions. 
 
5.3 Convergences and Divergences Based on Particular Themes 
Our three scholars Cessario, Keenan, and Kotva have made significant contributions to 
contemporary virtue ethics. Beyond the broad suppositions of their traditions, it is 
possible to identify similarities and differences around certain key themes. The 
																																																								
56 Keenan, “Virtue Ethics,” 92. 




following sub-sections will look at the convergences and divergences based on the 
areas of the nature of virtue, the development of virtue, and the use of scripture. These 
areas are chosen to provide depth while at the same time limit the scope of the study.  
5.3.1 The Nature of Virtue Ethics 
Our conception of virtues today cannot ignore the historical antecedents of the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. The readings of the works of Cessario, Keenan, and 
Kotva are a procedural and contextual continuity of the above tradition. It may be said 
that Cessario speaks for all three when asserting the value Aristotelian-Thomistic 
ethics holds for moral theology and moral philosophy.59  
 To recall the Thomistic understanding of virtue outlined by Cessario: Prior to 
Aquinas, St. Augustine defined virtue as “a good quality of mind by which one lives 
righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us without us.” 
As we saw earlier in chapter two of this thesis, Aquinas adopted this Augustinian 
definition because it captures the generic sense of the word habitus: “As a generic 
category for virtue, habitus describes both the acquired human virtues as well as the 
infused moral virtues. Since habitus amounts to the real shaping of our character, 
virtue ensures that one actually does live righteously.”60 This Augustinian definition 
espoused by Aquinas became one of the central points of departure between him and 
Aristotle. Thus, while Aristotle defines virtue as habitual action-dispositions which are 
oriented towards Eudaimonia, Cessario follows Aquinas by defining virtue as “an 
interior principle of the moral life which directs the individual’s relationship with God 
and with neighbour. As such, Christian virtue remains a stable reality, something 
																																																								
59 Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 12. 
60 Ibid., 53. 
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which firmly establishes in the believer the capacity to accomplish those deeds which 
are worthy of the kingdom of God.”61 
 There are three characteristics that make Cessario’s conception of virtue 
distinctive from Keenan and Kotva: Firstly, he follows Aquinas’s theological 
application of the word habitus by relating it to the kenosis of Christ:  
Christ . . . as he assumed a full and complete human nature and 
accepted the personal history implied in living out a human existence. 
In the case of Christ, meritorious acts of love and obedience form the 
center of his life of preeminent virtue. By this kind of life, ultimately 
expressed in his salvific death on the cross, Christ makes complete 
sanctification possible for the whole human race.62 
 
 Secondly, Cessario unlike Keenan and Kotva describes and applies virtue in such a 
way that satisfies human psychological, religious, and physical capacities:  
Habitus supposes a conception of the human person as open to 
development and modification from both natural and divine causes. 
Furthermore, habitus points up the difference between what derives 
from authentically personal activity and what remains rooted in the 
biological givens of temperament or personality type.63 
 
Thirdly, Cessario’s conception of virtue harmonizes with Fuch’s transcendental and 
categorical levels of Christian ethics as explained in chapter two.64 Cessario’s use of 
habitus moved away from the common understanding of habitus as something 
mechanical to openness to creative activity by emphasizing development of habitus as 
chapter two highlighted. He therefore links habitus with Christian faith, conversion and 
freedom.65 All these concepts linked to virtue ethics offer more possibility for holistic 
approach.66 
																																																								
61 Ibid., 1. 
62 Ibid., 7 & 37. 
63 Ibid., 36. 
64 See chapter two of this thesis. 
65 Ibid., 35. 
66 Cessario, The Virtues, or the Examined Life, 100. 
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 The nature of virtue ethics that Cessario constructs is attentive to the entire 
narrative that defines the human person, by broadening Thomistic approach to fit into 
contemporary Christian concept of moral goodness. He argues that this is acquired 
through inborn aptitude and the grace of God.67  Accordingly, Cessario departs from 
those who consider virtue ethics as some form of determinism and holds that Christian 
virtue ethics cannot be taken out of the context of human predilection towards good 
and God’s grace. By so doing, Cessario remained focus to his task of positioning his 
notion of virtue within the wider setting of the Christian tradition by giving it a 
theological-anthropological underpinning. 
 Keenan, like Cessario considers it appropriate to sustain and at the same time 
broaden the Thomistic concept of virtue, but unlike Cessario he approaches it largely 
from an anthropological perspective. But like Cessario, he argues that virtue should be 
understood in Thomistic terms as a habitus that orients us towards the ultimate good, 
namely God. According to Keenan it is by conceiving virtue in this light that can lead 
to self-understanding and relationship with God.68 Where he differs with Cessario is 
based on methodology rather than theological conceptualization. To clearly show this 
departure, Keenan’s entire theological framework on the virtues is based on one’s self-
understanding and relationship with God which is summed up in the three 
anthropological visions mentioned in chapter three: “who are we?”, “who we ought 
become?”, and “how do we get there?”. Both Keenan and Kotva adopt the above 
insight from MacIntyre for their presuppositions. Keenan’s methodology may be 
different from Kotva but his theological articulations in the above concepts in 
describing the nature of virtue are similar. For example, like Cessario, Keenan argues 
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q.108. a. 2. 
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that virtue consists in knowing who we are, the good we ought to do as disciples of the 
kingdom. Therefore he explains virtue by placing it within the context of discipleship. 
This is because discipleship defines who a Christian is in relation to God and others.69 
He draws upon Tillmann who argues that virtue directs the Christian to desire 
perfection by re-echoing that the birthplace of moral goodness is man’s interior 
dispositions and not external actions.70 Christ who is the embodiment of virtue shapes 
the Christian’s life first from within.71 But unlike Cessario, Keenan emphasises the 
anthropological aspects rather than the theological. 
 In his second consideration of the vision of the person “who we ought become” 
Keenan offers a critical teleological understanding of virtue. He shares in the 
Thomistic idea that virtues are an aspect of the Christian faith that establishes the 
kingdom of God that is the telos of the Christian. In this sense, virtues for Keenan have 
both religious and ethical implications.72 This means that Keenan shares Cessario’ 
convictions that virtue becomes a central part of situating human conduct. Because 
both argue that human conduct should not be judged through obligation or rules but 
rather through dispositions. The shared conception running through their works is that 
virtue covers socio-historical, biological and developmental aspects of the human 
person. We shall later re-iterate how Keenan goes further than Cessario. 
 Kotva shares particular ideas similar to those of Cessario, and Keenan. For 
example his conception of the nature of virtue is akin to Cessario’s and Keenan’s. 
Kotva in his understanding of the nature of virtue works within five generalized 
conceptions of virtue. But we shall re-state only three here. Firstly, like Cessario and 
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72 Ibid., 40. ST I-II, q. 90. a. 2. I refer the reader to chapter three of this thesis where I 
sketched the historical variances in the concept of telos between sociology and 
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Keenan, he considers virtue in relation to human end or telos.73 The unique aspect of 
Kotva’s assertions is that virtue and the telos are open to modification and 
improvement.74 Therefore, he proposes a twofold teleological virtue ethics: One that is 
leading to and also constituting the human end.75 In this sense, he articulates like 
Keenan that the content of the telos includes the notion of becoming a certain kind of 
person.76 Both Keenan and Kotva define the notion of becoming within a relational 
context that combines theology and metaphysics. Therefore, Kotva’s account, like 
Aristotle’s, is philosophical, but unlike Aristotle’s, it is theological.  
 Secondly, Kotva argues like Cessario and Keenan that virtue incorporates both 
the intellectual and affective aspects of a person. Although these authors may differ by 
emphasizing one over the other, but the underlying datum is that virtue must reflect a 
whole range of human feeling, emotions, thinking and acting. However, Kotva 
emphasizes more of the affective aspects which includes the religious convictions of 
the Christian than the intellectual aspect.  
Thirdly, as a corollary to the second point, Kotva is united to Cessario and 
Keenan by arguing that virtue fundamentally involves the treatment of tendencies, 
habitus, dispositions and capacities. Although they vary in style in the way they use 
terminologies in their works. For example, Cessario as archetypical Thomist uses 
habitus, as dispositions, more often than the rest. While Keenan will prefer terms like 
inclinations and habits.77 With a pastoral outlook, Keenan prefers to use habits in order 
to make his discourses practical rather than abstract. While Cessario and Kotva are 
cautious in using the word habit to avoid the ambiguity of the term and also its 
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74 Ibid. 42. 
75 Ibid., 21. 
76 Ibid. Also see Harrington and Keenan, Paul and Virtue Ethics, 4ff. 
77 Keenan, Virtues for Ordinary Christians, especially chapter three. He gives the 
various levels of the use of habits. 
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mechanical implications. However, in whatever way these scholars use these terms 
they use them to encompass the fields of intellect, will and human feelings in relation 
to reason.78  
5.3.2 The Development or Acquisition of Virtue  
Central to all accounts of virtue is the development of virtue or character formation. 
This is because the development of virtue continues to be foundational and meaningful 
to our understanding of the entire concept of virtue. When we talk of development of 
virtue we are talking about character development. The questions that are often raised 
are: are virtues or character taught? Do they naturally occur? Or are we responsible for 
the development and growth of virtue?  
Many other forms of moral inquiry attempt to give answers to these questions. 
For example they are points of interest in political philosophy. In Part III of A Theory 
of Justice by John Rawls, attention is paid to how individuals might be trained in a just 
society to develop the virtue expected of them as citizens.79 According to Marcia 
Homiak, Rawls presuppositions became foundational to later discourses on 
psychological foundations of virtues as the starting point to good moral character.80 
Similar questions are also being asked with legal theory, with relatively new 
developments in virtue jurisprudence.81 
However, the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition on the development of virtue 
remains the most persuasive. To be able to situate the scholars under study, a guide is 
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(Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
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required. To use a common source of all three scholars, Aristotle in Nicomachean 
Ethics proposes a method by which people develop virtue by using an analogy between 
virtue and art. In Book II, chapter 1, he argues that virtue as a set of skills gradually 
develops over time through practice. He distinguishes between capacities acquired by 
nature and those acquired through practice. For him natural capacities are those “we 
first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity” like hearing and seeing. 
These activities do not need practice.82 In contrast there are those activities or skills we 
acquire through learning and practice, for example differentiating musical notes.83 But 
in chapter 4 of Book II, Aristotle himself takes into consideration the deficiency of his 
analogy given that virtues necessitate a person to be in a particular internal disposition 
while the arts do not. 
 The primary thrust of the above is that virtue is both acquired innately and 
through corresponding practice, correction and inner personal disposition. Aquinas 
expanded on Aristotle’s thought when he wrote:  
Virtue is natural to man inchoatively . . . in so far as in man’s reason are 
to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of 
both knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and 
moral virtues, in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good 
in accordance with reason . . . [B]oth intellectual and moral virtues are 
in us by way of natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, since 
nature is determined to one, while the perfection of these virtues does 
not depend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in 
respect of the various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue’s 
action, and according to various circumstances.84 
 
Mary M. Keys in Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good recognizes 
a distinction between Aristotle’s account of the development of virtue and Aquinas’s 
accounts:  
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On Aristotle’s account, by nature we are more or less fertile soil for 
planting the flowers or fruits of the ethical virtues. On Aquinas’s 
account, the soil of our nature already contains the seed of those virtues, 
both intellectual and ethical, as well as an inclination to water and grow 
them.85 
 
To turn again to Cessario, Keenan and Kotva.  
 Cessario as a realist moral theologian begins by appealing to a realist 
anthropology that recognizes how people have different aptitudes for moral 
development.86 He then proceeds to substantiate this claim by adopting Aquinas’s 
epistemology which states that each person possesses a natural endowment distinct 
from habitus which exist within the limits set by common human nature, which is 
achievable through personal effort.87 He then draws a link between habitus and 
capacity; habitus is a structuring structure that directs capacities.88 As such it must 
have within it three conditions to fully develop into a virtue: versatility (ability to 
perform other functions), malleability (suppleness towards change), and the agent 
himself (affected by two sources; infused and acquired).89 These three conditions 
summarize Aquinas’s position on the development and growth of virtue, which 
Cessario adopts.   
 One of the distinctive aspects of Cessario’s conception of the development of 
virtue is the activity of the Holy Spirit operational in the infused virtues which elicits 
twofold change: Image restoration which consists in the rectification of disordered 
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appetites and also the acquisition of an array of graced benefactions.90 Another distinct 
feature is that Cessario acknowledges the value of behavioural sciences, although he 
rarely follows through on this point. 91  It is however an acceptance of one of 
Anscombe’s theses, that is the need of an adequate philosophy of psychology, 
especially moral psychology.92 Therefore, the virtues can be acquired through the gift 
of grace and practices congenial to human reason, goodwill, and intentionality. 
Unfortunately, Cessario left intentionality unexplored all through his works. 
 Similarly, Keenan does not depart from the Thomistic pattern for the 
development of virtue, albeit he does not offer an in-depth explication, as did Cessario. 
However, he hypothetically treats it under the theme of habits.93 Keenan argues that 
there are traits of character that are innate in us, but more so there are those that can be 
acquired by learning and practice.94 But he does not bring out the difference between 
ordinary habit and actual practice which involves the use of one’s rational powers as 
Carlisle argues.95 He simply follows MacIntyre who maintains that practices help to 
develop dispositions to perform particular actions that are virtuous.96 MacIntyre further 
states that virtues can be acquired through internal and external practices within an on-
going social networking.97 He therefore emphasized our understanding of virtues 
should begin from practices rather than passions. Keenan draws upon this conception 
and enlarges the dimension of the social networking which resonates with the practices 
considered from his concept of relationality as seen in chapter three. Keenan is more 
anthropological than Cessario who is more theological. 
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 One of the distinctive features in Keenan’s concept of the development of 
virtue that makes him different from Cessario and Kotva is his emphasis that virtues 
are dynamic rather than static. This encompasses the realm of experience in one’s life 
and that of others’.98 His relationality model in which the concerns for the general good 
can affect concerns for self-care and unique relationship as explained in chapter three 
informs this approach. Another distinct feature is that our varied states of life and 
occupation constitute formative processes to the acquisition of virtues. 99   As a 
pastorally orientated theologian, Keenan is very practical in showing how the virtues 
can be formed. For Keenan the acquisition of virtue must be personal and intentional, 
demanding self-knowledge. Self-knowledge means the understanding our personalities 
that will aid form particular dispositions that are appropriate to specific choices in 
life.100 
 Keenan analogously maintained that the grace of God is must needed for the 
development of virtues. But going through his works one can see a nuance that he 
tends to be more anthropological. He tends to write more about practices and habits 
more than what the grace of God can do within us.  
 Kotva unlike Cessario and Keenan appeals to behavioural sciences as basis to 
his understanding of the development of virtues. This is clearly seen when he takes a 
middle course between behaviourism, and voluntarism.101 Although appealing to the 
behavioural sciences, he accentuates the point that virtue ethics considers the self as a 
self-forming and determining agent by arguing: “We acquire the virtues in or through 
our actions and choices, by habituation and training, and through the praise and blame, 
																																																								
98 I refer you to chapter three where cited my father’s experience as a drunk. 
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100 See example given in chapter three. 
101 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, 26-27. 
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censure or encouragement of others.”102 The above idea of blame resonates with the 
example I shared in chapter three regarding my father. Virtues do not only come about 
through praise but as well through constructive blame. A virtue then can develop 
contrary to an acquired vice. Kotva therefore expands his scope on the development of 
virtue by referencing praise and blame.  
 Like Cessario and Keenan, Kotva also links the development of virtue with 
grace. But unlike Cessario and Keenan he criticizes earlier account of virtue that 
ignored the role of grace.103 This legitimizes his position as belonging to the Reformed 
tradition by weaving through the ideas of Berkhof, Erickson and Macquarrie.104  These 
scholars underline the fact that both God’s grace and human effort are necessary for 
sanctification and the development of virtue. Understandingly, he choses three authors 
from the Reformed tradition with similar world view on grace in order to show a shift 
from the typical Reformed tradition of Sola Gratia to a more ecumenical view that 
tallies with the Catholic tradition. He ends up by constructing an understanding of 
grace that is very Augustinian.105  
Note that Kotva is writing in response to a contention that the Reformed 
tradition finds virtue and Grace incompatible. For example, Porter argues that the 
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salvation.  
	 344 
theology of the Reformers led to a turn to law rather than virtue.106 As previously 
detailed, Protestantism was suspicious of virtue because it presupposed total 
dependence on the person to achieve moral goodness. For example the French 
Protestant theologian Roger Mehl in Catholic Ethics and Protestant Ethics argues that 
virtue in itself does not make a person good. However, general protestant ethics 
acknowledges the pedagogical significance of virtue.107 Correspondingly, Donald G. 
Bloesch in Freedom for Obedience: Evangelical Ethics in Contemporary Times 
conveys doubts in the concept of virtue because the notion of character purports to 
emphasize habituation that is irreconcilable to Christian thought on grace.108 These 
conversations according to the typical Reformed tradition end in the conclusion that 
virtue does not make us good because we are dependent on the grace of God.109  
Kotva as a Reformed theologian does not legitimize the above claims and 
therefore responds to the contention differently by stating that grace is compatible with 
virtue ethics. Recent writers have argued in line with Kotva. For example Rehnman 
finds the above suspicion and doubt unfounded and blames it on a gross neglect of 
primary sources.110 To solve this problem Rehnman focuses on the works of early 
Reformer Pietro Martire Vermigli (1499-1562). Vermigli argues in his work 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics that virtue is central to a good life and 
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is compatible with grace.111 He clearly brings this out in the distinction he makes 
between the infused and acquired virtues in Ethicorum Commentarius when he states:  
The acquired virtues do not contradict the infused virtues: when it 
comes to the true virtues such as faith, hope, charity and the like, we 
must say that nothing prevents our nature (in spite of its corruption) 
from being adorned with those gifts of grace, provided that God himself 
stoops to impart them. It is against human nature, however, to acquire 
these virtues by ourselves and through our own efforts.112 
 
This is the trend of thought which Kotva has so far followed. He has avoided the 
extreme position of the radical Reformers. He supports the argument that grace is not 
contrary to virtue and human nature. Similarly, Cessario following Augustine and 
Ambrose argues that the Christian must be attentive to the active interaction between 
human effort and divine grace.113  
 Even though Cessario, Keenan, and Kotva have shown that virtue come about 
through practice, all have fail to show in depth how political, economic, and religious 
institutions play a huge role in the development and growth of virtue. They may have 
affirmed the anthropological and sociological contributions but have not develop an 
engaging account that reflects the deeper influences of environment, family and 
cultural values of particular people. Any account of the development of virtue must be 




111  Pietro Martire Vermigli, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. 
Emidio Campi and Joseph C. McLellard (Kirksville: Truman State University Press, 
2006). Originally in Primum, secundum et initium tertii libri Ethicorum ad 
Nicomachum Commentarius, ed. Guilio Santerenziano, Luca Baschera and Christopher 
Moser (Leiden: Brill, 2011). 
112 Vermigli, Ethicorum Commentarius, 309. 
113 Cessario, The Virtues, or the Examined Life, 10. 
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5.3.3 Use of Scripture 
As previously noted Optatam Totius 16 challenges theologians to use scripture in order 
to establish biblical-theological foundations to aid a moral theology that is explicitly 
Christian.114 In a more specific way, the renewal of moral theology through Scripture 
in virtue ethics can be legitimized with the following reasons: Firstly, scripture is 
relevant to virtue ethics because of the prominence it gives to the law of the spirit 
written in people’s hearts.115 This is an operating principle that has its roots from the 
Old Testament (See Jer 31:33). The spirit works within the hearts of humanity to 
recreate us and to give the strength to yield the fruits anticipated by the word of God.116 
In connection to virtue, Aquinas is more exact when he writes: “What is primary in the 
law of the New Testament, and it is in this that the entire virtues consist, is the grace of 
the Holy Spirit that is given through faith in Christ.”117 
Secondly, a return to Scripture reiterates the datum that there are particular 
things that human reason alone cannot comprehend. Hence we turn to Scripture for 
fuller understanding.118 Hamel further argues that human reason is not infallible and so 
needs to be perfected by Scripture. In this sense, biblical morality becomes a faithful 
and more consistent mirror and guide especially in those areas that deal with the 
passion.119 He further amplifies the importance of the use of scripture when he states:  
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Biblical morality will reveal to the Christian the profound meaning of 
the indications that come from one’s own conscience. Left to one’s own 
lights, the human being remains an enigma to oneself . . . only 
revelation provides the full meaning of human moral rules, of human 
values (virtues). Biblical morality will also serve as a developer.120 
However, there are diametrically opposing views to the importance of Scripture 
in doing ethics today. For instance Jack T. Sanders in Ethics in the New Testament: 
Change and Development offers two reasons why the New Testament is irrelevant for 
ethics: the diversity of Scripture, and the eschatological probabilities of the New 
Testament writers.121 Sanders argues:  
Jesus does not provide a valid ethics for today. His ethical teaching is 
interwoven with his imminent eschatology to such a degree that every 
attempt to separate the two and to draw out only the ethical thread 
invariably and inevitably draws out also strands of the eschatology, so 
that both yarns only lie in a heap.122 
Perhaps, Sander’s presuppositions are more epistemological than theological. Because 
within the theological dimension Jesus’s ethics can be merged with his eschatology 
when we consider his ethics as a ‘kingdom ethic’.123 Sanders apparently downplays the 
force of the identity that the Christian experiences in his or her faith in the person of 
Jesus as the normative person in the whole of the Christian tradition. In this, the ethics 
that Jesus offers encompasses the whole of his life and ministry. It may not be logically 
laid out as we have ethics done today but its distinctive character is nonetheless evident. 
Hence, Bruce B. Birch and Larry L. Rasmussen write in Bible and Christian Ethics: 
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“Our contention is that the most effective and crucial impact of the Bible in Christian 
ethics is that of shaping the moral identity of the Christian and the church.”124  
Bearing in mind the above reasons for the use of Scripture, and its relevance to 
virtue ethics, we shall proceed in this sub-section to position Cessario, Keenan, and 
Kotva in their use of Scripture. It is not the intention of this thesis to address explicit 
methodological and exegetical issues in their use of scripture. It is rather to highlight 
their hermeneutical patterns. More specifically it is our intention to situate them within 
James M. Gustafson’s two distinctions in the use of scripture, namely, a “moral use” 
and “theological use” and partly Kenneth R. Himes four hermeneutical tasks as we 
shall later explain.125 The advocates of the “moral use” use scripture as an authoritative 
source of morality, while the advocates of “theological use” apply scripture as a 
primary source of knowledge which shapes and informs our response to God’s call.126 
Cessario’s use of Scripture is identifiable with Gustafson’s “theological use”. To 
cast our minds back, Cessario argues that the New Testament presents virtue as an 
internal principle, which guides an individual’s relationship with God and neighbour.127 
For Cessario, such operative principle of the New Testament is not only limited to the 
infused virtues but also applicable to the moral virtues. This shows the theological link 
expressed by Vermigli as shown in the previous sub-section. The “theological use” of 
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Scripture by Cessario is further illustrated through his constructive hermeneutical 
interpretation of the Parable of the Maidens in Matt. 25: 1-13. He explains that the text 
challenges the preparedness of the Christian disciple in welcoming the kingdom of 
God.128 	
The implication for Cessario’s approach stresses further the significance of the 
scriptural text in the formation of a virtuous character for the kingdom. The underlying 
factor here is the entire process by which an individual’s character is formed in 
agreement with beatific vision. This is in line with what John Brunt and Gerald 
Winslow say in an article “The Bible’s Role in Christian Ethics: “Scripture shapes the 
character of the moral actor.”129 This supports the earlier statements made by Birch and 
Rasmussen in chapter one.130 For Cessario, a person’s identity is vividly captured in 
his/her response to God. He uses biblical citations that are indicative of such. For 
example, Matt. 5:9, Matt. 6: 33; Luke 18:18-19; John 1: 5; 1 Cor. 2: 14; 2 Cor.4: 6 etc. 
Therefore, Cessario’ use of Scripture can be situated within the  “theological use”. 
 Similarly, Keenan acknowledges the place of Scripture in virtue ethics 
specifically moral theology in general when he writes: “Roman catholic moral theology 
which long considered scripture as no more than a reminder of the moral life, now finds 
through the medium of virtue ethics the resources for living an animated life of love and 
justice based on revelation.”131 This is further re-echoed in Keenan’s co-authored books 
with Harrington, Jesus and Virtue Ethics and Paul and Virtue Ethics. Primarily, these 
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two books can be said to be a respond to the call of Vatican II towards the renewal for a 
biblically founded moral theology as earlier detailed. Keenan himself acknowledges that 
he uses virtue ethics as a means of transmitting the content of the New Testament 
Ethics.132 In the above mentioned co-authored books, while Harrington treats questions 
of methods in biblical exegesis and makes textual interpretations of particular pericopes, 
for example, Matt. 6:24 and Luke 16:13, Keenan interprets the text with a view to 
creating a bridge between virtue ethics and scripture. His focus is to express the New 
Testament emphasis on human response to God’s gracious activity in Jesus.133 
 Like Cessario, Keenan applies the “theological use” of scripture. This is visible 
in the way he seeks deeper insights into his three-fold question of “who are we?” “who 
we ought become?” and “how do we get there?” These are compressed into the concept 
of God’s kingdom as the perspective and goal of which the entire Christian ethics is 
centered upon. In this way, Keenan’s interpretations of biblical texts (although few) are 
based on divine standards not human standards. For example in his interpretations of 
Matt. 20: 1-16 he writes:  
In scripture, we see that Jesus teaches that, although God’s kingdom 
will establish the right order, it will not be simply based on human 
standards of justice and on strict reward and punishment. The parable of 
laborers in the field who enter the work force at different times . . . 
makes clear that the eschatological celebration will not be simple quid 
pro quo, since because of the owner’s generosity, all are paid the same, 
even though some worked only a short time.134 
The thrust of Keenan’s argument is the kingdom. He therefore draws upon the virtue 
thoughts of Aquinas and relates it to the kingdom as the end which demands certain 
qualities. In this sense, to be part of the kingdom, one must develop particular virtues 
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or values as highlighted in the Sermon on the Mount in Matt. 5: 3ff. 
 Keenan’s use of scripture is informed too by his idea of the concept of 
movement, or growth in virtue as seen in various New Testament texts particularly in 
the encounter Jesus had with people.135 He argues, moving forward is a constant theme 
within the Gospels: The shepherds hurry to see the baby Jesus (Luke 2: 8-21), the 
disciples called to leave everything and follow Jesus (Matt. 4: 18-22) Zacchaeus climbs 
the tree to see Jesus (Luke 19: 3-5), the woman with haemorrhage pushes forward to 
touch Jesus (Luke 8: 43-48) and the prodigal son turns towards home (Luke 15: 11-32). 
Keenan’s idea of using movement is centered on a movement towards God. This is one 
of the best descriptions of the “theological use of scripture.” He may be lacking in 
exegesis but he brings out the theological significance of the text as it relates to virtue 
as a moral theologian. 
 Like Cessario and Keenan, Kotva also admits the compatibility between 
scripture and virtue ethics.136 But unlike them Kotva uses scripture in the “moral 
sense”. Scripture for him is used as an authority. This is an approach common within 
the Reformed Tradition as we have seen. For example he does this by appealing to the 
Beatitudes in Matt. 5:3-6 to stress the internal qualities exhorted by Christ which are 
reflective of virtues’ emphasis on dispositions. Like Keenan, he comments on the 
Sermon on the Mount but interprets them rather as entirely having a direct link with 
virtue ethics which this thesis considers not completely so: 
 Consider, for example, the Sermon on the Mount. The beatitudes depict 
the kinds of people and actions that will receive full share in God’s 
coming Kingdom. In pronouncing blessings on the “poor in spirit” 
(5:3), on those who “hunger and thirst for righteousness” (5:6), and 
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those who are “pure of heart” (5:8), Matthew’s Jesus promises God’s 
reign to those who are humble before God, who yearn for and desire 
God’s justice, and who live from a position of genuineness and 
integrity. While these and other blessings presuppose action, they also 
commend a posture reflecting certain attitudes and feeling.137 
One may seek to interpret these beatitudes along the lines of virtue ethics but to claim 
that they have direct link with virtue ethics will be too presumptuous. This goes to show 
how he uses scripture as an authoritative source. 
Hermeneutically, one of Kotva’s dialoguing partners is Allen Verhey who in 
The Great Reversal: Ethics and the New Testament suggests that the text of the 
beatitudes demands certain character traits and in fact creating what he calls a 
“catalogue of virtues”.138 This explains the antithesis in Matt. 5: 21-48 where there is a 
movement from external actions to internal dispositions: “Jesus never denies that 
killing is wrong, but he explicitly warns about anger (5:27-28)”139 Here Jesus addresses 
the root of murder which is anger. What Kotva is doing is to show how the gospel 
narratives provide a context which forms our individual and collective personalities. 
This is in line with Hauerwas conception of how narrative affects virtue.140  
Kotva repeatedly turns to St. Paul’s writings to re-enforce the internal qualities 
he argues in favour of in Matthew. For example, he appeals to the lists of virtues in 
Romans 1:29-31; 13:13; 1 Cor. 5:10-11. Kotva in his use of Scripture explores both 
Matthew’s and Pauline literary and rhetorical devices that are consistent with virtue 
ethics, for example moral paradigms, and illustrations of character traits. While 
Matthew’s supremacy of Jesus structures the distinctive virtues of a person, Paul’s 
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insistence on God’s grace makes a Kotva’s approach comprehensive. 
Kotva also employs the “theological use” of scripture. Parallel to Keenan’s 
conception of discipleship as the call Jesus offers in the New Testament, Kotva is 
convinced that Jesus calls his disciples, trains them and becomes a true model to 
them.141 Also like Keenan, Kotva employs the concept of moral growth through the use 
of terms like “walking” or “racing” in the light of Christian demands depicted in texts 
like Rom. 6:4; 8:4; 1 Thess. 2:12; 1 Cor. 3:3; 1 Cor. 9:24-27. According to Keenan and 
Kotva, the Christian life through virtue is dynamic not static.142 Kotva particularly uses 
concepts like transformation and sanctification to highlight the above point. 
On the whole, we can say that Kotva in particular is more grounded in biblical 
exegesis and hermeneutics than Cessario and Keenan. This explains his criticism of 
Cessario for inappropriate use of Scripture.143 While Cessario and Keenan will more 
often use scripture as proof-text, Kotva engages with the text through a hermeneutical 
method of correlation and appropriation as emphasized in chapter four. Again Kotva is 
more specific in his choice of texts which capture both the implicit and explicit 
language of virtue better than Cessario and Keenan. Perhaps this is borne out of the 
knowledge that for the Reformed tradition Scripture has a regulative function.144  
 Interestingly, Kotva’s choice of Matthew, which at first value represents a law-
ethic and Paul’s emphasis on grace seemingly, gives little space for virtue ethics. But 
the methodology that he applies persuasively shows how these books are connected to 
virtue ethics through a conversation by realizing the relevance of Spohn’s assertion:  
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Readers who are seeking meaning rather than a detached, objective 
picture of Jesus cannot treat the . . . text as a relic. They must enter 
into conversation with it, bring their questions and concerns into ‘the 
world of the text’ and interrogate it from new angles. They also must 
let the text interrogate them and allow its strangeness to upset their 
familiar frameworks and assumptions. It must enter the world of the 
reader to generate fresh meaning.145 
 
The on-going application of biblical text into moral reflection reiterates the 
significance of scripture in moral theology as we explained in chapter one. To 
adequately interpret Scripture and relate it to moral theology one needs to be aware of 
four tasks as identified by Kenneth R. Himes in “Scripture and Ethics: A Review 
Essay”:  
-The Exegetical task: examines the text from its original context. 
-The Hermeneutical task: assesses the meaning of the text for today. 
-The Methodological task: shows how scripture is used in moral Reflection 
-The Theological Task: explicates the relationship of scripture to other sources of 
moral wisdom.146  
Sandra M. Schneiders in The Revelatory Text incorporates these tasks into her three 
hermeneutical models: The World Behind the Text, The World of the Text, and The 
World Before the Text.147  
Kotva’s interpretations or application of Matthew, Paul and other biblical texts 
he uses are based on Himes third and fourth tasks: Methodological and Theological 
tasks. He ignores the broader historical, cultural, literary contexts of the text. But the 
interest here is to agree with Spohn who argues that Scripture today is read through 
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ethics than through history.148 Perhaps this explains the inability of Cessario, Keenan 
and Kotva to reflect the “world behind the text” that is the history of composition of 
the various texts used. But in the words of Gula: “Any use of the Bible is uncritical 
which ignores the cultural horizons and presuppositions both ‘behind the text’ and ‘in 
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5.4 The Human Person as the Image of God: A Biblical-Theological View 
The question ‘what is a human person?’ is a question that has challenged all generations 
and different fields of study.150 For some, it is best answered through philosophical 
inquiries. For example the German Philosopher Emmanuel Kant summarizes his 
understanding of the human person by answering four fundamental questions 1. What is 
man? (Anthropology) 2. What can I know (Epistemology)? 3. What ought I do? 
(Ethics) 4. What may I hope? (Religion). The last three questions cannot be adequately 
answered without consideration of the first which deals with the identity and nature of 
the human person.151  Religions offer a deeper insight into the experiences, narratives 
and concepts pertaining to the human person as existence, meaning and purpose of the 
human life. Catholic Christian theology drawing upon both sources of faith and reason 
seeks to present a holistic approach to the human person.  
Put together, one can consider the human person as a created, social, political, 
historical, moral and spiritual being.152  However, this section shall consider the human 
person from the biblical anthropological perspective as created in the image and 
likeness of God. This thesis chooses to restrict our understanding of the human person 
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to Imago Dei for the following reasons: Firstly, to consider the human person from the 
various fields of inquiry will be rather too broad. Secondly, the concept of the Imago 
can encompass key concepts pertinent to our subject and to moral theology as whole.153 
There are other relevant biblical passages that speak of the person as an image 
of God, the central biblical reference concerns creation: “Let us make humankind in our 
image, according to our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, 
and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the 
earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth” (Gen. 1: 26-27). 
According to Michael Maher, in Genesis: “The phrase as a whole is meant to convey 
the idea that humanity, the high point of creation, was brought into being as a result of a 
special divine choice and decision.”154 In the creation narrative of Genesis only the 
human person is created in God’s “image” (tselem) and “likeness” (Demuth).  
According to Gula: “To say that the human person is the “image of God” is first 
a theological statement before it is an anthropological one. This means that it says 
something about the relation between God and us which has implications for what it 
means to be human.”155 Both the theological and anthropological understanding of the 
human person as the “image of God” is highlighted more in the New Testament. For 
example James 3:9, forbids the use of the tongue to curse other persons because we 
have been made in God’s likeness. Again in 2 Cor. 3:18, St. Paul writes: “And all of us, 
with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror, are 
being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another; for this 
comes from the Lord, the Spirit.”  
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The above text unveils a progressive nature of the image of God within us while 
the Old Testament texts show how the human person originated. This progressive 
nature of the image of God is further expressed by St. Paul in his letter to the Ephesians 
4: 23-24:  “Be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and to clothe yourselves with the 
new self, created according to the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness.” 
From this context therefore, the human person is not the definitive image-bearer of 
God; Jesus Christ is (2 Cor. 4:4; Col. 1:15).156 James and Demarest argue:  
By entering our time and space, the Son of God has given visible 
demonstration of what God is like (John 1: 18; 14:9). God’s purpose 
for His twice-born children is that they should “be conformed to the 
likeness of his Son” (Rom. 8:29). Thus through the new birth and life-
long “imitation of Christ” . . . believers are being shaped into the 
likeness of Christ, the perfect image of God. The fact of the human 
being’s creation in God’s likeness is stated in the first page of the 
Bible; but not until the revelation of God’s Son and His redeeming 
work did the full implications of the human person’s resemblance to 
God become clear.157 
 
 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church also states: 
 
It is in Christ the ‘image of the invisible God’, that man has been 
created ‘in the image and likeness’ of the Creator. It is in Christ, 
Redeemer and Saviour, that the divine image, disfigured in man by the 
first sin, has been restored to its original beauty and ennobled by the 
grace of God.158 
 
 The history of Christian theology has affirmed that over the centuries there 
have been developments and different interpretations of the doctrine of the Imago Dei. 
The International Theological Commission in a document titled Communion and 
Stewardship: Human Persons Created in the Image of God writes:  
Patristic and medieval theology diverged at certain points from 
biblical anthropology, and developed it at other points. The majority 
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of the representatives of the tradition, for example, did not fully 
embrace the biblical vision which identified the image with the 
totality of man. A significant development of the biblical account was 
the distinction between image and likeness, introduced by St. 
Irenaeus, according to which ‘image’ denotes an ontological 
participation (methexis) and ‘likeness’ (mimêsis) a moral 
transformation (Adv. Haer. V,6,1; V,8,1; V,16,2). According to 
Tertullian, God created man in his image and gave him the breath of 
life as his likeness. While the image can never be destroyed, the 
likeness can be lost by sin (Bapt. 5, 6.7). St. Augustine did not take up 
this distinction, but presented a more personalistic, psychological and 
existential account of the imago Dei. For him, the image of God in 
man has a Trinitarian structure, reflecting either the tripartite structure 
of the human soul (spirit, self-consciousness, and love) or the 
threefold aspects of the psyche (memory, intelligence, and will). 
According to Augustine, the image of God in man orients him to God 
in invocation, knowledge and love.159 
These divergent patristic views have greatly influenced the writings of the scholastics. 
For example, the Commission continues by explaining this influence in the works of 
Aquinas, Bonaventure and Meister Eckhart:  
 
In Thomas Aquinas, the Imago Dei possesses an historical character, 
since it passes through three stages: the imago creationis (naturae), the 
imago recreationis (gratiae), and the similitudinis (gloriae) (ST I q.93 
a.4). For Aquinas, the Imago Dei is the basis for participation in the 
divine life. The image of God is realized principally in an act of 
contemplation in the intellect (ST I q.93 a.4 and 7). This conception can 
be distinguished from that of Bonaventure, for whom the image is 
realized chiefly through the will in the religious act of man (Sent. II 
d.16 a.2, q.3). Within a similar mystical vision, but with a greater 
boldness, Meister Eckhart tends to spiritualize the Imago Dei by 
placing it at the summit of the soul and detaching it from the body 
(Quint. I, 5, 5-7; V, 6.9s).160 
 
 
Across the divergent approaches, it may be said that the concept of the Imago Dei is 
what makes humans human.161 One anthropological implication is that we all share in 
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the same human condition. Our existence as persons is based on the divine love of God, 
which is a Trinity that remains a great symbol of our relationality; God says: “let us 
make man”.162 Gula further captures: 
The Trinitarian doctrine implies a communitarian understanding of 
being human. The trinitarian vision sees that no one exists by oneself, 
but only in relationship to others. To be is to be in relationship. The 
individual and the community co-exist. Humanity and relatedness are 
proportional so that the deeper one’s participations in relationship is, 
the more human one becomes. Since community is necessary to grow 
in God’s image.163 
 
Moral principles therefore can be generated as we enter into relationships with other 
people. Principles that help us discover who we are and who we can be within ourselves 
and in relation to others.164 
Millard J Erickson in Christian Theology goes on to further convey the 
theological-pastoral implications:  
Our understanding of the image will affect how we treat our fellow 
humans and how we minister to them. If we understand the image as 
being primarily human reason, then our dealings with others will be 
basically of an educative and cognitive nature. If we understand the 
image to consist in personal relationships, our ministry will emphasize 
“relational theology” and small-group interaction.165 
 
To adequately consider the human person that is consistent with biblical notion, we turn 
to the three-fold view of image presented by Erickson. He examines the idea according 
to a substantive, relational, and the functional view.166 The trifold approach will enable 
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us to place the three theologians under study within these three respective views of the 
human person.  
5.4.1 Substantive View 
Traditionally, the substantive view interprets the uniqueness of the Imago Dei in terms 
of humans exclusively possessing reason or intellect, will and other spiritual 
characteristics.167 These capacities are what distinguish humans from other animals.168 
This explains the use of the term Homo sapiens, thinking beings. The substantive view 
has been a major view in the history of Christian theology.169 Its interpretative process 
is based on the text of Gen. 1:26-27. Erickson remarks: “On the basis of Genesis 1:26-
27 a tendency gradually developed to understand “image” and “likeness” as two 
aspects or dimensions of the image of God.”170  
Different conceptions on “image” and “likeness” developed over time in 
Christian theology. To this effect, the patristic Fathers and later medieval theologians 
where polarized in distinguishing between image and likeness. For example, in the 
early centuries of the church, Justin Martyr (100-165) in his Apology outlined the 
“image” in relation to reason and moral aptitude: “In the beginning when God created 
man, he endowed him with the power of understanding, of choosing the truth, and of 
doing right.”171 While St. Augustine posited that the imago inhabited the rational, 
spiritual soul and mind.172 His anthropology is further linked to his theology of the 
person when he argued that the human person could “use reason and intelligence to 
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understand and behold God”.173  Augustine does not show a clear distinction between 
the image and likeness. But St. Irenaeus the bishop of Lyons developed a systematic 
distinction between image and likeness.174 In his treatise Against Heresies he argues 
that the image means that Adam had reason and freewill, while the likeness indicated 
some sort of supernatural benefaction. Accordingly, at the fall Adam lost the likeness 
but retained the image to some degree.175 
 This distinction between image and likeness by Irenaeus was further advanced 
by the scholastics. The Aristotelian-Thomistic version of the substantive view is 
considered the best version.176 According to Beck and Demarest: “Aquinas wedded 
Aristotelian logic with Augustinian anthropology. Thomas endorsed the patristic and 
medieval distinction between image (the intellectual nature retained after the Fall) and 
likeness (conferred righteousness lost at the Fall).”177 Aquinas affirms that a human 
person “is said to be made to the image and likeness of God” specifically with respect 
to “the end or terminus of the production of man” which is God.178 He further 
articulates:  
 
Since it is because of his intellectual nature that man is said to be made 
to the image of God, it follows that he is made to God’s image to the 
highest degree to the extent that his intellectual nature is able to imitate 
God to the highest degree. But it is with respect to God’s knowing and 
loving Himself that an intellectual nature especially imitates God.179 
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Aquinas therefore synthesized the works of the early fathers like Augustine and Origen 
and developed a theological-anthropology of the Imago Dei that is also teleological in 
nature. Unfortunately, this theological synthesis was unsuitable to the Reformers. 
The Reformers rejected the distinction between image and likeness that 
characterized some of the writings of the patristic Fathers and systematized by the 
scholastics. Martin Luther for example in his Lectures on Genesis does not see a 
distinction between image and likeness. He posits that it expresses a common Hebrew 
tradition of parallelism.180 He takes an extreme position when he argues that all 
features of the image of God in man were corrupted and what is left is but a relic.181 
Luther takes this position in order to argue in favour of the grace of God and so de-
emphasize merits which seem to be apparent in scholastic distinction or more precisely 
a feature in Catholic theology. 
 These polarized interpretations within the substantive view of the human 
person leave uncoordinated conceptions of the image of God. But Erickson concludes 
that although they differ, however, “they agree in one particular: the locus of the 
image. It is located within humans as a resident quality or capacity. Although conferred 
by God, the image resides in humans whether or not they recognize God’s existence 
and his work.”182  
In relation to virtue, Erickson’s conclusion suggests that the infused virtues are 
part of the image and likeness of God that was not lost by sin. It also suggests the 
acquired virtues can be developed by people whether or not they believe in God. 
Remarkably, all the virtues both infused and acquired find a locus within the human 
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person; in fact the acquired virtues are called human virtues. From the above, one can 
argue that virtue ethics helps in realizing the fuller image of God in the human person.  
 As we stated earlier, the substantive view has dominated the history of 
Christian theology. Yet it has not gone unchallenged. Lilley, offers us three prototypes 
of the challenge: Firstly, the substantive view negates people with mental or physical 
disabilities because it only emphasises the intellectual dimension of the person.183 
Secondly, the substantive view appears to depart from the original, scriptural context 
of the Imago Dei, by appealing to non-biblical concepts for example the ancient Greek 
concept of reason.184 Thirdly, the substantive view ignores the presuppositions of 
biological evolution. More specifically, it does not take into account the radically 
embodied nature of human persons, and capitulates to a rudimentary and 
unsophisticated form of mind-body dualism.185 
5.4.2 Relational View 
The conceptualization of the human person within the substantive view maintains that 
the Imago Dei resides in the capacity to reason. Contrary to this, the relational view 
develops a interactive understanding of the Image of God. Theologians in support of 
this view argue that the image and likeness consists in establishing relationships.186 
Erickson also contends: “Humans can be said to be in the image or to display the 
image when standing in a particular relationship.”187  
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The relational view epitomizes a moving away from post-modern critique of 
individualism.188 It finds its basis in the “I-thou” personalism of Martin Buber (1878-
1965). 189  From this context then, existentialism becomes the philosophy that 
accentuates the relational view.190 P. Donati develops Buber’s “I-thou” personalism 
when he writes:  
The human person is someone who, standing in between the natural 
world (bio-physical) and transcendence, develops through social 
interaction. At the start, the person is a subject or potential self (“I”) 
who, through experience (practice), gets out of nature and becomes a 
primary agent (“me”), then a corporate agent (“we”), then an actor 
(auctor) (“you”). To me, it is at this point that the dialectic I/you meets 
the need to cope with the transcendental world. Then the subject returns 
on to the “I” as self. The “exit” from nature must always pass through 
the nature again and again. The transcendental reality is treated in the 
reflexive phase that the subject realizes after having passed through 
practice and sociality.191 
 
Paul K. Jewett gives a theological explanation to Buber’s personalism of “I-thou”. 
Jewett in Who we Are: Our Dignity as Human defines imago relationally: “To be 
created in the divine image is to be so endowed that one lives one’s life in an 
ineluctable relationship with God and neighbour. The neighbour is that human ‘other’ 
that ‘thou,’ in relation to whom I know myself as ‘I’.”192 
Essentially, the relational view finds adequate explanation in the theological 
anthropology inherent in the doctrine of the trinity.193 Therefore, theologians in favour 
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of this view ascertain the image to be strictly in human relationships. For example the 
neo-orthodox theologian Karl Barth in Church Dogmatics holds the relational view of 
the image of God. Barth argues that the image of God is consisting both in vertical and 
horizontal relationships; vertical between humans and God, horizontal between 
humans.194 By such relationships with God man becomes an associate, a co-creator 
with God. Interpreting Barth, Erickson captures: “He especially sees this in the male-
female relationship, so that the statement  “male and female created he them” is in 
effect a parallel to the statement that God created humans in his own image.”195 The 
inference is that the image is found in all humans and at all times. In this sense, the 
image is never loss even in the state of sin.196 The most perfect image of God is Christ. 
For Barth to understand our humanity we must understand the paradigmatic image in 
Christ.197 
From the above presentation, the relational view emphasizes that the image is 
evolving. Stanley J. Grenz in Created for Community construes the image as that 
which one becomes and not something given: God desires that we become the image 
of God.” He further adds: “Ultimately, the ‘image of God’ is a social reality. It refers to 
humans as beings-in-fellowship.”198 This means that humans are only truly human 
within a social context. 
The relational view of the person does have a link to the social content of 
virtue. To establish this link Milton Fisk in Ethics and Society: a Marxist 
Interpretation of Value argues that we must first decipher the moral sense of goodness 
which may be personal or corporate: personal when it advances the needs of he 
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individual independent of the needs of the group and corporate when it advances the 
realization of the needs characteristic of a group.199 When we apply this conception to 
our study, personal goodness must be done within the parameters of internal historical 
needs of the community, a social whole. In this sense therefore, the virtuous person is 
not an isolated person but one who is in tune with the tendencies characteristic of his 
community:  
Virtues are among the tendencies needed for groups. Virtues are behind 
the systematic continuous efforts to advance group interests without 
which a group could not persist. And so if social entities do not exist 
without virtues and if good actions advance the purposes of social 
entities, the good actions do not exist without virtues.200 
 
Virtue therefore becomes both a necessary theological and ontological condition for 
adequate relationality.201 
In the relational view of the human person, theologians do not show a  
distinction between the “image” and “likeness” as we saw in the substantive view. This 
view too does not go unchallenged.  According to Erickson, the view that the image of 
God is totally a relational matter is problematic.202 He highlights two of the problems; 
the first is the universality of the image; “In what sense can it be said that those who 
are living in total indifference to God, or even in hostile rebellion against him, are (or 
are in) the image of God? Second, “what is it about humans that enables them to have 
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5.4.3 Functional View 
This view treats the human person as an operational being rather than a metaphysical 
being. The common concept in the functional view is that “the image is not something 
present in the makeup of the human, nor the experiencing of relationship with God or 
with fellow humans, but rather consists in something one does. It is a human 
function”.204 This view primarily considers the tasks an individual performs rather than 
the constitutive qualities that make the person.  
 Traditionally, the functional view interprets the image in relation to the 
dominion of the material world by the human person.205 This view attempts to describe 
the content of the image which was lacking in both the substantive and relational 
views.206 According to a Racovian Catechism (anti-trinitarian) cited by Erickson: “The 
exercise of dominion is considered to be the content of the image of God.”207 For 
Erickson, the basis of this view is: 
In Genesis 1:26 ‘Let us make mankind in our image, in our likeness” is 
followed immediately by “so that they may rule over the fish of the sea 
. . .’ A close connection between these two concepts is found not only 
in this verse . . . but also in verses 27-28, where we read that God did in 
fact create humans in the image of God and issue to them a command to 
have dominion.208  
 
Man naming and domesticating the animals further brings out this dominion in Gen. 
2:19-20. Again we shall return to this in chapter five. Another text used to support the 
functional view is Psalm 8:5-6: “You made them a little lower than the angels and 
crowned them with glory and honour. You made them rulers over the works of your 
hands; you put everything under their feet.” Although these verses do not use the words 
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image of God but it follows that the author is talking about the human person which 
Genesis says was made in the image and likeness of God. 
 Gerhard von Rad an Old Testament exegete maintains the functional view of the 
image of God in his book Genesis:  
In the ancient world a king erected images of himself throughout the 
empire to establish his authority to rule. The author of Genesis
 appropriated this ancient sense of şelem to conclude that man is placed 
upon earth in God’s image as God’s sovereign emblem. He is really 
only God’s representative, summoned to maintain and enforce God’s 
claims to dominion over the earth. The decisive thing about man’s 
similarity to God, therefore, is his function in the non-human world.209 
 
Based on von Rad’s interpretation, Beck and Demarest conclude that the functional 
view of the image resounds adequately with modern ecological and environmental 
concerns. 
The functional view also has links with virtue ethics. For example in ancient 
Greek, philosophers explained virtue in terms of function; humans for them have the 
function of engaging in rational activity in conformity with rational principles.210 
Functioning here means the carrying out of reasonable actions reasonably. In this sense, 
the virtuous person is one who acts consistently as human. For the Greeks what 
determines the function of the human is that the human must play his or her role as a 
citizen. And according to the functional view what determines a person’s image is the 
exercise of dominion within the material universe. In like manner, the human person 
must be able to exercise dominion over his capacities, dispositions, emotions and 
desires.  
This view also has its difficulties. Firstly, it reduces the content of human 
person to mere dominion and therefore draws upon philosophical functionalism.211 
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Secondly, it equates the function of the person with the image rather than be seen as an 
aspect or a consequence of the image.212 Thirdly, it does not show the limits to one’s 
functional ability in relation to another’s functional ability. 
 
5.5 Convergences and Divergences: Substantive, Relational, and Functional Views  
The twentieth century has seen a turn to the human person in philosophy and theology. 
During the Second Vatican Council, the then young Karol Wojtyla observed that the 
greatest problem of the modern age was the erosion of the dignity of the human person 
by the depersonalizing strategies of the ideologies of Nazism and communism.213 In 
response to his observations, John Paul II, influenced by the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
tradition and the Phenomenology of Max Scheler, shaped his philosophical-theological 
ideas on the human person. In The Acting Person he argues that the human person is 
not just a bundle of emotions and sensory perceptions but a real person and operational 
agent.214  
At the Vatican Council itself, Gaudium et Spes developed and proposed a 
deeper view of the human person. The document gives a dynamic account of the 
human person based on biblical data in answering the question “what is man?”. It 
sought to understand the human person based on revelation but also acknowledging the 
complexities inherent in the positions of the human sciences.215 It accepts that an 
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 Within the Christian tradition, it is possible to categorise the variety of 
approaches into three models: substantive, functional and relational views. The three 
theologians at the centre our study may also be categorised accordingly.  
Firstly, Cessario, Keenan, and Kotva are in agreement that virtue ethics 
concerns the human person. This is seen against the backdrop of other methods of 
normative ethics like deontology and consequentialism that are action-centered. We 
have argued that virtue ethics is not only concerned with dispositions and isolated 
actions of persons but the whole of the person. The three scholars under study all argue 
that the “image” is a resident quality or capacity in all humans. It means that all virtues 
both acquired or infused find a locus in the human person.  
 Secondly, the substantive view as formerly detailed is one of the major views in 
Christian theology because it encompasses reason, will, and spiritual abilities in its 
conception of the human person. Furthermore, its views are based on the biblical text 
of Genesis 1: 26-27 which speaks of the human person being made in the image and 
likeness of God. In general, Cessario, Keenan, and Kotva can be situated within the 
substantive view of the human person that is expressive of virtue ethics. For example 
Cessario argues in line with Aquinas’s position when he affirms that the human person 
is said to be made in the image and likeness of God especially with respect to the end 
of man; namely God.216  Cessario himself writes: “Central to a theological view of the 
human person, such as set forth in the doctrine of the Imago Dei, remains the faith-
affirmation that ultimate destiny of each individual lies in beatific fellowship with the 
blessed Trinity . . . God remains our final goal.”217  For Aquinas the image is present in 
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all human persons.218 Since Cessario follows Aquinas’s concept of the substantive 
view it means the above statement counters the criticism by Lilley that the view 
neglects people with physical disability.219 
Cessario also follows Augustine’s concept of the Imago Dei which was adopted 
by Aquinas.220 But Augustine goes further by stating that the image is present in 
humanity only through humanity’s response to the image through a righteous or 
virtuous life. Like Augustine however, Cessario did not show a distinction between 
image and likeness like did some of the Patristic Fathers. 
 For Cessario, the human person has to be understood from the perspective of 
his telos which is God. Cessario connects his substantive view with virtue by stating: 
“The theologian must define virtue only by reference to what contributes to the 
perfection of the image of God in each individual.” 221  Therefore, he gives a 
transcendental-teleological explanation of the human person. This category has 
become one of the most dominant features in the whole of Christian anthropology. One 
can see a merging together between philosophy and theology in Cessario’s conceptions 
of the human person when he insists that the human person discovers God’s 
communication through human reason and revelation in the person of Christ.222 By so 
doing, Cessario integrates natural law and theology. Sadly, he does not clearly explain 
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The conclusion Cessario arrives at is that in using the concept of imago Dei as a 
theological category simply re-states the origins and destiny of the human person.  And 
the substantive view of the human person in relation to virtue ethics incorporates both 
the cognitive, affective and appetitive capacities.  
As stated in chapter three, the entire theological structure of Keenan’s approach 
on virtue is build around the human person. Keenan accuses other ethicists of 
depersonalizing ethics.223 Keenan’s answers to the three anthropological questions we 
explored in chapter three place his conception of the human person on both the 
substantive view and the relational view. For example his answer to the first question 
of “who we are?” through a dialogue with Tillmann and Demmer states that we are 
disciples who are made in the image and likeness of God.224 He further argues that 
one’s identity is defined based on relationships not only with God but also with others 
and oneself.225 Through the above assertions Keenan therefore creates a link between 
the substantive and relational views. In this sense the substantive view which 
emphasizes response to God’s call is highlighted by Keenan when he writes: “He God 
is the unsurpassable goal who always goes before us, making our call to follow him a 
dynamic movement.”226 This call is made more practical in the person of Jesus. Thus, 
the human person through the substantive view can be understood through the person 
of Christ, because Jesus is the paradigmatic image and likeness of God. However, the 
fuller understanding is contingent upon the quality of our relationality: through the 
imitation of Christ, we must love one another as he loved, and forgive as he forgave. 
																																																								
223 See Keenan, “Proposing Cardinal Virtues,” see also MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed. 
6-16, Keenan, “What is Ethics?”  
224 Harrington and Keenan, Jesus and Virtue Ethics, 49.  
225 Ibid., 55. 
226 Ibid. Italicized word is mine. 
	 374 
The substantive and relational views create a ‘double helix’ understanding of the 
human person.227   
Kotva, does not clearly develop the aspect of the concept of the substantive 
view on the image and likeness, but rather through a synthesis of the Christological 
approaches of Schillebeeckx, Kraus and Berkhof asserts that Christians know 
“something of our telos, of our true end, because we have seen that end in Christ. By 
looking to a specific, concrete life within history, we find clues to our true nature.”228 
To this end Jesus becomes a normative figure. For Kotva Jesus is “what humanity can 
be”.229 Connecting this view with virtue ethics, Kotva writes: “Virtue ethics, unlike 
other approaches, can fully embrace the claims Christians make about Jesus’ normative 
humanity. Theology sees in Jesus the new Human (cf. Rom 5:14; I Cor. 15:22, 45) and 
views him as exhibiting our true purpose, potential, and act.”230 To this end, we can 
categorize Kotva within the functional view. Christ salvific action finds meaning and 
purpose within the human person who is saved. As the human person recognizes 
Christ’s role in his life, he is brought into a deeper awareness of who he is or can 
become. 
5.5 The Human Person and Points for Further Consideration for Moral Theology 
The monolithic approach of the manuals that prevailed in the wake of the twentieth 
century has challenged the need of new and relevant approaches in moral theology 
especially since Vatican II. This process has begun through ressourcement and 
aggiornamento. Ressourcement calls for a return to the sources of scripture and 
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tradition while aggiornamento appeals to the church to re-engage in dialogue with the 
modern world.231 This means that moral theology has to be both anthropological and 
theological in its approach by turning to more operative concepts within its domain. 
These operative concepts should encompass the realms of God, the human person and 
the world.232  
Dialogue on the human person lies at the very core of moral theology. This is 
however, often taken for granted by theologians. For example, Philip S. Keane in an 
article “Catholic Moral Theology from 1960 to 2040: Accomplishments and 
Challenges for the Future” gives an appraisal of moral theology in the past forty years 
and the future of moral theology in the next forty years, without adequately addressing 
the place of the human person.233 Although often implicitly so, the human person must 
be more explicitly placed at the centre of moral theology.  
To this effect, this thesis has been concerned with three theorists and their 
accounts on virtue ethics with specific interest on the relational value of such a field. 
By means of three different models or traditions they have presented a theology of 
virtue ethics that is centred on the human person. In view of the three conceptions of 
the biblical views of the human person as substantive, relational and functional, this 
thesis proposes that moral theology and moral theologians could be fashioned or 
placed according to this schema.   
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SECTION 3 
5.6 Convergences and Divergences on The Relational Value of Virtue Ethics  
This thesis is committed to the refutation of virtue ethics’ charge for having a 
narcissistic approach. The focus in this section is to further this commitment. We argue 
that virtue ethics has a community or relational value. It should be noted that the 
community value which this thesis advocates is not identifiable with social conformity 
that vilifies individual self-worth.234 One of the great motivations of re-echoing the 
community value of virtue ethics is to de-emphasize quandary ethics and promote 
formation of character, socialization, spiritual and moral growth.235 To substantiate our 
position on the relational value of virtue ethics we need to elaborate on the distinction 
between liberalism and communitarianism. 
Early advocates of liberalism like John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer and James 
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock argue that the primary essential philosophical entity is 
the human person as an individual.236 While those who support communitarianism like 
Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and MacIntyre criticize liberalism for neglecting 
communal values in moral life.237 These argue that the narrative of community and 
tradition are essential aspects of personality identity, a position that argues against 
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individualist anthropology of liberalism.238 Society is not a ‘heap’ of individuals 
according to Spencer’s view but an organism with a composite internal life.239 It means 
that we cannot interpret people’s identity independent of their community.  
 Liberalism and communitarianism have their extremes; the former endorses 
extreme individualism while the latter considers an individual as the complete product 
of the community.  Hence, our concern here is to show the community value of virtue 
that eschews both extremes. The aim here is to emphasize the relational nature of 
virtue ethics. This is not to say that the virtue ethics favours community over an 
individual. We argue here that virtue ethics promotes standards of moral excellence 
that are consistent to both individuals and communities. Individual moral excellence 
rather has social content.  
To understand the social content of virtue Fisk argues that we must first grasp 
the moral sense of goodness which is both personal and communal.240 Personal 
goodness as used by Fisk only advances the needs of an individual while communal or 
corporate goodness are those that advance the realization of the needs representative of 
a group. However, the needs characteristic of a group are based on internal historical 
needs brought about by group membership.241 This means that personal goodness or 
virtue must be done within the parameters of the internal historical needs of the 
community. In this context, the virtuous person is not an isolated person, but one in 
total agreement and conformity to the characteristic needs of the community to which 
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he or she belongs.  The virtuous person naturally internalizes corporate tendencies and 
capacities and directs his dispositions, actions and emotions towards the good of the 
community.242 Fisk further argues: “Virtues are among the tendencies needed for 
groups. Virtues are behind the systematic and continuous efforts to advance group 
interests without which a group could not persist.”243 Therefore, we argue that virtue is 
more than a logical condition for being good or doing a good action but it is also an 
indispensable ontological condition for community living.244 This is because virtue is 
the disposition required within a social whole and it directs other capacities to fit into 
social purposes.245   
It follows that individuals shape themselves and the narrative of virtuous 
individuals that make the community further shapes their communal understanding. 
However, in the light of Fisk assumption, a definition of such narrative is made 
possible through and within a community’s relationships. This thesis argues that virtue 
ethics is foundational to the entire field of social ethics irrespective of the particular 
cultural context; black African, Latin American, American, European, Asian etc. In 
this sense, virtue becomes an animating force within all cultural contexts. 
Therefore, the relational value of virtue ethics is sensitive to the concerns of 
Beck and Demarest whose relational concepts of external and internal relations we 
have adopted.246 It should be noted that our approach here takes into cognizance their 
suggestions that any genuine theology of the human person must incorporate both the 
external and internal relations. 
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 First, virtues are innate or cultivated over time. Virtues are cultivated via social 
and political institutions, the family, the society, the school etc. Social institutions like 
the schools and family become the nucleus of formation of virtuous life. Cessario, 
Keenan and Kotva do not adequately further this course in their works. Perhaps this is 
to de-emphasize how virtue ethics becomes institutionalized within the above-
mentioned social units.247 However, to counter the gross individualism within Western 
culture, these social units especially the family must take centre stage within virtue 
ethics. 
Second, to understand the relational or community value of virtue ethics we 
need to understand how Cessario, Keenan, and Kotva differ in approaches. For 
example Cessario is more concerned with the transformation of sinful or disordered 
habits than the formation of the habits. He sacramentalizes his approach by arguing 
that the transformation of sinful behaviours of Christians comes about through Christ’s 
action within the community of the church.248 He also gives an ecclesiological and 
soteriological explanation to the relational value of virtue ethics by appealing to ascetic 
theology. This is evident in his use of terms like image-restoration and 
transformation.249 Cessario holds that there are three kinds of community: the natural 
family, the political community and the church which is the new community.250 All 
three communities serve the common good.251 However, Cessario gives the impression 
that the church is the community par excellence.252  
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 Similarly, Kotva accepts the relational value of virtue ethics but his approach is 
different from Cessario and Keenan. His approach is biblical in nature, which is 
identifiable with the Reformed Tradition. Within this approach he identifies with 
Cessario’s soteriological element when he discusses about Matthew’s procedure for 
dealing with sins (18:15-20).253 For him sins are not just personal matters but affects 
larger groups. For Kotva, Matthew insistence on involving community in issues 
contrary to internal norms within the Christian community expresses the value virtue 
ethics has on a living community. 254  This context is further expressed by the 
Matthew’s emphasis on the virtue of forgiveness that forms a basis of community 
living among early Christian life. Ogletree explains:  
The early church was a community gathered from the nations. Many 
natural supports for human association-family, kinship ties, a common 
language and culture, ethnic and racial identity- could no longer 
contribute directly to stable social order. The diversity of the 
community with regard to these factors actually increased the likelihood 
of unintended misunderstandings . . . communities transcending family, 
language, culture, and national identity could only sustain themselves 
through continual acts of forgiveness.255 
It means forgiveness is a necessary virtue for safeguarding and continuance of 
community. Kotva therefore concludes that our “social context is more than mere 
scenery or backdrop: we are morally interdependent.”256 Furthermore, Kotva’s biblical 
link is a buttress upon the fundamental aspect of Matthew’s ethics which is 
Christological. He argues that God in Christ invites us into a relationship with himself 
and one another.257 A relationship that is both individual and corporate. He provides a 
context for this relationship which is discipleship. However, Kotva’s biblical 
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perspective ignores the general anthropological links with people of no religious 
beliefs. 
Keenan also agrees that the morality of virtue ethics is fundamentally relational 
in nature. What makes him different from Cessario and Kotva is that his approach is 
highly anthropological and partly theological. At the anthropological level virtue ethics 
is person-centered and the virtues are consciously interiorized and practiced at both 
individual and communal levels by all people regardless of religious affiliations. 
Keenan’s personalist current makes this anthropological approach more pragmatic. He 
argued that we are relational in three ways; generally, specifically and uniquely.258 At 
the theological level he situates it within a communal setting of the Eucharist as seen in 
chapter three. We can thus argue that the Eucharist provides a dialogical setting that 
brings together both the anthropological and theological levels of the human person as 
a relational being with God as the source of our relationality. 
Keenan emphasises the relational nature of virtue ethics than Cessario and 
Kotva. For example he interlaces virtue ethics with sexual ethics, an approach which 
Cessario and Kotva neglected. Keenan argues that one of the best avenues that 
practically display the relational nature of the human person is found in human 
sexuality. 259  He argues that sex is a form of communication.260  Communication 
whether verbal or non-verbal is central in all relationships. The culmination and 
enhancement of this relational aspect of sex is attained with procreation.  He therefore 
concludes that virtues do not perfect powers within the person but perfect the 
relationships we have with one another. However, Keenan himself does not produce a 
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comprehensive account of the relationship between virtue ethics and sexual ethics as 
he fails to account fully on how virtue ethics can respond to contemporary sexual 
issues like contraception, homosexuality and pornography.  
 All three theologians as we have repeatedly stated accept the relational value of 
virtue ethics. But their relational and communal concepts are only restricted to 
interpersonal relationships. This is what we may call anthropocentric alienation. The 
huge gap in their works is that they failed to reflect the wider Christian context of 
relationship with the non-human world of nature, depicted in the ecological 
depredations of modern civilization.261 This gap is not only noticeable in the works of 
Cessario, Keenan, and Kotva but until very recently there has not been an official 
church document solely on humanity and environment. The recent encyclical by Pope 
Francis Laudato Si’ on care for our common home, addresses ecological issues in 
relation to humans with their ethical and moral consequences.262  
Until now, some church documents only make references to the relational 
nature between humans and the environment only in passing: For example, Mater et 
Magistra, 263  Populorum Progressio, 264  Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, 265  Centesimus 
Annus.266 Pope John Paul II spoke during addresses to groups of the ardent need to 
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address issues associated with global warming and pollution. Pope Benedict in a 
speech during the World Peace Day of 2010 followed John Paul II by arguing that it is 
a moral imperative to develop a good environmental attitude. Furthermore, in Caritas 
Veritatis Benedict made the case for protecting the environment for posterity.267 As an 
example Pope Benedict had installed solar panels in the Vatican and so made the 
Vatican the World’s first carbon-neutral state.268 Laudato Si’ in being the first church 
document to addressing the issue, implicitly identifies that there was a lacuna.  
5.6.1 The Human Relationality and Environment 
A close look at the creation account in Genesis 2 reveals how the narrative of the 
creation of the natural world has a connection with the narrative of the creation of 
humans; the man names the creatures which God had made before him.269 It implies 
that the creation of man and woman and the established relationship between them 
does not become the completion of the work of God. By naming the animals and the 
other created things man acknowledges them as creatures with which he shares the 
universe.270 According to Claus Westermann in Genesis: A Practical Commentary:  
In the biblical Creation narrative, humanity is considered to be God’s 
creation in all its relationships. Integral to the creation of the man is his 
environment (the garden), his food (the fruits of the garden), his work 
(v.15), his community (vv. 18-24), and in all of these his relationship to 
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his creator. God has created the human race as a totality that includes 
these elements of its existence.271   
In the same light Pope Francis re-echoes citing Pope Benedict:  
The world cannot be analysed by isolating only one of its aspects, since 
the book of nature is one and indivisible, and includes the environment, 
life, sexuality, the family, social relations and so forth. It follows that 
the deterioration of nature is closely connected to the culture which 
shapes human coexistence.272 
 
Therefore, human relationality is incomplete without reference to the 
environment. “If we take God seriously as Creator of the human race, we must 
acknowledge that God is also concerned with the environment, sustenance, work, and 
community.”273 From this perspective, our consideration of virtue ethics as a having a 
relational value will be deficient if we do not consider our relationship with the 
environment. At the same time humanity’s relationship with other created things 
cannot be placed at par with the relationship between humans. In as much as humanity 
does not treat other creatures with insensitivity, it should not as well try to humanize 
these creatures. A balance needs to be established. Unfortunately, the needed balance 
seem obscured by the way humanity relates to and uses the universe.  
According to Häring, ecological issues are special relational problems, because 
they reveal the highest forms of disorder within social processes and relationships.274 
In modern times, ecological issues have generated a series of reactions leading to 
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different paradigms.275 There are those who argue that due to humanity’s unrestrained 
activities of exploiting nature, the human life is at the brink of possible extinction. One 
of the early advocates of this extreme position is Gordon Taylor in The Doomsday 
Book: Can The World Survive? He vehemently argues that human life stands the risk 
of extinction due to the destruction of nature.276 Conversely, there are those who deny 
there is an ecological problem and criticized the above as being over dramatic. For 
example Thomas R. Shepard in an article titled “Disaster Lobby” claims that the earth 
is becoming cleaner and safer and the human species is not in anyway threatened.277  
But Henlee H. Barnette in The Church and The Ecological Crisis tries to take a 
middle position between the two extremes expressed above. He writes: “Somewhere 
between the radical position of those who see doomsday is around the corner and those 
who deny that there is any environmental problem at all lies the truth of the matter.”278 
Barnette agrees there are ecological issues that need attention. For example, water 
pollution, air pollution, eco-backlash-causing flooding, drought and warmer 
temperatures etc. that have been caused by anthropocentrism, technology, 
consumerism and overpopulation.279 Biologists approximates that about one thousand 
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plants and animal species become non-existent annually (three per day).280 But there is 
scientific consensus today about the environmental problems facing humanity.281 This 
means that the order of Genesis has been grossly compromised. Richard Bauckham in 
an article “Humans, Animals, and the Environment in Genesis 1-3” writes:  
The order of the cosmos portrayed in Genesis has been unprecedentedly 
disrupted by modern humanity’s scientific-technological project of 
unlimited domination of the whole world. Modern humans have 
overfilled the earth and grossly depleted its resources without regard to 
the fate of other species. Genesis 1 coheres closely with the lesson 
taught over and over by ecological catastrophe, already happening or 
unavoidably imminent: that humans must exercise their right to put the 
earth to use within strict ecological limits and that they exceed these 
limits at their own peril, as well as that of other species and the planet 
itself. Our modern knowledge of the interconnectedness of all life on 
earth can provide us with renewed appreciation of the portrayal in 
Genesis 1 of the ordered interrelationships of the creatures, while its 
emphasis on variety warrants contemporary concerns about 
biodiversity.282 
Very recently, there are some scientists who argue that the current global 
warming is not due to “anthropogenic and natural forcings” but due to solar 
variability.283 They produce a composite that implies warming trends during the 
periods of 1880s-1940s and 1980s-2000s. According to them the estimates imply a 
more prominent cooling trend during the 1950s-1970s. Therefore they concluded the 
relative warm of the mid 20th century is comparable to the recent warm period.284 It 
means that the trend is cyclical. However, they arguments do not deny the pollution 
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inherent in both land and sea due to human activity. The danger here is to ignore care 
of the earth and business as usual becomes the order of the day. 
Nonetheless, in the last century to date, humanity has come to realize the need 
to take care of the environment. This challenge is echoed by International and national 
Organizations, government and non-governmental organizations, for example, United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), World Nature Organization (WNO), 
Climate Action Network (CAN-Europe) etc. Until recently, religious organizations 
have been more concerned with issues of war, social justice, sexual ethics e.t.c than 
ecological issues.285 There is a challenge before us and today the church recognizes 
this challenge.286 For example Pope Benedict XVI in The Garden of God: Toward a 
Human Ecology writes:  
We need to care for the environment: it has been entrusted to men and 
women to be protected and cultivated with responsible freedom, with 
the good of all as a guiding criterion. Human beings, obviously are of 
supreme worth vis-à-vis creation as a whole. Respecting the 
environment does not mean considering material or animal nature more 
important than man. Rather, it means not selfishly considering nature to 
be at the complete disposal of our own interest, for future generations 
also have the right to reap its benefits and to exhibit towards nature the 
same responsible freedom that we claim for ourselves.287 
The Pontiff further avers the earth is “our common home” and must be protected.288 
Mark I. Wallace in Green Christianity: Five Ways to a Sustainable Future concludes: 
“Today, many North American churches, synagogues, mosques, and other places of 
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worship are transforming themselves into forward-based earth-care centers committed 
to protecting God’s creation, sustainable lifestyles, and safeguarding the public 
health.”289 
 There are ways to protect the earth which have been proffered by institutions 
and international organizations, for example Montreal Protocol. The scientist can 
provide us with the needed information about the depletion of the earth and the 
consequences. However, science cannot answer the ethical questions like “why should 
endangered species or polluted oceans or disappearing rain forests, drying up of small 
rivers and drought in so many places matter morally at all?”290 Such ethical or moral 
question finds answers within ethics, precisely virtue ethics. But how can we through 
virtue ethics respond to the ecological issues as part of the wider concept of our 
engagement within a relational model?  
This thesis has argued that in doing virtue ethics there is a link between our 
identity that is who we are and our actions that is how we ought behave. Therefore, the 
kind of people we are and how we live our lives can have impact on the environment. 
In the words of Benedict XVI: “The way humanity treats environment influences the 
way it treat itself, and vice versa”.291 This highlights the relational link between 
humanity and the environment. And Gustafson calls us to be aware that: “Man 
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(individual persons, communities, and species) is a participant in the patterns and 
processes of interdependence of life in the world.”292 
From the foregoing this thesis shall propose an all-inclusive relationality via a 
triad of ecological virtues based on the gap identified earlier: “ecological-justice”, 
“ecological-love”, and “ecological-prudence”. 
5.6.2 An All-Inclusive Relationality 
In 1933 Albert Schweitzer in Out of My Life and Thought observed that “the great fault 
of ethics hitherto has been to deal only with man’s relationships to man.” 293 
Shockingly, thirty-three years later the environmentalist Aldo Leopold in Sand County 
Almanac wrote: “No ethic dealing with man’s relations to land and of the animals and 
plants which grow upon it.”294 Both Schweitzer and Leopold underscored a lacuna and 
proposed that ethics should be more holistic by considering the relationship between 
humanity and their environment. Michael S. Northcott in an article “Ecology and 
Christian Ethics” argues that moral values situated “within certain capacities of persons 
be extended to beings in, and/or features of, the non-human world”.295 Therefore, we 
are part of nature and “we use our environment as a way to express our identity”.296 In 
effect, nature cannot be conceived only as a location in which humans exist but as an 
integral part of our existence. 
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Willis Jenkins in Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian 
Theology argues that humans have the tendency to connect their ideas about the virtues 
stringently to independence which does not reflect the Christian call for relationality.297 
It means that the Christian call to relationality provides a wider context best expressed 
by Curran as “relationship with the world.” It follows that there is need for humans to 
engage more with the world of nature in order to preserve it and consequently 
perpetuate the human specie. To this end, Curran writes: “Our relationship with the 
world calls for care, concern, reverence, and solidarity with our environment, we might 
call this virtue ecological stewardship.”298  
In what follows, the next sub-sections shall examine what we may call 
“ecological virtues”. Our aims here are three:  First, to create a cross-disciplinary 
dialogue between moral theology and ecology that will emphasize the relevance of 
particular virtues and the environment as well. Note that Aquinas’s starting point in his 
theology is God’s creation, “he makes the doctrine of creation a major framework 
within which he places moral theology. The creation is one large and directed whole, 
and people experience this in their own beings.”299 Aquinas argues that at the fall, 
creation did not impede the intellectual ability of man to attain human potentialities. 
And Vandermeersch comments that these potentials are engraved in the human heart 
through God’s plan of creation.300 Therefore, Aquinas interlaces this framework with 
Aristotle’s ideas in order to attain ultimate happiness through the virtues. Such a 
connection has been lost in the history of moral theology. Therefore, this thesis is 
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committed to the resurgence of this Thomist framework. Second, to further expand the 
relational value of virtue ethics with respect to the non-human world of nature as an 
intrinsic aspect of the human relationality. Third, to further articulate that virtue ethics 
is about the formation of good people who invariably become good ecological 
participants; other humans, plants, animals, water etc.301 Fourthly, to further encourage 
what we may call environmental justice for its sustainability.  
Connecting virtue ethics with the environment means that a person whose 
character towards the environment is one of care will necessarily be sensitive to other 
people whom he or she interacts. For example John Muir expressed that his encounter 
with animals changed his perception of humanity and it increased his generosity and 
joy at being a part of the universe.302 In the light of Northcott’s proposal and the gap 
demonstrated in the works of Keenan, Cessario, and Kotva and the assertions made by 
Schweitzer and Leopold, in the succeeding sub-sections, this thesis will fill in the gap.  
   5.6.2.1 “Ecological-Justice” 
Pope Francis in Laudato Si’ writes: “We have to realize that a true ecological approach 
always becomes a social approach; it must integrate questions of justice in debates on 
the environment, so as to hear both the cry of the earth and the cry of the poor.”303 The 
term “ecological-justice” depicts the intrinsic connection between God, human person, 
and creation. Leonardo Boff in Ecology and Liberation writes: 
God is present in reality, profoundly immanent, and becomes 
transparent through medium of all created beings. This transparency is 
tarnished and obscured by the aggression that one creature, the human 
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being, practices on other creatures, and, tragically indeed, on his or her 
own kind. What should prevail instead is ecological justice-Respect for 
the otherness of beings and things.304 
The concept of ecological-justice is intended to refute man’s absolute 
domination over creation and its consequent implications to the exploitation of the 
earth’s resources and the inherent injustices therein for both contemporary society and 
posterity. This is what Pope Francis calls “intergenerational solidarity”.305 The failure 
to consider this is what Sean McDonagh calls the anthropocentric bias deeply rooted in 
our use of the earth’s resources.306 It is a bias that is rooted in the misinterpretation of 
the Priestly narrative of creation in Genesis 1: 26 “subdue the earth and have dominion 
over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and every living thing that moves on the 
earth.” McDonagh objects to the absolutism of humanity over creation. He writes:  
The Genesis account of creation is not entirely anthropocentric. One of 
the best examples of this wider vision is the Book of Job, which deals 
with the predicament of a just man who is made to suffer . . . Yahweh 
demands to know whether the Proud Job understands or can account for 
all the natural phenomena in the world around him. Yahweh asserts that 
not everything which he has created is meant for human use. Other 
creatures have their legitimate needs and Yahweh, as creator of all 
provides them with their unique habitat.307 
Thus, the domination or control of the natural world by man is to be considered from 
the perspective of perfecting it rather than exploiting it.308 McDonagh citing Gustavo 
Gutierrez comments on Job 38: 25-27, 39:5-6 further argues:  
God’s speeches are a forceful rejection of a purely anthropocentric view 
of creation. Not everything that exists was made to be directly useful to 
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human beings. Therefore they may not judge everything from their 
point of view. The world of nature expresses the freedom and delight of 
God in creating.309 
To explicate more on the concept of ecological-justice, we appeal to Gaudium 
et spes no. 34. The church in this document observes that although man was given 
mandate over the earth, yet he is called to rule over it with justice and holiness. Jürgen 
Moltmann in God and Creation argues that theology has the task of imparting modern 
scientific culture to look at the world as God’s creation rather than mere nature. That 
every creature has their own sanctity and integrity and is not ordinary matters to be 
manipulated for human purpose.310 Unfortunately, man understands only the command 
to subdue the earth but fails to comprehend the need and challenge to protect the earth 
for posterity. The consequent result is an unstrained consumption and exhaustion of the 
natural resources with no concern for future generations. 
There are three implications to ecological-justice: First that the otherness of 
things be respected and protected. Second that there is a call to consciousness that 
other human beings somewhere in the world are suffering more the exploitation of the 
nature and so ecological-justice has deep links with social injustice and even racism. 
For example in America: “Advocates of ecojustice note that toxic-waste dumps, 
chemical works, nuclear power stations, polluting factories and landfill sites are almost 
exclusively located in the neighbourhoods of poor people and people of colour.”311 
Northcott further argues: 
Developed countries are beginning to address some of these internal 
environmental equity problems by removing their dirtiest technologies 
and manufacturing facilities from poor neighbourhoods to poorer 
countries in the developing world, where labour is cheap and 
environmental regulations often non-existent.312 
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This situation is decried by Pope Francis: “There is also the damage caused by the 
export of solid waste and toxic liquids to developing countries, and by the pollution 
produced by companies which operate in less developed countries in ways they could 
never do at home, in the countries in which they raise their capital.”313 Citing the 
Regional Bishops of Patagonia-Comahue Argentina, the Pontiff  concludes:  
We note that often the businesses which operate this way are 
multinationals. They do here what they would never do in developed 
countries or the so-called first world. Generally, after ceasing their 
activity and withdrawing, they leave behind great human and 
environmental liabilities such as unemployment, abandoned towns, the 
depletion of natural reserves, deforestation, the impoverishment of 
agriculture and local stock breeding, open pits, riven hills, polluted 
rivers and handful of social works which are no longer sustainable.314 
 
Additionally, the toxic waste from such companies cause a lot of health hazards-
causing cancer, asthma and other respiratory diseases- to communities within which 
they are situated. 
Third, there is need to use earth’s resources bearing in mind the generations yet 
unborn. To this effect, Pope Francis writes: 
We can no longer speak of sustainable development apart form 
intergenerational solidarity. Once we start to think about the kind of 
world we are leaving for future generations, we look at things 
differently; we realize that the world is a gift which we have freely 
received and must share with others. Since the world has been given to 
us, we can no longer view reality in purely utilitarian way, in which 
efficiency and productivity are entirely geared to our individual benefit. 
Intergenerational solidarity is not optional, but rather a basic question of 
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 To place the second implication into perspective we wish to consider the impact of 
global warming has to the third world. By discussing this second implication, the other 
two will fall in place. 
In recent decades, scientists have proven that there is global warming which is 
human-induced and is moving at an unprecedented ratio for the past one thousand three 
hundred years.316 To be more precise in 2006, Al Gore in An Inconvenient Truth argues 
that the world is warmer than ever, and twelve warmest years in human history have 
occurred in the past twelve years.317 The consequences of this are serious. According to 
J. A. Church and N. J. White, there is a global rise in sea levels of about seventeen 
centimeters (6.7 inches) in the last century, but the rate in the last decade is nearly 
twice that of the last century. 318  This explains the erratic weather conditions 
experienced across the globe, increased occurrences of flash floods, drought and 
hurricanes. Unfortunately and fortunately, when these occur, the western world is well 
able to a large extend deal with them because of their technological and economic 
strengths.319 Sadly, the third world is always worst hit by such disasters because of 
poverty and lack of necessary technologies: “The deleterious effects will have greater 
impact on the populations that are already marginalized or with low incomes, such as 
those of sub-Sahara Africa.”320 The ripple effects of these also affect the areas of 
drought causing famine in many sub-Saharan countries. The issue of social justice is 
raised here: where in one part of the world people and animal lives are loss because of 
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hunger while in another part of the same planet people are obese due to over eating, 
with a dominant throw-away culture.  
Therefore, ecological-justice calls for respect for and proper use of mother 
earth. It calls present generations to become more conscious of generations yet unborn 
for their sustainability. To this end the Encyclical Letter of Pope Paul VI Populorum 
Progressio reiterates this fact:  
We are the heirs of earlier generations, and we reap benefits from the 
efforts of our contemporaries; we are under obligation to all men. 
Therefore we cannot disregard the welfare of those who will come after 
us to increase the human family. The reality of human solidarity brings 
us not only benefits but also obligations.321 
 
It also challenges a pattern of thought process and initiatives as to the awareness of the 
deeper crisis of environment. “Ecological-justice” as a virtue enhances the quality of 
every human life and the conservation of Mother Nature. 
   5.6.2.2 “Ecological-Love” 
 
One of the general principles of eco-theology today is to draw a link between religion 
and nature or rather ethics and cosmology.322 It means we seek to understand nature 
through theological-ethics. Robert Fancy in an article “The Exploitation of Nature and 
Teilhard’s Ecotheology of Love,” explains how Teilhard de Chardin works out a 
theology of Jesus Christ that is centered on Ecotheology of love.323 Barnette is more 
precise when he argues: “The norm of an Eco-ethic is love or otherwise called 
Agape”.324 Agape as used in this context means:  
To will the welfare of all living creatures and things. It is grounded in 
God, whose being is love (1 John 4:8); and it extends, as does God’s 
love, to the whole creation . . . Love constrains us not only to will the 
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welfare of our neighbour, but also to preserve and promote the kind of 
environment that maximizes the possibility of full selfhood for each.325 
 
Consequently, nature must be treated with love because it is God’s creative work of 
love. Also it is a platform for a fuller realization of all human potentials.  
 “Ecological-love” illustrates the interdependence between humanity and nature 
that has long existed. According to Barnette: “Both biblical and biological views of 
nature see the interconnection and interdependence of man and his environment. Man 
is intrinsically related to nature that when he sins against God, nature suffers; and when 
he obeys God, nature rejoices.”326 For example the disobedience of Israel always 
brought down the wrath of God even on nature, seen in the lack of rain which causes 
drought and consequently starvation (cf. 1 Kings 18). Prophet Isaiah captures this in 
24: 1-6:  
Now the LORD is about to lay waste the earth and make it desolate, 
and he will twist its surface and scatter its inhabitants. And it shall be, 
as with the people, so with the priest; as with the slave, so with his 
master; as with the maid, so with her mistress; as with the buyer, so 
with the seller; as with the lender, so with the borrower; as with the 
creditor, so with the debtor. The earth shall be utterly laid waste and 
utterly despoiled; for the LORD has spoken this word. The earth dries 
up and withers, the world languishes and withers; the heavens 
languish together with the earth. The earth lies polluted under its 
inhabitants; for they have transgressed laws, violated the statutes, 
broken the everlasting covenant. Therefore a curse devours the earth 
and its inhabitants suffer for their guilt; therefore the inhabitants of the 
earth dwindled and few people are left. 
 
The deuteronomistic-historian expresses the same idea in Deuteronomy 28:1-14 more 
profoundly. Pope Francis further details the consequences of a ruptured relationship: 
“Disregard for the duty to cultivate and maintain a proper relationship with my 
neighbour, for whose care and custody I am responsible, ruins my relationship with my 
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own self, with others, with God and with the earth.”327 This shows cyclical connection 
between creation, humanity’s actions and consequences.  
 The concept of ecological-love here used is intended to emphasize the 
appreciation of the spirituality of the earth which is a combination of both Christian 
community through historical heavenly Jerusalem and the journey of primordial matter 
in the earth.328 It means whatever way one looks at nature either as an evolutionary 
process or created matter in theology, humanity has to see beyond the exploitation of 
the earth. Its sacramentality has to be realized. 
 Since we are arguing from the standpoint of theology, God remains the telos of 
the Christian moral life. Similarly, he remains the telos of created things. Humanity 
may have been given the authority to use the goods of the earth, yet God remains its 
telos. Therefore, our understanding of the God of love should impact on our use of 
earth resources. To this end, T. S. Eliot observes: “A wrong attitude towards nature 
implies, somewhere, a wrong attitude towards God, and the consequence is an 
inevitable doom.”329 This is not to imply that nature is equated with God in the 
Pantheist conception, but rather in the sense that God is involved as creator and 
sustainer of the universe. 330  Ecological-love consequently enables people to see 
themselves as “co-creators” with God and as tenants and stewards of the universe as 
well. 
 This approach is not uncomplicated. According to Northcott, there is the 
tendency for humanity to turn our control or stewardship of the earth into replacement 
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for God and we end up worshipping the creature instead of the Creator.331 This is not to 
place man side by side with God but used in a sense of enhancing the original created 
work of God. 
 Therefore, the love of God should serve as the basic foundation to our love of 
nature because “idolatry-of technology, of consumer goods, of human control and 
corporate power- is at the heart of the collective and individual sins that constitute the 
environmental crisis”.332 And James Nash in Loving Nature: Ecological Integrity and 
Christian Responsibility argues that we are called to love creation, because we share 
with creation in the restoration that is promised us in and through God’s work of 
redemption in Christ.333 In conclusion we hold: 
Envisaging the human relation to nature in terms of love has profound 
implications for the modern social form; for the cost-benefit calculus 
that insures that billions of animals every year are imprisoned in cruel 
and valueless life to provide cheap protein for humans; for the corporate 
and intergovernmental calculus that sets as a price for international debt 
repayment the systematic clear-cutting of ancient forest and 
environmental exclusion of peasant farmers and tribal peoples from 
their ancestral lands.334 
 
Therefore: “ We can hardly consider ourselves to be fully loving if we disregard any 
aspect of reality: ‘Peace, justice and the preservation of creation are three absolutely 
interconnected themes, which cannot be separated.”335 
   5.6.2.3 “Ecological-Prudence” 
The Yahwistic narrative of creation in Gen. 2:4b-25 presents humanity not as mere 
explorers who dominate the earth as expressed in the priestly narrative of Gen 1:26 but 
rather as keepers and custodians of the earth: “The Lord God took the man and put him 
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in the garden of Eden to till it and keep it” (Gen. 2:15). This verse shows that man was 
and is given a task “to till and keep it”. The two Hebrew words used in this verse are 
abad and shamar. Abad is the root word for other words related to service. It can be 
used either as a noun or a verb. As a noun it refers to a servant and as a verb it means 
“to serve”. While shamar means to protect or keep. There are other couplets that 
resonate with abad and shamar; serve and preserve, enhance and protect.336 According 
to Pope Francis tilling and keeping “implies a relationship of mutual responsibility 
between human beings and nature.”337 While nature provides our needs we too must 
preserve nature. 
Therefore, man is given the task to improve his environment as well as protect 
it from waste and depletion. By implication corporal or material exertion is not enough 
but humanity will need the ability to exercise their powers of right judgment which we 
here call ecological-prudence in order to “keep and till” the earth. It means that modern 
human knowledge based on scientific investigations about the earth should enable us 
know the workings of nature and use them not for our selfish interest but for the good 
of nature itself and posterity.338 And “a fragile world entrusted by God to human care, 
challenges us to devise intelligent ways of directing, developing and limiting our 
power”.339  
Our task to cultivate and keep the earth should not in any way make humanity 
attempt to supplant God with the creature as explicit Renaissance humanism 
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portrayed.340 This extreme is further cautioned by C. F. D. Moule in Man and Nature 
in the New Testament:  
Man is placed in the world by God to be its Lord. He is meant to have 
dominion over it and to use it . . . but only for God’s sake, only Adam 
in paradise, cultivating it for the Lord. As soon as he begins to use it 
selfishly, and reaches out to take fruit which is forbidden by the Lord, 
instantly the ecological balance is upset and nature begins to groan.341 
 
 
Consequently, there is a need for ecological-prudence in the use of resources. This is to 
create the proper ecological balance as intended by its creator and also the sake of 
generation yet unborn. To this end, Pope Benedict insists:  
Humanity today is rightly concerned about the ecological balance of 
tomorrow. It is important for assessments in this regard to be carried out 
prudently, in dialogue with experts and people of wisdom, uninhibited 
by ideological pressure to draw nasty conclusions, and above all with 
the aim of reaching agreement on a model of sustainable development 
capable of ensuring the well-being of all while respecting 
environmental balances. If the protection of the environment involves 
cost, they should be justly, distributed, taking due account of the 
different levels of development of various countries and the need for 
solidarity with future generations.342 
 
Ecological-prudence has various ramifications: First we have to take 
responsibility over our mismanagement of the resources of the earth. Taking 
responsibility expresses the awareness of where we are and how our actions have 
impacted negatively on the earth. Sadly, taking this responsibility lacks leadership on 
the one hand and on the other hand vitiated by certain economic powers as noted by 
Pope Francis. He writes:  
Economic powers continue to justify the current global system where 
priority tends to be given to speculation and the pursuit of financial 
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gain, which fail to take the context into account, let alone the effects on 
human dignity and the natural environment. Here we see how 
environmental deterioration and human and ethical degradation are 
closely linked. Many people will deny doing anything wrong because 
distractions constantly dull our consciousness of just how limited and 
finite our world really is. As a result, ‘whatever is fragile, like the 
environment, is defenceless before the interests of a deified market, 
which become the only rule.343 
  
However, we appreciate the little vestiges of steps taking by president Obama in trying 
to reduce green house gasses in America.  
Second, concerted efforts by taking the right decisions on how to use the goods 
of the earth, and how to equally protect it: “It means being committed to making joint 
decisions, decisions aimed at strengthening that covenant between human beings and 
environment.”344 Third, the awareness that the depletion of earth resources causes 
untold hardship to millions around the world. MadHav Gadgil in an article “Cultural 
Evolution of Ecological Prudence” captures:  
The imperative of survival for the poor of the Third World countries 
whose very existence is threatened by the rapid depletion of the natural 
resource base on which they depend for many of their basic necessities. 
The dawning of this amongst the majority of the world’s human 
population will perhaps ultimately lead to the re-establishment of . . . 
ecological prudence in the modern world.345 
  
 Summarily, all human activity in the earth should not be driven towards 
transcending mother nature but understanding the limited context within which the 
earth has been given to us to till and keep. Considering the challenges which the world 
faces today, it is pertinent that the virtues of ecological- justice, ecological-love and 
ecological-prudence should resonate with contemporary project of scientific-
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technological breakthroughs not from the context of dominance but forming a culture 
of interaction and interdependence.  
 
5. 7 Concluding Remarks 
The central thrust of this chapter has been to compare and contrast the teachings of 
Cessario, Keenan, and Kotva on virtue ethics based on their traditions and particular 
themes. We started this chapter by legitimizing the concept of commensurability. This 
enabled us to further articulate how each of the scholars under study is influenced by 
his tradition. Our study has substantially affirmed the observations made by Kerr that 
there are indeed different versions of Aquinas. Accordingly, the various interpretations 
of Aquinas bring up more theological and hermeneutical problems. For example, Karl 
Barth theology may look at Aquinas from a protestant lens that may not be justifying to 
a Catholic or Aquinas himself. Also there may be philosophical development that are 
non-Christian but may reject Aquinas’ Christian perspective.346 Hence, Kerr concludes: 
“Sometimes this or that interpretation must be regarded as simply mistaken”.347  
 Therefore, identifying Cessario, Keenan, and Kotva within a tradition has 
enabled us not only to encase within a common factor but further recognized their 
differences both within the same tradition and variances in approaches, methodology 
and theologizing. More importantly, it has shown us on the one hand the different 
strands within a particular tradition and on the other hand the interactions or dialogue 
between different theological traditions. 
 This chapter has also shown that the human person is central in any moral 
inquiry but particularly in virtue ethics. It proposes an understanding of the human 
person that takes into consideration Erickson’s  three views: substantive, relational, and 
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functional. In considering them together, one will suggest that the substantive view 
which is essentially more theologically based should serve as a linkage between the 
relational and functional views, with virtue ethics as an intrinsic cartilage.  
 This chapter also forms part of the re-appraisal of virtue ethics to refute the 
narcissistic charge. Hence, this chapter appealed to a more relational-oriented approach 
by highlighting the relational value within virtue ethics. However, a more systematic 
approach is needed to further elucidate the social networking within virtue ethics to 
make it a more credible normative principle. We propose here therefore, a more 
engaging and a more in-depth inter-disciplinary inquiry into field of ecology. A 
comprehensive narrative of relational value of virtue ethics must take this into account. 
This is imperative because: “We have lost the contact with the earth and its rhythms 
that our ancestors had. We have lost contact with ourselves, and our own natural being, 
and are driven by an imperative of domination that condemns us to ceaseless battle 
against nature both within and around us.”348 This thesis therefore proposes a change in 
ideological and epistemological perceptions that warp our understanding and use of the 
earth.349  
Therefore, we further propose the need of a Christian theology that is less 
anthropocentric but stresses a concrete relationship between God, us and our 
environment.350 For “our relationship with the environment can never be isolated from 
our relationship with others and with God. Otherwise, it would be nothing more than 
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romantic individualism dressed up in ecological garb, locking us into a stifling 
immanence.”351 At the same time all ecological approaches must take into account the 
value of the human person. Pope Francis in Laudato Si’ calls this “integral ecology”.352 
For this to be achievable the roles of ethicists, environmentalist, and scientists must be 
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5.8 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Salie McFague in Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language 
writes that the: “Dominant model of Christianity is a personal, relational one: the 
Divine and the human have been envisioned in terms of responsible interaction”.1 The 
preponderance of Christian virtue ethics furthers the course of a model that is both 
personal and relational. Our commitment in this thesis was to advance a relational 
understanding of virtue ethics through a conversation with three theologians, 
Romanus Cessario, James F. Keenan, and Joseph J. Kotva Jnr. It sought to do two 
things: Firstly, to present the salient positions of our interlocutors insofar as they 
relate to the theme of our study. Secondly, to carry out a comparative reading of their 
ideas by showing the degree of convergence and divergence, and perhaps uncover 
problem(s) and point to a supplementary way of going forward. As this study has 
navigated through these two goals, it is appropriate to here summarize the 
proceedings so far and also offer some concluding remarks. 
 The historical background to the entire study was presented in chapter one. 
This chapter began by reading backwards by identifying the reasons for the eclipse of 
virtue within the history of moral theology and the need for the retrieval of virtue in 
the current philosophical and theological landscape. The historical-intellectual 
tradition this thesis followed was the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition because the 
account of virtues by this tradition is more systematic and encompassing. The 
influence of such tradition is the pioneering works of Elizabeth Anscombe and later 
on Alasdair MacIntyre and even on present Aristotelian-Thomist philosophers and 
theologians. The challenge for contemporary theologians to appropriately 
contextualize the language and theology of virtue in other areas still remains. 
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 The three chapters that followed positioned Cessario, Keenan, and Kotva as 
our conversation companions. Beginning with a brief biographical data, they were 
situated within a general moral landscape and placed within a particular theological 
tradition: Cessario as ressourcement Thomist, Keenan as revisionist-Thomist, and 
Kotva as Neo-Aristotelian and Reformed Tradition. This enabled us to understand the 
development and application of their ideas on virtue based on the selected themes that 
relate to the general subject of this thesis.  
 Chapter five was a comparative reading drawing upon particular themes 
offered in preceding chapters. It began by justifying importance of a comparative 
study. It then showed how the theological tradition of each of the theologians impacts 
on their various styles and approaches on the virtues. Through a selection of particular 
themes which I considered encompassing, the thesis looked at the convergences and 
divergences. Some of the divergences may not have offered a complete contrast in 
notions but rather are a shift in emphasis. However, based on the general theme of our 
study a huge gap was noted namely, the non-recognition of our extensive relationality 
with the world of nature. The thesis offered a way forward by proposing three 
ecological virtues of “ecological-justice”, “ecological-love”, and “ecological-
Prudence”. This thesis does not claim that the proposed list is exhaustive. For 
example Laura Ruth Yordy in Green Witness: Ecology, Ethics, and the Kingdom of 
God also proposes the ecological virtue of Patience.2 
 While this thesis at a general level defends the relevance of virtue ethics, at a 
particular level I wish to take a stand on the three theorists based on their traditions. 
Although, I appreciate the theological and academic rigors of Kotva from the 
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Reformed tradition with a correlational model, however I am more drawn to the 
approaches of Cessario as a ressourcement Thomist and Keenan as a revisionist 
Thomist for the following reasons. 
 Firstly, since after Vatican II Church renewal has prominently come through 
ressourcement as a method. Retrospectively, ressourcement seeks meaning from 
primary sources of revealed truth which offers readers the opportunity to dialogue 
with narratives of the past. This will help situate the appropriate readings within a 
concept of continuity and growth in theology. In this sense, I will call it a neo-patristic 
approach- a going forward by looking backwards to the patristic Fathers. Perhaps, 
such a link with the past is a panacea against liberal or so-called progressivists and 
simplistic narratives of contemporary era especially within moral theology. It should 
be noted that the inspiration for such an approach to theology is more pastoral than 
academic.  Cessario displays such a motivation towards theology via virtue ethics. 
The rich resource in such a tradition should be explored more deeply by theologians. 
 Secondly, revisionism which seeks to further the renewal of moral theology 
cannot be dismissed either.3 It rejects the manualist tradition with its proclivity 
towards rigorism. It aims at entering into dialogue with contemporary society and 
ethics while integrating the broader vision of theology. Keenan’s revisionist approach 
is foundationally relational and so it is important in of stimulating virtue ethics in 
many directions: sexuality, gender ethics, bio-ethics etc. Revisionism can facilitate 
theological innovation especially on topical issues.    
 There is the temptation to presume that ressourcement and revisionism are 
polemical. But I posit that they do not stand in utter contrast to each other. As a point 
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for further study I suggest that a dialogue between these two traditions should be 
enhanced especially within moral theology. This is with a view to reducing the 
extremes of rigorism on the one hand and liberalism on the other hand. It will 
inevitably create a synthesis of moral theology that is encompassing and can relate to 
people of different eras.  
Based on the core theme of our study, relational value of virtues, I wish to 
make some general suppositions to justify the above position. Firstly, the human 
person is dialogical in nature. It means that no human person can come into existence, 
through the processing of life and achieve self-understanding without what George 
Mead calls “significant others”.4 This point is captured in Mead’s model of society in 
which an individual is related to the social process as bodily parts are related to 
bodies:  
The self is something which has a development; it is not initially there, 
at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that 
is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that 
process as a whole and to other individuals within that process.5 
 
The same can be said of virtue ethics. As individuals we can hold an opinion about 
particular non-moral issues like the kind of sports we enjoy, the kind of cars we 
choose to drive. These may have no moral significance. But no one can stand-alone 
when it involves overarching subjects of identity, formation of character or habits 
which are principal aspects of virtue ethics. In this context, developing and sustaining 
a virtuous life is not narcissistic but in dialogue with “significant others” who could 
be our parents, siblings, and friends.6 This dialogue continues all through human life 
and can take different forms. 
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 Secondly, to say that a person is self-centered is to hold that such a person is 
motivated by his or her own moral values with no reference to normative principles or 
faith beliefs. The same cannot be said of virtue ethics. This is because a virtuous 
person is guided by basic general principles of natural law and characteristic faith 
based principles which are summed up in acquired and infused virtues. In this sense 
the virtuous person is concerned with issues that transcend the self be they religious, 
political, epistemological or historical.7 For example a hermit is drawn to his lover 
namely God. He may be considered selfish but he is drawn by something that 
transcends him and in this case it is God.  
Thirdly, virtue ethics may be considered egoistic only when viewed 
independent of human actions or practices. However, actions of the virtuous 
individual like magnanimity, forgiveness, sincerity, and empathy are always extended 
to others. We cannot isolate the virtuous person from his or her practices that are 
always relational. In this sense the virtuous person celebrates friendship. However, 
the concept of friendship within virtue ethics needs further development.  
Therefore, the entire arena of virtue ethics highlights the importance of social 
existence. Our relational nature as beings becomes the central locus of self-
understanding and growth within the context of the common good. It means that to 
desire to be this kind of a person through internalized qualities is to recognise and 
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